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*Indian  
Philosophical  
Quarterly*

VOL XXX NUMBER 1	CONTENTS	JANUARY 2003
SYED A. SYEED	: Cross-Cultural Rationality	1
R. C. SINHA	: The Interface of Swadeshi Culture and Technological society	45
H. S. PRASAD	: The Buddhist Foundation of Morality, Universal Culture and Social Ethics	57
J. B. PARANJPE	: Dance of The Signifiers	79
SIBY K. GEORGE	: Nihilism in Heidegger's Being and Time	91
SARBANI BANARJEE	: Theory of Nyāya : Some Observations	103
ABHA SINGH	: Nagarjuna on The Concept of Morality	111
RAGHUNATH GHOSH	: A Logical Illumination of Syadvada	119
SUMAN MEHTA	: Thinking - A Polymorphous Concept	127
<b>Book Reviews</b>		
I) SHRINIVAS RAO	: <i>Dharmakīrti's Santāna and Santā- nāntara</i> by Mangala Chinchore	137

II) N. G. Kulkarni : *Aniccatā/Anityatā* 140  
by Mangala Chinchore

III) S. V. Bokil : *Anattā/Anāmatā* 146  
by Mangala Chinchore

**Indian  
Philosophical  
Quarterly**

**VOL. XXX  
NUMBER 2**

**CONTENTS**

**APRIL 2003**

JOHN-MICHAEL KUCZYNSKI :	Is There Non-Epistemic Vagueness?	153
SREEKALA M. NAIR :	Reformulation of The JTB Account - An Evaluation	177
A. KANTHAMANI :	Does Verbalising Across Cultures Embody Quinean Multiculturalism?	199
RISHI KANT PANDEY :	How Performatives Exactly Work	219
K. SRINIVAS :	The Argument from Illusion	237
GAYATRI MITRA :	Alienation and Philosophical Ideas of Rabindranath Tagore	251
R. K. GUPTA :	Gandhi on Conversion	263
BINDU PURI :	Hinduism - A Legacy in Dispute - Savarkar and Gandhi	271
SEBASTIAN J. CARRI :	Ahimsā and Indian Secularism	291

**Book Reviews**

I) AMITABH GUPTA :	<i>Human Cognition : A Multidisciplinary Perspective</i>	327
II) S. V. Bokil :	<i>Illocutionary Acts and Sentence Meaning</i>	347

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Indian  
Philosophical  
Quarterly

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VOL. XXX NUMBER 3	CONTENTS	JULY 2003
----------------------	----------	-----------

---

SURESH CHANDRA	: Nature of the Subject that owns states of Consciousness	357
K. CHENCHULAKSHMI	: Emergent Evolution and Ārambhavāda - A Comparison	371
PRABHAT MISRA	: Role of Psychosis (Vṛttī) in Advaita Psychology of Perception	379
JAYDEB JENA	: Is Faris' Derivation of 'If P then Q' from 'P $\supset$ Q' Tenable?	401
D. N. TIWARI	: Ontological Non-being (Abhāva) vs. Philosophical Being [Indian Context]	411
JAGAT PAL	: Sterba on Reconciling Anthropocentric With Non-Anthropocentric ethics	443
DILIPKUMAR MOHANTA	: A Note on Sañjaya's Amarāvikṣepavāda	453

**Book Reviews :**

I) RANJAN K. PANDA	: <i>Recent Developments in Analytic Philosophy</i> , by R. C. Pradhan	459
II) K. Bagchi	: <i>Value Perspectives in Indian Philosophy</i> by Bijayananda Kar	470

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*Indian  
Philosophical  
Quarterly*

**VOL. XXX  
NUMBER 4**

**CONTENTS**

**OCT 2003**

WILLIAM SWEET	: Cultural Integrity and Liberty Rights	479
S. PANNEERASELVAM	: Gadamer's Critique of Heidegger's Hermeneutics of Facticity	495
ASHA MUKHERJEE	: Civil Society : A Transpositional Understanding	509
G. VEDAPARAYANA	: The Conditioned and the Unconditioned Mind - J. Krishnamurti's Perspective	525
RAGHUNATH GHOSH	: The Āvirbhāva and Tirobhāva Theory in Vallabha Vedānta : Some Philosophical Problems	553
A. D. NAIK	: Ontological Argument	563
AMIT KUMAR SEN	: Inference : Dharmakīrti and Hempel	569
SANTOSH KUMAR PAL	: A Critical Analysis of Sartre's Existential Humanism	575
ARPANA DHAR DAS	: Ethical Responsibility Towards Environmental Degradation	587

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**S. V. Bokil**  
*Chief Editor,*

## CROSS-CULTURAL RATIONALITY

SYED A. SAYEED

The decisive issue for any relativist thesis is the relativity of rationality. In the final analysis, no defence of relativism is worth the trouble if it has to give in on the question of the relativity of reason. It is, I think, a recognition of this fact that constitutes the theoretical impulse behind Peter Winch's well-known article 'Understanding a Primitive Society'.<sup>1</sup> In this article Winch takes Evans-Pritchard's Famous Study<sup>2</sup> of witchcraft among the Azande tribe as the basis of his discussion and argues against Evans-Pritchard that we cannot declare the Azande beliefs and attitudes with regard to witchcraft and oracles irrational on the grounds that they are full of what appear to be flagrant contradictions. In his article titled 'Rationality'<sup>3</sup> Charles Taylor has taken the stand that while Winch is correct in refusing to describe the Azande beliefs as irrational, he is mistaken in implying that we cannot compare the Azande system of beliefs with other belief-systems and judge the relative superiority or inferiority of their standards of rationality. This claim of Taylor involves a number of issues which are as relevant today as they were when Taylor wrote his article nearly two decades ago, not only to the question of cross-cultural rationality but also to the larger question about the possibility of a version of relativism that can offer an alternative to hegemonic and totalising absolutism without itself lapsing into an irrationalist sort of subjectivism. This fact, in my view, makes Taylor's response to Winch an ideal background for discussing these issues, without clarity on which, the relativism-absolutism debate is likely to remain the confused impasse that it has been for quite sometime now. So, to discuss a few of what I believe to be the central issues in this debate, I have followed the following procedure in this article : I have

*Indian Philosophical Quarterly* XXX No 1  
January 2003

recapitulated Taylor's arguments at some length but in such a way as to throw the main issues into relief, and discussed some of them with reference to his views. Then I have discussed some of the remaining issues in a somewhat broader context, for which I have made use of a crucial concept developed by Ian Hacking.

## I

### Theoretical and Atheoretical Cultures

Taylor begins his article by asking if we can understand rationality purely in terms of the notion of consistency. He answers that while the notion of consistency plays a significant role in determining rationality, our notion of rationality is actually richer than mere conformity to the formal requirement of consistency. He suggests that this fact becomes clear when we raise the question whether there are standards of rationality which are valid across cultures. It is in this context that he discusses Peter Winch's article. Very briefly, this is the gist of Winch's article: Evans-Pritchard had observed in his study of the Azande tribe that in their beliefs about witchcraft, the members of this tribe were flagrantly self-contradictory. On one hand they believed that there was a witchcraft substance which could be found in the intestines of witches. On the other hand, when a post-mortem examination of the intestines of the suspects conclusively demonstrated the absence of any such substance, instead of conceding that the suspect in question was not a witch, they continued to treat the question whether or not the suspect was a witch as an open one. On the basis of this inconsistent attitude, Evans-Pritchard had argued that the Azande tribe were irrational. In his article Winch rejected this conclusion by arguing that the basis on which the charge of irrationality rested involved the altogether mistaken assumption that Azande notions of witchcraft constituted a theoretical system in terms of which they were trying to gain a quasi-scientific understanding of the world. It is certainly correct that consistency is a primary requirement in the construction of theoretical systems. But the Azande, argued Winch, were not even attempting to construct a theoretical system. They were not playing that language game at all. So, to accuse them of irrationality would be analytically misguided and even morally wrong. The basic mistake here, according to Winch, is that we are trying to judge atheoretical cultures with the criteria of theoretical cultures,

not realising that they cannot be compared with regard to standards of rationality.

Taylor's position is that although Winch is generally right in his refusal to go along with Evans-Pritchard in calling the Azande irrational, the final conclusion he (Winch) draws that two cultures cannot be compared and judged as to their rationality on the basis of such comparison is mistaken. Why?

According to Taylor, we typically tend to make two opposite kinds of mistakes in such matters: Either we straight away assume that the culture being studied has a tradition of theoretical understanding and that the practice or belief in question is part of an attempt at such theoretical understanding, and finding that it involves contradictions, conclude that that particular belief or practice and by extension the entire culture is irrational; or we try to defend that culture by explaining that particular practice in terms of a framework other than that of theoretical understanding such as the symbolic or expressive frameworks where contradiction does not matter. In the case of the Azande, Evans-Pritchard makes the first kind of mistake while Winch makes the latter mistake. From the fact that the Azande do not seem to be perturbed when confronted with contradictions, Winch draws the inference that witchcraft (in the Azande culture) belongs to the (atheoretical) domain of symbolic or expressive practice. On the basis of this inference he argues that we should not consider the Azande tribe irrational since it is wrong to judge an atheoretical culture with the standards of a theoretical culture. The activities engaged in are different and it would be wrong to assess them according to identical criteria.<sup>4</sup> If, for instance, we try to understand magic as a sort of proto-technology -- a less effective, pre-scientific attempt to gain control over Nature, and evaluate it according to the criteria of modern science and technology, it is bound to appear ridiculously inefficient and downright irrational. But this, Winch says, proves nothing. We must always consider the possibility, in fact the likelihood, that magic is not a proto- or infantile technology, but an altogether different sort of activity with aims that have nothing to do with control of Nature. They may, for instance, constitute forms of expression intended as reflective frameworks that would facilitate

a deeper understanding and a more tranquil acceptance of the vicissitudes of life. In ignoring that possibility we would be violating a fundamental principle of the study of human action which says that human action must be understood, at least initially, on its own terms.

This view of Winch, as we can see, involves a thesis of incommensurability. The central, though implicit, question here would be whether there are common standards of rationality applicable to incommensurable paradigms. Evans-Pritchard seems to hold that they do while Peter Winch would appear to maintain that they don't. Taylor, however, feels that matters are far from being so simple as Winch's view implies.

Evans-Pritchards' view is that the ability -- and more pertinently the willingness -- to negotiate contradictions is the hallmark of rationality in all circumstances. For Peter Winch, on the other hand, logical consistency is relevant only in the context of theoretical understanding. Taylor feels that Winch is perhaps a little rash in deciding that the principle of consistency need not constrain Azande beliefs. He argues that it is perfectly possible that the Azande care very much about contradictions but have different ways of ironing out the inconsistencies of their belief-system. That is, they might have a different set of assumptions as to what should count as an exception, which situations should be treated as constituting extenuating circumstances and so on -- assumptions which would become explicit and operative if their framework were to be extended in the direction of theoretical understanding. The fact that a culture does not have a tradition of theoretical understanding does not necessarily mean that they would tolerate contradictions. However, according to Taylor, there is another point which is a great deal more important than this one. It is to do with the fact that in making the assertion that a certain culture does not have a theoretical tradition, we are assuming that the theoretical-atheoretical dichotomy is universal and applicable to all cultures.

Winch's view, as we said, is that the Azande beliefs about witchcraft represent an atheoretical culture which is characterised by the desire to 'express an attitude to contingencies' while the theoretical approach involves the attempt to 'control those contingencies'. Taylor finds this absolute

contrast between the two approaches problematic.<sup>5</sup> He argues that this contrast itself is the product of a very doubtful analogy between the two paradigms-- the Western and the Azande. He points out that Winch himself is aware of this fact and tries to mitigate the dichotomy by suggesting that there is an expressive relation *in addition* to the controlling relation which is ignored by the Western anthropologist.<sup>6</sup> But, Taylor argues, once you allow the pragmatic-symbolic, manipulative-expressive dichotomy as applicable at a trans-cultural level, it matters little in terms of what permutations of the pragmatic and the symbolic you describe a culture. The very acceptance of this dichotomy constitutes an insufficiently radical critique of ethnocentricity.<sup>7</sup> This and other such dichotomies are a part of the Western paradigm and are the consequence of the transition from premodern to modern science in the seventeenth century which involved the purging of the symbolic and expressive dimensions from the scientific enterprise. Therefore, to transpose this dichotomy to other cultures and explain them in terms of some type of contrast or combination of the two terms of this dichotomy, is to fail to understand the depth of the incommensurability involved. However, Taylor gives a peculiar twist to his argument at this point and argues that *contra* Winch, incommensurability, far from being an obstacle to comparison, in fact constitutes the condition of its possibility. But before discussing this very interesting claim, there is another point which I wish to discuss. This concerns the specific content that Taylor tries to give to the substantive dimension of rationality, which is supposed to provide the basis for a comparative judgement of standards of rationality of different cultures.

In the course of explaining why universality cannot be accorded to the theoretical-atheoretical divide, Taylor traces the origin of the tradition of theoretical understanding and explains what it actually means. According to him, theoretical understanding aims at a disengaged perspective. In theoretical understanding we do not try to understand phenomena in terms of how they impinge on our lives, but as they are in themselves. (The fact that such a disinterested knowledge yields consequences which impinge on our lives in many ways does not alter the fact that any interest in those consequences does not primarily orient the enterprise of theoretical understanding.) Tracing the origin of this paradigm to Classical philosophy,

Taylor points out that according to Plato in the *Republic*, to have real knowledge of something is to be able to 'give an account' of it.<sup>8</sup> On this basis he argues that the notion of 'articulation' which is linked to the concept of rationality in Western philosophical discourse would be central to theoretical understanding, since where theoretical understanding is applicable, the best articulation comes from a disengaged perspective. In other words, 'the demands of rationality are to go for theoretical understanding where this is possible'.<sup>9</sup> Consequently, in European culture, theoretical understanding represents the manifestation of rationality. This means that there is a substantive dimension of rationality which progresses ineluctably in the direction of an increasing theoretical understanding. In other words, theoretical understanding is the *telos* of substantive rationality, in contrast to the requirement of consistency which characterises formal rationality. But what would be the *telos* of substantive rationality in those domains of a paradigm which are not amenable to theoretical understanding? It cannot be consistency since as I pointed out earlier, for Taylor consistency is a formal criterion which, while applicable to all paradigms, is an internal criterion in the sense that it can be applied only to assess the coherence of relations between the different elements of a paradigm. Taylor's statement that it is the set of 'human activities of articulation which give the value of rationality its sense',<sup>10</sup> seems to imply that there are modes of articulation applicable to the nontheroetical domains and which serve as the criteria of their rationality. By extension he seems to suggest that it is on the basis of the standards of articulation that different cultures can be compared as to their level of rationality. But how are the standards of articulation to be evaluated? What are the criteria that define the degree of success achieved in articulating reality? It turns out that they are nothing other than the extent of understanding of the natural world as measured by the predictive and manipulative ability rendered by it. But is this not a criterion internal to modern science? Taking the example of the science of High Renaissance and the modern science initiated by Galileo and others, Taylor argues that it is not. He concedes that the Renaissance sage may have valued, say wisdom, above manipulative ability and measured his science with that standard. But, according to Taylor, we cannot set aside the tremendous technological spin-off generated by modern science because

greater control over Nature is a necessary part of the objectives of any science. In other words, knowledge and understanding provide recipes for action, and better knowledge provides better, more efficient recipes for action. Taylor puts this in the form of a crisp equation: there is no scientific advance without increased technological applicability.<sup>11</sup> It must be pointed out, however, that in giving this equation, Taylor shifts the basis of its relevance. At this point in his argument he holds, not that increased technological applicability is the reason why we should prefer modern science to that of high Renaissance, but that increased technological applicability *show* that modern science is superior to the science of High Renaissance. This is, of course, a familiar argument from Realism which argues back from the success of prediction and manipulation to the correctness of the description on which the prediction and the manipulation are based. That there are several serious problems with that argument and that the entire gamut of relativist positions represented by Kuhn, Feyerabend and others are based on a consideration of those problems is something that, I think, Taylor himself would not deny. So I will avoid going into the debates surrounding arguments from Realism, and concentrate on two points which are more pertinent to the issue of rationality. They are 1. The means-ends characterisation of rationality and 2. The relation between relativity of truth and the relativity of rationality.

Taylor's argument that the technological success made possible by modern science testifies to its superior rationality is an application of the view according to which rationality consists in the employment of successful means to achieve desired ends and conversely an irrational person is one who acts flagrantly in violation of his own objectives. That this instrumental view of rationality is a needlessly narrow view is, I think, fairly obvious. By leaving out the rationality of 'ends' out of the picture, it presents not only an impoverished but a distorted idea of the relation of rationality to values. This view, for instance, cannot offer a coherent account of religious beliefs. In any case, since Taylor himself considers this notion of rationality at the beginning of his article but subsumes it under the notion of consistency,<sup>12</sup> he cannot possibly treat employment of successful means which is a derivative of consistency as the substantive dimension of rationality. Moreover, the separation of means and ends is a species of abstraction

that presupposes a theoretical matrix as a context. Therefore, the means-ends relation wouldn't seem to be a very promising candidate for the substantive dimension of rationality. (I am myself inclined to the view that the notion of 'good reasons' is a much more promising candidate, and shall devote a considerable part of section II of this article to defend that view.)

The second point concerns the relation between the relativity of truth and the relativity of rationality. Taylor's argument about the success of modern science confuses between these inseparable but distinct things.<sup>13</sup> Considering modern science as a body of knowledge or a set of theories about the world, and comparing it with, say, the Azande belief-system, we might be able to easily show that the former offers a correct description of the world while the latter does not. But to do this is only to prove that the Azande belief-system is false. It does not amount to proving that the Azande tribe are irrational for believing what is false. For what is at issue is not possible superiority of modern science to the Azande belief-system but the putative superiority of the standards of rationality characteristic of modern science over those of the Azande culture. The bare assertion that modern science shows its superior rationality, firstly by virtue of its valid claim to have achieved a more perspicuous order than premodern science in articulating the natural world and secondly by virtue of the fact that it has provided the means to develop superior tools and weapons, involves an indefensible normative grounding of rationality in knowledge or in the acquisition of some 'objectively' true beliefs.<sup>14</sup> But such an attempt to argue from knowledge to rationality, at best, simply broadens the basis of comparison. It replaces the merely formal, general criterion of consistency with a specific, substantive criterion of knowledge. But this move does not provide us any better means to meet Winch's objection, since what is at issue is whether or not the substantive dimension of rationality is relative.

So, it would seem that on the one hand Taylor agrees with Winch on plurality of standards, and on the other hand insists on universalising the mode of substantive rationality peculiar to modern science and using it as a criterion for evaluating different cultures. However, Taylor doesn't see any inconsistency in his position. According to him the plurality permits comparison because it is a plurality of the incommensurable. He says,

...I entirely agree that we must speak of a plurality of standards. The discourse in which matters are articulated in different societies can be very different, as we can see in the Azande disinterest in explaining away the paradox Evans-Pritchard put to them in witchcraft diagnosis. The standards are different, because they belong to incommensurable activities. But where I want to disagree with Winch is in claiming that plurality doesn't rule out judgements of superiority. I think the kind of plurality we have here, between the incommensurable, precisely opens the door to such judgements.<sup>15</sup>

In other words, cultures are more incommensurable than Winch realised. But contrary to what Winch imagines, their incommensurability far from precluding the possibility of comparison, makes comparison possible. This is the intriguing claim to which I alluded a while ago. Taylor tries to substantiate this claim by introducing a crucial distinction between the 'different' and the 'incommensurable'. If this distinction and the claim based on it are valid, obviously, the very idea of incommensurability will have to be rethought. As is well-known, Thomas Kuhn and those who have followed him have used the notion of incommensurability to argue against the possibility of comparing two paradigms.<sup>16</sup> Taylor, on the contrary, seems to be holding the exact opposite. It is evident that this issue is not only central to Taylor's disagreement with Winch, but is crucial to the entire debate on relativism and therefore worth serious attention.

### **The Different and the Incommensurable**

Taylor suggests that two activities may be different from each other but not incompatible with each other. On the face of it this is a simple enough distinction. There may be two activities which are concerned with two different things. On the other hand there may be two activities which are actually two incompatible ways of doing the same thing. The former do not occupy the same logical space but the latter do. This is the meaning of the assertion that the latter are incommensurable. And precisely because they are incommensurable, they can be compared. The approach of medieval science and that of modern science, for instance, constitute incompatible and hence incommensurable ways of explaining how the world is. The former is grounded in a notion of 'correspondence' between different levels and domains of reality while the latter operates with a totally different

basis for seeking explanation of natural phenomena. And since they constitute incompatible approaches to the same problem, they represent a case of incommensurability and therefore they can be compared.

Taylor argues that the relation between the modern culture and the Azande culture is similar. They are not different but incommensurable. Therefore, while it is wrong to use the same conceptual dichotomies to describe the two, it is a mistake to imagine that they cannot be compared. They can be compared precisely because as incompatible attempts to make sense of the world, they occupy the same logical space. According to Taylor, Winch correctly recognises that primitive magic and modern science, for instance, are not different but incommensurable, but from this fact he draws the quite erroneous conclusion that they cannot be compared and hence no comparative judgements are possible. But,

...incommensurable activities are rivals; their constitutive rules prescribe in contradiction to each other. Only where two activities are simply different is there no question of judging one to be inferior version of the other, and perhaps in some cases of inferior rationality.<sup>17</sup>

It follows that modern scientific culture and the Azande culture can be compared and judged in terms of their standards of rationality. Now, I think this simple looking contrast between 'deference' and 'incommensurability' is unworkable for the simple reason that it is based on a confusion regarding two closely related points: 1. The proper unit of incommensurability and 2. The referentiality of a paradigm.

In brief, firstly, Taylor's distinction depends upon a confusion whether incommensurability is a property of entire cultures (or paradigms or conceptual schemes) or of activities (or beliefs) which constitute a culture.<sup>18</sup> My contention is that this makes considerable difference. Secondly, Taylor does not examine carefully enough the distinction between the way the reference of a paradigm and that of a constituent of a paradigm is determined and the relation this distinction has to the question of incommensurability. Let me elaborate.

Let us take, by way of example, two practices, say, worship and healing. These are two different practices with entirely different objectives. They are not incompatible with each other. There is no reason why they

both should not be done together (or pursued together) simultaneously without any friction. It makes no sense to compare them and judge one of them to be inferior to the other. On the other hand, if we take two different practices of healing, say, modern medicine and faith-healing, they are not different practices in the strict sense but are two versions of the same practice, two incompatible ways of dealing with the same phenomenon and having the same objective which is healing sickness. They are incommensurable in the sense that they cannot be mapped on to each other. They are based on incompatible descriptions of what sickness is and how it can be cured. None of the elements of one can be fixed in a relation of correspondence with those of the other. But, inasmuch as they refer to the same aspect of reality (disease) and have the same general objective (healing), one can meaningfully compare them and judge one of them as inferior to the other in its analysis of illness and its stated objective of healing it.

Now, taking the second point of confusion first, the crucial issue concerns the assertion that the two incommensurable activities are about the same aspect of reality or that they have the same objective. In other words, the question here is as to how precisely we are to understand incommensurability in the context of referentiality. If we can speak of an explanation or theory of a particular phenomenon obtainable in two rival paradigms does it mean that they are not incommensurable, inasmuch as those phenomena (that is, their boundaries) and the criteria of identifying them seem to be common to the two paradigms? If we answer this question in the affirmative, it will have some interesting consequences, one of which will be that if two paradigms are really incommensurable, they cannot be seen to be so. In other words, we cannot meaningfully speak of two demonstrably incommensurable paradigms *and* they are comparable. It is in this context that the fact that in discussing comparability Taylor moves from a particular activity to the paradigm as a whole brings in the question of what is the true unit of incommensurability.

Let me begin this part of the discussion with a quotation from Taylor. He says that

...Incommensurable ways of life seem to raise the question insistently of

who is right. It's hard to avoid this, since anyone seriously practising magic in our society would be considered to have lost his grip on reality, and if he continued impervious to counter-arguments, he would be thought less than fully rational. How do you keep this judgement from extending to the whole way of life in which magic fits?<sup>19</sup>

I think this passage clearly shows the kind of confusion that can arise if we are not sufficiently alert in distinguishing between a paradigm and its elements. Here Taylor first refers to a person practising magic in the modern western society and rightly states how such a person would be considered less than rational. The implication, one assumes (and there is sufficient warrant in Taylor's account for this assumption), is that the irrationality consists in the conflict between the practice of magic and the paradigm embodying the modern western society. But immediately he moves on (in the last sentence of the passage quoted) to the case of a culture of which the practice of magic is an integral element. He does not seem to realise that this is not a valid move. The fact that a certain practice is incongruous in a certain culture and anyone who does not realise that incongruity is less than rational does not justify our extending it to the assertion that if there is a culture in which that practice is not felt to be incongruous, that culture must be regarded as less than rational.<sup>20</sup> What we find here is, in effect, an arbitrary move from an incongruity resulting from a conflict between one element of a culture and its other elements to an incongruity that is the manifestation of the conflict of a culture with something outside that culture.

The important point here is that we appeal to the notion of a paradigm precisely in order to deal with the question whether the fact that in a certain culture a particular belief or practice is considered irrational constitutes sufficient ground for holding that any culture whatsoever in which such a belief or action is permissible must itself be irrational. We should not forget that a paradigm is primarily a frame of reference. The very idea of a paradigm implies that we cannot judge any particular belief or action except with reference to the paradigm of which it is an element. To reject this assumption is to reject the very notion of a paradigm or a conceptual scheme. But Taylor does not seem to be rejecting that idea since he does entertain the concept of incommensurability which is of a piece with the notion of

paradigm. However, the point I wish to make here is that, to invoke the notion of paradigm is to recognise that individual beliefs or practices cannot be compared directly but only through the mediation of frameworks of which they are elements. But the fact that the elements of two frameworks cannot be compared means not that those elements are incommensurable but that the frameworks are incommensurable. It is this distinction that I want to emphasise. But why cannot elements of different frameworks (or paradigms) be incommensurable?

My answer is : Because commensurability is a structural property. By this I mean that commensurability is basically a matter of coincidence of conceptual structures. This implies that it makes no sense to speak of the commensurability or otherwise of two simple elements. Either they are the same or they are different. That's all. We can meaningfully speak only of the commensurability or incommensurability of two complex conceptual units on the basis of the overlap or otherwise of their internal organisation. In other words, it is absurd to talk of the incommensurability of two beliefs or two activities. We can only talk about the incommensurability of two beliefs-systems or two cultures or at the most of two practices insofar as these are complex phenomena comprising several beliefs and activities. Of course, if two activities are sufficiently complex, one can speak of their incommensurability but we can do so only in terms of the coincidence of their respective (internal) conceptual structures.

Now let me connect this to the issue of referentiality. That it is more or less possible to determine the reference of the paradigm as a whole does not mean that the reference of its constituents would be uncomplicated. To take an extreme case for the sake of clarification, the ultimate paradigm would be a worldview in the comprehensive sense of the term. There need be no confusion regarding the referentiality of two such ultimate paradigms for the simple reason that they are both concerned to explain the whole reality -to explain all that exists. On the other hand, referentiality becomes problematic in the context of specific regions within paradigms. When people from two paradigms point in a certain direction, there is no way we can be certain that they are pointing to the same fragment of reality. If the boundaries of that fragment as mapped in each paradigm are

at all coterminous, then the paradigms in question are not, *in that particular conceptual region*, strictly incommensurable.<sup>21</sup> In a pair of significantly incommensurable paradigms coterminous referentiality would be impossible except in a very rough sense. What the proviso granted here means is that there may be coterminous referentiality sufficient for the purposes of knowing that some particular theories or conceptual apparatuses from two paradigms are concerned with roughly the same region of reality. But it would never be exact enough to constitute a strict identification of the phenomenon concerned, leave alone allowing comparative judgements. To revert to the example of healing, we can say that two systems of healing may be concerned with restoring health or removing sickness but this identity is only of a rough sort. In one of the paradigms sickness may mean sickness of the body while in another it may include sickness of the mind or even sickness of the spirit. Similarly in different paradigms the norms of health may differ very drastically: in one paradigm, health may mean health of the body, in another it may mean a certain condition of the entire psychosomatic system, and in another paradigm it may even include the ethical dimension or some other dimension of life that is not even recognised in the other paradigms. In such a case, we cannot speak of the different practices of healing as identical either in their description of a stage of affairs or in their objectives. More particularly, when we come to the constituents of the two systems, such as classification of diseases, their aetiology and so on, their divergence becomes even more pronounced. However, to emphasise the point of more immediate relevance, we must understand that whatever similarity there may be, we cannot contrast it with 'difference' and identify it with 'incommensurability' as Taylor does. Incommensurability is the property of paradigm as a whole. Two paradigms are (to whatever degree) mutually commensurable or incommensurable. Within each of those paradigms there would be constituent elements-specific theories, practices etc. of which we can say that they are concerned with *approximately* the same phenomenon. This sameness is neither identical with incommensurability nor is it a consequence of incommensurability. All that can be said is that, as a rule, there will not be found two different theories about the same thing in the same paradigms and that if there are two different theories about the same sort of things,

they must belong to two different paradigms, and insofar as paradigms are incommensurable with each other, it is not absurd to talk of two conflicting theories about roughly the same phenomenon even though they belong to incommensurable paradigms. But all this leaves the main question here unanswered whether we can compare two activities directly, i.e. without reference to their respective paradigms? The reason why this question remains unanswered is that the difficulty of bringing about a convergence of the reference of two theories about the 'same' phenomenon is actually an index of the degree to which those theories are entrenched in their respective paradigms. That is to say, the notion of a paradigm implies that any concept or theory is an element of a structure and therefore it cannot have isolated reference but rather its referentiality is a function of the entire structure. But Taylor, while making use of the concept of a paradigm, appears to treat referentiality as prior to the structurality of the system that constitutes a paradigm. In order to see whether this move by Taylor is valid we will have to look at how paradigms are structured.

I have tried to bring into focus some of the fundamental, unresolved issues relevant to the problem of relativism using the Winch-Taylor debate, particularly Taylor's response to Winch. I think we can, for heuristic advantage, subsume these issues under the rubric of three broad questions: 1. What is rationality--or more manageably--what is it to be rational? 2. Of what sort of entities is rationality a possible attribute? and 3. Is there a (nontrivial) rationality-invariance between paradigms?

Now, in the rest of this article I shall try to answer these questions without particular reference to Taylor's article. The three questions I have mentioned above are closely related to each other and consequently, although I discuss them more or less separately, there will be many points of overlap. I hope that does not affect the cogency of the arguments I offer.

## II

### Rationality: Beliefs, Practices and Persons

Let me begin with the first question and offer an answer comprising what is perhaps the simplest and least controversial, minimal notion of rationality. *To be rational is simply to have reasons.*<sup>22</sup> However, to say

just 'reasons' is not enough since there can be good or bad reasons, valid or invalid reasons. The problem of rationality is the problem of determining what counts as a good or valid reason. What makes the problem complex and refractory is the fact that it is not easy either to locate the source of the criterial for determining good reasons or to decide their exact status. One of the ways in which this problem can be made a little more manageable is to ask, 'What is it to *have* good reasons?'

So, before proceeding further with the question 'what it is to be rational?', let me bring in the second of the three broad questions I listed above and try to answer it in the light of the minimal notion of rationality with which we have started. The question is : Of what sort of entities is rationality a possible attribute? Or to put it more simply, what sort of things can be rational or irrational? I mean this question, at least to begin with, in a fairly simple sense. For instance, it is obvious that inanimate material objects cannot be rational or irrational.<sup>23</sup> About some other candidates, however, the answer does not seem to be so obvious. I mean such things as facts, beliefs (and sets of beliefs including belief-systems such as cultures and world-views) and practices. Among these, 'facts', although they are probably the most intractable entities--conceptually speaking--philosophers have to deal with, perhaps do not present much of a problem. I think it would be agreed that there are no such things as rational or irrational facts. Facts might be intelligible or unintelligible. But this feature of facts does not warrant us to say that facts are rational or irrational. To invoke the definition with which we started, facts do not have reasons. So, it is not unreasonable to conclude that they cannot be rational or irrational. (For that matter, I do not suppose there is any definition of rationality as per which facts can be argued to be rational or irrational.) Now let us look at 'practices'. Practices seem to be different. We do speak of irrational practices. Moreover, practices would seem to be amenable to the definition we have agreed to. Practices must have reasons. Irrational practices are those which are backed by bad reasons while rational practices are those that have sound reasons behind them. But what is it really to say that a practice has good reasons behind it?<sup>24</sup>

As far as practices are concerned, it is probably not so difficult (as

opposed to beliefs, which I shall come to presently) to sort things out. Practices are deliberate, purposive activities, and to say that a practice has good reasons behind it is to say that it will achieve the purpose intended. But intentions, once again, are entertained only by persons. Strictly speaking, a practice does not have an intention. In other words, if an action  $p$  is such that it leads to the consequence  $q$ , and if I intend  $q$ , I would have good reasons for doing  $p$ . To put it simply, actions have neither purposes nor intentions. To say that an action has purpose is just an elliptical way of saying that the person performing the action intends the consequence that (he believes) would follow from that action. This in turn means that to say that a practice has a good reason behind it is to say that the agent engaged in that practice correctly believes that the consequences intended by him will result from the actions which constitute that practice. Hence, in the strict sense, practices do not have reasons, and consequently, the question of their being rational or irrational does not arise.<sup>25</sup> To say that a certain practice is irrational is just a casual way of saying that the person engaging in that practice does not have good reasons (howsoever those reasons may be determined) for doing so. What I have said does shift the question to beliefs, since the rationality of a practice is a matter of the rationality of the beliefs regarding the efficacy of the practice. But as I shall argue, to talk of the rationality of beliefs is to be no less imprecise.

One does hear a great deal about rational, particularly about irrational beliefs, and by extension about irrational belief-systems and cultures and so on.<sup>26</sup> Superstitions, for instance, are usually defined as irrational beliefs. In fact, most discussions on relativism and related issues one way or the other involve taking a stand about the rationality and irrationality of beliefs. (This is what I was referring to when I said at the beginning of this article that rationality constitutes the decisive issue for relativism). But in precisely what sense are there such things as rational or irrational beliefs? We do of course speak of reasons for belief. It would appear reasonable to say that an irrational belief is one without good reasons for holding it. But certainly, this does not mean that beliefs *have* reasons. *We* have reasons for holding the beliefs. Beliefs are by themselves simply true or false. They are taken (by us) as true or false depending on their relation to facts or on their logical relation to other beliefs whose truth is not in question. To be more

precise, once again, we decide whether they are true or not on the basis of their relation to facts etc. or to be even more exact--on the basis of our perception of their relation to facts, etc. Propositions by themselves do not point to the corresponding facts nor do facts point by themselves to the corresponding propositions. We identify a fact -- and this identification is not always a matter of simply picking one fact from a collection (I will elaborate this point later on) -- as the one corresponding to the propositions under consideration. To put it more simply, beliefs are true or false and they have criteria which determine their truth or falsity. But criteria are applied by us according to certain rules. And rules, as Wittgenstein has pointed out, are not part of the furniture of the world. Nothing comes with a set of rules that are applicable to it. We make the rules and we decide which rules to apply.<sup>27</sup> Which rules are to be applied depends on the context. However, we must be very clear as to what such an assertion means. Contexts are not given. It is not as if its respective context surrounds a fact, a belief or rule like an atmosphere and all we have to do is to refer to it. Nothing exists in a vacuum. But everything has infinite number of overlapping facts surrounding it, standing in some relation to it. Whatever has a relationship with an entity -- no matter how remote the relation -- is an element of its total context. When we talk about contexts what we mean is not that total context but the *relevant* context. But relevance is a matter of selectivity, of decision. However, that decision is in turn, as any decision must, guided by our reasons. So, persons decide whether or not a belief is acceptable on the basis of what they regard as pertinent reasons. In other words, it is persons who have reasons for holding beliefs. To repeat the point, beliefs themselves do not have reasons, and are not therefore, rational or irrational. It is persons who are rational or irrational depending upon whether they hold whatever beliefs they hold for good reasons or in the absence of good reasons. This means that the frequent tendency to identify rationality with holding true beliefs and irrationality with holding false beliefs is largely misguided -- unless we mean 'true' according to the paradigm whose rationality is under consideration. But this qualification would make the statement question begging. In fact, it would be less misleading to assert that the truth of one's belief *as such* has very little to do with one's rationality. It is only the goodness or adequacy

of my reasons that determines my rationality. It is perfectly conceivable that a person may have excellent reasons for holding what turns out to be a false belief. Conversely a person may hold a true belief without a good reason or for altogether wrong reasons. To put it in the terms used in the traditional definition of knowledge as justified true belief, it would be accurate to say that rationality is not a matter of true beliefs but of justified beliefs.<sup>28</sup>

To sum up this part of the discussion, rationality is not an attribute of facts, practices, beliefs or theories. It is an attribute of persons and it has to do with the rightness of the reasons which prompt them to say, believe or do something. Any talk of rational or irrational beliefs and practices is at best a rather misleading short-hand for saying that a person is rational or irrational in connection with those particular beliefs or practices.<sup>29</sup> In other words, for saying that the person has no good reasons for entertaining those beliefs or for engaging in those practices. But what precisely is it to have *good reasons*? To ask this question is to ask what constitutes rationality.

So, once more we return to this central question, but this time fortified, so to speak, with the understanding that rationality is an attribute only of person.

We started with the simple notion that to be rational is to have good reasons. However, I think it needs to be expanded a little and restated: to be rational is to have good reasons for one's total behaviour. What this expanded definition implies is that rationality cannot be determined -- in a significant sense -- by the presence or absence of good reasons for occasional behaviour. It also implies that rationality is not a matter of isolated good reasons, but of an entire network of good reasons. Both these points, I think, are fairly evident any elaboration. However, there is one aspect of the first point which I believe is of some consequence. Let me briefly allude to it.

Although it is not, strictly speaking, incorrect to speak of a person's behaviour being rational or irrational on a particular occasion, rationality, in a nontrivial sense, is a holistic attribute. I mean 'holistic' in the sense in which happiness can be said to be a holistic attribute. I may of course reproach someone with acting irrationally in a certain situation, but in doing

so I am taking his rationality in general for granted. Now the significant aspect of this matter to which I referred above is this: a form of hermeneutic circle is involved in proper judgements of rationality. We make judgements regarding the total behaviour of a person or culture on the basis of our interpretation of the rationality of that person in particular situations. At the same time, we judge the rationality of particular actions only against the backdrop of our assumptions as to the overall rationality of the person. My reason for attaching some significance to this fact is that it shows that judgements of rationality involve interpretation much more than is usually recognised, and more importantly I think this fact points to the appropriateness of a structural account of rationality.

As for my second claim that the notion of isolated good reasons is incoherent and that good reasons must form a network, in a way it follows from the first point. If rationality is to be judged on the basis of total behaviour, then there must be some consistency to the criteria which determine the good reasons appropriate for beliefs and actions on different occasions. What would be the nature of this system of criteria? In other words, what would be the nature of the self-supporting circle of good reasons that constitutes rationality? To answer this question I have found a concept that has been developed by Ian Hacking very helpful. This is the concept of 'styles of reasoning'<sup>30</sup>

### Styles of Reasoning

Ian Hacking remarks the fact that relativists have generally taken recourse to the concept of a paradigm or a conceptual scheme. They have argued that there is no such thing as objective, universal truth; that a proposition is true only relative to the conceptual scheme of which it is a component. This concept of conceptual scheme has been criticised by a number of thinkers such as Davidson as being incoherent.<sup>31</sup> While agreeing with this criticism, Hacking suggests that there is, however, another thing which is a source of epistemic relativity which is quite distinct from a conceptual scheme and which is not vulnerable to the Davidsonian kind of criticism. This other source of epistemic relativity is what he calls a 'style of reasoning'. A style of reasoning is the distinct mode of thinking which

generates new and characteristically different propositions. That is to say, while different conceptual schemes assign different truth-values to the same set of propositions, different styles of reasoning would issue in different sets of positive or truth-value assignable propositions.

Hacking argues that there have been different styles of reasoning in operation, not only in different cultures but at different periods within the same culture. He gives the examples of different styles of reasoning that came into being at different periods within the western scientific tradition: the mathematical reasoning of classical Greece, the experimental approach of Galileo and the statistical method of contemporary social science. Hacking explains in detail the distinction between conceptual schemes and styles of reasoning and the reason why the latter cannot be argued out of court with the arguments generally marshalled by the absolutist. To elaborate this matter a little, Hacking feels that if difference of truth-values is what distinguishes different conceptual schemes, then Davidson's criticism that the very notion of a conceptual scheme positing a dichotomy of a reality and a conceptual scheme through which it is expressed is incoherent since we cannot put ourselves in a position from where we could judge if others have concepts or beliefs different from our own, is valid.<sup>32</sup> But different epistemological traditions, according to Hacking, are not distinguished by different conceptual schemes as much as by different styles of reasoning. And a style of reasoning is characterised by the fact that it does not provide criteria to decide whether a proposition is true or false but *generates propositions which are amenable to being judged true or false*.

This idea of styles of reasoning offers a new ground for relativism. Hacking argues that this form of the relativist thesis is not only invulnerable to Davidsonian criticism, but also has the equally important virtue that it does not lapse into an indefensible kind of subjectivism. Rather it supports a kind of relativism that allows us to continue with our own epistemological tradition or style of reasoning inasmuch as it has proved fecund and looks promising, while respecting other traditions embodying different styles of reasoning. The reason why this form of relativism encourages us to respect other traditions is that it is based on the recognition that it is not possible to make a comparative evaluation of different styles reasoning:

We cannot reason as to whether alternative systems of reasoning are better or worse than ours, because the propositions to which we reason get their sense only from the method of reasoning employed. The propositions have not existence independent of the ways of reasoning towards them.<sup>33</sup>

This concept of styles of reasoning fairly approximates to the dimension of substantive rationality that I am trying to sketch here in contrast to the concept Taylor has developed which consists in successful articulation of reality. I am also in agreement with Hacking on the fundamental character of styles of reasoning as well as on the virtues of the healthy kind of relativism it promotes.<sup>34</sup> However, there are two significant respects in which I find Hacking's account unsatisfactory. First, Hacking does not elaborate on what the structure of a style of reasoning is like. Second, I am inclined to believe that there is more to a style of reasoning than Hacking allows. Regarding the first point, I think that the structure of a style of reasoning can be best understood in terms of a network of good reasons I am trying to describe here. As regards the second point which is the more important one, I believe that once we analyse the structure of a style of reasoning, we can see that in fact the activity of generating new propositions and the activity of assigning truth-values to propositions are not separable activities, but are the two inseparable, essential components of a single activity. This revised concept of a style of reasoning, I think, not only explains the diversity of epistemological traditions more coherently but also proves of greater explanatory use in the context of debates concerning the possibility of relativism.

### Good Reasons

Let us begin with a specific question. Given that to be rational is to have good reasons for one's beliefs, how do we decide what constitutes a good reason for holding a particular belief? To put it more simply, what is a good reason?

A reason is, of course, a justificatory belief. It could be logical, factual or causal, normative or some other kind. An important feature, however, is that a reason is a complex entity comprising at least two components. Let me explain what I mean with the help of a very simple example. Someone says, 'It is going to rain.' If we ask him the reason for his belief, the

answer would be, say, something like, 'The sky is cloudy.' But this is not the complete answer as far as the statement of the reason is concerned. There is a second component which is usually left implicit which would be something like 'And whenever the sky is cloudy, it rains.' This second component states the rule which connects the first component to the belief in question. One might say that in a narrow sense the first component is the reason for the belief and the second component is the justification of the reason, and the two constitute a unit since, properly speaking, only a justified reason is a reason.

There are a few things here which deserve close attention. First of all, it should be noted that the first component represents a cognitive belief in the broad sense that it refers to a state of affairs. It is connected to other such beliefs and it would ultimately terminate in what would be regarded as cognitively self-evident or foundational beliefs. The second component states a rule or which it is an instance or an application, it would generally constitute an element in a network of several such rules. Any belief-system whatsoever involves both: chains of cognitive beliefs and networks of rules. In Ian Hacking's account only the second component constitutes a style of reasoning. The view I am trying to defend here is that a style of reasoning involves the combined operation of both these components. Or if we wish to state the matter in terms of the relativity of reason and the relativity of truth, I would say that as against Hacking's attempt to defend the relativity of reason (which he identifies with his notion of style of reasoning) and argue against (or rather acquiesce in Davidson's argument against) the relativity of truth which he associates with the concept of a paradigm, I would like to argue that these two types of relativity are actually two inseparable aspects of a single phenomenon, and that this phenomenon, which in my view represents a style of reasoning properly, is not so distant theoretically from the notion of conceptual scheme or paradigm as Hacking imagines. I hope this claim becomes more intelligible when we try to understand the operation of the two components of a 'reason' in the context of my earlier thesis that reasons are the attributes only of persons.

Take the first component. As I said a while ago, it describes a state of affairs. Now, let us concede for the sake of argument that it would be incoherent to relativise the truth of the belief constituting this component,

only noting for the present that the notion of a paradigm or a conceptual scheme would imply such relativity. Even if the truth of that belief is 'objective', the more crucial question is: how does that belief come to be the reason for the original belief in question? Let me explain this with the help of the example I gave above. Even if the belief (or observation) that the sky is cloudy is 'objectively' true, it would be a mistake to imagine that this particular belief somehow presents itself as a reason for the belief that it is going to rain, that it somehow points to the belief that it is going to rain. It does so only to the person who believes in the second component which states that whenever the sky is cloudy, it will rain. It is the person's acceptance of the second component which prompts him to select that particular belief (that the sky is cloudy) as a candidate for the first component. And the second component is not grounded in any self-evident, universal belief but is an element of a network of rules. To explain this point with the help of our example, even where it is true that the sky is cloudy now, I pick up that fact as a reason for believing that it will rain *only because I believe in the rule which states that it will rain whenever the sky is cloudy*. This latter is not a self-evident, universal truth 'given' to me, but is the product of my style of reasoning. But, one might object, this network of rules cannot possibly be altogether arbitrary. It must have a cogent relation to the beliefs whom it connects. Certainly. But the point is, what constitutes a cogent relation is itself a matter of rules, and those rules are as much a part of that network as any other.<sup>35</sup>

Let me briefly recapitulate some of this discussion before proceeding further. Rationality is a matter of having reasons for one's beliefs. So, if we take a belief  $P$  held by a rational person, it would have a reason. That reason would be, naturally, itself another belief, say  $Q$ . In order to be a good reason for  $P$ ,  $Q$  must fulfil two requirements. First of all, in order to be a good reason,  $Q$  must be a true belief. A false belief, obviously, cannot be a good reason. Secondly it must be a belief concerning  $P$ . But both the requirements are, in different ways, problematic. As for the first requirement, how exactly the truth of  $Q$  is determined is an open question, since the conditions of truth would in turn involve a chain of rules and good reasons. But it is the second requirement which is more complicated. The belief  $Q$  does not in some self-evident way present itself as a reason for  $P$ .

The relation of  $Q$  to  $P$  as a valid reason for the latter is the function of a rule. That rule is represented by another belief  $R$ , although of a different kind. We might call it a regulative belief. This regulative belief has the function of what you might call an epistemological connective (in contrast to logical principles). It states whether  $Q$  is a good reason for holding  $P$ . Hence,  $Q$  and  $R$  together form, properly speaking, the good reason for holding  $P$ . My claim has been that a style of reasoning consists of a framework comprising an inter-related network of both categories of beliefs. I now want to sketch a model of the structure of a paradigm incorporating these features that I have been discussing.

### **The Structure of a paradigm**

Let me begin by reiterating my reservations regarding Hacking's claim that Kuhnian paradigms differ from each other only in the assignation of truth-values to a common stock of propositions. I think a correct interpretation of the notion of a paradigm would show that the Kuhnian concept definitely implies something like Hacking's style of reasoning. However, I think one can identify the quite understandable reasons for Hacking's misreading of the Kuhnian concept. One of the reasons is, of course, the paradigmmatists' somewhat misplaced and -- as Barry Barnes and David Bloor have pointed out-- totally unnecessary emphasis on (un)translatability.<sup>36</sup> There has been a tendency to describe incommensurability or even the very relation between two paradigms almost exclusively in terms of translation, as a result of which translatability has been treated as conclusive proof of the incoherence or at any rate the invalidity of the concept of paradigms or conceptual schemes. But a more serious reason, I think, is related to the fact that not enough attention has been paid to the possibility that the structure of a paradigm may be heterogeneous. I believe that this possibility makes a very significant difference to almost all issues connected with relativism. More particularly, I want to argue below that once we look at the total structure of a paradigm focusing on its heterogeneity and in that perspective look at the role of regulative beliefs, it becomes easier to understand the relation between the plurality of paradigms and the diversity of the substantive dimension of rationality.

In this part of the discussion, however, I shall not try to separate

questions relating to the structure of a paradigm and questions relating to a comparison of different paradigms since I think the notion of a paradigm (as much as that of a conceptual scheme) implies the possibility of a plurality of paradigms, and therefore to discuss the structure of a paradigm is to implicitly refer to the possible diversity of that structure. The notion of styles of reasoning (even in Hacking's version) has a similar implication since Hacking is not concerned to merely point to the existence of a hitherto unknown element in universal epistemology but to suggest the existence of different styles of reasoning incarnated in different epistemological traditions. So, also, the thrust of my own argument in speaking of 'regulative beliefs' is to draw attention to the fact that different cultures with their distinctive belief-systems exhibit different modes of substantive rationality which is effected by the possibility of a variety of systems of regulative beliefs (with concomitant cognitive beliefs).

There are three levels at which two paradigms can be contrasted with each other: 1. Truth-values of propositions 2. Meaning of concepts and 3. Corpus of positive propositions (or beliefs). According to Hacking, as we saw, different epistemological traditions, insofar as they are characterised by their own individual styles of reasoning differ, not with respect to the first or the second, but the third of these three features. I am trying to argue, on the contrary, that these three features of paradigms are interrelated and that their interrelatedness flows from the fact that a style of reasoning actually involves the assignation of different meanings to concepts and the assignation of a pattern of truth-values to the totality of propositions that characterise a paradigm, in addition to the undeniably crucial activity of generating a distinctive set of positive propositions that constitute the paradigm, and that in the final analysis, there is not such a great difference between the notion of conceptual schemes or paradigms and domains of styles of reasoning as understood by Hacking. But what is the ground of that activity of reasoning, variations of which, following Hacking, we have called styles of reasoning? Or putting it another way, where is the network of regulative beliefs grounded.

### **Sameness and Significant Difference**

The most fundamental categories are that of identity and difference.

It is the system of identity and difference which is the source of all perception, all understanding, from which arises the activity of concept formation, of implicit definition (of what a thing is and what it is not), and of classification. It is the structure of identity and difference which gives rise to concepts and propositions or beliefs which are descriptions of the interrelation of particular units of identity and difference -- a concept describing a convergence of certain propositions and a proposition in turn describing the relation of some concepts. From them arise series of other, usually more complex, concepts and propositions. It is at this point that the chain of good reasons begins. It begins with an intuitive recognition and application of identity and difference. The structure of perception and the principles of reasoning begin there. But how is diversity possible in this network of identity and difference? It becomes possible, primarily -- as we learn from the insights that constitute structuralist thought -- because of the fact that it is difference which is primary and identity is derived from an interplay of difference. The question whether or not difference is 'objective' is not meaningful since our very capacity to objectify something is structured through difference. However, there is one important point about identity and difference which must be grasped if we wish to understand how these constitute the ground of any paradigm.

Absolute identity and difference are pure abstractions or rather idealisations which play no role in the basic structure of our understanding. The effective form in which they operate in understanding is that of 'sameness' and 'significant difference'. That is to say there *always* are criteria to determine identity and difference. Of course, a thing is identical only with itself and it is different from everything else. But this is a purely formal notion which is of no use for understanding reality. It is when a thing moves in time or space that the question of identity is called for in the context of reality. In that event, it becomes a question of 'sameness'. This substantiation of identity as sameness is, even at the outset, a matter of a decision : decision as to whether or not a thing is the same, or in other words, whether or not its identity is affected by change of time or place (or change of perspective). Similarly in the case of difference (our priority to identity here is, needless to say, purely heuristic), the perception of difference is based on criteria -- minimally, perceptual criteria. Only an observable

difference is a difference. In any classification, what operates is this notion of 'significant difference'. And what constitutes a significant difference is, once again, a matter of criteria. The notion of consistency, too, is grounded in this interplay of sameness and significant difference. Consistency is a matter of maintaining the gap between sameness and significant difference. That is the reason why consistency must remain an intra-paradigmatic affair. Here, however, a question may arise: if even the notion of consistency is grounded in their interplay, how is the validity of the criteria which determine sameness and significant difference to be determined? But inasmuch as this is a question about meta-criterional principles, that is, principles that lay down the conditions of valid criteria which constitute the ground of any framework of understanding, I doubt if there is an alternative to treating it as axiomatic that meta-criterial principles are always and necessarily self-validating. As Barnes and Bloor have argued with reference to Lewis Carroll, Susan Haack and others, all logical principles including the allegedly sacrosanct rules of deductive logic are self-justificatory. Both induction and deduction which are 'our two basic modes of reasoning are in an equally hopeless state with regard to their rational justification'.<sup>37</sup> However, this is not to suggest that the fact of their self-validating character by itself proves that there cannot be a set of transparadigmatically invariant regulative beliefs or core principles of styles of reasoning. Whether there is only one, universal style of reasoning or there is a variety of radically dissimilar, incompatible versions of it, at the most basic level the validating principles must be necessarily self-validating. The basis of diversity of styles of reasoning, the possibility of plurality in the ground of our framework of understanding, that is to say, the possibility of different systems of sameness and significant difference, lies elsewhere. That basis lies, in the final analysis, in the diversity of something like what Wittgenstein has called 'forms of life'.<sup>38</sup>

The real problem in this context, however, is to reconcile the plurality in the ground of our framework of understanding that follows from the undeniable fact of the diversity of forms of life with the equally undeniable fact that -- in Strawson's phrase -- understanding presupposes the existence of 'a massive central core of human thinking which has no history'.<sup>39</sup> I believe, however, that these two facts are not irreconcilable. I think the

existence of such a core need not preclude the possibility of diverse styles of reasoning, diverse paradigms, diverse modes of rationality. But before proceeding further, there is another question which appears to have a bearing on the possibility of plurality of paradigms but doesn't. It is the questions whether it is feasible to operate with a concept of a non-definite reality. There is a variety of formulations of this question in different philosophical traditions, whose common denominator is 'whether or not there is a matter of fact'. Any position such as the one I am taking here, I think, must be necessarily Kantian -- or if you prefer, phenomenological -- on this point, and is to the effect that to speak of the structuring of reality is to bracket such a question. The notion of definiteness is dependent on the structure of identity and difference. To say that something is definite, even to say that 'something is' is to place it in that structure. If to say so is, in some sense, Idealism, perhaps one need not be unduly apologetic about it, since any worthwhile epistemological itinerary must begin in Idealism and proceeding through intersubjectivity terminate in Realism. However, the relevant point here is that the assumption of a primary cognitive structuring of reality per se does not have any implication for pluralism of paradigms. That pluralism has its basis in the fact that human reality is necessarily situated and that situatedness has variations, or in other words, in the fact that man can be correctly understood only as an 'engaged agency', and in the further fact that the background which constitutes that engagement and conditions his entire orientation to reality is not singular.<sup>40</sup> My attempt here is to reconcile this fact with the fact of the core of ahistorical thinking insisted on by Strawson, by suggesting that human reality as engaged agency has many levels, all of which are not homogeneously shared intersubjectively.

My reference here is to a simple and fairly obvious fact, though I think the very obviousness of this fact has caused its implications to be overlooked. We, as a species, are quite similar to each other at a biological level, at the level of sensory, neural equipment but exhibit considerable dissimilarities at the emotional, imaginative and intellectual levels.<sup>41</sup> I find the model of a number of multi-layered pyramids with different apices resting on the same base useful to illustrate this fact.<sup>42</sup> As per this model, the base which is common to all the pyramids represents the sensory level.

It refers to the fact that inasmuch as purely physical perception -- at the level of sense-data -- can be isolated, it can be seen to be fairly uniform across the species (the proviso is very important as I shall presently explain). The upper layers of the pyramid represent the psychological, intellectual, creative, cultural levels and as we move up the pyramid towards these levels, there is a great diversity of perception. At these levels the objects are not perceived in the same way by two individuals from different backgrounds. Another way of stating the same fact would be to say that there is a dimension of complexity to perception and that in the case of complex perception, the perspectives available are several and different from each other. Now, the problem is that, more than disagreement as to whether or not actually the human race is so constituted cognitively, confusion as to what would be the consequences if it were so constituted has dominated the discussions on the possible grounds of relativism. Therefore I want to spend a while clarifying the structure of the situation rather than argue for its *prima facie* plausibility. To this end let me introduce an extremely simple hypothetical situation which is actually something of a thought-experiment.

Assume that the world is divided into two groups of people, one of whom (A) can distinguish two colours, say red and green.<sup>43</sup> The other group (B) can distinguish three colours, say red, green and blue. Now there is no way these two groups can decide whose perception is correct or even relatively more correct. From the viewpoint of group A, the group B would be seen as arbitrarily introducing a spurious distinction within a single colour -- green. From the viewpoint of group B, group A would be seen as being unable (or unwilling) to make a valid distinction between green and blue. There would be a complete communication deadlock between the groups caused by an unbridgeable perceptual divide. What is the 'same' for group A is a matter of 'significant difference' for group B. That is to say, the two groups have organised the world into two different structures of identity and difference. As a result, we find that there is a divide between the two groups on all the three counts: concepts, set of propositions and truth-values of propositions. The concept of blue is present in one conceptual scheme while absent in the other. Propositions regarding the colour blue would exist in one of the schemes but not in the other. The same proposition such as 'The sky is green' would be true in the first

scheme while it would be false in the latter scheme. Further, *some* propositions about red and green would be mutually translatable while no proposition involving the colour blue would be amenable to translation. Now, I am not suggesting even for a moment that human beings exhibit such a divide at the level of sensory perception as such. As I said above, insofar as we are a single species, we share the same sensory apparatus and functions. The differences, at whatever level they are obtained, are the result of divergence at the level of complex gestalts. My reason for using this hypothetical situation for illustration is that I think it quite faithfully represents the structure of incommensurability. That is, it does not help us decide whether incommensurability is obtained in a particular situation, it tells us what to expect in case there is incommensurability. The point I want to make with the help of this model is that contrary to what Ian Hacking seems to assume, paradigms differ not only in relation to truth-values of propositions but necessarily also in relation to the repertoire of concepts and the capacity to generate propositions.

I think this model helps to see clearly the exact status of the notion of rational and irrational beliefs and the idea that somehow true and rational beliefs on one hand and false and irrational beliefs on the other make natural pairs.<sup>44</sup> If group A says 'x and y are both green' and group B insists that 'x is green while y is blue', conceding that the world is closer to the group B description,<sup>45</sup> it still makes no sense to say that the former belief (or statement) is irrational. It is no doubt false. But it is not rational or irrational in addition to, or in spite of, being false. The only legitimate question would be whether *the person or group* holding that belief is rational. The answer, as I have argued above, is that insofar as group A has good reasons to hold that belief and group B has no way of convincing them that their reasons are not good enough, we would not be justified in calling group A irrational. On the other hand, a member of group B would be irrational if he held that belief. But he is irrational not because he is upholding a false belief but because he is refusing to acknowledge on that occasion the significant difference between green and blue (which, insofar as he is a member of group B he must be acknowledging as a matter of course on all other occasions), and hence is being inconsistent.<sup>46</sup> In other words, consistency is a matter of consistent interpretation of identity and

difference. And that interpretation is relative to a paradigm, or to put it more accurately, the ground of a paradigm consists of the rules for interpreting identity and difference into a structure of sameness and significant difference. Further, two such groups stand in a mutual relation of causes versus reasons. For group B the belief of group A is matter of causes -- their possible colour blindness. Similarly for group A the belief of group B would be a matter of causes -- their possible hallucinatory makeup. In other words, whatever falls outside our own circle of good reasons we tend to consign it to the realm of causal explanation. Reasons and causes (of human behaviour) are coterminous with the boundaries of the ground of a paradigm -- reasons falling within and causes falling outside the boundaries.

Now, the next question is this: if the human species is not, as I have admitted, divided at the purely sensory level and if all human beings share the basic principles of logic, at what level do the differences of styles of reasoning originate? It is not very satisfactory to suggest that somehow differences emerge at the cultural level (In the very broad sense) where imagination, emotion, creativity etc. come into operation. The answer I am suggesting is that differences emerge in the process of the integration of sense-data into larger structures which constitute meaningful wholes.<sup>47</sup> Or more accurately, I would say that the notion of 'integration into larger structures' implies alteration of the relationality of the elements. Further, the greater complexity permits greater diversity. The direction of the variation of the larger structures is determined by the fact that the rules that govern or mould the integration originate from the imaginative, creative faculties. That is to say, the structuring of reality at the level of such meaningful wholes is not shared by the entire species but is culture-specific.<sup>48</sup> As we move up the pyramid towards more complex structures, the greater is the divergence. However, it would be a mistake to imagine that perceptual atoms, so to speak, at the level of sensory perception, are perceived in the same way by all members of the species and that differences appear only when they are combined into different, culturally determined, larger, complex units. The whole point of the notion of sameness and difference is to draw attention to the fact that the delineation of identity and difference at even the most basic level is determined by forms of life. In other words, every

level of cognition involves the organisation of the cognitive field into sub-structures which constitute elements of sameness and significant difference. That organisation is determined by the level higher than itself. The sense-data are elements of the lowest level and their organisation into a network of identify and difference is determined by the organisation of the level above it. To take a well-known example, how a person hears a sound is determined by the phonetic sapce that constitutes his native language. That is, two sounds are perceived to be 'the same' or 'significantly different' depending upon the phonetic organisation of the native speech of the hearer.<sup>49</sup> Does this mean then that there is total incommensurability at the level of sensory perception too? The answer is 'No.' Or more exactly, this entire way of looking at incommensurability in quantitative, all-or-nothing terms is a mistake. We must look at incommensurability in more consistently structural terms.

Let me formulate this point in terms of the model I have been using. Different paradigms are to a certain extent commensurable at the base but are increasingly incommensurable as we move up towards the apex representing the more complex perceptual and conceptual units. What this means is that the observational-sentence doctrine which posits a central core of some sharply identical concepts and propositions surrounded by a sea of utterly different ones is somewhat inaccurate. It would be more accurate to say that incommensurability must be understood as a gradually receding family resemblance. To put it a little more exactly, it is a matter of increasingly blurred boundaries of sameness and increasingly divergent rules defining exceptions reaching a point of total incommensurability at a certain level. For instance, if we take a series of binary concepts and the beliefs associated with them, such as black-white, edible-inedible, living-nonliving, good-evil, sacred-profane, the resemblance will be seen to gradually recede, reaching at one point a state of near-total lack of overlap requiring considerable imaginative effort for learning those concepts and beliefs and calling for some very contrived verbal manoeuvres for adequate translation. What constitute good reasons for holding the more complex binary oppositions have to be understood in terms of the simple dichotomies till we reach the level of simplest units of perception where the operation of the network of criteria that determine sameness and significant difference

is minimal. In fact the only justification for the pyramidal model I have employed is that it conveys this fact with greater perspicuity than the 'field' model used, for instance, by Quine.

Now let me recapitulate the point I made earlier to the effect that paradigms differ with respect to all three constitutive features i.e. the meaning of concepts, the truth value of propositions and the repertoire of positive propositions, and explain it with reference to the model I am presenting here.

At the level of sensory perception *per se*, as I said a while ago, the operation of the network of regulative principles which interpret identity and difference in substantive terms is not very significant. As we move up to more complex units of perception and thought, the role of this operation increases. This in turn determines the structure of perception at the lower level. However, this process is not homogeneous. All elements of the lowest level are not integrated to the same degree in the higher level structures.<sup>50</sup> There is a considerable quantity of residual elements which are not greatly integrated into upper level gestalts that constitute the common core of experience shared intersubjectively across different cultures and paradigms. The concepts representing these unintegrated elements are amenable to more or less simple correspondence. But the elements which are integrated in larger structures are defined in terms of the matrix of those structures (defined by more complex theories) and therefore the meaning of these concepts varies across paradigms. At this point, rather than simple correspondence appealing to intersubjective perception, interpretation must be brought in (bringing in its wake all the problems of translation which have served as the point of attack for most critics of the notion of paradigm or conceptual scheme). Once the meaning of concepts varies, inevitably the truth-values of propositions involving those concepts will vary. Further, the integration of concepts into larger structures is brought about by positing new relationships between the concepts. This leads to the generation of new propositions that articulate those relationship.

Given all this, what is to be said about rationality-invariance or the commonality of principles of rationality between paradigms, which is, after all, our central question? Can we speak of regulative principles of rationality

that are applicable to all paradigms? If such principles do exist, it would be possible to evaluate different cultures for the degree of their rationality as claimed by Taylor. My own inclination in this discussion has been to be sceptical about the existence of such principles. Let me now conclude with a brief defence of my scepticism in the light of the analysis of the structure of paradigms I have sketched here.

### **Rationality - Invariance**

I have argued that rationality is a matter of good reasons for one's belief and that good reasons are, on the whole, relative to a paradigm. Let me explain -- and defend -- this claim by identifying 'good reasons' in the model of a paradigm I have employed.

I have suggested above that a good reason has two components. One component describes the situation and the other component articulates the rule by virtue of which the reason given is a valid reason for the belief in question. Now, the first, cognitive component is accessible from outside the paradigm depending on the extent to which it is integrated into larger gestalts. If it is relatively unintegrated and is a part of the common, intersubjective stock of cognitive beliefs, it can be evaluated from outside. On the other hand, if it is integrated into more complex belief-structures, its truth cannot be verified in any 'direct' fashion. Similarly, the second component of a good reason, which is the regulative component stating a rule or a criterion, forms network. If this network belong to the lower levels, it would relate to the common stock of unintegrated cognitive beliefs. Therefore it would be the product of inductive generalisations which are accessible from outside since those generalisations are shared by different paradigms. If the network belongs to the upper levels, that is, if it relates to complex beliefs which are integrations of lower-level beliefs, it would be deeply entrenched in the paradigm. In other words, it would involve concepts and propositions which are not available in other paradigms since the latter would have integrated their lower-level beliefs in a different, incommensurable pattern. Therefore, those higher level networks of the regulative component of good reasons would not be accessible from outside the paradigm. To put it a little more simply, inasmuch as the basic level of sensory perception is to a large extent commensurable, the chain formed

by regulative beliefs at that level would be commensurable. That is to say, good reasons at that level would be invariant across paradigms. As we move up to the upper levels, there is a diversity of the networks of sub-structures. That is to say, the overlap between the different pyramids representing different paradigms begins to diminish. At these levels the lateral networks of elements that represent the second component of a 'good reason' vary increasingly in different paradigms. At these levels incommensurability is greater, and good reasons would not be invariant across paradigms. This means that it is possible to evaluate the 'good' reasons for those beliefs which are not integrated in the higher structures from the standpoint of another paradigm, but with regard to the 'good' reasons for those beliefs integrated into the higher structures, i.e. those beliefs which are deeply entrenched in a paradigm, it is not possible to evaluate them from outside.

This means that it is not possible to an equal degree to evaluate the good reasons for the beliefs of a belief-system. It depends on how little or how deeply a belief and the chain of reasons supporting it are integrated into the structure of the belief-system. This implies, as I have tried to argue, that incommensurability is not an all-or-nothing affair. The structure of a paradigm being heterogeneous, at certain levels, all paradigms overlap more or less completely, and at the level of greater abstraction, greater theorisation, they would differ considerably. Also, it is not necessary that all paradigms would be equally incommensurable with each other. To use the figure of a plurality of pyramids on a common base that I have employed, there may be pyramids which are only slightly non-overlapping. Their apices would be quite close together. While they cannot be mapped one onto the other, significant approximations would be possible. On the other hand, there may be paradigms which, after arising out of a common base, sharply diverge with very little overlap at the other levels. In such cases translation is initiated easily enough but as we move to beliefs more deeply entrenched in the respective paradigms, translation becomes a slippery business.

Now, speaking of judgements of rationality, I have argued that it is only persons who are rational or irrational. As I hope to have shown, it would be a mistake to make simplistic extensions from unintegrated beliefs

to the integrated beliefs or vice versa and make judgements about the system as a whole. If we make our judgements of rationality of a culture on the basis of unintegrated beliefs we may find that we share those beliefs and the good reasons supporting them and hence conclude that they are rational. On the other hand, if we look in isolation at the more intergrated beliefs and the reasons offered for holding them, we might conclude that they are irrational.

But can we make judgements of rationality concerning the choice of a paradigm? I do not think so. At any point whatsoever, to talk of rationality is to raise the question of possible good reasons behind a person's decisions or beliefs, and as I have tried to show, there cannot be free-floating chains of good reasons unanchored in any paradigm. There is no 'good reason' why the choice for a paradigm should be an exception to this rule.

#### NOTES

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1. P. Winch, 'Understanding a Primitive Society', *American Philosophical Quarterly*, 1 (1964), pp; 307-324.
2. Evans-Pritchard, E. E., *Witchcraft: Oracles and Magic Among the Azande* (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1937).
3. Taylor, C., 'Rationality', in *Rationality and Relativism*, ed., Martin Hollis and Steven Lukes (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1982).
4. *Ibid.*, p.92.
5. *Ibid.*, p.93.
6. *Ibid.*, p.93.
7. *Ibid.*, p.94.
8. *Ibid.*, p.90.
9. *Ibid.*, p.90.
10. *Ibid.*, p.105.

11. *Ibid.*, p.103.
12. *Ibid.*, p.87.
13. Their inseparability will be another point I will be discussing.
14. *Ibid.*, p.104.
15. *Ibid.*, p.105.
16. Kuhn, T., *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1950).
17. Taylor, C., p.99.
18. In Fact, there is persistent ambiguity, both in Winch and Taylor, as to whether their reference is to specific practices or to cultures as a whole. It is not clear in either of the articles whether it is the specific practice of witchcraft in the Azande culture which is supposed to be atheoretical or whether the entire Azande culture is supposed to be atheoretical. It makes all the difference which it is. On the face of it, Winch seems to hold that the entire culture is atheoretical while Taylor seems to be talking about a particular practice or activity. But both make statements contrary to their apparent positions. Winch does not hesitate to make what appears to me to be an illegitimate jump from the character of a specific practice to the culture as a whole, while Taylor is not only guilty of this, but in addition, fails to grasp the implication that his refusal to apply the theoretical atheoretical dichotomy to all cultures will make sense only if he is primarily addressing the issue at the level of a specific practice and not the entire culture.
19. *Ibid.*, p.100.
20. Then there is the further point that Taylor moves from the possible irrationality of a person practising magic to the irrationality of a culture. I am not convinced that there exists a rule of inference permitting this kind of extension from the rationality of a person to that of a culture, given the fact that persons and cultures are two different kinds of entities. In any case, as I shall argue below, we can coherently attribute rationality (or irrationality) only to persons.
21. This of course implies that incommensurability is not necessarily an all or nothing affair. That is, it implies, firstly, that at some points a paradigm may be commensurable with another, and secondly that incommensurability may be a matter of degree inasmuch as the degree of overlap can be variable. This may appear to complicate the concept of incommensurability to the point of making it incoherent, but I shall try to show that if we operate with a hierarchical model of the structure of paradigms, these two factors, far from constituting a complication,

help render greater coherence to the notion of incommensurability.

22. I may appear to have settled on this definition a trifle too insouciantly as if I thought that there are no serious contenders in the field. That is not the case. I do deal, albeit briefly, with some rival definitions such as: rationality defined as 'successful employment of means', as 'capacity to acquire true knowledge' as 'capacity for rule-making and rule-application', at various points in this article and try to argue that they are either not comprehensive enough or can be subsumed under the definition I have opted for. That of course does not mean that there is no room for further discussion on this question. But, while I have not demonstrated the inadequacy of the other definitions, I think I am making a reasonably good case for defining rationality as having good reasons for one's behaviour.
23. Of course there is a dimension to this assertion which is far from simple. It is to do with such things as robots. There is a clear, unambiguous sense in which robots are inanimate material objects, but insofar as it seems that whether the aggregate of their abilities amount to intelligent behaviour is an open question, it might be argued that the question whether robots are capable of rationality cannot be treated as settled. However, I do not think we need to get involved in this question here. My assertion here means no more than that things such as rocks and pieces of furniture cannot be called rational or irrational.
24. In this connection I think there is need for greater clarity with regard to the logic of expressions such as 'x has a reason', 'x has a context' and 'x has a justification', etc. I believe that while such expressions are serviceable enough in most contexts, in certain cases they tend to be seriously misleading, or at any rate, are a source of considerable confusion.
25. To make a brief allusion again to Taylor's position, this is the fact he fails to recognise when he places rationality in too close a relation to successful knowledge.
26. I should perhaps apologise for being so pedantic in this part of the discussion. But the quantity of imprecise talk about rational and irrational beliefs and practices and cultures in the literature dealing with relativism is simply appalling.
27. Harold Brown mentions a list taken from Elster (Elster, J., *Sour Grapes*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1983, p. 1) of the items to which the terms rationality is frequently applied. The list includes, 'beliefs, preferences, choices or decisions, actions, behavioural patterns, persons, even collectivities and institutions.' Harold I. Brown, *Rationality* (Routledge, London and New York, 1985) p.5.
28. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Preliminary Studies for the "Philosophical Investigations"* (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1958), reprinted in *Philosophy in the Twentieth Century*,

- Vol. Two, Ed. William Barret and Henry D. Aiken (Random House, New York, 1962), p. 721.
29. The View I am trying to develop here, as must be evident by now, can be understood in terms of the broader epistemological framework centred around the concept of 'personal knowledge' forged by Michael Polanyi. I think the relevance of Polanyi's framework for debates on relativism has not been sufficiently appreciated.
  30. Hacking, Ian., 'Language, Truth and Reason', in *Rationality and Relativism*, ed., Martin Hollis and Steven Lukes (Basil Blackwell, Oxford), 1982.
  31. Davidson, D., 'On the very idea of a conceptual scheme', *Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association* 47 (1973-4), pp.5-20.
  32. Hacking does not give either a detailed account of, nor an elaborate response to, Davidson's complex and compelling arguments since he is not taking issue with Davidson so much as discuss an alternative which may be invulnerable to the latter's attack. For more or less the same reasons, I have also not attempted a detailed discussion of Davidson's critique.
  33. Hacking, Ian., p. 65.
  34. As I have indicated at the beginning of this article, I believe that the effort to explore the possibility of a positive kind of relativism, particularly in today's world, lacerated as it is by conflicts grounded in ethnocentrism and a domineering globalism, is of great importance. In this context I think that it is necessary to insist on the distinction between the two kinds of 'relativism' as much as possible. In fact, I even suggest that we reserve the word 'relativism' for the negative, subjectivist variety and employ the term 'pluralism' to denote the kind of relativism Hacking refers to. Such a terminological distinction, while trivial in itself, I think, will help us avoid a good deal of talking at cross-purposes that goes on in discussions on relativism and related issues.
  35. This point, I think, further strengthens my argument that the ability to apply rules cannot be a satisfactory criterion of rationality since the notion of good reasons is more basic than that of rules. In this context too, the Wittgensteinian question (to which I have referred in the text) whether a rule can have an in-built rule stating the conditions of its applicability, and whether a situation can point to the rule applicable to it, I believe, favours the idea that an intuitive sense of good reasons is more primary and the ability to apply rules presupposes it. For an interesting discussion of the attempt to define rationality in terms of rules, particularly algorithms (rule which, when applied to a problem guarantees a solution in a finite number of steps), see Harold Brown's *Rationality*. Brown, Harold I. (Routledge, London and New

- York, 1988), pp. 17-23.
36. Barnes, Barry and Bloor, David, 'Relativism, Rationalism and the Sociology of Knowledge', in *Rationality and Relativism*, pp.21-47.
  37. *Ibid.*, p.41
  38. The question as to how a particular form of life issues in a particular pattern of sameness and difference is indeed a very interesting one. However, I do not think it is the business of the philosopher to concern himself with this question. It may be the business of and a rewarding exercise for, the anthropologist or the psychoanalyst to try to trace those factors. What physical and emotional landscape, what primeval dreams and fantasies, what permutations of archetypes, what portions of the collective unconscious are the source of the basic modes of perception and reasoning of a culture is an issue of great importance. But the epistemologist can have nothing pertinent -- leave alone anything very significant -- to say about it. He must take it as a given and confine himself to analysing the structure of that determination.
  39. Strawson, D.P.F., *Individuals* (Methuen, London, 1959), p. 10.
  40. I have taken the term and the concept of 'engaged agency' from Charles Taylor's use of it in his analysis of the Heideggerian concept of finitude of all knowledge. Taylor argues that Heidegger's importance lies in fact that he helped contemporary philosophical outlook come out of a facile sort of rationalism which ontologised the contingent modes and procedures of rational thought by reading them into the very constitution of the mind and part of its structure. Taylor argues that the rationalism deconstructed by Heidegger had induced the illusion that man is a disembodied, disengaged thinker situated nowhere. Taylor uses the notion of engaged agency to suggest the fact that man's orientation towards the world is moulded by the context of his situatedness. He argues that the context is not, to use Michael Polanyi's concepts, part of our focal knowledge but is a part of our tacit awareness which is closer to a 'knowing how' than to a 'knowing what'. Although Taylor does not commit himself on this point one way or the other -- at any rate in this article -- I think that the notion of engaged agency is necessarily pluralistic. I don't think it makes sense to admit physical embodiment and deny cultural embodiment. What I am trying to do here can be said to be an attempt to exploit the gradation, so to speak, of defferent levels of embodiment. Taylor, C., 'Engaged Agency and Background in Heidegger', in *Cambridge Companion to Heidegger*, Ed. by Charles B. Guignon (Cambridge University Press, 1993).
  41. I am not trying to be either very precise or very exhaustive here. My interest is to

draw attention to the general fact and point to its implications rather than argue out the details.

42. I have chosen the three-dimensional model of a pyramid to explain my meaning as a lesser evil since it is my feeling that the metaphor of a two-dimensional field has not been a great heuristic success. (I have in mind Quine's use of it with allusions to 'centre' 'periphery'). I am aware of all the pitfalls that attend the use of any such metaphor -- particularly a spatial metaphor. As for the talk about levels and hierarchies, I sympathise with the uneasiness it inspires and wish to clarify that all I am trying to suggest through this model is the fact of increasing integration of perceptual and conceptual units. In invoking the notion of hierarchies, I do not in the slightest mean anything normative.
43. Of course the colour perception of the human species does not show such heterogeneity. The matter has been too well established by the work of Berlin and Kay (*Basic Colour Terms*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1969) To allow any doubts about it. I am using this example, as I have indicated, only by way of something of a thought-experiment, to illustrate the *structure* of the situation. On the other hand, as I have mentioned, If we take the perception of sound, we can see that it is structured by the phonetic space of the language of the agent.
44. This tendency is all too prevalent in the concerned literature. For example, Martin Hollis in his article 'The Social Destruction of Reality' after referring to Strawson's statement about the 'massive central core of human thinking which has no history' which I have discussed above, goes on to say that 'in ascribing beliefs, we must be able to start by discerning the true and the rational and to end with the false and irrational' (Ibid., p 75). If I am right even in the general direction of my argument regarding the meaning and the agent of rationality, it must be evident that Hollis's coupling of the true with the rational and the false with the irrational must be avoided at all costs. This fallacy is of course, as I have tried to point out, the consequence of the more egregious tendency to ascribe rationality to beliefs. However, subscribing to this way of talking for a moment, what can be said about the relation between the true and the rational and the false and the irrational is that it is obtained within a paradigm. But it must be pointed out that it is a contingent relation. All that can be said is that within a paradigm, what is regarded as a true belief alone will serve as a good reason and therefore it will be found that rational behaviour moves in alignment with true beliefs.
45. Of course this is an illegitimate, at any rate problematic, concession since the only legitimate picture of reality, or even a coherent concept of reality, to begin with, must be the product of intersubjective agreement. One of the points that become

clear through this mode, I think, is that, given the necessarily intersubjective character or reality, there is no way ontological disputes can be 'rationally' settled.

46. If We now look at the case of a person practising magic in a modern society where the culture of modern science prevails, we can see that he is irrational not because magic involves 'irrational' beliefs, but because he is inconsistent in the sense suggested here.
47. I hope it is clear that my use of the term 'sense-data' does not convey the impression that I am inclined towards perceptual atomism. My use of this term here is mere terminological expediency. My entire discourse, I hope, makes it sufficiently clear that I try to consistently hold to the idea of perceptual as well as conceptual structuralism.
48. It might, of course, also be a matter of individual capacity.
49. This is of course an almost commonplace insight of the structuralist doctrine. But the relevance of this insight for the undersatnding of commensurability among paradigms has not been, I think, sufficiently appreciated.
50. The idea that all the elements are gradually integrated until we reach one final unit in which everything is integrated -- a sort of Hegelian Absolute - is, I am convinced, a mistake. Some paradigms, particularly ideologies, may aspire for such monism. But that is another matter.

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## THE INTERFACE OF SWADESHI CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGICAL SOCIETY

R. C. SINHA

The present paper attempts to address three issues. First, technology in itself is value-free but assumes value when linked with social activities. Secondly, technology is not logically incompatible with Indian culture. Thirdly, Swadeshi culture is integral and spiritual in nature. It integrates technological society with cultural values. It also gives ontological basis to secular values of technological society.

The expression "technological society" needs a little clarification. The expression does not refer to any particular society of any technologically advanced country. It refers to the 'technical phenomenon'. It refers to the attitude and the frame of mind, which characterize the present day civilization. The present civilization of India has its roots in science and technology. It views technique above other things. It seeks for the most efficient and result oriented means in every field and in every walk of life. The expression 'technological society' has not been taken to denote 'machine Society'. In 19<sup>th</sup> century, the European industrial society understood 'technological society' as a machine society. But technological society is more than 'machine society'. In the industrial society, machines became source of alienation. In a 'technological society' technique integrates machines with society. Machine may alienate, technology is liberating. Thus, the expression 'technological society' refers to that mental attitude of the post-modern man, which has been influencing the life style of the people of different place in varying degrees.

The expression 'Swadeshi culture' denotes a set of values dear to Indians. Values have two dimensions. One is spiritual and other is secular.

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Spiritual value is a set of goals or ideals. Secular values refer to interest preference and choice, which are essentially changing. When we talk about Swadeshi culture, people may consider it as Indian moral values. Values are not necessarily moral. Indian culture transcends morality on higher planes of existence. In practical realm of existence, it concentrates on secular values.

The expression 'interface' refers to the views that Indian culture and technological society are not opposed to each other. Ordinarily, it is believed that Swadeshi culture and technological society are incoherent. Culture is spiritualistic and value oriented while technology is mechanical. Values are useful at every step of human existence. The activities of individual and society should be in accordance with certain values or ideals. Man is essentially a value-conscious and value-pursuing being. Individuals as well as society cherish some ideals or values. Human beings cultivate faith in values and also create new values. This fact has inspired me to give an interface of Indian culture and technological society.

The present human society is faced with a paradox. The paradox is due to the fact that if human society is technologically advanced, it is faced with evil, and if it is technologically backward, it is evil because man loses his manness. Technological backwardness also causes evil because man suffers and lives in poverty. It goes without saying that insufficient progress of technology is evil because it causes backwardness. The prime object of the invention of new technology is to get rid of backwardness. So naturally we have to choose technology as an instrument in order to ameliorate conditions of the suffering humanity. But there is an opposite view also that considers technological progress to be a great source of present evils prevailing in the society. But in spite of laudable achievements, a man of philosophic temperament can not deny the social evils of the past few decades. It is true that technological society is responsible for dehumanization and degeneration of culture. Technology has managed to throw human relations into disorder and chaos. On the other hand, communication technology has made it quite easy to develop relationship with other nations. Technology has changed human society and its values. It has been used for well-being of human society. In order to get rid of economic evils, we have to develop technology. Recent nuclear explosion in Pokharan has

established India as a nuclear power. The technology can be used for self-defense and development of the country. Our Late Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri gave the slogan "Jai Jawān, Jai Kisān". The present Prime Minister Sri Atal Behari Vajpayee added "Jai Vigyān" to the original slogan. He demarcated a new dimension and uttered "Jai Jawān, Jai Kisān and Jai Vigyān". This throws ample light on our choice of science and technology since India has chosen to become Nuclear.

In technological society, technology determines the direction of the development of society and its values. But seemingly, technological in itself is not value loaded. Technology is ethically neutral and value free. The benefits of technology are mainly the use to which it is put by man. It is neither good nor bad. The use of technology determines its values. We can not pass any value judgment relating to technological society, whether it is a good society or bad society. Mahatma Gandhi, the great champion of 'Swadeshi Culture' does admit in his famous book entitled "Hind Swaraj" that India can import technology and life saving drugs from foreign countries. It does not affect our Swadeshi ideology since life saving drugs and necessary technology are linked with the well-being of India. So it is possible for "Swadeshi Culture" to import technology and then try to assimilate it in indigenous culture. We can try to position imported technology in our own cultural fabric.

The Indian mindset is culture-bound. We are quite upright in culture. India can not cope with the great power of technologically advanced society. There are many questions related with the Indian culture and technological society. The conflict between Indian culture and technological society and the influence of technology upon the course of society and cultural life of India have been a great source of controversy. The main objective of this paper is to discuss the technological society and its bearings on the cultural identity of India. We are preparing to enter into 21<sup>st</sup> century. In this century, man can not live without technology. In 21<sup>st</sup> century life and society will be governed by technological relations. Technology advances rapidly. The technology which is useful today may not be useful tomorrow. If we do not prepare the new generation to adopt new technology and new values of life, the new generation will lag behind.

Though technology is value-free yet technology creates conditions

for new ways of life and its values. Values do change in accordance with the change in technology. We think that technology is an instrument in the service of humanity. By the phrase value-free, I mean that technology is neither evil nor good in itself. It is a means and not an end. It is use which makes technology either good or bad. The new technology facilitates the coin words and assign new meanings. Technology creates new values, also formulates new language. It gives new meanings to words. Technology affects our value system and thus affects our culture. For example, Russia considers that "efficiency" and "speed" have emerged as new values with the growth of new technology. Efficiency is a value but is not moral value. Efficiency and speed are amoral. Efficiency and speed are valuable because they are valuable in life. With the change of technology, cultural values do change. B. D. Nag Choudhary observes, "Values erode, values change. A society adopts new values". This means that cultural progress is in one sense determined by the technological progress and advancement. Technology does affect culture. In this regard, it may be mentioned that Leslie White has introduced the most important theory of "technological determinism". According to White, "not only technology determines the direction of cultural development, but it also determines the need of building social foundation." Technological society presupposes technological determinism. Technological determinism assumes that technological innovation is the driving force behind social change imposing its own logic. Talcott Parson enumerates the technology as a kind of capability on the part of the organization for a more effective control and necessary change in the physical environment in favour of human needs and demands". To say that technology is meant to change the society is just like saying that technology causes change in our value system. It is true that technology is the product of society and values are also product of society. The Indian technological society owes its present position to Indian cultural patterns.

The social development leads to the question of interface between technology and culture. In ordinary parlance, development can not be equated with economic progress. Development is a multi-dimensional process which includes economic, social, political and cultural spheres. Development is an important factor for economic well-being. Technology has not been created and developed in isolation. The introduction of new technology

also a cultural phenomenon. Technology directly affects cultural values and also behavior of human beings living in society. Technology is responsible for new ways of life and culture. It is true that the society which consumes more and exhausts nature is considered more advanced. This society is known as consumer society. Technological society in one sense is consumer society. In Indian context, development is not simple economic. It is integral development. Integral development means social, cultural and economic developments taken together. Development is a historical change. The society moves from one historical stage to another. In fact preparing the society for development is a historical necessity. The transfer of technology can be effective in the progress and development of Indian society. Technology should be in harmony with cultural conditions of Indian society.

The development is not a sapling, which may be brought from one nation and transplanted in another nation. Culture can depend on technique and not on technology. "We can survive without technology, we can't survive without technique. To say that technology and culture are not logically incompatible is to say that technology and culture are interface to each other. Culture presupposes techniques. System of technique is technology. "Thus, there can be no technique without culture, no culture without technique". The logical assumption would be that every culture has relied on a corresponding system of techniques. "Technique is nothing but the premanent and dynamic expression of an individual culture. Cultures can only express themselves or survive through technique. Thus, the so-called potterwasp is known for its technique in constructing what we human beings culturally recognize as pots, however, the samll vessels are conclusion of technique, without it there would be no pot, propagation and no survival".

Technology introduces change in society. It is a positive device in the service of humanity. It is a means which can be properly used for the welfare of human being. By applying the latest laser technology we may help cure the cataract. However, laser could be used to guide a bomb. We can use satellites for education and cultural progress. We can also use them as a means to spread the destructive cultural and ideological patterns. Technology is a means in the service of human beings. It can help us to utilize natural resources in a better way. It can also play a positive role in safeguarding the cultural identity for the unity and survival of the nation.

Ramakant. Sinari observes, "Science and technology have invested man with power-they have fructified his 'will to power'. Man can use this power either to better and to prolong his survival or to annihilate himself

Man is always trying to develop new techniques. Therefore, our culture necessitates evasion of extremes in using the natural resources. The appropriate use of technology should be made so that we would not be affected with its negative outcome. Gabriel Marcel has called this "technological mentality". The very birth of technology represents the rise of urge of full freedom in Human consciousness. The growth of technology enhances man's ability to release himself from nature-oriented evils. Safeguarding Indian culture and its identity does not mean to go away from the current technology. It is inevitable for human existence to accept the realities of the present technological society. "Technologically advanced societies have solved many of the problems, e.g. hunger, disease, poverty, epidemics, illiteracy, physical discontent, lack of means of communication and movement". In one sense technology protects cultural identity. Technology constitutes the reality of time. Our goal must be to protect our cultural identity by using the gifts of technology. We should not sacrifice the culture for the sake of technology. If one looks at technology as machine and the principle of work then it is value-free. But if one looks at the minute details of human activities which take place in life with the use of technology, the answer will be that technology is a part of life. It is part of culture. Arnold Pacey has considered three different aspects of technology.:

1. The organizational aspect constituting of the activity of designers, engineers, consumers and labour unions.
2. The technical aspect which is limited to technology, that is skill and know-how-tools and machines.
3. The cultural aspect means goals, values and moral rules, beliefs and progress, affecting the creativity of designers.

Arnold Pacey believed that people use technology in its concept and sometimes with its limited meaning. When technology is presented in a limited way, the cultural values and the organizational factors related to it assume for it the shape of an alien factor. In this case, technology is known

in its complete technical sense. If technology is taken as a part of life, then we can not say that technology is value-free. We think technology has direct and indirect impact on values, tradition and the human life. Technology actually transforms cultural values. Technology is a means for change in our civilizations. Ramakant Sinari upholds, "The twentieth century technological culture has compelled a change in our view of the individual, he is looked upon as a function, as a mere one of them as one not necessarily with an ātman or a human face". A direct interface between culture and technology exists and both of them affect the other in a sequential manner. In advanced societies which are the birth place of technology, it is attempted that social and cultural organizations be put in line with technological development. Here we have interface of culture with the present day technological society. To a critical philosopher, this attempt may sound obscure. Indian culture which is grounded in spirituality can not be compatible with technological society. It is difficult to bring Indian culture close to technological society. We simply uphold that culture whether Indian or Western is not incompatible with technology. The present study is initiated with the conviction that technology is a part of Indian culture. The present day values in India are largely shaped under the influence of technological society.

The absence of logical incompatibility between the values cherished in a technological society and those endorsed by Indian culture can be worked out in two ways:

1. By showing that there is some kind of compatibility between technology and culture.
2. By demonstrating that culture can in its own ways, lessen to some extent the negative effects of technology.

This is a fact that science and technology occupy a place of immense importance in post-modern Indian society. The problem is how Indian culture can accommodate technology without going astray. How Indian culture can at one and the same time satisfy Indian tradition and technology? This brings into the consideration as to under what conditions technological society can be interface into Indian culture without destroying its inner harmony. In traditional societies like Indian, the situation is more complicated

because technology will be made an alien entity which appears an independent system in the face of existing cultural system. Culture determines the way in which individuals identify and recognize one another within their own social spheres of action. Indian culture and its value system constitute the factors of social harmony of Indian pluralistic society. Indian value system gives a special cultural identity to Indian society. In the process of social evolution and change, which emanates from the introduction of value and models of foreign technologies, the Indian cultural systems in entirety are attacked. Therefore, the main risk lies in the endangering of Indian cultural identity, which is rooted in tradition. The development of communication technology, the ability to record and transmit sounds and images over any distance have changed the value system. It has changed the face of contemporary Indian culture. With the enormous development in communication technology, the culture has enormously changed. The mass is not culturally neutral. This reflects the thinking, the idea, and the value. Communication technology serves as the channel of transmitting values or ways of life.

The promotion of technology in India is not fully indigenous activity. We have three options in the face of modern technology.

1. The first option is its total acceptance of foreign technology without taking into account tradition bound Indian culture.
2. The second option is total rejection of any type of foreign technology.
3. The third option is selection of relevant technologies which have greater conformity with the socio-cultural and economic conditions of India i.e., the selection of appropriate technology.

India by making proper and positive use of technology, has succeeded in bringing about a fundamental change in the ways of the people's mentality. Technology is being employed for fulfilling specific human needs. It is forcing man to continuously adjust to its impact. Ramakant Sinari observes, "Instead of technology, being developed to meet the design of the society, it is shaping the organization and structure of a society and human relations in it". Technology has brought change in our educational system. It has helped to popularize family planning. The T. V. has promoted health care in villages. It has created understanding among different nations.

Now we are in a position to say that there does exist some sort of compatibility between the value endorsed by Indian culture and cherished by technological society. In Indian culture secular values and spiritual values are not opposed. In Hindu tradition, Dharmashāstra and Mokshashāstra are not incompatible. The secular values are relegated to worldly status. But this is quite clear that even in secular culture, the spiritual attitude pervades. The Vedānta philosophy is the bedrock of Indian spiritual culture. The secular culture refers to technological society. The secular culture refers to technological society. The spiritual culture gives ontological basis to secular or technological culture. The secular culture of technological society assumes a general spiritual dimension or ontological basis. On technological level, Indian attitude can be summed up as the attitude of impersonality. It is an attitude of the man rising above his own person. The value, which emerges in a technological society, is the value of impersonality. There is a basic character of the functioning of technique, and these, in turn lead to impersonality.

The tendency towards impersonality sets in a process of dehumanization. The dehumanizing effects of technology are taken as the negative effects of the technological society. Dehumanization is taking away from man his manness. It reduces man to the status of machine. It stifles creativity. Technological society makes life mechanical and artificial. The process of dehumanization upsets the person of a man. In Vedāntic spiritual culture, man has to transcend his ego. It is also a kind of 'superb dehumanization' when man transcends himself. But Indian philosopher and critic may point out that it is not proper to describe the process of transcendence as 'superb dehumanization'. In transcendence man does not negate man but sublimates himself to higher plane of existence. In Vedāntic culture, the lower aspect of man is suppressed and transcended. The Technological process of dehumanisation takes away from man his manness as such. The dehumanized individual is merely a bundle of reactions. The Indian spiritual culture gives creativity a full play. The spiritual process attempts to realize the essence of man. Technological culture robs the essence of man. Techniques eliminate creativity. In technological society technique tends to determine everything. In Indian culture, the human existence has been given an ontological foundation. The cult of spiritualization

is not negative. But in technological society dehumanization is negative.

A philosopher may point out that any attempt to draw a line of interface between technological society and Indian culture is far fetched because they belong to two different dimensions of human existence. This objection requires a little consideration. Technology and culture both are concerned with man and society. Both attempt to contribute in social development. Social development has two aspects one is economic development and other is cultural. Technology takes care of economic development. Culture is rooted in value system. But this is a misconception that technology and culture are not interface to each other. The technological development cause change in our value system. Moreover, Spiritual values give ontological dimension to technological society.

Indian culture is integral in nature. Now the integration may be turned outward or may turn inward. These two ways are not mutually exclusive. It is possible to emphasize either the outward character of integration or the inner character of integration. Social integration is integration turned outward. Self-integration is integration turned inward. Technology integrates society. Culture is self-integrating. Technology is concerned with man's world, and therefore its aim is to have integrated social reality. The integration that it attempts is social. Indian culture is spiritualistic and the integrations that it values is self-integration. Thus, it can be argued that it is not proper to say that Indian culture is far removed from the technological ways of the modern times. Margaret Chatterjee observes, "India has her own scientific traditions without which the people could not have survived over centuries and of which we have evidence today, for example, in indigenous systems of medicine which have a long ancestry."

Here we can make an attempt to demonstrate that Indian cultural values can be relevant for the technological society. Philosophers and social scientists have spoken about the negative effects of technology. Technological society is characterized as full of environmental pollution, deterioration of the quality of life, threat to the beauty and balance of nature and ecological imbalances are cited as examples of the negative effects of technological society. But we are here concerned with the technological effects at the level of human sensibility, because it is at that level that Indian culture can be relevant. Technology persistently causes

alienation and estrangement. It upsets the established order and uproots man from his moorings. This is apparent also in developing countries like India where lure of industrialiation, urbanization and computerization have upset the life-styles of the Indian society. It has led to the disappearance of privacy and of personal human relationship. Technology is causing social and psychological tension. The life is becoming more and more mechanized. The man has lost zest for living. Man creates technology but in course of time man becomes dependent on technology. When technology is controlled and utilized by man for social well-being then, it is useful. But when technology becomes, the master of man then it is bad. There is need to overcome the sense of being overwhelmed by technology. Here Indian culture can be of great help. Indian culture can help man to get rid of dehumanization. Indian culture being spiritual in nature attempts to shift its importance from technique to man.

In technological society, man leads a mechanical life. Man is under bondage of technology. The negative effect of technological society is a sense of estrangement. Technology has taken away from human being his sense of humanness. Technological society does not know how to get rid of dehumanization, Swadeshi culture can save humanity from estrangement and dehumanization. The life becomes meaningless in the wake of mechanical life style. The Swadeshi culture can give meaning to human life by sublimating man's existence to higher plane. The integral cultures of India can establish harmony between ontological and secular and otherworldly and this wordly notions of values. I think that the integral Philosophy of India presupposes interface of Swadeshi culture and technology in the post-modern society.

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## THE BUDDHIST FOUNDATION OF MORALITY, UNIVERSAL CULTURE AND SOCIAL ETHICS

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In this paper I propose to discuss the very foundation of a culture which is truly universal in application and manifestation taking in its scope not only human beings but the whole nature as well. Such a culture, which will be Buddhist in letter and spirit, looks for a firm foundation not outside a person but inside in him awaiting to be cultivated and developed by transforming his attitude and moral behaviour without taking the help of any divine deity, scripture, and religious person claiming to possess revelatory knowledge. It is an attempt to structure human consciousness to help it rise to its higher level and then to its highest level, the level of the Buddha and the Bodhisattvas. In such a state of consciousness, it is believed, a person transcends his selfish good and throughout his life works for the welfare of the entire world. In other words, the whole exercise is aimed at complete reorientation of social ethics and culture which prepares the background for global humanistic education in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. This culture further gets reflected in all forms of human action, viz., in art and language, speech and deed, and personal discipline and social governance.

This paper criticizes the Vedic and Upaniṣadic notion of culture and morality, or for that matter any such notion, which is grounded in divine power and commandments. Herein the whole construction of a universal culture and social ethics is done by working out certain Buddhist insights which anyone can develop through his personal effort. This is a unique Buddhist approach, unlike other cultural and ethical systems, whose whole thrust is put on understanding the very nature of the existence of man, his predicament, his total personality transformation by transforming his mental

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attitude, and achieving excellence in ethical and social practices without any metaphysical and divine foundation or grace. This is an approach which envisages progress in morality through the progress in the evolution of a person.

Morality consists in the whole human behaviour which presupposes the 'other' for its manifestation and fulfillment. It builds interpersonal relationship, structures the whole fabric of a family, community, society, nation and the entire world. It is not only anthropocentric but cosmocentric or ecological as well in nature and concern. It constitutes and defines the entire personality of a person, sets and directs his goal, and instills purpose of life in him. But the crucial questions of paramount importance are: Does morality have its own universal foundation or a Moral Truth which shapes it and justifies its utility and indispensability? And if there is any such foundation, then what is its nature and scope? Is it a universal metaphysical reality or a personal, social and cultural phenomenon? These are some of the questions which I propose to address here in the context of Buddhism, of course, in comparison, rather in contrast, with the Vedic and Upaniṣadic modes of thinking.

It is natural that morality demands a firm foundation. At the same time, it is a well-known historical fact that there are various, even conflicting, ethical systems or systems of morality which presuppose various foundations, each claiming and justifying universality of its own foundation as if it is self-justifying, self-evident, and the only legitimate source of morality and therefore, they maintain, the moral codes of conduct derived from it must be obligatory. This conflicting diversity of claims gives birth to the *problem of ethical indeterminacy* which shows the failure of finding an absolute foundation of morality. Here the thrust is more on "foundation" than on morality". This is also a fact that despite this failure, which is more of an intellectual or academic kind, various kinds of moral systems, even if they are mutually conflicting, are prevailing even today in the world in theory and practice. Before I discuss these issues in Buddhism in detail, I think it is necessary to have a survey of the Vedic notions of the foundation of morality.

**The Vedic and Upaniṣadic Notion on Morality :**

The earliest idea of morals we find in the *Rg Veda*. It talks of *Rta* which stands for the whole cosmic order including the moral order and the god Varuṇa as its guardian. *Rta* is here considered as an intelligent metaphysical and moral principle which regulates both the cosmos and the individual beings. It is the inexorable moral law operating in the context of *karma* and its *phalas*.<sup>1</sup> The *Rg Veda* sets the metaphysical tone by saying that the Upaniṣadic Reality is One Absolute which is professed by scholars differently.<sup>2</sup> It talks of the essential unity of all beings, sentient as well insentient, and claims to achieve the unity of the empirical ontological diversity through intuitive realization. It professes the cherished ideal, on the basis of this metaphysical identity of all beings, that the whole world of human beings is a family,<sup>3</sup> and aspires to create a homogeneous and harmonious world in which there is an unanimity in goal, thinking, speech, feeling, acting, mutual caring etc.<sup>4</sup> In other words, it propounds One, Universal Absolute metaphysical as well as moral Truth necessary for attaining personal liberation and establishing a peaceful and harmonious world. The Upaniṣads take upon themselves the task of elaborating, establishing and promoting the Vedic philosophy. Later the *Bhagavadgītā* contributes to this philosophy by making it more applicable in practical life. It is a self-evident fact for all of us to see that in the Hindu tradition and way of living, its teachings have tremendous influence on the common man. Herein the Lord Kṛṣṇa asks Arjuna, His friend and devotee, to surrender to Him as He is the Supreme God, who is also the absolute metaphysical and moral truth. He means to say that only by being absorbed in Him (*manmayā*) and taking refuge in Him (*mām upāśītā*) that many persons in the past have attained transcendental love for him.<sup>5</sup> One who knows His true nature attains His eternal abode.<sup>6</sup> As all surrender (*prapadyante*) to Him, He rewards them accordingly and so everybody, in every respect (*sarvaśaḥ*) follows Him.<sup>7</sup> According to Him a sceptical person who is ignorant and lacks faith in the revelations of the scriptures does not attain the highest abode, he is doomed to fall and he is in peace neither in this world nor in the next.<sup>8</sup> A moralist who follows the path of revealed scriptures or in other words, who has identified himself with the Supreme Lord, who is a purified soul and who has control over his mental

and sensuous faculties develops mutual loverelationship with others (*sarvabhūātāmbhūātāmā*).<sup>9</sup> Again, only those persons are entitled to attain the Supreme Abode who have transcended the duality, a creation of doubt, who have seen the same Truth in all beings (*rṣayaḥ*), who are completely engaged in the welfare of all beings (*sarvabhūtahite ratāḥ*).<sup>10</sup>

All this explains that one is not free to act according to one's own decision and the foundation of morality lies in the revealed scriptures which are the records of divine commands, but it is also to be noted that the welfare of all creatures or beings, which is the aim of the acts of moral practices, is considered the path of the Supreme God leading the practitioner to his Supreme Abode.

Further, in the Vedic tradition, philosophy, religion, and morality are found overlapping and aiming at the same goal, i.e., the realization of one's true identity as the identity of the individual soul (*ātman*) and the Universal Soul (*brahman*). This is taken as the *summum bonum* of one's life. In the empirical sphere this metaphysical doctrine of *ātman* implies an ethical ideal. This metaphysical truth becomes a reason and justification for our love to the other, be he husband, wife, son or any other being sentient (Gods, human beings, animals, plants, etc.) or insentient (wealth, landscape, river, etc.). This is the message we get from Yājñavalkya in the *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad*.<sup>11</sup> In principle, this passage denies any other consideration than this metaphysical one. Once we realize that this personal soul is Brahman (*ayam ātmā brahma*,<sup>12</sup> *tat tvam asi*<sup>13</sup>), and the whole universe is nothing but this Brahman (*sarvaṃ khalvidaṃ brahma*<sup>14</sup>) the extension of 'self' to the 'other' in the realm of moral practices becomes complete. Therefore our primary task is to see, hear and reflect upon this Self.<sup>15</sup> because only by seeing, hearing and reflecting upon this Self that we can know the above fact and behave accordingly. It is believed for sure that once one realizes this fact one transcends selfishness and starts caring for others. Thus we see that in the Vedic tradition, especially in the Upaniṣads, the metaphysical reality becomes the Moral Truth, the source and foundation of morality. In general, the holy scriptures and the seers of truth claim to reveal the same truth and prescribe the ethical training and practices in obligatory tone. This is the most striking fact about the Vedic notion of morality which is mostly instructive, prescriptive, and obligatory

in nature and which turns out to be moral laws. Consequently, we find in the whole tradition various lists of 'what to do' and 'what not to do'. These moral laws are less rigid in the Vedas and the Upaniṣads, but very rigid and invite punitive actions on violation in the *Dharmaśāstras* and *Manusmṛiti*. In the former the metaphysical principle and the fear of God are invoked, but in the latter, in addition to these, even the fear of State authority and Society is invoked, perhaps for the sake of maintaining social order and harmony. Thus the tightening of the grip of the tradition over the individuals becomes complete. The Vedic and the Upaniṣadic prescriptions and advice, as a matter of fact, in practice, constitute the foundation of morality. In case of confusion, doubt, or ignorance in respect of moral laws, the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*<sup>16</sup> advises its students to imitate the Brāhmaṇas who are the realized souls and whose behaviour is the source of guidance:

...If there is in you any doubt regarding any deeds, any doubt regarding conduct, you should behave yourself in such matters, as the Brāhmaṇas there (who are) competent to judge, devoted (to good deeds), not led by others, not harsh, lovers of virtue would behave in such cases. ... This is the command (ādeśa). This is the teaching (upadeśa). This is the secret doctrine of the Veda (vedopaniṣat). This is the instruction (anuśāsana).

Above all, the Upaniṣad instructs its students to speak truth (satya) and practice virtue (dharmaṃ cara).<sup>17</sup> Radhakrishnan writes: "[Here] *dharma* means essential nature or intrinsic law of being; it also means the law of righteousness. The suggestion here is that one ought to live according to the law of one's own being"<sup>18</sup> Further, in case of doubt about the behaviour of a Brahman or a Veda-teacher himself, one should be the guide onto oneself as per the *dharma*s prescribed in the Vedas. Following Śaṅkara's warning (*sāvadyāni śiṣṭa-kṛtāny api nokartavyāni*), Radhakrishnan further says: Even with regard to the life of the teacher, we should be discriminating. We must not do the things which are open to blame, even if they are done by the wise."<sup>19</sup> So in case of doubt one is made free to guide oneself but ultimately not outside the established parameters of the Vedic teachings (dharma). This is unlike the freedom one has in the Buddha's teachings which allow, rather encourage everybody to be free from all traditions, beliefs, society, family, teachers, etc., not as a revolt but to know the truth through one's own experiences and reflection.

The *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* has all the three categories of creation - gods, men and demons - under its purview as far as the virtuous practices are concerned. The famous teaching of *da* to them by Prajāpati is claimed to be the mother of all other virtues. It is presumed that these three categories of being are prone to non-virtuous practices, hence they are required to be virtuous. The dialogue between Prajāpati and them as recorded in the *Upaniṣad* is like this:

1. Three fold offspring of Prajāpati, gods, men and demons, lived with their father Prajāpati as students of sacred knowledge. Having completed their studentship the gods said, 'Please tell (instruct) us sir.' To them then, he uttered the syllable *da* (and asked) 'Have you understood?' They (said) 'We have understood, you said to us "*damyata*" "control yourselves". He said, 'Yes, you have understood.'
2. Then the men said to him, 'Please tell (instruct) us, sir,' To them he uttered the same syllable *da* (and asked) 'Have you understood?' They (said) 'We have understood, you said to us "give".' He said, 'Yes, you have understood.'
3. Then the demons said to him, 'Please tell (instruct) us, sir,' To them he uttered the same syllable *da* (and asked) 'Have you understood?' They (said) 'We have understood, you said to us "*dayadhvam*", 'be compassionate.' He said, 'Yes, you have understood.' This very thing the heavenly voice of thunder repeats *da, da, da*, that is control yourselves, give, be compassionate. One should practise this same triad, self-control, giving and compassion.<sup>20</sup>

Radhakrishnan writes:

"The gods are said to be naturally unruly and so are asked to practice self-control. ...Men are naturally avaricious and so they should distribute their wealth to the best of their ability. ...The demons are cruel, given to inflicting injury on others, they should have compassion and be kind to all."<sup>21</sup>

Following Śaṅkara he further writes:

"It is suggested that there are no gods or demons other than men. If they are lacking in self-control while endowed with other good qualities, they are gods, if they are particularly greedy they are men, if they are cruel and given to inflicting injury on others, they are demons. Men themselves are distinguished into these three classes according to their lack of self-control

and the possession of other defects or according to the tendencies of the three, *guṇas*.<sup>22</sup>

Although the Upaniṣad is didactic in nature, but at the same time clearly conveys the message that there is a scope for man within him to rise from demonliness to godliness, and from there to the self-transcendence to Brahman, the state of only 'good'. This also shows the progress of morality in man, the culmination of which is nothing but the nature of his true being, the Being of Brahman, the all encompassing Reality, the Supreme Value. What appears transcendent is shown to be immanent in him. This has been variously said in the Upaniṣads: *ayam ātmā brahma*,<sup>23</sup> *aham brahmāsmi*,<sup>24</sup> *tat tvam asi*,<sup>25</sup> and *sarvaṃ khalvidaṃ brahma*.<sup>26</sup> In the Upaniṣadic teaching what is ethical is stated to be ontological. They propound the doctrine of ethics of self-realization, knowing oneself in true sense. To what extent the equation of metaphysics and ethics brings change in the attitude and behaviour of man, who elsewhere in the same set of literature is shown to be determined by such factors as his irreversible hereditary and hierarchical status in the society is a mute question.

But in Śaṅkara,<sup>27</sup> ethics is asocial, selfish, and just a means to the ultimate end of self-realization, a state of passivity. I am surprised whether, outside the social context, it can be called ethics at all. In his philosophy, the so-called ethical training acquires the most rigorous and uncompromising character. He goes even further and maintains that these ethical practices are not sufficient. These are just one of the four requirements which an aspirer (*adhikārin*) must fulfill before he is initiated into the process of self-realization. These requirements are:

1. *nityānityavastuviveka*, i.e., capacity to discriminate between what is eternal and what is non-eternal or contingent.
2. *lhamutrārthaphalahogavirāga*, i.e. renunciation of desire of both worldly and trans-worldly nature.
3. *śamadamādisādhanaśampat*, i.e. endowed with six virtues like quietude (*śama*), self-restraint (*dama*), withdrawal from worldly activities (*uparati*), endurance (*titikṣā*), meditation (*samādhi*), and faith (*śraddhā*) which purifies the candidate (*adhikārin*) and prepares the background for the dawn of self-realization.

4. *mumukṣutva*, i.e. longing for liberation.

Śaṅkara is condemned by his opponents to be responsible for denigrating the world of action and the social emotions. "[T]o the charge that Advaita fails to give a proper place to love for one's fellow man modern apologists sometimes answer that, because Advaita teaches that there is only one Self, and because everyone loves his own self, which is identical with the one Self, it follows that everyone loves everyone else's self. That this argument is not found in early Advaita is, I believe, entirely to its credit, for the argument is quite fallacious. ...Still, it may be retorted, at least the Self-knower must love his fellow man, since what he knows is precisely that his is the one Self. But that doesn't follow either. To love one's fellow man one must presumably recognize him as one's fellow, but that means to distinguish him from oneself, and for the liberated man there are no distinctions.'<sup>28</sup>

There are passages in the Upaniṣads which show divinely revelatory nature of everything, including the moral principles:

1. As a spider moves along the thread, as small sparks come forth from the fire, even so from this Self come forth all breaths, all worlds, all divinities, all beings. Its secret meaning is the truth of truth. Vital breaths are the truth and their truth is It (self).<sup>29</sup>
2. As from a lighted fire laid damp fuel, various (clouds of) smoke issue forth, even so, my dear, the *Rg Veda*, the *Yajur Veda*, the *Sāma Veda*, *Atharvāṅgīrasa*, history, ancient lore, sciences, *Upaniṣads*, verses, aphorisms, explanations and commentaries. From this [*mahad bhūta*: the Great Reality], indeed, are all these breath forth.<sup>30</sup>
3. [Parting advice to the pupil] This Brahṁā told to Prajā-pati, Prajā-pati, to Manu, Manu to mankind. He who has learned the Veda from the family of a teacher according to rule, in the time left overdoing work for the teacher, he, who after having come back again, settles down in a home of his own, continues the study of what he has learnt and has virtuous sons, he who concentrates all his senses in the self, who practises non-hatred to all creatures except at holy places, he who behaves thus throughout his life reaches the Brahṁā-world, does not return hither again, yea, he does not return hither again.<sup>31</sup>
4. Brahṁā arose as the first among the gods, the maker of the universe, the

protector of the world. He taught the knowledge of brahman, the foundation of all knowledges, to Atharvan, his oldest son.<sup>32</sup>

According to the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad*, for the realization of one's true Self, it is imperative that the seeker thoroughly purifies himself in moral terms. It says, "Not he who has not desisted from evil ways, not he who is not tranquil, not he who has not a concentrated mind, not even he whose mind is not composed can reach this (self) through right knowledge."<sup>33</sup> In the same chapter, in the preceding passage, it also talks of the extra-moral factor, like the divine grace of self's own choice without which the moral perfection becomes inconsequential. It says, "This self cannot be attained by instruction, nor by intellectual power, nor even through much hearing. He is to be attained only by the one whom the (self) [of the God in the self] chooses. To such a one the self reveals his own nature."<sup>34</sup> In other words, even the realization of the identity of the self and the other, which is the foundation of morality in the Vedic and Upaniṣadic tradition, is not within the personal effort of human beings. Throughout this tradition we find many such conflicting and confusing passages. It is because of this that the Buddha look for the foundation of morality within the person himself.

In the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*,<sup>35</sup> while discussing Brahman and the process of evolution therefrom, there is a discussion of the five sheaths (kośa)- matter (anna), life (prāṇa), mind (manas), intelligence (vijñāna), and bliss (ānanda) wherein the soul of a person resides:

1. This, verily, is the person that consists of the essence of food.<sup>36</sup>
2. Verily, different from and within that which consists of the essence of food is the self that consists of life. By that this is filled. This, verily, has the form of a person.<sup>37</sup>
3. This - life - is indeed the embodied soul of the former - physical sheath. Verily, different from and within that which consists of life is the self consisting of mind. By that this is filled. This, verily, has the form of a person.<sup>38</sup>
4. Verily, different from and within that which consists of mind is the self consisting of understanding. By that this is filled. This, verily, has the form of a person.<sup>39</sup>
5. Verily, different from and within that which consists of understanding is the self consisting of bliss. By that this is filled. This, verily, has the form of a person.<sup>40</sup>

These are the five hierarchical principles of a human being representing "his body, his subconscious, conscious and self-conscious life,

and last, a still higher grade of existence which he sometimes manifests, and for instance, when he is contemplating the true and the holy.<sup>41</sup> In the present context, the first two-*anna* and *prāṇa* - fall outside the moral realm as they lack the element of mind and a conscious principle. The last one, bliss (*ānanda*), is a sheath wherein the soul transcends the realm of duality and the realm of ethical practices which presupposes the duality of 'good' and 'evil'. For him, the evil is overcome, and thus for him its relative term 'good' is also meaningless. But for worldly people he is the epitome of only 'good'. The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* says:

Him (who knows this) - these two (thoughts) do not overcome, for some reason he has done evil or for some reason he has done good. He overcomes both. What he has done or what he has not done does not burn (affect) him ... Having found that, one is not tainted by evil action. Therefore he who knows it as such, having become calm, self-controlled, withdrawn, patient and collected sees the Self in his own self, sees all in the Self. Evil does not overcome him, he overcomes all evil. Evil does not burn (affect) him, he burns (consumes) evil. Free from evil, free from taint, free from doubt he becomes a knower of Brahman.<sup>42</sup>

Now the third and the fourth - mind (*manas*) and intelligence (*vijñāna*) - are the most important and cardinal principles which are related to the ethical issues and training. Of these two, mind is an inner faculty of perception endowed with the conceptualizing and discriminative characteristics.<sup>43</sup> It is a passive receptor in the sense that it is externally guided by the commands of the holy scriptures like the Vedas and the Brāhmaṇas, and the holy seers (*ṛṣi*) of the divine laws of morality. (In the family and educational institutions, the young ones are commanded by parents and teachers respectively as per the tradition.) At this stage, the person, since his childhood until he acquires the grown up stage of intelligence and develops the capacity of reason, to analytically/critically think of ethical issues like 'What are good and evil' and 'What are right and wrong'. It is the stage of initiation of ethical training and practice conforming to the obligatory and revelatory moral rules as enunciated by the holy scriptures and the holy seers. "In one sense, no doubt," writes Hiriyanna following the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* cited above, "the latter [intelligence] alone is genuine moral life; but the former [mind] is not."

therefore to be counted unnecessary; for right conduct is at first learnt through obedience to external law. That is how moral education begins and it is only by and by that one comes to practice virtue in its twofold aspect of purity of thought (*ṛta*) and purity of deed (*satya*) through a belief (*śraddhā*) in its intrinsic worth"<sup>44</sup> In this vein, the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* says, "the *Yajur Veda* is its head; the *Rg Veda* the right side; the *Sāma Veda* the left side; teaching the body; the hymns of the Atharvaṇs, and Āngirasas, the lower part, the foundation."<sup>45</sup>

So a person, since his birth and childhood grows under the shackles of the external authorities and is molded accordingly in respect of all sorts of behaviour-mental, vocal, and physical. He is in true sense a mechanical person as programmed by them.

The fourth stage, i.e. intelligence, is actually the true stage of rationally conscious morality which is supposed to involve, in today's language, reason, freedom of choice, and responsibility for what one does. But according to the *Upaniṣad*, before intelligence starts functioning it has first to develop faith (*śraddhā*) in the divine revelation contained in the holy scriptures. The *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* says, "Faith is its head; the sight its right side, the true its left side, contemplation its body, the great one, i.e. the principle of *Mahat*, the foundation."<sup>46</sup>

So the Principle of intelligence in the *Upaniṣad* is the principle of reason but not in the sense we understand it today as that which allows, rather, encourages to question the very presuppositions, explore various possibilities, metaphysical and knowledge claims, absoluteness and obligatory nature of ethical practices, ways of training, and the need to transcend all these in order to realize one's true being, viz., Brahman, the Only Universal Being, which itself cannot be challenged by its own creation intelligence/reason because of its incapacity and limitedness. The self-realization of one's own being by intuitive method, not by intelligence, and thus the transcendence of the realm of morality means that "the sphere of morality is narrower than the sphere of life."<sup>47</sup>

It is now clear that the *Upaniṣadic* notion of morality, although it talks of intelligence/reason, is authoritative/divine/revelatory in nature. Here reason is supposed to function under the reign of faith in the revelation of

the scriptures (as the body of ultimate knowledge) and the seers (who have realized for themselves the Truth) so that faith is further strengthened and assumes the absolute foundation of morality. So the task of reason is to rationally reestablish what has already been revealed in the scriptures. Rationality is structured by the reason as the situation demands. The suitable empirical and non-empirical evidences are corroborated. The Upanishadic ethical training is so comprehensively and rigorously designed that it captivates and reigns the very being of a person from birth to death, claiming even to regulate the future life. It does so at every stage of a person's existence - mental or intellectual, vocal or physical, personal or social. A person's natural instincts are controlled and given a set direction, his consciousness (of course, empirical consciousness) is structured in a particular way, the purpose and meaning of his life are defined, his perception is radically transformed, religious faith is changed into epistemological beliefs. That is to say, what is external authority is transformed into internal authority. He sees, thinks, speaks, physically acts, and wants what has been taught to him. This shows he is not free to realize his own self or being independent of external authorities, he is not a free moral agent, he loses his true identity and is made to believe that his true identity is what the holy scriptures say.

The Vedic tradition talks of classification of *karmas* in various ways. The one among many ways is to classify it as *nitya*, *naimittika*, and *kāmya karmas*. The *nitya karmas* are regular and obligatory in nature like taking bath, performing *agnihotra*, etc. The last two are optional, but they have been practised in such a manner that they sound obligatory. This can be seen in the context of legitimization of the classification of *varṇa*, *Jāti*, *āśrama*, and *nitya-naimittika-kāmya karmas* in the Vedic tradition. This legitimization is done on the firm belief that this classification is divine, factual, natural and hereditary. This in turn has given rise to the rigorous hierarchical system in the society. In such cases, the supposed divine metaphysical grounds are considered more important than the ethical grounds, except in some exceptional cases. This has been a major point of fierce controversy between the Vedic and non-Vedic traditions like Buddhism, Jainism and the materialists. In Buddhism, all such classifications are based on the progress of morality in the persons. A person is classified

differently on the basis of his ethical level he achieves at different stages of his life. Its whole emphasis is on the primacy of progressive ethics over the primacy of "The Being or Self" and the ethics determined by this metaphysical Reality and other revelatory factors. These are the reasons why the Buddha and the Buddhists criticize many of the ethical teachings of the Vedas and the Upaniṣad, especially those teachings which are loaded with obligatory and revelatory colour. I now propose to discuss this and some more issues along with the Buddhist notion of morality

### **The Buddhist Notion of Morality and its Critique of the Vedic and Upaniṣadic Ethics :**

The Buddhist attitude toward the Vedic and Upaniṣadic concept of ethics or morality is generally critical. In the various Pali *Suttas* the Buddha is said to have opposed it because of its divine and revelatory nature, perhaps also because it promotes religious fanaticism and fundamentalism at the cost of the immediate concern toward the fellow beings. This has become self-evident and ubiquitous in most parts of today's world.

In the Vedic tradition (*Brāhmaṇas*, *Āraṇyakas* and the *Upaniṣads*), we find numerous instances of claims to revelation, very often inconsistent and mutually conflicting. The *Tevijja Sutta*<sup>48</sup> narrates a story about such conflicting claims about "the straight path to the union with Brahṁā", a path of salvation, by the distinguished and wealthy Brāhmaṇas, two of whom are Pokkharasādi and Tārūkkha, whose staunch followers are Vāsettha and Bhāradvāja. The latter two Brāhmaṇas, who are contemporary to the Buddha, develop a difference of views about the above matter. They approach the Buddha for resolution of the conflict. They want to know which one is the straight and true path and which the false or whether various paths are true and lead to the same goal. The Buddha asks Vāsettha, "Is there a single one of the Brāhmaṇas versed in the three Vedas? or a single one of their teachers, or the teacher of their teachers (up to seven generations), *ṛṣi* of the Vedas, who has seen Brahṁā face to face? To this, Vāsettha replies in negative. The Buddha says such view has been handed down from teachers to pupils, from generation to generation. To talk about the straight path to liberation leading into the state of the union with Brahṁā without having seen and known him is a foolish

talk. Invoking, praying and praising Gods, and mere hoping to cross a swollen river, not practising those qualities which really make a man Brāhmaṇa, and being infatuated by various kinds of lust, will never liberate a person or a Brāhmaṇa. The Buddha emphasizes the importance of the purity of mind and the practice of the five śīlas in order to liberate oneself and be happy.

The Veda is by definition considered to be the body of revelatory knowledge which among other things also claims to reveal the consequences of various moral practices. The Buddha, considering himself as a human being and not a divine revealer of truth, ridicules any claim to divine revelation on the ground that such claims are simply impossible for any human being.<sup>49</sup> The Buddha time and again says that "One is one's own refuge, who else could be the refuge."<sup>50</sup> He claims to be only a teacher who shows the way.<sup>51</sup> According to him, a person has to tread his path himself, he is capable of liberating himself from his bondage. In the *Alagaddūpama Sutta*, he asks his followers to take his teaching merely as a raft which helps cross over a river after which one should not keep hold of it or carry it over his head.<sup>52</sup> When asked what kind of teacher he is, he replies:

I, Bhāradvāja, say that there is a difference among those who claim that, in regard to the fundamentals of the Brahma-faring, they have attained here-now to excellence and to go beyond through super-knowledge. There are, Bhāradvāja, some recluses and brahmans who depend on report [*anussavika*], these claim that it is through report that, in regard to the fundamentals of the Brahma-faring, they have attained here-now to excellence and to going beyond through super-knowledge - such as the three-Veda-brahmans. But there are, Bhāradvāja, some recluses and brahmans who with only mere faith claim that, in regard to the fundamentals of the Brahma-faring, they have attained here-now to excellence and to going beyond through super-knowledge - such as reasoners and investigators [*takki-vimamsī*]. There are, Bhāradvāja, some recluses and brahmans who by fully understanding *dhmma* of themselves only [i.e. not learning it or hearing it from others], although these truths had not been heard before, they have attained here-now to excellence and to going beyond through super-knowledge. Now, Bhāradvāja, I am one of those recluses and brahmans who by fully understanding *dhmma* of themselves only, although

*The Buddhist Foundation Of Morality,*

these truths had not been heard before, claim that, in regard to the fundamentals of the Brahma-faring, they have attained here-now to excellence and to going beyond through super-knowledge. You must understand it in this way, Bhāradvāja, that I am one of those recluses and brahmins who by fully understanding *dhamma* of themselves only, although these truths had not been heard before, claim that, in regard to the fundamentals of the Brahma-faring, they have attained here-now to excellence and to going beyond through super-knowledge.<sup>53</sup>

In the *Caṅkī Sutta*, the Buddha talks of five things which have the double characters of being true and false or empty:

These five things, Bhāradvāja, have a twofold maturing here-now. What five? faith, inclination, report, consideration of reasons, reflection on and approval of an opinion. These, Bhāradvāja, are the five things having a maturing here-now. Moreover, Bhāradvāja, even although something be thoroughly believed in, it may be empty, void, false; on the other hand, something not thoroughly believed in may be fact, truth, not otherwise. Moreover, Bhāradvāja even although something may be thoroughly inclined towards. .. well reported. .. well considered. .. well reflected upon, it may be empty, void, false, on the other hand, even although something is not well reflected upon, it may be fact, truth, not otherwise. Preserving a truth, Bhāradvāja, is not enough for an intelligent man inevitably to come to the conclusion: 'This alone the truth, all else is falsehood.'<sup>54</sup>

In this *sutta*, the Buddha advises Bhāradvāja to go beyond these five things and first develop intuitive wisdom and an awakening to truth. He says, "There is attainment of truth, Bhāradvāja, by following, developing and continually practising these things themselves."<sup>55</sup>

In the *Lohikha Sutta*, the Buddha criticizes the monopoly of the Brāhmaṇas in Vedic learning and holy practices, their divine exclusive right and claim over the intellectual tradition and their divinely superior status over other castes. He questions the hereditary criterion of superiority and propounds that without any religious pre-qualifications one is entitled to learning, teaching and practicing a particular way of life. The only requirement for these acts is that one has to develop oneself in terms of merit accordingly. This should be the guiding principle of deciding one's qualification in such matters. The Buddha is very concerned about the

welfare of others. In his opinion, a liberated 'self' must work to liberate others. This is an extension of self to the other and serves a social purpose. In this *Sutta*, the Buddha converses with Lohikka, the Brāhmaṇa, who raises a question: Why should a Samaṇa or Brāhmaṇa, having achieved a good state of mind, should bother about others who will be of no use for him? The Buddha replies that this kind of thinking or teaching is dangerous and creates enmity for others, and is therefore an unhealthy or unsound doctrine. The dialogue between the Buddha and Lohikka goes like this:

'Then suppose, Lohikka, one were to speak thus: King Passendi of Kosala is in possession of Kāsi and Kosala. Let him enjoy all the revenue and all the produce of Kāsi and Kosala, allowing nothing to anybody else.' Would the utterer of that speech be a danger-maker as touching the men who live in dependence on King Pasendi of Kosala-both you yourself and other- or not?

'He would be a danger-maker, Gotama.'

'And making that danger, would he be a person who sympathised with their welfare, or not?'

'He would not be considering their welfare, Gotama.'

'And not considering their welfare, would his heart stand fast in love toward them, or in enmity?'

'In enmity, Gotama.'

'But when one's heart stands fast in enmity, is that unsound doctrine, or sound?'

'It is unsound doctrine, Gotama.'<sup>56</sup>

In the same *Sutta*, the Buddha talks of three kinds of teachers who are blameworthy and identifies himself with that teacher, who having achieved excellence in ethical practices, guides his disciples to attain the same distinction and excellence.<sup>57</sup> In other words, only that teacher is praiseworthy who, unlike some of the Upaniṣadic realized souls, do not become passive by transcending 'good' and 'evil' practices. Such teacher cares for others; he always practises 'good' and teaches other to practice the same. He suggests union with the four *brahma-vihāras* - benevolence (*matī*), compassion (*karuṇā*), sympathetic joy (*muditā*), and equanimity (*upekkhā*) - rather than vainly seeking union with imaginary Brahmā, the

so-called metaphysically absolute reality.

In the *Kālāma Sutta*,<sup>58</sup> a confusion is created in the minds of the Kālāma princely sons of the Kesaputta by the situation wherein different views are propounded by different teachers. The Buddha advises them to be guided by their own experience of what is good for themselves as well as others. This should be the only moral consideration to overcome such confusions. The same issue has been discussed in the *Ambalatthikā-Rāhulovāda Sutta*<sup>59</sup> where the Buddha answers his son's query as to what constitutes 'good'. Rāhula is advised to be reflective about his conduct whether it is wholesome both to himself and others. These *Suttas* show that the Buddha himself, as a teacher, does not decide what is good and what is evil. He, contrary to the Vedic prescriptions, does not set any command about human behaviour. He leaves it to the person himself to reflect on the matter and to be guided by the principle of wholesomeness of moral consequences. This strategy brings psychological transformation in the person, a progress in his moral attitude and behaviour. The Buddha wants to see everybody to become guide unto oneself. His advice to one and all is to follow the middle path, a path of avoiding the two extremes of self-mortification and self-indulgence.<sup>60</sup> In ethical sphere, the middle path is the Noble Eightfold Path. In brief, according to the Buddha, moral behaviour should not be blindly guided by the so-called divine revelations, scriptures or holy teachers, one should first develop one's own reflective conscience taking into consideration the wholesome consequences of his behaviour for both oneself and others. For him, the foundation of morality is within the person himself which is to be cultivated and developed. This foundation does not lie in any religious, divine, legal or social commandments as we find in the Vedic, Judaeo-Christian and Islamic traditions.

In Buddhism, there is an advocacy of the gradual development of a person on the line of the gradual progress in morality which is not confined to mere external obligatory, legal or social behaviour. A person's development is nothing but his moral progress. It is in progressive stages like a long journey which requires a relay of seven chariots, the first one taking the traveler from the starting point up to the second one, the second one up to the third one and so on up to the seventh one which ultimately

takes him to the destination. Likewise, a man's ultimate destination is nibbāna, a state of complete freedom, wisdom, moral perfection and universal compassion. This is the state of a person who tirelessly works for the welfare of the entire humanity, even for the non-human creatures. It is in this vein that the *Rathavinā Sutta* says:

.. purity of moral habit is of purpose as far as purity of mind, purity of mind is of purpose as far as purity through crossing over doubt, purity through crossing over doubt is of purpose as far as purity of knowledge and insight into the Way and what is not the Way, purity of knowledge and insight into the Way and what is not the Way is of purpose as far as purity of knowledge and insight into the course, purity of knowledge and insight into the course is of purpose as far as purity arising from knowledge and insight, purity of arising from knowledge and insight is of purpose as far as utter nibbāna without attachment.<sup>61</sup>

From the preceding discussion, it is amply clear that the Buddha put maximum emphasis on the self-effort and self-realization in the matter of moral development of a person. This development, according to him, envisages the true manifestation of human nature which in its essence is endowed with loving kindness, compassion, sympathetic joy, and equanimity. It is further required to be wholesome in nature and application and achieved without being dependent on any external agency, divine or human. This means that the transformed and wholesome attitude of a person itself is the true foundation of morality which equally takes care of both the self and the other. In this scheme, moral behaviour of a person is supposed to be guided by only one factor, i.e. the immediate concern in a given situation which demands immediate expression of one's moral practice. This kind of concern rejects the demand of irrelevant and false notions of such identities like religion, caste, creed, ideology, nationality, and gender.

### NOTES

Translation of all the *Upaniṣad* and Pali passages are taken from S. Radhakrishnan's *The Principal Upaniṣads*, London, George Allen & Unwin, 1974 (hereafter SR, for Sanskrit passages too) and the Pali Texts Society (hereafter PTS) editions respectively.

*The Buddhist Foundation Of Morality,*

1. *Rg Veda*, I.1.8; I.2.8; I.84.4; I.105.12; II.23.15; IV.23.8, 10.
2. *ekam sat viprāḥ bahudhā vadanti. Rg Veda*, I, 164. 46.
3. *vasudhaiva kuṇumbakam. Hitopadesh, Samdhi, Katha is, Kā: 133.*
4. *Rg Veda*, X.191.2-4.
5. *Bhagavadgītā*, IV.10: *Vīrarāgabhayakrodhā manmayā mām upaśītāḥ / bahavo jñānatapasā pūtā madbhābhāgatāḥ //*
6. *Ibid.*, IV.9 : *Janma karma ca me divyam evam yo vetti tattvataḥ / tyaktvā dehaṃ punar janma naiti mam eti so rjuna //*
7. *Ibid.*, IV.11: *ye yathā māṃ prapadyante tamstathaiva bhajamyaham / mama vartmānuvartante manuṣyāḥ partha sarvaśaḥ //*
8. *Ibid.*, IV. 40: *ajñāś caśraddadhanaś ca saṃśayātmā vinaāyati / nayaṃ loko sti na paro na sukhaṃ saṃśayātmanaḥ //*
9. *Ibid.*, V.7: *yogayukto viśuddhātmā vijitātmā jitendriyaḥ / sarvabhūtātmabhūtātmā kurvann api na lipyate //*
10. *Ibid.*, V.25: *labhante brahmanirvāṇam ṛṣayaḥ kṣīṇakalmaṣāḥ / chinnadvaidhā yatātmanaḥ sarvabhūtahite ratāḥ //*, aslo cf. XII.4.
11. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, II.4.5
12. *Ibdi.*, II 5.19.
13. *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, VI. 8.7
14. *Ibid.*, II. 14.1.
15. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, II.4.5: *ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaḥ śrotavyaḥ mantavyaḥ nididhyāsitavyaḥ, maitreyi ātmano vā are darśanena śravaṇena matyāvijñānenedaṃ sarvaṃ viditam.*
16. *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*, I.II 4, 6: *atha yadi te karma-vicikitsā vā vṛtta-vicikitsā vā syāt ye tatra brāhmaṇās sammarśinaḥ yukta āyuktāḥ alōkṣā dharma kāmās syuḥ yathā te tatra varteran tathā tatra vartethāḥ. ...eṣa ādeśaḥ, eṣa upadeśaḥ, esa vedopaniṣat, etad anuśāsanam.*
17. *Ibid.*, I.2.1.
18. SR, p. 538.
19. *Ibid.*
20. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, V.2.1-3.
21. SR. p.290.

22. *Ibid.*
23. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, II.5.19.
24. *Ibid.*, I.4.10.
25. *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* VI.8.7.
26. *Ibid.*, III.14.1.
27. *Brahma-Sūtra-Śāṅkara-bhāṣya*, I.1.1.
28. Karl H. Potter (ed.), *Encycloedia of Indian Philosophies*, Vol. III, Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, 1981, p.37.
29. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, II.1.20: *sa yathorṇanābhiś tantunocaret, yathāgneḥ kṣudrā visphuliṅgā vyuccaranti, evam evād ātmanaḥ sarve prāṇāḥ, sarve lokāḥ, sarve devāḥ. sarvāṇi bhūtāṇi vyuccaranti: tasyopaniṣat, satyasya satyam iti prāṇā vai satyam, teṣāṃ eṣa satyam.*
30. *Ibid.*, II.4.10: *sa yathārdra-edhāgner abhyāhitāt pṛthag dhūnā viniścaranti, evam vā are sya mahato bhūtasya niḥsvasitam, etad yad ṛgvedo yajurvedaḥ sāmavedo tharvāṅgirasa itiḥāsaḥ purāṇaṃ vidyā upaniṣadaḥ ślokāḥ sūtrāṇy anuvyākhyānāṇi vyākhyānāṇi: asyaivaitāni sarvāṇi niḥsvasitāni. Also cf. Maitrū Upaniṣad, VI.32.*
31. *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* VIII.15.1: *tadd haitad brahmā prajāpataya uvāca, prajāpatir manave, manuḥ prajābhyaḥ. ācārya-kulād vedam adhītya yathā-vidhānam, guroḥ karma (kṛtvā) atiśeṣena abhisamāvṛtya, kutimbe sthitvā, śucau deśe svādhyāyam adhyānāḥ, dhārmikān vidadhat, ātmani sarvendriyāṇi sampratiṣṭhāpya, ahimsaṃ sarva-bhūtāny anyatra tirthebhyaḥ. sa khalv evam vartayan yavad āyurām brahmaa-lokam abhisampadyate, na ca punarāvartate.*
32. *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad*, I.1.1: *brahmā devānām prathamā sambabhūva viśvasya kartā bhuvanasya goptā sa brahma-vidyām sarva-vidyā-pratiṣṭhām atharvāya jyeṣṭhaputrāya prāha.*
33. *Kaṭha Upaniṣad*, I.2.24.
34. *Ibid.* I.2.23.
35. *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*, II.2-5, III.
36. *Ibid.* II.1.1: *sa vā eṣa puruṣo anna-rasa-mayaḥ.*
37. *Ibid.*, II.2.1: *tasmād vā etasmād anna-rasa-mayāt anyo ntara ātmā prāṇamayāḥ tenaiṣa pūrṇaḥ, sa vā eṣa puruṣa-vidha eva.*
38. *Ibid.*, II.3.1: *tasmād vā etasmāt prāṇamayāt, anyo ntara ātmā manomayaḥ. tenaiṣa*

- pūrṇaḥ, sa va eṣa puruṣa-vidha eva.*
39. *Ibid., II.4.1: tasmād vā etasmān mano-mayāt, anyo 'ntara ātara ātmā vijñānamayaḥ, tenaiṣa pūrṇaḥ, sa vā eṣa puruṣa-vidha eva.*
40. *Ibid., II.5.1: tasmād vā etasmād vināna-mayāt, ntara ātmā ānandamayaḥ, tenaiṣa pūrṇaḥ, sa vā puruṣa-vidha eva.*
41. M. Hiriyanna, *The Quest After Perfection*, Mysore, Kavyalaya Publishers, 1952. p.1.
42. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, IV.4.22-23: *etam u haivaite na tarata iti, atah pāpam akaravam iti, atah kalyāṇam akaravam iti; ubje u haivaiṣa ete tarati, nainam kṛtākṛte tapataḥ. ...nainam pāpmā tarati, sarvaṃ pāpmam tarati, nainam pāpmā tapati, sarvaṃ pāpmānam tapati, vipāpo virajo vicikitso brāhmaṇo bhavati.*
43. Śaṃkara on *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, II. 3.1: *saṃkalpa-vikalpātmaṃ kam antaḥkaraṇam tanmayo manomayaḥ.*
44. M. Hiriyanna, op. cit., p.2
45. *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* II.31: *tasya yajur eva śiraḥ, ṛg dakṣiṇaḥ pakṣaḥ, sāmottaraḥ pakṣaḥ, ādeśa ātmā, atharvāṅgirasas pucchaṃ pratiṣṭhā.*
46. *Ibid.*, II.4.1: *tasya śraddhaiva śiraḥ, ṛtam dakṣiṇaḥ pakṣaḥ, satyam uttaraḥ pakṣaḥ, yaga ātmā, mahaḥ pucchaṃ pratiṣṭhā.*
47. M. Hiriyanna, Op. cit., p.2.
48. *Dīghanikāya*, I.13 (tr. by T. W. Rhys Davids, *Dialogues of the Buddha*, Part I, Pali Text Society, London, reprint, 1973, 298-320).
49. Cf. Subha Sutta, *Majjhimanikāya*, tr. by I. B. Horner, *The Middle Length Sayings*, Vol. II, PTS, 1975, 388-98); also cf. Saṇḍaka Sutta, *ibid.*, 192-203.
50. *Dhammapada*, XII.4: *attā hi attano nātho ko hi nātho paro siyā/ attanā hi sudantena nāthaṃ labhati dullabhaṃ//*
51. *Ibid.*, XX.1: *tunhehi kiccam ātappaṃ akkhātāro tathāgatā* (You yourselves should make the effort; the Tathāgata [as teacher] can only show you the right path.)
52. Cf. Alagaddūpama Sutta, *Majjhimanikāya* (tr. by I. B. Horner, op. cit. Vol. I, 167-82).
53. *Square brackets are mine.* Saṅgarava Sutta, *Majjhimanikāya* (tr. I. B. Horner, op. cit. Vol. II, p. 400).
54. *Ibid.*, pp. 360-61.

55. *Ibid.*, p. 363.
56. *Dīghanikāya* (tr. *Dialogues of the Buddha*. Vol. II, op. cit., p. 291-92).
57. *Ibid.*, pp. 293-96
58. Cf. *Anguttaranikāya* I.188ff.
59. Cf. *Majjhimanikāya* (tr. I. B. Horner, *The Middle Length Sayings*, Vol. II, op. cit. pp. 414 ff.).
60. *Samyuktanikāya*, II. 17 ff.
61. *Majjhimanikāya* (tr. I. B. Horner, *The Middle Length Sayings*, Vol. I, pp. 192-93).

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## DANCE OF THE SIGNIFIERS<sup>1</sup>

J. B. PARANJPE

Aldous Huxley has suggested that we live in various universes, and that "these universes in which we live are members of one or other of two super-universes; the universe of direct experience and the universe of words." Between the universe of direct experience and us is this world of words, which is not as transparent, as we would like it to be. There is a need to take a closer look at this world of words since it unconsciously governs and conditions our responses to the outer world. The question is can we rely upon the word?

In this essay, I propose to treat Saussure as a point of reference. His seminal book on linguistics, which appeared at the beginning of the 20th century, dominated the intellectual climate of this century, particularly structuralist and post-structuralist thinking. According to Saussure, the sign refers to "the total resultant of the association of the signifier and what is signified." He holds that the link between the signifier and signified is arbitrary, that is to say, "the linguistic sign is arbitrary." Elaborating it, he adds an explanatory note:

There is no internal connection between the idea 'sister' and the French sequence of sound *s-o-r* which acts as its signal. The same idea might as well be represented by any other sequence of sounds. This is demonstrated by differences between languages, and even by the existence of different languages. The signification of 'ox' has as its signal *b-o-fon* on one side of the frontier but *o-k-s* (Ochs) on the other side.

At this juncture, we may raise a couple of questions. What is really

*Indian Philosophical Quarterly* XXX No 1  
January 2003

arbitrary? Is it the linguistic sign? Or, is it the signification? This is a crucial point in the argument of Benveniste. He remarks: "But immediately afterwards he [Saussure] stated that the nature of the sign is arbitrary because it has not natural connection with the signified. It is clear that the argument is falsified by an unconscious and surreptitious recourse to a third term, which was not included in the initial definition. This term is the thing itself, the reality." Benveniste's objection must be properly understood. He is an admirer of Saussure. He knows that Saussure had scrupulously avoided the use of a referent in his definition. However, he could not avoid it in his explanation. The argument is that there is tacit notion of a referent present in Saussure's explanation. Benveniste therefore infers that there is "a contradiction between the way in which Saussure defined the linguistic sign and the fundamental nature attributed to it." This anomaly creeps in, he thinks, because Saussurean concept depends upon the system of thought which is in some measure rooted in the historical and relativist thought at the end of the nineteenth century. He writes: "The real problem is far more profound. It consists in discerning the inner structure of the phenomenon of which only the outward appearance is perceived, and in describing its relationship with the ensemble of manifestations on which it depends." Saussure seems to lay much stress on the arbitrariness of the linguistic sign but the emphasis is wide off the mark "since the essence of this definition is only to consider the relationship of the signifier and the signified." A detailed analysis of the mutability of the sign reveals that Saussure's argument regarding the arbitrary character of the sign is "true of signification, not of the sign."

The trouble with Saussure's argument is that he is apparently against "an externally imposed element," and yet, he seems to be "always thinking of the representation of the real object." It is this surreptitious presence of the third term that explains the contradiction in Saussure's idea of the sign. Benveniste suggests that Saussure should not have raised the question of arbitrariness because there was no need to raise it. As a systematic student of philosophy, Benveniste argues his approach quite methodically and logically. He suggests that the question of arbitrariness be kept wholly outside the domain of linguistics. He says:

*Dance of the Signifiers*

...[T]he mind accepts only a sound form that incorporates a representation identifiable for it; if it does not, rejects it as unknown and foreign. The signifier and the signified, the mental representation and the sound image are thus in reality the two aspects of a single notion and together make up the ensemble as the embodiment and embodiment. The signifier is the phonic translation of a concept: the signified is the mental counterpart of the signifier. The consubstantiality of the signifier and the signified assures the structural unity of the linguistic sign.

It may seem that Benveniste is only trying to suggest an improvement in Saussure's definition of the linguistic sign. But this is not so. He does not reject Saussure's definition. However, by suggesting that the signifier and signified are together by necessity, he brings about a change in the level of discussion. Word does not remain outside. It becomes a part of us, and stays with us as a powerful tool in our exploration of the universe. In Benveniste's approach, language is both a constituent and a constitutive factor.

Two important aspects of this approach are: i) the linguistic sign is viewed as a unity and ii) the linguistic sign stands delinked from reality. Thus this sign can be used in a variety of situations and in a variety of ways. In a way, word is set aside from the surrounding physical reality. As a constituent and constitutive factor, it becomes something like an organ - a part of our self. Its basic function may be that of denotation, but it transcends this function, and performs a number of other functions. By the same token, language is also an integral part of me. As a constituent and a constitutive factor, it acts as a structured and structuring agency. It enables me to achieve some sort of order -- whether logical and aesthetic, and the way I use it reveals the kind of organisation that I have achieved.

Benveniste's critique of Saussure certainly raises the level of discussion. He understands Saussure well because he knows the difficulties involved in taking the stand that Saussure had taken. The merit of his approach is that his idea of sign combines the 'inner' and the 'outer'. In this approach, word is not directly related to the world outside. Since the signified is viewed as mental counterpart of the signifier, our idea of what is shaped by language. Benveniste thinks that "the consubstantiality of the signifier and the signified assures the structural unity of the linguistic

sign." But the problem is: 'can we really take for granted the "consubstantiality of the signifier and signified." In an ideal condition, there could be presumed had there been one-to-one relationship between the signifiers and the signifieds. But as we all know, this is not the case. In practice many acoustic images embody more than one concept. Moreover, the signifieds have a tendency to work as signifiers. Leave alone the question of mutability or immutability of the sign, even there is no fixed or stable relationship between the two in a given system.

Benveniste wants to save the linguistic sign from what may be called its inherent contradiction. But the way Derrida has deconstructed Saussure goes all the way to prove that there is no absolute foundation for language and that, in the use of language, we are constantly faced with the problem of indeterminacy. Words are univocal and indeterminate. The gap between the signifier and what it points to is filled by the sign, or what may be called object in-absentia. The notion that the gap is filled in is only a mirage always suggesting the possibility of reaching the object, but never realising it. The conclusion can be anything but nihilistic, there is no stability in the use of language: word is not supported by anything like a reality principle and hence the chase for meaning is itself meaningless.

Now it will be agreed that this conclusion is not at all new. But the process of disintegrating, dismantling or deconstructing the systems that have been carefully built over the years is indeed new. The strategy underlying this language scepticism is really remarkable. Instead of providing a counter-argument, we challenge and contradict the very assumptions on which the argument is founded. The loaded metaphors are carefully selected and exploded from 'within' by following the deconstructive mode of logic. Usually the value of scepticism lies in that it can be used as a 'corrective' and in that it has been encouraged in the traditional set up. But here the language-scepticism goes far beyond this. It keeps us constantly aware of the underlying sense of void -- an absence of an anchoring and anchoring centre, and threatens all our bids to regulate, theorise, and systematise. The sheer brilliance of argument is such that Husserl, Saussure, Plato, Rousseau stand 'deconstructed' -- ripped off, as it were, their logocentric and phonocentric sheaths. All this has such a devastating effect on our way of thinking that we may at times feel shy (if not guilty) of the logocentric

*Dance of the Signifiers*

and phonocentric tendencies ingrained in us. Actually there is no ground for any unconscious sense of guilt. Logocentricism and phonocentricism are the result of man's desire to find some 'centre' without which the phonetic and phonemic constructs will hold. Whatever way the language-sceptics argue, the fact remains that there are essentially two different - almost parallel -- ways of thinking.

In his critique of Saussure, Derrida seems to admire the former for his formulation that in language there are only differences, without positive terms." Herein Derrida finds a powerful critique of logocentricism. But the same logocentric tendencies in Saussure's own formulations become manifest in his definition of the linguistic sign. Regarding this, Jonathan Culler argues that "[T]he concept of the sign is so involved with the basic concepts of logocentricism that it would be difficult for Saussure to shift it even if he wishes to." Indeed this is the crux of the problem. From the point of view of deconstruction, theoretically, there is an unbridgeable gap between the signifiers and the signifieds. Indeed it seems impossible to move away from the signifiers to the signifieds. But in practice, the signifieds are not unapproachable, although they always seem to elude the grasp. The paradox inherent in this kind of situation is noted by almost everyone -- by Derrida as also by his commentators. Objections to the extreme positions taken by the deconstructionists are usually set aside by drawing a line of demarcation between the common-sense view of language and the more serious considerations of language. For instance, this is how Christopher Norris tries to gloss over the issue. He writes:

Scepticism in philosophy has always borne this ambiguous relation to the 'natural' or common sense attitude. Its proponents have never pretended that life could be conducted in a practical way if everyone acted consistently on sceptical assumptions. What would such 'consistency' amount to, if one denied the very basis of reason and logical coherence? This is not to deny that the sceptic's questions are trivial or totally misconceived. They are -- as I have tried to show with Derrida -- questions that present themselves compulsively as soon as one abandons the common-sense position. But language continues to communicate, as life goes on, despite all the problems thrown up by the sceptical thought.

This is not the kind of issue that can be treated lightly. In this case,

the kinds of questions that the sceptics have asked are so fundamental that our whole attitude to the problem of 'Knowing' gets affected. The question is not merely about what role does language play in our knowledge of the world. The question is: 'can language ever play the role that we have assigned to it?' 'Can language be ever relied upon?' It has been accepted almost by common consent that in actual situation language works. This basic assumption is questioned the moment we ask if it can really work in the absence of absolute foundation. Derrida's procedure is succinctly summarised by M. H. Abrams. He writes:

He agrees that it works, then asks, "But is it possible that it really works?"

He concludes that, lacking an ultimate ground, it is absolutely not possible that it works, hence its working is only a seeming -- that, in short, though text may be legible, they are not intelligible, or determinately significant.

Let us, therefore, see how language *actually* works. Let us begin with a passage from Derrida's writings:

We can extend to the system of signs in general what Saussure says about language: "The Linguistic system (*langue*) is necessary for speech events (*parole*) to be intelligible and produce their effects, but the latter are necessary for the system to establish itself..." There is a circle here, for if one distinguishes rigorously *langue* and *parole*, code and message, schema and usage, etc. and if one is to do justice to the two principles enunciated, one does not know where to begin and how something can in general begin, be it *langue* or *parole*. One must therefore recognize, prior to any dissociation of *langue* and *parole*, code and message and what goes with it, a systematic production of differences, the production of a system of differences -- a difference among whose effects one might later, by abstraction and for specific reasons, distinguish a linguistic of *langue* from a linguistic of *parole*.

Here I would like to draw the attention of my readers to the word which has apparently no place in our dictionaries: '*Ddifference*'. This is what creates a gap in the text -- the gap that may pose some problems in weaving the text. If a reader were really innocent, he would treat it as a spelling error, or a slip. But the fact that the word is printed in italics is a signal, a sort of forewarning, that it should be treated more seriously, especially in case of a writer who plays his game carefully, scrupulously and following the rules of the game in spirit. '*Difference*': Is it a sign? Sign of what? Or a signifier?

*Dance of the Signifiers*

What then does it stand for? The reader may look for some other signs, which may point to this particular sign. Surely there are some indications, but all that is not enough to make sense. Can a dictionary explain? We know that there is no such signifier in the dictionary -- not at least, at this moment. This signifier, if it is to be called so, is poised to be differentiated, distinguished, waiting to point away to something other than itself, and not finding a way out, draws all our attention to itself, like a spot of coagulated blood in the texture of the text. But the text is not completely silent. We have the author's explanation of it: *differance*, he writes:

Is a structure and a movement that cannot be conceived on the basis of the opposition presence/absence. *Differance* is the systematic play of differences, of traces of differences, of the spacing [*espacement*] by which elements relate to one another. This spacing is the production, simultaneously active and passive (the *a* of *differance* indicates this indecision as regards activity and passivity, that which cannot yet be governed and organised by that opposition), of intervals without which the "full" terms could not signify, could not function.

Derrida's commentators further explain the idea. A close reading of their text would reveal that they are reading it as Derrida would like it to be read, equating, or rather approximating (perhaps, strangely enough) their reading with his, and moreover, writing with that self-confidence about what they mean. The point is that both the writer and his commentators are serious about it, and they know that their writing will be taken seriously. This is that well known Derridean strategy which combines the two senses -- conveyed by the two signifiers: 'differing' and 'deferring' -- by producing a new signifier 'differance': it is that which indicates and yet holds back something, and else refuses to indicate and yet reveals something, and it is that which we are encouraged to accept with the new sense which is really absent, while theoretically rejecting the very plausibility of arriving at any sense.

The general drift of Derrida's critique is directed towards emphasising the theoretical impossibility of making a sense, of reaching signifieds. But for all practical purposes, the *sense* has been conveyed, and the most curious thing is that the strategic substitution of 'e' to 'a' has been responsible for conveying this *intended* sense because this is how

the author of the text wants us to read the term '*differance*'. The theoretical stance is undercut by the practical considerations, which, in turn, suggest that language works.

The most curious thing is that Derrida himself knows it very well. He is keenly aware of the linguistic and academic conventions in the field of scholarship and wants to follow them scrupulously. He seems to take writing very seriously and further assumes and knows that his writing will be taken seriously by his readers, too. Even when he effects a change in spelling and produces a variant, he is quite sure that whatever may have caused him to produce the variant will be known and understood by his readers. If all this is true, neither Derrida nor his commentators can summarily dismiss the simple claim of their opponents that they should explain or account for the contradiction between the theoretical stance and practice. My simple claim is that Derrida and his commentators are absolutely certain that it is not impossible to produce a new signifier, the sense of which will be conveyed with a fair degree of confidence. No one rejects the right of the sceptic to disentangle, dismantle, and deconstruct the prevalent view or theory of language. The impeccable honesty, scientific rigor and exacting demand for consistency in Derridean logic are such that we should feel almost completely convinced about the utter futility of reaching signifieds through a chain of signifiers. At the same time, we know that, for all practical purposes, this is not true: we *do* reach signifieds. Again, at the theoretical level, Derrida shows that the logic implicit in the Saussurean mode of argument finally leads to a state of dissemination wherein "language reveals an anarchic and unpredictable level of functioning, subversive of all rigid proper meanings on the ordinary socially controlled level." And yet, the practice reveals that the "anarchic and unpredictable level of [its] functioning" can be very well managed and controlled by the author. Now in this situation, the sceptic cannot escape the responsibility of stating how the language works the way it works. It has worked in sciences: it has worked in literature. True that there is a difference between the common-sense view of language and the more serious consideration of language. The 'language' of which Saussure speaks is no other than this so-called common-sense view.

What is so remarkable about this deconstructive mode of logic and

*Dance of the Signifiers*

strategy is that it allows Derrida to deconstruct Saussure without rejecting him. "I am very fond of everything I deconstruct in my own manner," says Derrida, "the texts that I want to read from the deconstructive point of view are the texts I like, with that impulse of identification which is indispensable for reading." What makes him dismantle the metaphysical and rhetorical structures is not "to reject or discard them but to reconstitute them in another way." This is also what distinguishes him from all other sceptics. In the Derridean canon, Saussure's position is as ambivalent and precarious as that of Rousseau, Husserl and others whom he has deconstructed: that is to say, neither accepted, nor rejected. Thus he accepts their terms and plays them against each other, revealing the problematic aspect of their internal relationship. Let us, therefore, once again, return to Saussure.

As a linguist, Saussure's strategy is well suited to his purpose. He knows what he is about. The phenomenon we call 'language' is indeed complex in terms of assumptions, attitudes and levels. It is a part of that reality with which it deals. It can also be used effectively as an escape route for running away from that reality. Saussure, therefore, seems to select the communicative aspect of language. It is interesting to see how he describes the language-behaviour. He seems to approach language methodically, objectively and scientifically. Like a scientist, he isolates that aspect of the complex phenomenon, which he can study systematically. Strictly speaking, it is not language but linguistics, which is systematic. No doubt, linguistics cannot become systematic unless there is something in language which enables the linguist to study it systematically. This is perhaps why Saussure makes a distinction between language, *la langue* and *la parole*. *La langue* is a human construct -- an aspect of the totality, which opens and assures the possibilities of a systematic study.

Saussure describes it as a system of signs where "there are only differences, without positive terms." Now this is only one way of defining it. The uniqueness of a thing can be defined in terms of the qualities/characteristics/attributes that it has, provided we can point out the elements or qualities that can be viewed as belonging to that thing and no other thing. We cannot talk about the linguistic items in absolute positive terms. We can distinguish and differentiate them, negatively, that is to say, in

terms of what they are not.

This way of talking about word, the linguistic sign, is not altogether new. Saussure inherited the legacy of Western Culture, but he had also known and acquired the insights of the eastern culture. A student of Sanskrit, it is not unlikely that he had known the differing views of *mīmāṃsakas*, *naiyāyikas* and the grammarians, the Buddhists and the Vedantins. The *mīmāṃsakas* preferred to define words in positive terms. But the Buddhist held a different view. They used the term *apohah*, which means distinction or difference of an object from all other objects, which are again different from it. They further held that words signify merely the distinction of things from others that they are not. Thus, the word 'cow' signifies that the entity we call 'cow' is distinguished from 'not-cow.' Commenting upon the second couplet (*kārikā*) "*sākṣāt sanketitam...*" (*Kavyaprakasa*, Ch.II), Mammata incidentally refers to this view and summarily dismisses it as useless. It is interesting to note that Mammata's commentator quickly controverts the view, saying: "it is difficult to agree with Mammata here. The last two views [of the ancient *naiyāyikas* and that of the Buddhists] have as much relevance as the first two. Whether you accept them or not is entirely different matter." Two aspects of the Buddhist view are relevant to our discussion: a) a word has two aspects - *vācya* (concept) and *vācaka* (sound-pattern), and b) difference or distinction is what matters when we consider a word. Sanskrit scholars specifically relate words to conventions (*sanketa*), but there is no clear-cut emphasis on what we call 'system.' The notion of 'system' or 'institution' seems to have an affinity with the nineteenth century thought. Saussure's originality as a thinker lies in that he combines the insights which were available to him in both the traditions. He treated language as a system of differences. Thus, as a linguist, he defines *la langue* as the object of his study: i.e. the linguistic system where there are only differences, without positive terms." Finally all the four terms -- *la langue*, *la parole*, *signifiant* and *signifie* -- get interlocked in such a way that the whole has an appearance of a closely-knit monolithic system, with well-defined programme. The aims, objectives and purpose of linguistic analysis are clear, the methods are properly outlined and the whole ensures positive results.

*Dance of the Signifiers*

A specific letter in a language, the linguists argue, does not have significance; all the other letters in that language determine its significance in that language. 'A' is 'A' because it is not 'B' or 'C'.

We know this very well. But to be able to get distinguished or differentiated from all other letters in that language, this letter -- 'A' -- must have some 'content.' By content, I mean the way in which it is written or uttered. Its capacity to get itself differentiated from all other letters depends upon the physical content -- the letter itself -- the way it is written or drawn or uttered. For I cannot draw 'a' as आ and say that this is 'a' just because it can be distinguished and differentiated from all other letters in the English alphabet. That would be ridiculous. It will be argued that this 'new figure' does not have social sanction. That is right. The social sanction is given to the physical 'content' -- something that can be viewed positively. 'A' is a 'A' because it has some recognisable content in the English alphabet. This letter can be written in two ways -- 'A' and 'a'. Now, we can also say that 'A' is 'A' because it is not 'a', especially when we are using the written form. In oral communication, it is impossible to make such a distinction. 'A' is 'A' and not 'a' because it has some physical content, which becomes known to us in the written script. For a systematic production of differences as also for the production of a system of differences, the linguistic items need to have individual characteristics/traits/attributes. The strategic substitution of 'e' to 'a', introduced by Derrida, in order to distinguish 'différance' from 'difference' so as to have something of both -- 'difference' and 'deference' is possible only in the written form, and not in the oral form. To say that all that is important are differences and nothing else is only half-true. The uniqueness of the letter 'a' lies as much as in its content as in the logic of differentiation.

The importance of this argument would become clear if we extend the logic to encompass 'word'. Words are not mere empty spaces, they have a positive content, and this positive content is determined by the consubstantiality of both -- the sound and its significance. They are significant sounds. Remove the significance from the sound, and what we have is a noise. We must realise that 'nothing' connects 'nothing'. Significances are constructed, bit by bit, they are destroyed within no time. Deconstruction is not destruction, the annihilation of everything. If Derrida

uses the lever of deconstruction to show us the void beneath, it is perhaps not because he loves the 'void' but because he wants us to remember forever the thin line that divides light from darkness.

If deconstruction is a kind of 'reconstitution from within,' it is indeed welcome. However, this aspect of deconstruction was not forcefully foregrounded. Instead of restoring our faith in the Word, deconstruction, as a movement, has shaken our faith in the language -- the very foundation of all our structures of thought. Word is split from within. Consequently, we find ourselves in a precarious situation, merely watching the dance of signifiers, having no truck with the signifieds. One step more and we may find ourselves in world of utter chaos and confusion.

1. This paper was presented by Prof. J. B. Paranjape on 5th of November 2001 as a valedictory address of the 18th Annual Session of The Maharashtra Tattvajñāna Parishad held in Nagpur University, Nagpur. We requested Prof. Paranjape to work on this theme further by adding notes & references. Unfortunately he died recently leaving the paper without any emendations. We regret his untimely demise and pay our respects to him by publishing the paper in its original form. --- *Chief Editor.*

## NIHILISM IN HEIDEGGER'S *BEING AND TIME*

SIBY K. GEORGE

This paper looks into *Being and Time*- that fascinating book by one of the just passed century's tallest philosophical minds, Martin Heidegger - from the homestead of a specific sense of nihilism, i.e., partial nihilism. This whole exercise is dedicated to the conclusion that there is such nihilism deeply breathed into the very texture of *Being and Time*, if subtly, and that it is possible to make sense out of this dark wood of partial nihilism. Towards this purpose, I have divided my paper into four parts. The first part discusses the question of the type of nihilism found in *Being and Time*. The second part focuses on the aspect of the negation of absolute frameworks for meaningfulness in *Being and Time*. The third part dwells on the possibility of self-created meaning. In the final portion of this paper, I deal with the question of the legitimacy and significance of such a partial sense of meaningfulness.

I use the term 'nihilism' here in the sense of meaningfulness from a relative and not an absolute standpoint. 'Nihilism' is not used here in the sense of the philosophical claim that nothing actually exists or even that there is actually no meaning at all in human existence. I, rather, use this term to mean that human beings can make their existence meaningful, but not in reference to something everlasting and all-good, like the concept of God, but in reference to one's own self, one's individuality. It involves the claim that we need not look for eternal and non-temporal reference points to make our lives meaningful, but we can, as questioning and ontological realities (that is, as a Being for which its own being is an issue), make our lives meaningful by questioning and challenging ourselves to possibilities

*Indian Philosophical Quarterly* XXX No 1  
January 2003

which are better according to our ontological scale of priorities. In this kind of nihilism, we do not stand by the position of absolute absurdity or absolute nothingness, but by a relative absurdity, namely, that there is no absolute reference for meaningfulness, and by a relative nullity, namely, that by death it shall all come to pass. This nihilism is indeed partial, bold and heroic. It denies meaning only to assert it from another reference frame, namely, the individual. I shall henceforth refer to this sense of nihilism as partial nihilism in the forthcoming discussion, and even when the term 'nihilism' is used without the qualification 'partial' it should be read in that sense.

# I

The type of nihilism that we find in *Being and Time* can be best traced to the tempestuous writings of Frederick Nietzsche. As regards the fallen predicament of Dasein, Heidegger's *Being and Time* brings in memories of St. Augustine and Blaise Pascal. As regards the anxious awareness of this lost status of Dasein, Kierkegaardian writings could be thought of as precursory. However, most significantly, with regard to the bold assertion of one's authenticity and freedom in this situation, and the daring assertion of meaningfulness therewith, despite the chaotic and partially absurd modern situation, nothing matches *Being and Time* than the spirited, if provocative, writings of Nietzsche. The Nietzschean spirit has so much permeated *Being and Time* that when people began to raise eyebrows because of the clandestine nihilistic elements in the great book, Heidegger wrote sarcastically in his defensive "Letter on Humanism": "Because we refer to the word of Nietzsche on the 'death of God' people regard such a gesture as atheism. For what is more 'logical' than that whoever has experienced the death of God is godless?"<sup>1</sup>

Even to a casual reader, *Being and Time* strikes as a systematic work - a product of laborious effort. Nevertheless, as in most great books, certain things in it are left unsaid. The reader should get into the pulse of the work and know those tacit but important allusions in the book if he were to have any insight into its message. If you do not get at it, you lose the way into the otherwise tightly woven text. The underlying Nietzschean spirit in *Being and Time* is of that nature. We do not find in it words like

'nihilism', 'atheism' or 'absurdity'. We do not even find in it Nietzsche's famous phrase 'God is dead', which Heidegger often quotes in his later writings. However, the reader breathes the air of modern nihilism while he is engrossed in *Being and Time*.

Heidegger's effort in *Being and Time* may be termed as redeeming Nietzsche in certain important sense. In many respects he picked up from where Nietzsche had left off. He was deeply involved in the Nietzschean findings, but was aware that Nietzsche pinpointed only the problem and not its solution. Heidegger strove to give a direction to Nietzsche. In this effort he accepts nihilism as a modern fact that cannot be explained away or easily done away with. He accepts it as something that has come to stay in every European home, nay, in the world over. As William Barrett observes, Heidegger's was the most thorough going attempt at rethinking Nietzsche in the twentieth century. He writes that Heidegger was "engaged in nothing less than the Herculean task of digging his way patiently and laboriously out of the Nietzschean ruins, like a survivor out of a bombed city."<sup>2</sup>

Since it is a nihilism that has become a way of life for modern man, it is not necessary to dwell on it so much. Heidegger assumes that what Nietzsche did was enough in that direction: God is dead and together with that concept all supposed ethereal realities are also buried. Instead, *Being and Time* guides the reader out of modern nihilism. It does not deny that there is nihilism, rampant and certain, but tries to answer the question 'if so, what next?' Anyone who carefully goes through the text of *Being and Time* becomes aware that there is an intricately woven framework of heroic authenticity in it, despite the modern fact of nihilism.

Unlike Camus, Heidegger does not say that absolute absurdity is our modern fact and despite this we can choose meaningfulness in freedom. Rather, he says that Dasein is an ontological reality and so it basically questions itself by taking issue with its own Being. As far as this questioning is concerned, no other supersensible reference frame is necessary. The compact ontology of my Being-there, as Being-in-the-world, with 'Care' constituting my Being and 'temporality' as that into which I am projected, I can authentically 'be'. My authentic 'Being' is my meaningfulness. I do not contrive a meaningfulness out of absurdity, but my 'Being' in itself is

already meaningful without reference to anything else. Unlike Sartre, Heidegger does not say that we find ourselves condemned to be free in an already given but antagonistic world, and that we create our meaning holding on to this flicker of freedom. But he says that though it is true that we find ourselves thrown and fallen into the world, the ontological fact of our authenticity is prior to this fallenness by significance, that is, ontologically Dasein is special because it is already a being for which its own Being is an issue and it can possibly make its authentic Being real, just as it can make other possibilities real for itself. Dasein is projected into the temporal framework of numerous possibilities, among which the most significant one is its own authentic Being. It may or may not seize hold of this possibility. But if it does, Dasein tides over the nihilistic currents and becomes whole. Thus Heidegger chooses a truly middle path between absolute nihilism and absolute meaningfulness.

The tendency to read Heidegger's *magnum opus* from a staunchly nihilistic perspective should be resisted. Instead, it should be insisted that Heidegger tread a middle path between total nihilism and absolutism. One evident reason for such biased reading of *Being and Time* is the traditional and conceptually coherent and simple notion that we can find meaningfulness truly only from an absolute standpoint. The strong religious edifice of the traditional society was singularly responsible for this view. Upon the background of this sublime and totally even realm of things, every difficulty of life is made meaningful, every enigma of existence is evened out, every problem is adequately explained. In this manner, human mind began to be conditioned to think in terms of making everything partial in life to be whole by projecting it against the backdrop of an absolute world of complete and perfect realities. No better and imaginative picturization of such a view of things is available in Western thought than Plato's 'world of pure forms.' No doubt, Heidegger's *Being and Time* brushes aside the great edifice of absolute meaningfulness by the simple claim that the Being of Dasein is temporality. He doesn't explain and demonstrate like Nietzsche about how civilizations groomed the idea of absolute meaning. He does not tell us whether it is the case that absolute meaning is possible or not. He just tells us that the historical Dasein of his contemporary times was bereft of such an idea and that it is possible to think human being from a different

# Nihilism in Heidegger's *Being and Time*

paradigm.

In the same breath, it must be added that the other extreme tendency to view in *Being and Time*, vague and concealed absolutism should be resisted. The abundant use of Heidegger by theologians, both Protestant and Catholic, should be considered the chief reason for the prevalence of this view. However, it should be remembered that theologians are using the Heideggerian framework in their discipline without claiming any absolutism in it. They only creatively theologized the new philosophy as the liberation theologians did of Karl Marx. It would not be said, except for humour, that Marx believed in God since theologians borrowed from him.

## II

How does nihilism in the above sense come through in *Being and Time*? This happens in a variety of ways, of which the following may be considered significant.

First of all, *Being and Time* is built on the existentialist assumption that existence precedes essence. In its radical form, as Sartre later showed, this principle implies that there is no God-given or whatever a priori essence in humans, before each person creates her own essence. This, in a clean little sweep, puts the idea of eternal soul substance aside. Humans find themselves thrown into the world as Being-in-the-world. The question of how this 'throw' comes to happen is not addressed. There is only the probing into human being. Such a view is nihilistic because the foundational moorings of humanity are swept aside by it. However, it should be remembered that Heidegger is analyzing the human being from a particular aspect - as Dasein. This word, Dasein, could be translated as Being-there or Being-here. The point in using the term Dasein is precisely to treat its 'worldliness', that is, humans as immediately present here, humans in their flesh and blood concreteness and matter-of factness. So, really speaking, whether Heidegger believed in the eternal nature of the human spirit is an open question. But *Being and Time* is nihilistic because while saying so many profound things about this being, it put aside that eternal aspect of it, not even bothering to address it. For Heidegger, the 'Daseinness' of humans is a question that he is addressing methodologically, and from the ambit of this method, the spiritual aspect of humans is absent. And yet, this approach

is nihilistic because the whole idea that the reader gets while labouring through the many pages of *Being and Time* is that bold assertion that even if humans had an eternal spirit, it was not important to be discussed. This does not mean that without the metaphysical absolutes there cannot be meaning or value, but that without them there is no absolute meaning or value. *Being and Time* holds by this relative value by the proposal of the concept of authenticity, about which we will deal in the next section. Traditionally, meaningfulness of human destiny and values of human life have been absolutized, from an absolute and eternal framework. Since Heidegger overlooks this framework, his proposal is nihilistic to that extent. This does not mean that partial nihilism is negative, because while overlooking the metaphysical absolutes Heidegger did not say that human life is absurd and that no sense can be made out of it. But he says that by authentically owning up one's Being, one's life can be made meaningful. We shall see later, if this proposal of the individual as the paradigm of value could itself turn negative.

Secondly, the whole discussion on Dasein is centred on the idea of finitude. Dasein is finite and limited. Therefore, it will come to a finishing point. The word 'finite' is related etymologically to the idea of a finish. It is this idea that comes through when Heidegger says that Dasein's Being, in a primordial sense, is temporality. Humans live, move and have their Being within the finite framework of temporality. However, we should once again remember that Heidegger is discussing Dasein and not human being as such. And so we cannot say that *Being and Time* has closed its doors to life after death. For instance, while elaborating on his exposition of death Heidegger insists:

If "death" is defined as the 'end' of Dasein - that is to say, of Being-in-the-world-this, does not imply any ontical decision whether 'after death' still another Being is possible, either higher or lower, or whether Dasein 'lives on' or even 'outlasts' itself and is 'immortal'... But our analysis of death remains purely 'this-worldly' in so far as it interprets that phenomenon merely in the way in which it enters into any methodological assurance in even asking what *may be after death*, only then can we do so with meaning and justification.<sup>3</sup>

Heidegger was unwilling to enter into any argument about such questions

## Nihilism in Heidegger's *Being and Time*

in *Being and Time*. He preferred the hermeneutico-phenomenological approach of revealing by 'looking' and 'seeing'. Nevertheless, may be in some unguarded moments, he states that all philosophical arguments so far produced about the eternal nature of humans is to be considered unsatisfactory, nay, no argument at all:

That there are 'eternal truths' will not be adequately proved until someone has succeeded in demonstrating that Dasein has been and will be for all eternity. As long as such a proof is still outstanding, this principle remains a fanciful contention which does not gain in legitimacy from having philosophers commonly 'believe' it. (BT, p. 169-70)

Hence, it may be safely said that *Being and Time* is agnostic about the eternal soul substance and its proposal of the relative value theory has this as an underlying belief.

Thirdly, nihilism in *Being and Time* is closely tied to the very important concept of nullity. In simple words this means that the Being of Dasein is permeated with an inescapable nullity, a primordial "NOT". Nullity of Dasein implies three important 'nots': (i) Dasein's basis, its thrownness, is, first and foremost, null. To quote Heidegger: "It is never existent *before* its basis, but only *from it* and *as this basis*. Thus "Being-a-basis" means *never* to have power over one's ownmost Being from the ground up. This "*not*" belongs to the existential meaning of "thrownness." It itself, being a basis, is a nullity of itself." (BT, p.330) (ii) One of the basic characteristics of Dasein is its openness towards possibilities signified by the term 'projection'. This means that while choosing some possibilities Dasein "constantly is *not* other possibilities (BT, p.330). This again is nullity. (iii) Factually every Dasein is inauthentic in its average everydayness. This is again due to nullity, that is, Dasein is *not* able to raise itself above the inauthentic mode of existence to an authentic mode of existence. Hence, as such, Dasein is 'falling'. Heidegger writes: "In the structure of thrownness as in that of projection, there lies essentially a nullity. This nullity is the basis for the possibility of *inauthentic* Dasein in its falling, and as falling, every inauthentic Dasein factually is." (BT, p.331)

Heidegger's notion of ontological guilt is built around the concept of nullity. Dasein is guilty in its very Being because it is null. I *cannot* have power over its thrown basis, it *cannot* have power over all its projected

possibilities, it cannot have power over its mode of existence factually. Hence, guilt itself is defined as "*Being-in-the-basis of nullity*." (BT, p.329). It is important to stress the point of nullity with adequate emphasis, because Heidegger comes to a conclusion that though Dasein in its very Being is 'care' (that is, an entity which takes issue with its own Being), it cannot completely tide over the strong currents of falling inauthenticity because 'care' itself is permeated with nullity through and through.

What do we gather from this talk about nullity, guilt and an air of inevitability attached to them? This talk points to our basic human sense of incompleteness. It should not, however, be mistaken that this sense of incompleteness is the same as the religious notion of human immanence vis-a-vis God's transcendence. Heidegger's talk of nullity and guilt contributes to nihilism in *Being and Time* because there is no way of transcending it. There is no projection of a paradise of completeness. As Karsten Harries points out, Heidegger's message is that all search for a stable and secure place for humans is ultimately doomed to futility.<sup>4</sup> Later Heidegger would begin to speak of the radical homelessness of humans: "a homelessness in which not only man but the essence of man stumbles aimlessly about."<sup>5</sup> If so, the question now is: what can be made out of this profound message? Is it a bleak picture of merely negotiating with this vast ocean of radical meaninglessness?

### III

Heidegger chooses the term Dasein in his ontology of the human being to stress five points: (i) the entity under investigation is 'each of us' himself, (ii) it 'includes enquiring as one of the possibilities of its Being' and (iii) we cannot define its essence 'by citing a 'what', (iv) its essence lies in the fact that 'in each case it has its Being to be', and (v) it has this "being to be" as 'its own'. (BT, pp.27 & 32-33) If each of us, as enquiring and open-ended beings, always at the threshold of possibilities which are our very own, is destined to encounter our homelessness as our very own, what do we make out of it? How do we enquire into it? What possibilities do we embrace, if we are so entirely engulfed in nullity?

In reference to these questions the important distinction between authenticity and inauthenticity in *Being and Time* should be given attention.

*Nihilism in Heidegger's Being and Time*

to. These are the two modes of Dasein's existence. Of these two modes, authenticity is more primordial, prior and ontological than inauthenticity, according to Heidegger. Here there is a difficulty: factual Dasein already finds itself inauthentic, but still authenticity is prior. How? It is prior from the ontological perspective of significance to Being. Inauthenticity is eliding the possibilities which are truly one's own and embracing the possibilities of 'the-they,' which is but a characteristic feature of Dasein, and not individuals other than Dasein. We come to know of the possibilities which are our own by 'understanding' the totality of our projection, that is, what is projected in our understanding. Inauthenticity is eliding understanding itself and authenticity is understanding which entails possibilities that are our very own. In this schemata of projected possibilities, there is one possibility that we cannot do away with. It is necessary and absolute, and it gives a finite totality and completeness to our Being. This possibility is our own death. From the backdrop of this inescapable possibility, other possibilities which are not necessary and absolute can gather meaning. How do we choose these other possibilities? There is neither criterion nor rule for this act of choice. It has to be individually decided by every Dasein on the basis of the completeness with which it can see itself, if it cares to choose its own death as its very own and final possibility. Hence human authenticity in the Heideggerian framework consists in radically committing oneself resolutely to a project or choice upon the finite background of one's own death. If in this background ethics comes as that choice, it is fine, if it is a lack of ethics, it is equally fine. What matters is the authenticity of the choice itself and not its content.

This open content could easily lead to moral nihilism, again in the sense of a relative nihilism. By making individual the paradigm of moral values, all absolutes of morality are rejected. There are still moral values but they are relative to individuals and their act of choice. This proposal is at once heroic and suspicious. Heroic because humans are freed from all systems of morality and are given the responsibility to think, feel and choose to act according to their own internal resources. This proposal is also suspicious, because it does not take sufficient care of human frailties and the social nature of their Being. In present Heideggerian scholarship the whole question of this openness of content of human authenticity in

Heidegger's thought and its possible link with his own political action in supporting the inhuman reign of the Third Reich for a time, are hot questions.

However, in all this rhetoric of the authentic and inauthentic Dasein, what is evident is that there is nothing as absolute as our own death. That is the end of the show, but the show itself could be made colourful and entertaining if you accept the fact that the show does not go on. If the show fails, there is no other chance to make it fine on another stage. This important understanding will aid you to design the costume, the stage and the role itself for this first and last show. This is the partial meaningfulness that there is. If you look for another, there isn't. If you look for a better certainty, you don't find. The totality of your end in death and the authenticity of what content you want to give to your Being - in these two depend your meaningfulness. Though there is no absolute meaningfulness of the traditional mold, there is a partial meaningfulness, which comes to you, if you are courageous enough to encounter it. Such is the message of the nihilistic elements of *Being and Time*. As Karsten Harries points out, this is "a heroic nihilism, a faith in the meaning of life in spite of, or perhaps rather because of a lucid awareness of the nothingness that governs human existence and that dooms man and all his projects to establish a secure dwelling place for himself to certain defeat."<sup>6</sup>

#### IV

In his nihilistic rhetoric Heidegger presumed that nihilism had become 'world destiny'<sup>7</sup> and that European nihilism had become 'a planetary phenomenon'.<sup>8</sup> This assumption itself needs to be analysed thoroughly, but the scope of this paper does not permit such an analysis. However, we may point out that just as there is no satisfactory basis for believing in a supersensible basis for reality, there is also no satisfactory basis for believing that there is none. It is just that some minds are spiritually bent and others not, some cultures radically this-worldly and others radically other-worldly, some civilizations are promoters of rationalism and others of spiritualism. Since the days of the darkness-dispelling enlightenment and renaissance, the West has leaned heavily on the role of reason and science. This is what Heidegger, by his hermeneutico-phenomenological digging into the consciousness of historical Dasein (this digging is also, nay primarily, into Heidegger's own Dasein, since Dasein is in each case we ourselves are).

reveals as the nihilism, homelessness and nullity permeating the modern humans. This finding has tremendous importance, if what tradition has specified as the spiritual realm of things were merely a fantastic product of human imagination. If so, it could be that at a point in history humans have grown beyond their mere imagination and have realized the truth of how things are actually placed. But as it is, we have no way of knowing how things actually stand. Heidegger's picturing of the western human's embracing of the meaningfulness of nihilism as all-embracing itself calls for radical questioning. Heidegger writes:

Nihilism is the 'strangest' of all guests because it is the unconditional will to will complete homelessness. There is no point in trying to show this guest the door, since this guest has already invisibly gone right through the household... No one of insight would today deny that nihilism in the most various and hidden forms is the normal state of human beings.<sup>9</sup>

However, what we in the East are sure of is the fact that despite the West's colonization through information blitz, market of dazzling goods and attempt to make our planet a global European village, we cannot yet say that nihilism 'has already invisibly gone right through the (our) household.' We cannot also deny that the trend is being seen, albeit in sporadic bursts. But still more, we need to be surprised at the strength of the spiritual moorings of our civilization, despite the irresistibly compelling Western onslaught. There is also a need for in-depth questioning to ascertain whether an authentic hermeneutico-phenomenological ontology of the human being can do without the spiritual-religious aspect of human consciousness.

Nevertheless, one single fact vouches for the value and significance of Heidegger's exercise. Today, people are increasingly finding it easier to live meaningful and serene lives while staunchly denying the ethereal world of metaphysical realities. One important concern in this regard would be about the possibility of ethics in such people's lives. But they concretely and heroically manifest how unbelief and ethics go hand in hand. Ethics has become a pragmatic and natural choice even for the ungodly. No wonder, more and more ethical and even theological reworking of the Heideggerian approach is always on the cards.

## NOTES

1. Martin Heidegger, "Letter on Humanism," *Basic Writings: From Being and Time (1972) to The Task of Thinking (1964)*, trans. David Farrell Krell, (New York : harper Collins, 1993), p.249
2. William Barrett, *Irrational Man : A Study in Existential Philosophy*, (New York : Doubleday and Company, 1962), p. 205
3. Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time* trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, (Oxford: Basil and Blackwell, 1973), p. 292. Henceforth, all references to this work will be made by indicating 'BT' and the page number within parenthesis at the end of the reference in the text itself.
4. Karsten Harries, "Fundamental Ontology and the Search for Man's Place," *Heidegger and Modern Philosophy: Critical Essays*, ed. Michael Murray, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978), pp 65-79
5. Martin Heidegger, "Letter on Humanism," *Basic Writings*, p.218
6. Karsten Harries, *op. cit.* 78
7. Martin Heidegger, "Letter on Humanism," *Basic Writings*, p.243
8. As quoted in Joanna Hodge, *Heidegger and Ethics*, from "The Question of Being" from p. 71. Author's own translation.
9. *Ibid.* 9

## THEORY OF NYĀYA : SOME OBSERVATIONS

SARBANI BANARJEE

Gautama's Nyāyadarśana writtern in the form of aphorism (sūtra) is a comprehensive philosophical system which like any other such system includes theories of being (ontology), knowledge (epistemology), inference (logic) and morals (ethics). One unique feature of classical Nyāyadarśana or Nyāya system of philosophy is that it includes in addition a theory of Nyāya.

This theory of Nyāya may be described as the science and art of disputation. In such disputation contending or rival parties aim at setting some controversial issue (i) through honest arguments (ii) through polemics and sophistry. In case of former type of disputation the dispute ends in arriving at or establishing or demonstrating certain truth which all concerned accept as proved. In sanskrit this type of controversy is known as *vāda* or *vāda kathā*. The second type of controversy ends in the defeat by fair means or foul of one of the contending parties. If the contending parties in such disputes not only aim at merely defeating the rival by any means but has some position of one's own to defend then it is known as *Jalpa*. When the contending parties have no position of their own to defend the controversy is known as *vitanda*. When an absolute and committed skeptic engages himself in disputing some theoretical point with others, he has recourse to vitanda. Vātsyāyana in his Nyāyasūtra bhāṣya has held the position of a *vaitāndika* as self-stultifying.

In the Nyāya system of philosophy the theory of Kathā or disputation is to be distinguished from the theory of knowledge. The latter theory discusses among other things such means as perception etc. which are

*Indian Philosophical Quarterly* XXX No 1  
January 2003

means of knowledge or *pramāṇa*. So the theory of knowledge is *pramāṇasāstra* which includes theory of inference or *anumāna* also. For this *anumāna*, unlike deductive argument, yields novel information. The theory of disputation mainly discusses such means as *Nyāya*. *Nyāya* is not so much a means of knowing or *pramāṇa* it is rather a means of justifying certain position T (say the hill has fire) by showing that the ground that supports the thesis T (viz. smoke) is the right sort of ground capable of founding T. If it can be shown that the ground on which certain T is founded is sound then every one will accept T as proved in so far as it is based on that ground. It will also be demonstrated that the thesis contrary to the thesis T is not sound.

So, the means employed in settling issues or disputes in the context of theoretical debate or *Kathā* is *Nyāya*. We shall return to the discussion about the nature of *Nyāya* and how actually it hopes debates and controversies to be resolved. But a few other points may first be noted.

It has been already said that *Nyāya* system of philosophy in the classical period used to include with due prominence a theory of debate. In *Nyāya* text of this period detailed discussions would be found about the principles and techniques of such debates, conditions of success and failure in such debates and so on. But in later day *Nyāya* texts discussions of the art and science of debate are conspicuous by their absence. This suggests to many that the discussion on debate and disputation was necessitated during the classical period of *Nyāya* by the socio-cultural need. It has been said that during the classical period of *Nyāya* intellectuals and philosophers of the Vaidika society were found obliged to defend the beliefs and practices of the *vaidika* tradition against the socio-cultural (and not only intellectual) rivals who did not accept the authority of the *veda* and refused to believe and practice in the way the people of the Vaidika tradition did, on the simple ground that these were recommended or sanctified by the *Veda*. In short in India at that time there used to live in the same geographical region people who strongly differed on beliefs, practices and customs. So there had been genuine conflict and quarrel. To solve them at the theoretical and philosophical levels theoreticians and philosophers were often invited by the kings to engage themselves in public and open debate. There used to be honest understanding that the position, belief, custom or practice that

*Theory of Nyāya : Some Observations*

could be defended in the debate would have to be accepted and practised by the defeated contentant and the people on whose behest he engaged himself in dispute.

As could be expected when people of different traditions locked themselves in public debate to defend their respective position, unfair means were freely used to defeat the rival. Even so the disputants would have to observe certain norms and regulations so that even defeat could be forced on any one of the disputing parties. So the parties were obliged to agree on what could be allowed as permissible devices and what could not be allowed as such devices. Therefore even in Jalpa and vitanda form of debate or Kathā some rules norms and devices were used and some other such rules were avoided.

But since such form of debate is to be held between persons who respectively belonged to the vaidika and non-vaidika tradition, it could not have been obligatory for the disputants to use only such arguments as relate to things truth or position which was in conformity to what was said in the Vedas.

But in the *vāda kathā* none of the disputants was allowed to challenge or doubt the authority of the Veda. '*Śāstre vāde ca vimarśa varjjya.*' To put it otherwise śabdapramāṇa could be employed and non-polemical debates could be held only when no doubt was really entertained in the truth or soundness of the vaidika position. So the Nyāya, used as means in the debate of the form vāda, had to be such that it did not aim at demonstrating any position which was contrary to the vaidika position in the matter. If the Nyāya to be employed did not satisfy this condition then it would be branded as spurious nyāya or nyāyabhāsa.

In course of time socio-cultural conditions changed. No longer there were frequent occasions to dispute or defend certain vaidika position as burning social issue. The art of debate came to be used less and less. The need for building theories of debate or improving upon the existing theories and art of debate was felt less and less. Therefore this part of Nyāyadarśana - the theory of debate - was dropped.

But, the principles that were discovered when social conditions demanded that theory of debate (on vaidika position) should be developed,

were found to remain valid when the debates relate to secular matters. So if originally vāda kathā used to be held between a preceptor and a disciple none of them challenged or doubted the authority of the veda. We can well imagine that even today some variety of vāda kathā is held whenever a teacher and a student endeavour to a critically examine some position to decide on the truth of the matter.

Anyway the best way to visualise an actual context of doubt is to visualise it as a situation of actual open debate where there are two disputing persons or parties are there. Either they want merely to defeat their respective rivals or they want to be convinced which the positions being represented is true.

Each of the disputing parties wants to convince his opponent or more particularly, such other neutral persons who are present either as arbitrar observer (the Madhyastha) or witnessing member of the assembly of men (Sabhāsad). Convincing others as to the truth and soundness of a position T (say the self is eternal or immortal) is to produce in the other a knowledge to the effect T (i.e. that the self is eternal). If any of the contending parties succeeded in producing in others the knowledge which he claims to have then he may be taken to have established or demonstrated his position and convinced all concerned that the position he represents is the correct one.

But what means does and should one employ to convince all concerned about the truth of the matter in the context of an open debate. The answer is that he must employ certain form of language. If the issue being debated is whether the self is eternal or not then the two debating persons are men who hold respectively the positions (P1) the self is eternal and (p2) the self is not eternal. None of these men would be able to convince others if he employed language in the sense of uttering a sentence to make the assertion that the self is eternal or that self is not eternal. Mere utterance of a sentence to assert or deny certain position is the form of employment of language as pramāṇa. But utterance of a sentence or employment of language as pramāṇa succeeds only when the audience takes the speaker as an āpta that is as a sincere speaker who is in a position to know the truth.

*Theory of Nyāya : Some Observations*

But in the context of debate all that is known to the people present is that both the disputing parties is not true. Both are not sincere speakers who know the truth. One at most may be holding the correct position. But no one present is supposed to know who of the two debating person is he. Therefore when a debate starts every one present takes each of the debating persons to be possibly wrong and *anāpt*. So mere assertion or utterance of the sentence expressing his position will not convince any one present that what he is saying is true. Each party will of course assert the sentence which expresses his position. But such assertion will produce in others the knowledge that the utterer believes such and such to be the case (the utterer believes the self to be eternal). But to know that a person believes that self is eternal is not to know or be convinced that the self is eternal.

To convince the audience that he holds the right position the speaker should be able to produce the knowledge of the form that say: Self is eternal. How can he do so? If he were an *āpta* or taken to be an *āpta* then the utterance or assertion of the sentence expressing his own position would produce *śabdapramā* of the form self is eternal. But that is not possible here. And this the debating people know, so they use another form of language which is known as *Nyāya*.

This *nyāya* is totality of a number of sentences which are called constituent parts of *nyāya* or *nyāya avayava*. There is wide difference among the philosophers of different schools as to the exact number of *avayava* of a *nyāya*. The standard view of the *Nayāyikas* is that a *nyāya* consists of five sentences each of which has a specific form, function, order of utterance and name. The names in order are *pratijñā*, *hetu* etc. These *avayavas* or constituent sentences are also called *avāntaravākya* and the *nyāya* or the totality of all such *vākyas* is called *mahāvākya*. A *nyāya* succeeds in showing the legitimacy of the ground because each constituent sentence of it has the backing of the *pramāṇa* or the other. The number of *pramāṇas* admitted in the *nyāya* system are four.

When one employs *nyāya* in the context of a debate over whether the self is eternal or not his purpose is not to produce in the audience *śabdajñāna* or *śabdapramā* to the effect that self is eternal. This he cannot do. So he cannot be taken to employ language as means of knowledge or

as means of producing knowledge in himself or in others.

Nyāya is a form of speech but its employment is not to be confused with the employment of linguistic utterance as śabdapramāṇa. The person who utters nyāya is not taken as an āpta by the persons who are debating, observing or witnessing the open debate. On hearing the nyāya (a form of speech) uttered by any one of the disputing parties the audience come to have some linguistic or sentential belief (śābda buddhi) about certain matter. But the audience does not come to have knowledge of the matter or truth in respect of which the speaker wants to convince others.

But when eventually one of the debating persons succeeds in convincing all present that the position he holds is true he succeeds in producing in everyone present a kind of knowledge that the so and so is such and such (say that the self is eternal). For to convince one is to produce knowledge in others. But what form of knowledge is produced in the observer and witnessing individuals in a debate. The agreed position is that an inferential form of knowledge is produced which is considered as parārthānumiti.

But the puzzle is how in the context of an open debate some debating individual can produce in others inferential knowledge while what he employs as means is nyāya which is a form of language?

## II

The inferential knowledge which the hearer of a Nyāya vākya has is known as parārthānumiti. The special means that can produce Parārthānumiti is Parārthānumana. According to the Nyāya Vaiśeṣika whatever else a parārthānumana may be it cannot be śabdapramāṇa. Śabdapramāṇa can produce only śabdapramiti it cannot produce anumiti. Hence it cannot produce parārthānumiti either.

What does then produce parārthānumiti and what does employment of Nyāya contribute to producing such anumiti and convincing the audience in the context of open debate.

It is held that the factor which immediately causes both svārthānumiti and parārthānumiti is the same, namely parāmarśa. But the karaṇa in case of Svārthānumiti is Vyāptijñāna whereas in case of parārthānumiti it is manas or the mind.

*Theory of Nyāya : Some Observations*

If follows that general definition of anumiti cannot be given in terms of Karaṇa. This might have been the reason why Annambhaṭṭa defined anumāna (anumiti) in terms of parāmarśa. Viśvanātha's definition of anumiti (anumāna) as Vyāptijñānakaraṇakajñānaṃ is the definition of svārthanumiti. Gaṅgeśa defined anumiti in the Anumitiprakaraṇa of *Tattvacintāmaṇi* as *vyāptiviśiṣṭa pakṣadharmatājñāna jannya*. But he defined anumāna as the karaṇa of this anumuti. And that Karana in the case of a person inferring on his own is Vyāptijñāna. But in the case of a person who does not infer on his own but is made to infer so to say by the form of language (nyāya) which in the context of open debate the disputing persons employ is manas.

The idea is this. In uttering a nyāya vākya a debator virtually asserts that the ground supporting his position has all the marks of a legitimate ground of inference. To be told this for an audience is to have śābdabuddhi to the effect that the subject of the inference (Pakṣa) has or possesses a property or ground which is inferentially related to (Vyāpya) the object to be inferred (sādhya). Once the audience has such śābdaparāmarśa or memory disposition left by it as an auxiliary condition this cognition or disposition enables the means of the audience to yield a perceptual mānas parāmarśa. This in its turn produces in the hearer an inference that the pakṣa has sādhya that the self has permanence.

This is how the form of speech called Nyāya helps in producing the knowledge in the audience which convinces him as to which is the truth or who among the debating individuals is right. This settles the issue and brings the debate into successful conclusion.

The concept of parārthanumāna appears to have essential reference to some context of open debate where specific form of speech is used to produce indirectly an inferential means (anumāna) and inferential knowledge (anumiti=anumāna) So parārthanumāna is also known as nyāya sādhya anumāna.

It may be thought that if nyāya directly yielded any knowledge it would be śābda and not anumiti. There will always remain at the beginning doubt in the authority of the speaker of Nyāya. So no knowledge would be produced from the Nyāya he utters. And the belief that is produced will be śābda in nature and anumiti. If it is said that let not Nyāya it self produce

parārthānumiti but the śābdaparāmarśa which nyāya produces may yield parārthānumiti directly without any need for involving manas. In reply one may be tempted to say that śābdaparāmarśa is śābda by nature. It cannot be anumāna. But it would have to be anumāna if it were to (directly) cause parārthānumiti. How śābdaparāmarśa can be both śābda and anumāna. This reply is unacceptable. For in case of svārthānumāna i.e. svārthānumiti vyāptijñāna is regarded as anumāna. But vyāptijñāna is usually a case of memory. Thus a non-inferential knowledge can specially cause anumiti. In that case this noninferential knowledge is to be called anumāna.

The reason why śābdaparāmarśa cannot be regarded as anumiti is that karaṇa in case of parārthānumiti seems to be the following (i) anumiti is said to be caused by pratyakṣa. Remember Gautama's sūtra *atha tatpūrvakam trividhānumānam* etc. Here 'tat' refers to appropriate perceptual knowledge. (ii) A piece of cognition about the truth of which there is already doubt does not succeed to yield knowledge. In case of parārthānumiti the audience already has doubt about the truth of the śābdaparāmarśa generated by the nyāya employed by the contending parties to prove rival positions.

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## NAGARJUNA ON THE CONCEPT OF MORALITY

ABHA SINGH

The word 'moral' has its origin in the Latin word 'mores' (morals) which means customs or tradition, habits etc. Hence, morality is concerned with the behavioural life of man. Initially morality meant those behaviours of people which gave them progress, success and stability in social life. Social progress, led to social good and, in due course, these qualities were recognised as virtues, as they were conducive to social good. The determining factors of those virtues were later on absorbed and formalized, and those virtues did not remain restricted to a particular society but to the whole of human race.

In Indian context such virtues are not connected in the course of their development to the mundane world but also to the spiritual and supernatural. The progress of an individual is incomplete without the progress of the society and morality lay, according to the Indian tradition, not in striving for one's own progress, prosperity and happiness but in the progress, prosperity and happiness of all, that is the entire society and mankind.

*Sarve'pi sukhinah santu sarve santu nirāmayah I*

*Sarve bhadraṇi pashyantu mā kaścit dunkhamāpnuyāt II*

However, the congruity between individual and society is the presupposition of morality. Every society tends towards some ideal, some end. The distinctive feature of Indian philosophy and thereby of Indian society is that it is a synthesis of spiritual insight into the fundamental unity of the cosmos and encourages a practical pluralistic outlook with regard to

*Indian Philosophical Quarterly* XXX No 1  
January 2003

the social and ethical aspects of human life. Therefore, the segregation of morality and metaphysics has not been possible even in the heterodox systems in India. This is for the simple reason that the human mind cannot rest content with the sceptic or agnostic attitude. It cannot shut itself up in isolation from the whole or Reality, and attempt to lead an ideal life, without at the same time deciding whether the purpose of life tallies with the purpose of the universe or not. Buddha himself accepted the law of Karma and the possibility of mokṣa both of which are metaphysical concepts. The doctrine of karma is based on the universal ethical principle which is at the root of the world and its evolution. The silence of Buddha in these matters, though pragmatic, was perhaps responsible for the nihilistic attitude adopted by later Buddhism. Therefore the discussion of morality in the *Mādhyamika Śūnyavāda* would be justified only against the backdrop of its Metaphysical

#### METAPHYSICAL BACKGROUND

The crux of *Śūnyavāda* is that there is nothing in the phenomenal world which has any essence or nature (svabhāva) of its own. Therefore there is nothing mental or non-mental which is real. The universe is *śūnya* or void of reality. Behind this phenomenal world there is a reality which is not describable by any character either mental or non-mental. The real nature of objects cannot be ascertained by the intellect and, therefore, cannot be described. There is no truth, no essence in all phenomena that appear.<sup>1</sup> As the phenomena have no essence they are neither produced nor destroyed, they really neither come, nor go. They are really appearances.

*Śūnya*, according to Nagarjuna, does not mean a 'nothing' or an 'empty void'. *Śūnya* essentially means Indescribable (*avācya* or *anabhilāpya*) as it is beyond the four categories of the intellect. It is Reality which ultimately transcends existence, non-existence both and neither. It is neither affirmation, nor negation, nor both, nor neither. Empirically it means relativity (*pratitya-samutpāda*) which is phenomena (*samsāra*), absolutely it means Reality (*tattva*) which is release from plurality (*nirvāṇa*). The world is indescribable because it is neither existent nor non-existent, the Absolute is Indescribable because it is transcendental and no category of intellect can adequately describe it. Everything is *śūnya*, appearances are *Svabhāva-śūnya* or devoid of ultimate reality, and Reality

## Nagarjuna on The Concept of Morality

is *Prapancha śunya* or devoid of plurality. Thus *Śunya* is used in a double sense. It means relative as well as the Absolute. It means *Samsāra* as well as *Nirvāṇa*. *Śunya*, therefore, does not mean 'void', on the other hand it means 'devoid' - appearances devoid of Ultimate Reality and Reality devoid of plurality.

Undoubtedly, Nagarjuna conceives the apparent world as unreal or *śunya*. By real is meant any entity which has a nature of its own (*svabhāva*) which is not produced by causes (*akritaka*) and which is not dependent on anything else (*paratara nirapeksa*)<sup>2</sup> The real is independent uncaused being (*Aśunyam.....apratityasamutpānnam*).

The world of experience is bound by the relations of subject and object, substance and attribute, actor and action, existence and non-existence, origination, duration and destruction, unity and plurality, whole and part, bondage and release, relations of time, relations of space, and Nagarjuna examines everyone of these relations and exposes their contradiction.<sup>3</sup>

Nagarjuna's theory seems to require us to abandon the whole scheme of values as an illusion. When everything becomes unreal, good and evil are also unreal, and we need not strive to attain the state of *nirvāṇa* and free ourselves from miseries which do not exist.

### CONTOURS OF MORALITY

We cannot live taking life to be an illusion. It seems quite impossible to base moral life on a detected illusion. Though the miseries are unreal when judged by the absolute standard, they are real so far as our present existence is concerned. To one who has realised the *paramārtha* there is no problem at all. For he has reached *nirvāṇa*, but those who are entangled in the world have to work. Morality is not jeopardised, since the course of illusion is irresistible to all on earth. The illusion is so vital to human life that the distinction of good and evil remains unaffected whatever might happen to it in the higher condition. Nagarjuna recognized two kinds of truth, absolute and empirical. "The teaching of Buddha relates to two kinds of truth, the relative or conditional truth and the transcendent absolute truth."<sup>4</sup> By means of this distinction the otherwise insoluble contradiction between absolute nihilism and ethical life is avoided. While the higher leads to *nirvāṇa*, only

through the lower can the higher be reached.<sup>5</sup>

The theory of *Śūnyavāda* thereby is twofold - it is a philosophy of phenomenon as well as a philosophy of noumenon. They (*Śūnyavādins*) assert that Buddha's teachings indicate directly two orders of experience - the apparent and the transcendent. The apparent order is the non-substantial (*anātmā*) and transient (*anitya*) twelvefold process (*dvādaśbhāvachakra*) involving process from a basic ignorance to birth, death and rebirth, ending with suffering and sorrow (*jarāmaraṇa*). The transcendent experience (*nirvāṇa*) is the freedom from the apparent transient orders and basic ignorance, realised by following a triadic discipline of *śīla* (conduct), *saṁādhi* (concentration) and *prajñā* (insightful experience). The entire process is a practical method of purification. Buddha's teachings relates to two aspects of truth-the empirical and the absolute. The first is *Samvṛti* or *Vyavahāra*, the second is *Pāramārthika*. Those who do not know these two standpoints cannot understand the teaching of the Buddha.<sup>6</sup>

*Samvṛti* is a sort of covering. It hides the real truth. It is a workable reality, a practical make-shift, a necessary compromise. In the end it is no truth at all. But this can be realised from the absolute standpoint only. Though this distinction is a distinction within and by finite thought itself, yet it has got to be transcended. Intellect must be transformed into Spiritual experience. But his distinction is quite valid in the phenomenal sphere. The empirical cannot be condemned by its own logic. A dreamer, while he is dreaming, cannot condemn his own dream. Pure negation is an impossibility. It necessarily presupposes affirmation. Even an illusion, a mirage, a dream, a reflection as such exists. Appearances are not to be utterly condemned because it is only through the lower that we can go to the higher. The truth of the lower order is only a stepping-stone to the attainment of the higher. The nature of *nirvāṇa* experience which takes one beyond ordinary experience cannot be described. It can only be suggested negatively with the help of words which describe our common experience. Nagarjuna therefore, describes *nirvāṇa* with a series of negatives, thus: "That which is not known (ordinarily) not acquired anew, not destroyed, not eternal, not suppressed, not generated is called *nirvana*".<sup>7</sup> As with *nirvāṇa*, so also with the Tathāgata or one who has realised *nirvāṇa*. His nature also cannot

*Nagarjuna on The Concept of Morality*

be described.

In his *Ratnāvali*, Nagarjuna says that just as a learned grammarian may teach even the alphabets, similarly Buddha taught according to the capacity of his disciples. To the ordinary people he taught affirmation so that they may avoid all evil deeds. To the mediocres he taught negation so that they may realize the unreality of the ego. Both these are based on duality. To the best he taught the blissful *Śunya*, the deeper truth terrible to the fools but kind to the wise.<sup>8</sup> Nagarjuna condemns nihilism (*nāstikya*) by saying that negation leads to hell, affirmation leads to heaven and non-dual truth which transcends affirmation and negation, good and evil, heaven and hell is called Liberation by the wise.<sup>9</sup> From the absolute standpoint we have no thesis, no morality, no intellect, because they are all grounded in Pure knowledge (*bodhi*), the Reality.

The aim of the ethics of Buddhism is the highest stage of the *Bodhisattva*. The *Bodhisattva* is one who must give up egoism altogether and rise above anger, hatred and error to gain the virtues of conviction, compassion, benevolence and disinterestedness. The crux of Buddhistic ethics is that spiritual perfection, which consists in a harmonious life, alone can lead the aspirant to rise above the antinomies of pleasure and pain, heat and cold, joy and sorrow, and loss and gain. In this respect Buddhism agrees with the concept of *Sthitaprajñā*, or stable intellect of the *Bhagavadgītā* which is a unique ethical ideal. The purpose of referring to it here is that Buddhism is at one with the orthodox as well as the heterodox schools of Indian philosophy (except *Carvāka*) in the assertion that there is no possibility of attaining *Mokṣa* unless a person has first reached the empirical state of equilibrium and equipoise, *Jīvanmukti*.

**RADICAL MORALITY**

The distinctive feature of morality in *Śunyavāda* is that it is for the first time in the history of Indian philosophy that man-made distinction of caste, creed and sex were overlooked. Quite in the spirit of early Buddhism ethical humanism and the characteristic of universalism were stressed upon. Buddha's mission was to extend the blessings of salvation to all mankind. Hence the *Śunyavādins* asserted that each and every man, rich or poor, male or female, monk or householder, or even a low caste man could attain

*nirvana* by the practice of virtue and devotion to Buddha. The moral idea is to attain *Bodhisattvahood*. The word *Bodhisattva* literally means "one whose essence is perfect knowledge", meaning thereby "a Buddha designate" or a man destined to become a Buddha in this or in some future life.

The ideal of *Bodhisattva* is positive enough. It is associated with the doctrine of *parivarta* or turning over the ethical merit to the advantage of others. When once *nirvāṇa* is attained all earthly relations come to an end. A *Bodhisattva*, out of the abundance of his love for suffering humanity stops short of nirvana. The *Śūnyvādins* believe that no man lives to himself alone. The good or evil of one affects the whole. Hence a *Bodhisattva* would be the best guide for his brethren who under stress and sorrow are languishing for a personal guide. Thus he (*Bodhisattva*) could lead others towards true way of knowledge. The practical way of attaining spiritual experience has been suggested in various ways. These are four meditations (*dhyāna*), three *samādhis* and ten stages of *Bodhisattvahood*. The principles of moral life have been recognised as *dāna* (charity), *vīrya* (fortitude), *śīla* (morality) *śānti* (patience) and *dhyāna*. Faith and *bhakti* has also been stressed upon. As Nagarjuna says in his commentary on the *Prajñāparamita*, "Faith is the entrance for the ocean of the laws of the Buddha and knowledge is the ship on which one can sail in it."<sup>10</sup>

#### CONCLUSION

Thus we conclude that freedom from the conflict of the phenomenal world has been projected the highest goal of a human being in the *Mādhyamika* School. The goal is to be one with the Reality. This stage has been called *Nirvāṇa*. The route to *nirvāṇa* is through knowledge. It has been stressed upon prominently that the knowledge of the truth, that is the reality can be attained only through the path of morality. Hence this school pays equal stress upon action as well as freedom.

The ideal is to attain the state where one is untainted and unaffected by action and not the cessation of action. A man who has been able to attain *Bodhisattvahood* continues to perform his works but without selfish interest. It is a state of passionlessness. Although work is the prime activity for a householder, he too is free to aim the position of *Bodhisattava*. The

*Nagarjuna on The Concept of Morality*

idea of brotherhood of men and respect for all living things, and the prevention of cruelty to animals are the specific features of morality in this theory. Caste and all superficial distinctions have been broken down. The same appeals are made to all men, and the same goal is set before them. The goal is the infinite, tranquil, eternal felicity. It is a state of passionlessness. After the extinction of ignorance a state of perfect mental calm may be reached.

## NOTES

1. *Mādhymikāvr̥iti*, quoted in S. N. Dasgupta, *A History of Indian Philosophy*, Motilal Banarasidass, Delhi, 1922. Vol. I, pp. 140-141.
2. Nagarjuna, *Mādhymika Kārikā*, XV, p. 2.
3. See Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1962, Vol. I, pp. 645 ff.
4. Nagarjuna, *Mādhymika Sūtras*, chap XXIV
5. Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 658.
6. *dve satye samupāshritya Buddhāṃ dharmādeshana lokasamvrtisatyancha, satyancha paramarthatah ye nayor na vijanānti vibhagam satyayor, dvayoh. te tattvam na vijananti gambhiram Buddhashāsane - Mādhymika - Kārikā*, XXIV, pp. 8-9.
7. *Mādhymika - Śāstra*, chap. XXV, Karika 3.
8. Nagarjuna, *Ratnāvali*, IV, pp. 95-96.
9. *Ibid.* I, p. 45.
10. *Prajñāparamita*, quoted in Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, *op. cit.*, Vol I, p. 603.

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## A LOGICAL ILLUMINATION OF SYĀDVĀDA

RAGHUNATH GHOSH

Hemachandra in his *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā* has forwarded some arguments in favour of justifying *Syādvāda* and *Anekāntavāda* and refuted the view of the opponents. Our effort is to give a critical exposition of the position of Hemachandra on this score.

### I

Let us concentrate on the arguments given by the opponents as put forth by Hemachandra in connection with the refutation of the tenability of *Syādvāda*. It is the contention of the Jaina-logicians that the substance and mode are somehow identical and different both, but not absolutely different and absolutely identical. The opponents are of the view that such standpoint is not at all admissible due to having the defects like contradiction etc., of the following type.

First, just as an entity cannot be both blue and not blue in the same locus, both the affirmative and negative assertion in the same object cannot coexist, as they are opposite to each other.<sup>1</sup>

Secondly, if an object is both identical and different, an object becomes identical in respect of one aspect and different in another. From this, it will follow that there will be another locus of difference and another locus of identity leading to the non-integrity of the locus (i.e., as locus will not remain as one).<sup>2</sup>

Thirdly, the object is identical in some aspect and also different in some aspect. These aspects are also to be taken again as endowed with identity in some aspect and different in some aspect. Otherwise, every

thing would come under the influence of *ekāntavāda* (absolutism) but not *anekāntavāda* and there would arise the defect of *Infinite Regress* (*anavasthā*). That is, the locus of the identity and difference has to be taken as a bifurcated one due to having both identity and difference which must have another locus endowed with the same identity and difference and in this way *infinite regress*.<sup>3</sup>

Fourthly, an object is identical with reference to some aspect which is also endowed with both identity and difference. Again the object is different with reference to some aspect which is also endowed with both identity and difference. On account of having such opposite characters an object is to be taken as a mixed entity (*sankara*) not capable of being described with a particular name, definition etc. Because an object having definite shape, size etc. would be capable of being described. If something is having a mixed character, it becomes indescribable due to having no definite character,<sup>4</sup> but in our everyday life we describe and define an object.

Fifthly, the aspect which is associated with identity will have difference also and in the same way the aspect which is associated with difference must have identity also. That is, the same aspect will be associated with identity and difference. From this there would arise the possibility of exchange of functions and attributes of one with another due to having the same character, which is not possible.

Sixthly, an entity being endowed with identity and difference cannot be ascertained as having a particular character which would lead to doubt due to having two conflicting alternatives.<sup>6</sup> This doubt leads to the non-ascertainment of an entity and lastly this non-ascertainment leads us to the non-determination of the individual status of an object.<sup>7</sup> If an object is not ascertained at all, it cannot be utilised in our daily life to fulfil our purpose-oriented actions.

These are the arguments by which the opponents have proved the futility of the *Syādvāda* and *anekāntavāda*.

## II

Hemachandra came forward to refute the above-mentioned arguments and justified the Jaina-position. He argues that the problem of

contradiction as mentioned by the opponents is not at all a contradiction in the true sense of the term in an object already apprehended. An object is to be taken as opposite to another when in presence of an object the another is not known as existing. If the object is perceived clearly, how does there arise the question of contradiction? If there is the cognition of both blue and non-blue in particular locus, there is no contradiction as per the definition already cited. The Buddhists also do not accept contradiction between blue and non-blue cognised in a variegated canvas. If there is the realisation of the apparent diverse opposite characteristics like 'mobile and immobile', 'red and non-red', 'covered and non-covered' in a pot etc, there is no scope for the possibility of contradiction in the sense already mentioned.<sup>8</sup> In the light of the same reason the problem of the disintegrity of locus (*vaiyadhi-karaṇyadoṣa*) does not arise. In other words, if an object is identical with the locus in some form and different from the locus in some other form, there would arise the disintegrity of locus due to the difference, which is not correct. As said earlier an object may have both the properties the red and non-red etc. From this it does not prove that there is contradiction, because in presence of one (i.e., redness) another property (non-redness) is perceived in the same object. In other words, when redness is found, non-redness is also found as in the case of *citra-varṇa*. Hence, there is no question of disintegrity of locus as the object is the same.<sup>9</sup>

It has been stated earlier that an object is identical in some aspect and also different in some aspect. These aspects are to be taken as endowed with identity in some aspect and difference in some aspect, which leads to the defect of *infinite regress*. This view is also not tenable because the non-absolutist believes that in a real entity there is the synthesis of substance (*dravya*) and mode (*pariṇāma*). Difference is not other than this substance and mode, because the term *bheda* or difference denotes these two. When it is said that something is identical with substance, it is to be known that substance itself constitutes the identity, but nothing else. If something is said to be different, it indicates both substance and mode alone, nothing else. Hence it suggests that the real is one and many.<sup>10</sup>

If an object is identical in some aspect which is endowed with both identity and difference and if an object is different from something in some aspect which is endowed with both identity and difference, it would be

taken as a mixed entity not capable of being described with name etc. This defect of *samkara* does not arise at all, because it is already pointed out that in a cognition of the multiform colour and in the synthesis of universal and particular, in all existent objects there is no confusion inspite of having manifold varieties capable of being described. If it is said that in the above-mentioned instances problem is not there as it is solved by the direct experience of the data, it would go to the Jaina's favour. Because the Jainas also agree that the perception of something gives rise to the cognition that reality is manifold.<sup>11</sup>

Moreover, no doubt can be entertained in a matter which is already ascertained. Because, doubt is a kind of cognition which touches both the conflicting alternatives (*ubhayakoṭika*). Such type of doubt is absolutely not possible in an object the cognition of which is already ascertained without any conflicting alternatives. If it is said that the knowledge of an object which is known is not possible, it will lead us to the world of contradiction. If knowledge is established, it is to be assumed that there is no lack of knowledge. Hence, the concept of reality as the synthesis of substance and mode is not inconsistent with our experience leading to the substantiation of *anekāntavāda* or *Syādvāda*.<sup>12</sup> Though an object has got different modes, it cannot be described as a dubious one (*sandigdha*.) Because it is clearly known to us having diverse modes. The cognition does not touch both the alternatives like 'either snake or rope' or 'either pillar or a trunk of a tree (*sthānurvā puruṣo vā*) etc., but it has got definite character (*nirṇaya*) of diverse nature like an object having existence, non-existence, indescribable character etc.

### III

It is rightly pointed out by the opponents that, if an object has got manifold characters, it would develop a mixed character capable of not being described. In response to this some supplementary arguments may be developed in favour of the Jaina-thinkers. If it is said that an object having fixed (but not mixed) character is capable of being known and described, it would never be described. Because, it is very difficult to know all the definite or fixed characters of an object. Rather it is not possible for us to know all the hidden definite characteristics of an object. Some

characteristics are known and some unknown or indescribable. A man is not an omniscient being and hence he has got some limitations according to which he can have limited knowledge. For this reason the fixed character which is called *ekānta* is not at all possible for the Jainas as they believe that each and every object is fundamentally *anekānta* i.e., having diverse characters. Though an object is endowed with diverse characters yet it is capable of being known and described in diverse ways. When we keep looking towards an object, we become acquainted with its various aspects of it. To know an object means to know its substance and various modes, which are capable of being described. Hence, it is not true that a mixed entity cannot be described just as we can easily describe the various colours in the rainbow.

The Jaina view of *anekāntavāda* may be established through the insertion of relation according to the Nāiyayikas. It depends on the different modes (*bhaṅgī*) of looking towards a particular fact. When it is said - 'The mountain possesses fire' (*parvato vahnimān*), the existence of fire on the mountain is asserted through relation called contact (*saṁnyoga*). The same fire does not exist on the mountain through relation called inherence (*samavāya*). It is the relation through which an object is apprehended as existing as well as non-existing in certain locus, which proves the essence of *syādvāda*.

Though all Aryans and non-aryans reside in India at present, they may be described as existing in England also through a particular mode of looking which is through relation called *svasamrādadhikṛtārājyatva* (i.e. the property of being a kingdom occupied by a king ruling individuals of a particular state) The individuals in India are to be taken by the term *sva*. The king of them is the former king of Indian like Edward VIIth etc. The region conquered by him is England in which the kingdom of this type remains. Hence this existence is through the indirect relation called *svasamrādadhikṛtārājyatva*.<sup>13</sup>

Someone may say that he *is* in the room and *is not* in the room simultaneously. If it is left in this way, it would be contradictory like  $p \sim p$ . But the apparent contradiction may be removed if this positive and negative factors are shown to be correct through some specific mode. One may

say that one is in the room through the relation of contact (*samyoga*) and not in the room through the relation of inherence (*samavāya*). Though a woman is unmarried, she may be described as having a son (*putravati*) through insertion of a relation called *prāgabhāvavattva* (by virtue of being a locus of the prior-absence of a son). Though she is not married and no son, it amounts to saying that there is the *prāgabhāva* (prior-absence) of a son.

As per this *syādvāda* the apparently inconsistent pairs like 'existence non-existence', 'eternal-non-eternal' etc simultaneously feature the one and the same object relative to different limitors (*avacchedakas*). An individual may exist in some place in a capacity of husband, teacher, officer, father, actor etc. The wife feels the existence as husband, but others miss him not as such. In the same way, students, employees, sons, spectators feel his existence as teacher, officer, father, actor respectively. In such case also an individual can be looked upon as different ways. A jar may remain in some place as such, but does not exist as cloth (*ghaṭatvena ghaṭaḥ asti na paṭatvena*).<sup>14</sup>

In the same way, the knowledge of 'fire' may be described perceptual, inferential and also testimonial depending on the situation. From the words of a trustworthy person an individual can know of the existence of fire in a distant place. He may go towards the locus of fire. When he goes a certain distance, he sees smoke arising from a place by which he infers the existence of fire. When he goes nearest to the fire, he perceives the same with his own eyes.<sup>15</sup>

From the above discussion it may be concluded that the *anekāntavāda* or *syādvāda* of the Jaina-logicians is grounded on sound logic. Each and every individual has liberty to describe an object according to his own feeling, impression, presupposition, culture etc. As these are determining factors of describing some entity, the description may be of diverse types. This is one side of the *anekāntavāda* or *syādvāda*. One question may be raised in this context whether the presupposition, culture, feeling etc., lead us to describe an entity in different ways or the entity itself bears diverse modes for which it is described in various ways by an individual. Hemachandra will favour the latter alternative. To him an object

# A Logical Illumination of Syādvāda

is capable of being described in diverse ways as it is endowed with intrinsic diverse nature. This view may be justified from the fact that one can interpret a particular sentence or text in different ways according to one's culture, presupposition etc. if the object (sentence or text) is capable of being interpreted. Had there been no such possibility, no one could have given diverse interpretations. Hence, the entity itself bears nature of diverse types, which substantiates Hemachandra's position.

## NOTES

1. "Tathā hi - dravya-paryāyayorāikāntika-bhedābheda-parihāreṇa kathañcidbhedābheda-vādaḥ syādvādibhirupeyate. na cāsau yukto virodhādidoṣāt-vidhi-pratiṣedharūpayorekatra vastunyasambhavānnīlīvat.  
*Pramāṇamīmāṃsā*, 1.1.32. Prose portion - 130
2. "Atha kenacidrūpena bhedaḥ kenacidabhedāḥ. evaṃ sati bhedasyā-nyadadhikarāṇamabhedasya cānyaditi vaiyadhikarāṇyam." *Ibid*.
3. "Yam cātmānam purodhāya bhedo yaṃ cāśrityābhedaśānau bhina-vanyathaikāntavādaprasaktistathā ca satyanavasthā." *Ibid*.
4. "Yena ca rūpena bhedaśāna bhedaścābhedaśca yena cābhedaśānāpyabhedaśca bhedaśceti samkaraḥ." *Ibid*.
5. "Yena rūpeṇa bhedaśānābhedo yēnābhedaśāna bheda iti vyatikaraḥ." *Ibid*.
6. "Bhedābhedaśāmakatve ca vastuno viviktenākāreṇa nīścetumaśakteḥ samkaraḥ." *Ibid*.
7. "Tataścāpratipattiḥ iti ca viśayavyavasthā." *Ibid*.
8. "Naivam. pratiyamāne vastuni virodhasyāsambhavāt. Yatsannidhāne yo nopalabhyate sa tasya virodhiti nīściyate. Upalabhamāne ca vastuni ko virodhagandhāvakaśaḥ? Nīlānilayorapi yadyekatropalambho' sti tadā nāsti virodhaḥ. Ekatra citrapaṭijñāne saugataimīlānilayorvirodhānabhyupagamat ekasyaiva ca paṭādescalācalarakṭaraktāvṛtādirviruddhadharmaṇāmupalabdheḥ prakṛte ko virodhaśāmkāvakaśaḥ?" *Ibid*.
9. "Etena vaiyadhikarāṇadoṣo' pyapāstaḥ. tayorekādhikarāṇatvena prāguktayuktidiśa pratiteḥ." *Ibid*.
10. "Yadāpyanavasthānam dūṣaṇamupanyastaṃ tadāpyānekāntavā-dimānābhijñānaiva. Tanmatam hi dravya-paryāyātmake vastuni dravyaprayāyāveva bhedaḥ bhedadhvaninā tayorevābhidhānāt. dravyarūpeṇābhedaḥ iti dravyamevābhedaḥ ekanekātmakatvadvastunah." *Ibid*.

11. "Yau ca samkaravyatikarau tau mecakajñānanidarś anena sāmānya-viśeṣa-dr̥ṣṭā ca parihṛtau. Atha tatra tathā pratibhāsaḥ samādhm. parasyapi tadeva pratibhāsasyapakṣapātītvaṭ." *Ibid.*
  12. "Nirṇite cārthe samsāyopi na yuktaḥ tasya sakampaprapattirūpatvādakampapratipattau durghaṭatvāt. Pratipanne ca vastunyapratipattisāhasaṁ. Upalabdhyā-bhidhānādanupalambho'pi na siddhastato nabhava dr̥ṣṭeṣṭāviruddhaṁ dravya-paryāyātmakaṁ vastviti." *Ibid.*
  13. "Tathā hi svasamrādadhikṛtārājayatvasambandhena bhāratavarṣīyāḥ sarva eva anāryāśca englaṇde santi."
- Navyanyāyabhāṣapradīpāḥ* (Ed. By Kalipada Tarkacharya), Sanskrit College, 1915, p. 13.
14. Tushar Sarkar : *Some Reflections on Jaina Anekāntavāda and Syādvāda*, *Jadavpur Journal of Philosophy*, Vol 4, No. 2, P. 1992, p. 19.
  15. "...sarvatra viśayabhedasya darśitatvāt-satyam dharmyabhiprāyeṇa samprakāthyate ... Tadudāharaṇantu ... 'agnirāptopadeśāt pratiyate, amutreti, pratyāśādhūmadarśanenānumiyate pratyāsannatarena upalabhyate' ityadi."
- Nyāyamāñjarī*, The Oriental Research Institute, University Of Mysore, 1964, p.93.

## THINKING - A POLYMORPHOUS CONCEPT

SUMAN MEHTA

In this paper I wish to examine Ryle's characterization of the concept of thinking as a polymorphous concept, the characterization found in his paper<sup>1</sup> "Thinking and Language" (TL). I shall first see what Ryle means by speaking of *thinking*, that is, the concept of thinking, as a polymorphous concept and, then, how this view is similar to Wittgenstein's<sup>2</sup> characterization of the concept of game in terms of "family resemblance" rather than as an essence common to all the games. Ryle's position may be first elucidated by distinguishing polymorphous concept, as characterized by him, from (a) generic concepts, (b) concepts associated with adverbial verbs, and (c) some other non-polymorphous concepts. Towards the close of the paper I shall try to show that:

(i) Ryle overlooks a few important forms of thinking while elucidating a feature of polymorphous concepts.

(ii) Ryle's characterization of polymorphous concept in TL does not provide an adequate criterion for including a concept in, or excluding it from, the class of polymorphous concepts.

(iii) These observations pave the way for attempts to answer the question, which Ryle claims to be unanswerable, the question : What does *thinking* consist of?

To begin with, there are several processes to which the word 'thinking' is applied, e.g. dreaming, calculating, composing a poem, etc. Some psychologists, like Dewey<sup>3</sup>, classify the processes as follows.

1) The uncontrolled stream of consciousness is sometimes called

'thinking'. For example, in day-dreaming it is just the occurrence of several ideas without a specific subject-matter. Such thinking is automatic and uncontrolled.

2) The kind of thinking that consists in giving a serious consecutive consideration to the subject is called 'reflective thinking'. That is, it "involves not simply a sequence - a consecutive ordering in such a way that each determines the next as its proper outcome."<sup>4</sup>

3) Another application of 'thinking' limits it to things not sensed or directly preceived, as in imaginative stories.

4) 'Thinking' is sometimes taken to be practically synonymous with 'belief'. For example, 'I think she will come tomorrow'. There is, however, no indication in such a case that the belief is well founded.

It is reflective thinking in which we are actively involved. We give active, persistent and careful consideration to some idea.

However, reflective thinking is not the paradigm of thinking. Each one can independently be characterized. For example, believing is accepting a proposition as true, imagining usually involves forming images in mind, and so on. Here the following question crops up: what makes us apply the same word to different *kinds* of activities (or things) covered by a concept like *thinking*? Usually we look for an element, which may be common to various activities (or things). For, it is our natural tendency to classify things and identify them - even a child or a deaf and dumb adult can recognize some types of events/things encountered again. Similarly, we tend to look for an element, which may be common to various activities, covered by *thinking* and would provide the definiens for 'thinking'. Ryle cautions against this tendency. He points out that it may not be possible to formulate a simple definition of 'thinking', which would cover each one of various forms of thinking. For though one or more elements may be common to some forms, there is no element which is common to all. One form of thinking, say, imagining, may occur only in one's mind in the sense that it may occur in one's mind without thereby anything being manifested to others. Another may be performed outwardly and not merely in mind. An architect, for example, may be thinking of the design for a building by arranging and rearranging, say, cubes on the table. One form of thinking

*Thinking - A Polymorphous Concept*

may aim at truth and another may not: pondering usually does while writing a piece of fiction usually does not. Only a single step may be sufficient in some form whereas a number of steps may be required in another: for instance believing in the existence of something may sometimes require no more than a look at the object, whereas calculating or proving usually requires going through a number of steps.

Denying even a single element as something common to all the activities that constitute various forms of thinking is the very first point in Ryle's analysis of the concept of thinking.

There is no general answer to the question "What does thinking consist of?" There are hosts of widely different sorts of toilings and idlings, engaging in any one of which is thinking. Yet there need be nothing going on in one of them, such that something else of the same species or genus must be going on in another of them.<sup>5</sup>

The concept of thinking, according to Ryle, shares this feature with the concepts of gardening, working, etc.

Two men may both spend their leisure hours in gardening without one of them doing any of the things that the other does. Conversely, the professional footballer at work does a great number of things very similar to things done by the amateur footballer who is not working but playing. There are no ingredient activities common and peculiar to gardening or to working - or to thinking.<sup>6</sup>

Ryle regards this feature as a distinguishing feature of concepts like *thinking, working, farming, housekeeping* etc. which he calls polymorphous concept. He claims that it would be futile to find an element common to various activities covered by a polymorphous concept. For, it is not just a difficult task, but an impossible one, it would be like "isolating something which is not there to isolate"<sup>7</sup>.

In order to understand this position, let us first consider the relatively simpler polymorphous concept of housekeeping before considering the concepts of working and thinking. There are various activities engaging in any one of which is housekeeping. For example, activities like cleaning, keeping things at proper places, etc. done at home are called forms of housekeeping but if done at, say, hospital, or college, are not called so. It

doesn't, however, mean that any activity done at home is a form of housekeeping. My reading at home, doing any professional work at home and various other activities may not be counted as forms of housekeeping. That is, with regard to certain activities their being done at home is a necessary condition in order to be counted as housekeeping, but this does not suffice to make them housekeeping activities since they can be engaged elsewhere as much as at home.

Some polymorphous concepts, like *working* and *thinking*, not only cover an indefinitely large number of activities, but, what is even more important, the 'circumstances' in which these activities occur admit of enormous variations.

Some sorts of work are done with some sorts of tools, other with other sorts --- some sorts of work are done with special materials, like string or Carrara marble. But --- some work does not require materials at all --- Not all work is for pay, not all work is unpleasant, not all work is tiring -- There need be no action, inner or overt performed, by the policeman on his beat, which he may not also perform when strolling round the same street when his work is over.<sup>8</sup>

All these observations suggest that it is not even possible to lay down strict conditions about the 'circumstances' in which specific activities must occur in order to count as forms of a specified polymorphous concept. What is covered here by the blanket term 'circumstances' include such widely different things as intention, experience, rules, etc. Ryle makes similar observations about the concept of thinking.

The verbal noun 'thinking' does not--- denote a special or proprietary activity in the way in which 'singing' does. Thinking is not one department in a department store, such that we can ask what line of goods it provides, and what lines of goods does it, ex officio, not provide? Its proper place is in all the departments ---<sup>9</sup>

Polymorphous concept may be contrasted with generic concept. A generic concept is similar to a polymorphous concept in so far as it is not confined to one species. Just as a polymorphous concept, say, *working* covers various activities like running, singing etc. as its forms, a generic concept, say, *perceiving* covers various species like seeing, hearing, smelling etc. However, as White points out :

## Thinking - A Polymorphous Concept

a species necessarily implies its genus, whereas that (an activity) whose form a polymorphous concept takes on one occasion need not on another occasion be the form of this or, perhaps, of any other polymorphous concept.<sup>10</sup>

The relation between a genus, say, perceiving and its species is such that each species implies its genus. That is, not only does one usually perceive by seeing, hearing, etc. but one just cannot see, hear, etc. without thereby perceiving. But though a polymorphous concept covers a number of activities, none of them is always a 'form' or case of that concept. For instance, gardening when done for pay is a form of the polymorphous concept of working, but when it is done just for the sake of recreation or for spending leisure time is usually not counted as a form of working. Thus gardening does not imply working whereas seeing/hearing implies perceiving.

Generic concepts may be distinguished from some other non-polymorphous concept, which we may call specific-activity concepts. Unlike a generic concept a specific-activity concept does not have species. As mentioned earlier, one of the conditions for an activity, say X, to be a polymorphous activity is this: engaging in one or other of a number of heterogeneous activities can be engaging in the activity X. Consider for example, a polymorphous activity of farm-work

there are hundreds of widely differing operations, including apple-picking, to be occupied in any one of which is to be doing farm work.<sup>11</sup>

Engaging in a specific activity, on the other hand, is engaging in an activity, e.g. giving a blow, or engaging in one (or more) of a few activities which are related in some way, e.g. boxing. One can make out as to what its ingredients are and how they are connected.

Let us now distinguish a polymorphous concept from a concept associated with an adverbial verb. Adverbial verbs include verbs like 'to hurry', 'to obey', 'to attend', 'to rehearse' etc. Adverbial verbs, according to Ryle, are verbs, which we could easily be tempted into mistakenly treating as verbs of *doing*. They may well be called pseudoverbs. The common feature of all these pseudoverbs is that there are no independently specifiable activities, which they could be said to stand for. Ryle observes that

there is and can be no such thing as, for example, just obeying *per se* ...  
 Something positive or concrete must be being done ...<sup>12</sup>

This observation may be elaborated as follows :

(1) A pseudoverb may be said to stand for a pseudoactivity the occurrence of which requires some or other activity, which may well be called its co-activity. For example, in order that the pseudoactivity of obeying may occur one would have to indulge in some activity, to do something specific, even if in the negative sense of abstaining from doing something as in keeping silent.

(2) Any activity can be a co-activity of a pseudoactivity. There is, for instance, no activity, which cannot be the co-activity of obeying. The fact that paradoxical commands may be incapable of being obeyed does not affect the relationship between obeying and its co-activities.

(3) Perhaps no activity is solely the co-activity of a specific pseudoactivity. The description of the occurrence of an activity does not therefore, allow the inference of the occurrence of a specific pseudoactivity. An activity like opening a door may occur independently of any command and it would then not be a case of obeying, i.e., a co-activity of the pseudoactivity of obeying.

Ryle's explanation of the use of 'to think' at some place seems to be similar to his explanation of the use of 'adverbial verbs'. Since Ryle elsewhere speaks of the concept of thinking as a polymorphous concept, one may tend to assimilate polymorphous concept to the concepts associated with adverbial verbs. This tendency may be reinforced by Ryle's consideration of the concept of attending as a concept associated with an adverbial verb and also as a polymorphous concept. In the chapter "Adverbial Verbs and Verbs of Thinking" in his book *On Thinking* he includes 'to attend' in the class of adverbial verbs while in his article "Pleasure" he says:

the general point that I am trying to make is that the notion of 'attending' or 'giving one's mind to' is a polymorphous notion.<sup>13</sup>

Here we may cite a case where this tendency of assimilating two categories of concepts is clearly manifested. White in his book *Attention* considers concepts like *obeying*, *repeating*, etc. as polymorphous concepts.

*Thinking - A Polymorphous Concept*

However, Ryle might not consider these concepts as polymorphous concept. For, he emphasizes that it is not possible to give an answer to the question: What does thinking (or working) consist of? But though a pseudoactivity concept covers a number of activities as its co-activities, each pseudoactivity does admit of an answer to the question: what does it consist of? For instance, to obey is to follow someone's command/s. These concepts may, therefore, be excluded from the class of polymorphous concept.

We may now compare Ryle's account of *thinking* with Wittgenstein's account of *game*. Wittgenstein, like Ryle, denies that there is, or must be, an element common to various forms of a general concept, common to all the cases to which a general word applies. That is, a general word, e.g. 'game' or 'language' does not justify a search for some common characteristic/s shared by all the things to which the word applies. The word 'game', for example, covers or applies to card games, ball games, games that require physical exercises, games that require mental exercises, etc. etc.

Look for example at board-games, with their multifarious relationships. Now pass to card games, here you find many correspondences with the first group, but many common features drop out and others appear. When we pass next to ball-games, much that is common is retained, but much is lost.<sup>14</sup>

It may be noted that Ryle himself draws an analogy between the concept of thinking and the concept of game in his article "Thinking".

To look for some common and peculiar ingredients of all thinking is like looking for an ingredient common and peculiar to cat's cradle, hide - and - seek, billiards, snap and all the other things which we call 'games'.<sup>15</sup>

So, if it is asked as to what is common to all these activities, the answer would be that there is no single quality, which is common to all.

However, Ryle nowhere suggests it, and indeed it could not possibly be suggested by anybody, that the absence of anything common to a collection of things or activities is all that is required by a polymorphous concept. For, the absence of anything common is merely a negative condition ruling out generic concepts without ensuring any polymorphous concept. But it is not easy to formulate what Ryle would take as the positive condition

for a concept being a polymorphous concept. Wittgenstein, unlike Ryle, does formulate a positive basis for the application of a general word to varied cases in the absence of anything common to all of them.

We see a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing sometimes overall similarities sometimes similarities of detail.<sup>16</sup>

Wittgenstein calls such complex network of relationships a case of "family resemblance". For,

the various resemblance between members of a family : build, features, colour of eyes, gait, temperament, etc. etc. overlap and criss-cross in the same way.<sup>17</sup>

Thus Wittgenstein rejects the view that there must be some common element in all the cases where we apply a general term. As mentioned above, the cases to which a general word like 'game' is applied cover a wide range of overlapping affinities, like the varied resemblances of nose, eyes, gait, etc. which are the characteristics of the members of a family and which link them all into one group, without having anything uniformly present in them all. Here we may recall a simile by which Wittgenstein used to elucidate the relation of 'family resemblance'.

The strength of the thread does not reside in fact that some one fibre runs through its whole length, but in the overlapping of many fibers.<sup>18</sup>

It is interesting to note that Ryle's remarks on the polymorphous concept of thinking in his essay "Thinking" are parallel to Wittgenstein's, although in "Thinking and Language" he characterizes a polymorphous concept only negatively as a concept covering activities which have nothing in common.

There are, patently, lots of kinds of thinking which have something but not everything in common with computing, something else in common with computing, something else in common with philosophizing and so on and so on.<sup>19</sup>

It may appear from Ryle's similarity to Wittgenstein in the passages quoted above that the category of polymorphous concept can be fully explained by the notion of "family resemblance". Such an impression would, however, be incorrect.

The inadequacy of the analysis of the meaning of 'polymorphous

*Thinking - A Polymorphous Concept*

concept' in terms of "family resemblances", should be evident as soon as one recalls the very feature of polymorphous concept that distinguishes them from generic concepts - that the activities which a polymorphous concept covers can be performed without their belonging to that polymorphous concept. For instance, we may recall, though one works by writing, singing, etc. one can as well write or sing without thereby working. But, we never say that sometimes playing chess is not a 'form' of game.

Let us now see how far what Ryle says about polymorphous concept - that the activities which a polymorphous concept covers can be performed without their belonging to that polymorphous concept - is true. since according to Ryle the concept of thinking is a polymorphous concept, the activities covered by this concept, therefore, can be performed unthinkingly (or without a person's thinking). Immediately a question crops up : Can we say that a person can perform the activities like calculating, pondering, composing a poem, etc. without thereby thinking? Well, with regard to activities like calculating, composing of poem, etc. we can say that a computer, of which we do not say that it thinks, can carry out these activities.

But what about the activity of reflecting, which includes not only our thinking over what others say to us but also self-reflection (a distinctive character of man) utterly unrelated to the utterances and other actions of others? Can there be any occasion on which reflecting is not a case of thinking?

Lastly, it is worth noting that although one cannot find out an element which may be common to various activities which may be regarded as forms of a polymorphous concept, one can define a polymorphous concept in terms of something else, or one can at least identify an activity as a form of form of that polymorphous concept. Consider, for example, the case of an activity being a form of housekeeping (a polymorphous concept). It consists neither in some specific feature of the activity, nor merely in its being performed at home, but in its contribution to the management of the house and home-affairs. Perhaps it is possible to give a definition of some sort for expressions for other polymorphous concept, which may not be in terms of some element or the material content of the activities concerned.

If one refuses to admit such definitions then how can the concepts of pseudo activities be excluded from the class of polymorphous concept?

It seems then that thinking may well be regarded as belonging to the class of polymorphous concept in the sense that it covers many forms. But the concept of this category of concepts is itself far from clear. Ryle's characterization of this category does not provide a necessary and sufficient condition for deciding whether any given concept belongs to this category or not.

## NOTES

1. Gilbert Ryle, "Thinking and Language" (hereafter referred to as TL), *Proc. Arist. Soc. Suppl. XXV* (1951), p.68.
2. Wittgenstein (L.) *Philosophical Investigations*, Basil Blackwell, 1976.
3. Dewey (J), *How We Think*, D.C. Heath, 1933.
4. *Ibid.* p.4
5. Ryle, TL, *op cit.* p. 68
6. Ryle, "Thinking", *Collected Papers* (hereafter referred to as CP), Vol. 2, London : Hutchinson, 1971, p. 296.
7. *Ibid.* p. 297.
8. Ryle, TL, *op. cit.* p. 68.
9. Ryle, "Thinking" *op cit.* p. 299.  
Please also see Ryle, "Adverbial Verbs And Verbs of Thinking" *On Thinking* Basil Blackwell, 1979.
10. White (A), "Attending", *Attention*, Basil Blackwell, 1964, p.6, words in the brackets are my own
11. Ryle, TL, *op cit.* p. 69.
12. Ryle, "Adverbial Verbs and Verbs of Thinking", *op cit.*, p. 17.
13. Ryle, "Pleasure", CP, *op cit.*, p 332.
14. Wittgenstein, *op cit.*, Para 66.
15. Ryle, "Thinking", *op cit.*, p. 97-98.
16. Wittgenstein, *op cit.*, Para 66.
17. *Ibid*, Para 67.
18. *Ibid*, Para 67.
19. Ryle, "Thinking", *op cit.* p. 299.

## BOOK REVIEW : I

Chinchore Mangala R., *Santāna and Santānāntara : An Analysis of the Buddhist Perspective Concerning Continuity, Transformation and Transcendence and the Basis of an Alternative Philosophical Psychology*, Sri Satguru Publications, Delhi, 1996, Pages xlviii+314.

Though this is just one more addition to the thousands of scholarly works that have been published on Buddhism, its speciality consists in standing out as one among those very few dealing with the thought of Dharmakīrti. More specifically, it is quite invaluable in being a study of a rare and little known work of Dharmakīrti, the *Santānāntarasiddhi* which is available only in its Tibetan version, which has been translated into Russian by Th. Stcherbatsky and into Japanese by Hidenori Kitagawa. An English translation of Stcherbatsky's translation by Harish C. Gupta published in the *Indian Studies Past and Present* Series way back in the late sixties, is not easily accessible. So is Kitagawa's own English translation published in the early fifties. Some recent and excellent studies of Dharmakīrti do exist, but only in German. Therefore this full-length, detailed study of Dharmakīrti's *Santānāntarasiddhi* is as welcome as it is important in possibly stimulating interest in the long neglected as well as barely understood thought-system of Dharmakīrti.

This work is also a part of a trilogy by the author whose first two volumes dealt with the Buddhist concepts of impermanence and non-substantiality and the Buddhist criticisms of the notion of permanence. Hence it needs to be read along with those two. The doctrines of momentariness and impermanence of the Buddhists were vehemently opposed by other classical Indian philosophers on the ground that they would inevitably lead to scepticism and solipsism. The critics also charged the Buddhists of being self-inconsistent in simultaneously maintaining their theses concerning continuity and transformation along with a doctrine of impermanence. This charge was taken up very seriously by several Buddhist philosophers including Dharmakīrti who have argued in various ways that the charge is philosophically untenable. They have tried to show how, despite

conceiving reality to be changing or noneternal (*anitya*) and momentary (*kṣaṇika*), the notions of continuity (*santāna*) and transformation (*Santānāntara*) do make perfect philosophical sense. The present work is not only a general exposition of this central argument and defence by the Buddhists as found in various Buddhist philosophical works but also a specific and detailed exposition of Dharmakīrti's arguments as found in his *Santānāntarasiddhi*.

The great merit of the book consists in showing that while arguing for the philosophical feasibility of *Santānāntara*, Dharmakīrti also lays the foundations of an alternative philosophical psychology that is in perfect consonance with the basic Buddhist doctrines of *anityatā* and *kṣaṇikatā*. One very invaluable contribution of this book is the light it throws on the little known and even less understood subtleties of the very detailed and equally complex internal debates among the different schools of Buddhism. This internal debate is covered very briefly but also very clearly, being limited only by the self-imposed need of the author to focus always on the distinct and unique position of Dharmakīrti *vis-a-vis* the other great Buddhist philosophers. This brief part is so good that it can certainly be expanded into a separate book.

Probably one complaint that readers like me might have is about the style of writing. The abundant caution with which the book is written, together with the author's passion for extreme precision, has ultimately resulted in a very complex style that is somewhat reminiscent of arguments in a court of law. Sentences abound in complex qualifying expressions, detailed pre-emptive clauses and phrases at every turn and these are also repeated on every possible occasion throughout the book as if the author is arguing on behalf of Dharmakīrti before a very forgetful judge. A single sentence sometimes occupies a quarter of a printed page containing close to a hundred words. The desire for precision leads to about 50 pages out of the 103 pages of Chapter I being devoted to a "preamble and preliminary considerations." This kind of extremely cautious, elaborate, circumspect, and defensive argumentation, while its rigour is quite admirable, was probably required a few decades ago when Buddhist doctrines were little known and were also often grossly misunderstood. Such vigorous defence does not seem to be needed anymore since Buddhist concepts and doctrines

*Book Review*

are much better known and understood today than ever before.

My other big disappointment is that although the author has reconstructed Dharmakīrti's *Santānāntarasiddhi* from the Tibetan original into Sanskrit, I never got hear the original voice of Dharmakīrti concerning transformation (*Santānāntara*) and transcendence anywhere in the book. The book is backed by very solid and extensive documentation from dozens of original Buddhist works. Chapter II on *Santānāntara* has 117 reference notes, but of these only 8 pertain to *Santānāntarasiddhi*. Of these eight only two contain actual quotations from that work, each of which runs into exactly one and a half lines in print. The remaining six notes only ask the reader to refer to certain verses whose numbers are furnished. Considering the acute inaccessibility of this extraordinary work of Dharmakīrti, scholars all over the world would have been beholden to the author had she chosen to give extensive quotations from *Santānāntarasiddhi* while offering her elaborate and brilliant exposition and defence of Dharmakīrti's views.

There are also a few misprints that need to be corrected when the book is going to be reprinted next. But still, on the whole, this book undoubtedly emerges as one which no serious student or researcher in Buddhism can afford to miss, especially if that person is interested in Dharmakīrti.

SRINIVAS RAO

## BOOK REVIEW : II

**Chinchore, Mangala R : *Aniccatā/Anityatā - An analysis of the Buddhist Opposition to Permanence/Stability and Alternative Foundation of Ontology and/or Anthropology*, Sri Satguru Publications, Delhi, India pp. XXV + 247, Price Rs. 345/-**

This is a very difficult book to review. There are many places where I am not sure that I have understood the author. Spinoza's Ethics or complex chains of deduction in mathematical logic-in so far as I can follow them - have not strained my mind so much as several passages in the book. This is due partly to the highly abstract character of the concepts discussed, some of the most fundamental in philosophy-particularly Buddhist Philosophy. But partly, I believe, the author's use of highly involved sentences coupled with the paucity of illustrative examples, defeats the understanding. The purpose of the book is to delineate the categorical frame work involved in the Buddhist doctrine of universal momentariness (*Kṣāṇikavāda*). The theme is of great importance and the author highly qualified. The reviewer can never hope to equal the range of her scholarship as revealed in the Bibliography and the references and notes collected at the end of each chapter. I therefore, write these few lines not as a specialist, but as an educated layman who is greatly interested in Buddhism and has done a certain amount of reading on Pali Buddhism, and has reflected a great deal on its central themes.

The notions of *Duḥkha*, *Anātmata* and *Anityatā* are universally regarded as the three pillars of Buddhism. Of the three *Anityatā* is foundational. The first and most extensive chapter is devoted to this important concept and follows a brief introduction. The next chapter is devoted to *Kṣāṇikatā* regarded as an explanatory device to analyse *anityatā*. The third discusses *Kṣāṇabhanga* as the methodological aspect of *Anityatā*. The fourth chapter is devoted to a brief discussion of salient implications of the acceptance of *Anityatā* and its elaboration in the book. When the Buddha declared that every thing was impermanent and therefore full of sorrow, he was enunciating something emphasized by all the higher religions of the world. "Change and decay in all around. I see, thou who

Book Rev

change  
Christian  
all things,  
nairātmya  
of Skandh  
of the psy  
throughou  
is to be un  
therefore,  
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regards th  
indispens  
understan  
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The  
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But this b  
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## Book Review II

change not abide with me". Thus opens one of the most celebrated Christian hymns. But when he went on to emphasize the soul-lessness of all things, he was certainly revolutionary. He specially insisted on the *nairātmya* of human beings who were analysed in terms of the aggregation of *Skandhas*. This denial of an underlying soul over and above the strands of the psycho-physical organism has remained central to Buddhism throughout its history. It follows that every thing in the phenomenal world is to be understood in terms of momentary events or occurrences. *Kṣāṇikatā* therefore, is a logical corollary to *Anityatā*, a further 'unpacking' of the concept which may be regarded as an explanatory device. The author regards the concept of *Kṣāṇikatā* as the concept of minimal change indispensable to Buddhism and *Kṣāṇabhanga* as 'the lower most bound understanding of *anityatā*, as a methodological necessity with reference to occurrence of maximal change'. This means, I suppose, specification of the limits of maximum change in a Buddhist frame. They present, as it were, the floor and the ceiling of change, the least that is necessary and the most that can be tolerated.

The best statement of the Buddhist position, perhaps, is to state that the world is a succession of momentary events or occurrences. The usual formulations, that every thing is in a flux or that things are changing perpetually, suggest that there are entities that change, which is misleading. The author's formulation of *anityatā* in the most universal sense, as 'permanent susceptibility to change' has the same defect though I am sure she cannot be accused of this error. And the suggestion of some 'thing' that is liable to change remains even if we hold that even processes are liable to change. In this case, we have to distinguish between the initial uniform phase and the later alteration in the successive phase or phases. But this brings us to a real problem, not just an unfortunate suggestion of the language used by us. Strictly speaking, the Buddhist requires instants which are durationless just as Euclid's points have position without length or breadth. But, if so, as Śamkara argues, causality (even causality of the weaker type in the sense of regularity of succession) will not be possible because no two events or sets of events overlap and hence the only relation possible between them will be one of *mere* succession. If they have distinguishable phases, such as origin, development and dissolution, then

our events are not strictly momentary. Some of the Buddhists 'play in the hands of their opponents by speaking of *cittakaṇas*' which have *Utpadasthiti and bhanga*. The discussion of the problem, though not of Śamkara's argument, on p-104 does not enlighten us much 'The contention of the enlightened Buddhists is that the occurrence of change needs to be understood in the minimal sense, it is explanatorily redundant to extend beyond'. The quotations given in the reference notes amount to the blunt assertion that as soon as an event arises, it passes away. The cause has vanished before the effect arises, etc. It is no help to be told that even change has minimal duration when the question is how this is to be understood.

Śamkara's critique has many purely dialectical points but there is a real problem. Either duration arises from the succession of durationless events (instants) or events have minimal duration which is conceptually distinguishable into 'Phases', though not either physically or psychologically divisible. I am not making the unreasonable demand that the philosophers specify the minimum duration for every event either by specifying a procedure or by giving paradigm examples. Such an attempt is made by the author (p.p. 104-106), following venerable authorities. But such attempts are unnecessary and unprofitable, considering that science now measures time in micro-seconds. But this adds to our problems of clarificatory analysis. In any case, no philosopher can accept durationless events. This discussion is closely connected with that of causation or causal determination. Indian discussions of it, though providing valuable starting points, are not very illuminating because (1) the examples of these ancient and medieval philosophers are drawn, at best, from protoscience and (2) there was no clear formalization of logical principles. Hence, *vandhyāpura* (a logical impossibility) rubs shoulders with *ākāśakusuma*, causal impossibility (at present), and bathes in *mṛgajala* a causal impossibility-a perceptual error.

The author may be right in insisting on Buddhist opposition to determinism. But determinism, as we understand it, poses no serious problem unless science has elaborated a unitary system with great predictive power. There was no dilemma of determinism for Aristotle or the ancient Indian philosopher. The Buddha certainly insists, in The

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## Book Review II

*Anguttaranikāya*, that the law of Karma understood in one way is incompatible with the religious life, and interpreted in another way can make room for spiritual effort. In any case, those who accept basic substances and real universals can allow for freedom by embracing some form of 'Soft determinism'. And part of such a solution, even for an eternalist, will be the Buddhist insistence that 'Causes, do not compel'. All that is required is acceptance of actions not coerced or completely determined, which make a genuine difference to the course of events, though not to its general architecture.

But the most disappointing aspect of the book, for me, was the near absence of discussion of problems of great human interest—problems of selfidentity and the closely connected problem of the nature of Nirvāṇa in relation to personal identity even the nature of things which we identify, recognise and reidentify, the problem of dispositions and their status in a world of momentary events. The last is discussed very briefly, tersely (p. 175). And these problems have been discussed with great clarity and forthrightness by Buddhist philosophers, especially *Nāgasena* and *Buddhaghosa*. The latter discusses the mechanism of rebirth in Ch. 17 of '*Viśuddhi Magga*' making it very clear that the *viññāṇa* that finds a resting place in new embodiment is *not identical* with the former consciousness (i.e. of the departed person) but arises from it. *Nāgasena*'s discussion of the identity of a person and the use of proper names to refer to them is a classic. Roughly, he regards selves as series of psycho-physical states (*dhamasantati*) each united by causality. If accepted as an explanation of the unity of a person within a life span, it can be extended to cover a sequence of embodiments. Though any number of difficulties remain to be tackled they are not specially for the Buddhist but for all who believe in reincarnation. But, for us, the interesting point is the final conclusion illustrated by the famous analogy of the flame-series, or the candle burning throughout the night. he who is reborn (in relation to the departed person) is 'neither the same nor another'. Not the same as there is no persistent soul, not another because the series is not a random sequence of phenomena. It is not enough to insist tirelessly that for Buddhism substances and essences are anathema. Of course they are; but that does not absolve us from the duty of analysing the 'cash value' of our procedures in

identification, recognition, etc., in moral and social intercourse. The author gives some hope that the problem may be tackled (p. 157, para 2 (iii)). But apart from the insistence that we need not postulate a cogniser, enjoyer, agent, in addition to the cognitions, pleasures and pains and actions, we get no help. We may agree with the insistent assertion, and yet feel that the kind of work begun by Nāgasena and Buddhaghosa should be continued and placed in a new landscape enriched by advances in logical techniques and scientific knowledge. The earlier discussion of identity in the same chapter (see pp 164 to 166) applies only to events.

The problem of personal identity spills over into the problem of the nature of *Nirvāṇa* and the status of *Tathāgata* after *Mahāparinirvāṇa*. This is one of the many questions the Buddha set aside as indeterminate (*avyākṛta*) and refused to answer. But whatever may be the significance of his silence, *Nirvāṇa* has a special importance for the doctrine of *anitya*. Many feel, rightly or wrongly, that unless some timeless status is given to it, it amounts to no more than selfextinction and getting rid of the patient to get rid of disease. But whatever solution one may accept any philosophical anthropology with Buddhist foundations must give, in outline, some answer to the perplexity. The only place where the author comes near to it is on p. 126 para 2 (b). 'Nirvāṇa, continued or perpetual significance of Buddha's teaching, importance of three jewels....etc. are also *anitya* although particular understanding and interpretation of them do not cease to be so'. This together with the earlier stated assertion that *anityatā* itself is *anitya*, we are told, would not make any sense in the Buddhist conceptual framework. The latter statement is a verbal frivolity, largely. But the statement about *Nirvāṇa* I feel should have been discussed a little more extensively. I am not sure I understand either the statement or the explanatory note on p. 136.

The problem of universals and the closely related problem of the status of dispositions is also a major problem about which, like the book, I shall not say much. In discussing the epistemological aspects of *Kṣanabhanga* the author accepts the view that *citta* is a disposition not a quasi-substance. 'On this view it is a fact that we have disposition to selfimaging'. Who are 'We' here? If it makes no sense to ask whose disposition it is, because there is nothing substantive of which it could be

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held legitimately. What of our ascriptions of particular dispositions to particular persons? The difficulty about dispositions is that they hover between actuality and non-actuality and must have a locus unless indeed they constitute an independent category (p. 175). If I am convinced that they must have a locus, and momentary events cannot fulfil this role, I may as well modify Buddhism and accept a quasi-permanent subject (*pudgala*) as some Buddhist realists did. Such a procedure would be consistent and less counter-intuitive than the blunt assertion that it makes no sense to raise such questions. It was suggested to me by the late (Prof.) M.P. Rege, in discussion, that we could ascribe dispositions to occurrents instead of continuants. This is a counsel of despair.

The author quite rightly insists that Buddhism need not necessarily lead to solipsism and that we can go from momentary empiricism to personal empiricism and then interpersonal empiricism (pp. 181-183). We can certainly do so provided we reject the starting point of *Vijñānavāda*. I have a feeling that the author seems to make the fate of Buddhism and *anityatā* depend too closely on *Vijñānavāda*. The latter repudiates the existence of extramental, independent, objects. It may be 'methodological solipsism'; but if each one starts with his own experiences, even other cognition-series are inaccessible. *Ālayavijñāna* is still far away, and when it comes, it will be non-momentary. The *Lankāvatār sūtra* described it as 'Utpāda Sthiti Bhanga varjya', and also 'Vikalpa Prapañca Kahita'. It is strange that the teaching of the compassionate Buddha - which is India's greatest contribution to humanity - was overlaid with such speculative embroidery.

N. G. KULKARNI

## BOOK REVIEW : III

Chinchore, Mangala R. : *Anattā/ Anāmatā : An Analysis of Buddhist Anti-Substantialist Crusade*, 1995, Delhi - India, Sai Satguru Publications - A Division of Indian Book Centre, 40/5 Shaktinagar, Delhi, 110 007, pp. xx+ 196, Price : Rs. 300/-

This book is published way back in 1995 in the Bibliotheca Indo-Buddhica series and deserves attention of the scholars for the simple reason that it contains discussion of one of the most important Buddhistic themes that have closer affinities with the transformations that have taken place in the philosophical debates of the West during the modern and post-modern era. The author herself does not seem to be aware of this. A study of *anattā* or *anāmatā* could be construed as a Buddhistic deconstruction of Vedic and Upnishadic metaphysics of *attā* and *āmatā* by adopting linguistic approach. This observation is made not so much to highlight any major lacuna in the approach of the author to the study of Buddhistic anti-substantialist crusade as to emphasize the need of addressing the view of language which Buddha held in contrast to the view of language to be found in Vedas and Upnishads and which could possibly be placed at the centre in our comprehension of the three vital themes of Buddhism viz., *Duḥkha*, *Anattā* and *Anityatā*. I am not suggesting that Buddha was effecting anything like contemporary linguistic revolution as such but it is certain that he had an altogether different world-view in general and of human life in particular, for the expression of which philosophical language of Vedas and Upnishads was not, according to him, suitable at all. Nor do I want to propose any programme for comparative philosophy which, I know for certain, is a very difficult terrain strewn with prides and prejudices.

The significance of the job which is undertaken by the author in the book under review is nevertheless of great value because while in the West non-sustantival interpretations of reality have appeared a number of times (from Heraclietus to Whitehead), in India Buddha and his school of thought is exclusively the only one to stand in undaunting opposition to all other schools of thought, both of orthodox and heterodox variety, which have invariably taken substantialist view of reality including human persons.

*Book Review III*

The author therefore gets rightly interested in the full-scale landscape of inter-school controversies and the intra-school discussions on the theme of *anattā*, which is chosen by her obviously following the traditional outlook, as one of the three pillars of Buddhism. The Introduction and the First chapter of the book are completely devoted to labouring two points: i) *Duḥkha*, *Anattā* and *Anityatā* are the main pillars of Buddhism, they are independent of each other but nevertheless there is an interrelationship between the three of them, and ii) considerations are articulated by Buddha and his followers to justify the acceptance of *anattā* as an independent pillar of their philosophy. Regarding first point, it is not clear as to what the author is upto when she talks of independence of each of the pillars from the remaining two. One can easily grasp their distinctive posture in presenting a vision of reality which is totally different from the one that was available in the Vedic and Upanishadic literature. Surely they cannot be considered as logically independent of each other. If they are logically independent then there is no philosophical gain in assuring readers that they are *independent* and yet they have an inter-relationship that can be logically accounted for. Issue of their independence becomes thus a pseudo issue. The fact is that the three concepts are the off-shoots of the view of reality that emerges from a more basic concept of *pratītyasamutpāda* - a concept that is most fundamental to Buddhism - the concept which is not empty but which receives its filling from experience of change in the world. *Pratītyasamutpāda* is thus the only pillar of Buddhism. But it's a historical fact that this concept which was later on developed into a full-fledged causal theory lost its centrality. The off-shoots got prominence and the root lost its bearing in the abyss of abstract and abstruse metaphysics of later times. It can be argued that the three so-called pillars of Buddhism, in the context of human reality, follow logically from the *pratītyasamutpāda* theory of change and that, therefore, one should not ignore the heuristic maxim that wherever one can work out logical relationships one should not create problems which one cannot manage and see through. The book is not however designed to pass any such judgment on the history of Buddhist thought but just to depict it as faithfully as possible keeping in focus the concept of *anattā*, in the fervent hope of showing i) that the concept of

*anattā*, in the course of time as the Buddhist thought eventually developed, "gained more and more preponderance and articulate emphasis in such a way that the other two pillars of Buddhism seem almost to spin and revolve around it" (p. 1) and ii) that there are inter-school debates between Buddhists and non-Buddhists and intra-school debates between the Buddhists themselves in which repudiation of substantialist stand is taken, and that these debates shed a good deal of light on the points of strength as also on the points of weakness in the Buddhist considerations upholding *anattā*. In the first chapter the author very rightly chooses a very wide canvass of Dārshanīc thought in India and tries to develop a perspective for the analysis of *anattā* and the Buddhist reasoning behind it. Anchoring her analysis in Buddhist view that everything has a perpetual susceptibility to change and drawing its consequences of uncertainty with regard to future, author does well to show how the Buddhist conception of the real stands out and falls apart from all other conceptions of it fabricated and accepted by other trends of Indian philosophical thought. She also argues that since for Buddhists change presupposes permanent and irrevocable susceptibility to change nothing can be said to be constant and permanent. At which point of time or particular moment change will occur or materialise cannot be predictably determined. Continuity, thus, is not a primary and constitutive feature of reality for Buddhists. She extends the argument further by claiming that by treating 'perpetual susceptibility to change' as the necessary condition ever fulfilled for anything to be real, maximalistic interpretation of change (*ksaṇabhanga* or momentariness) is inevitable. Since it's a logical consequence, it cannot be ignored by us. Buddhists insist upon it as an invulnerable point of strength of their view of reality. They however do not refuse to accept continuity in its derivative functional and practical utility. For Buddhists, one has to bear in mind, the crux of continuity lies in some sort of resistance to change which is always exterior to thing that is for ever susceptible to change. The observation made by the author that this central and seminal contention of the Buddhists is either overlooked or misconstrued by the critics who belong to substantialists camp, deserves our attention. She is also at pains to see that some times some Buddhists also, though mistakenly, fall prey to the temptation of advocating continuity as primary and constitutive feature of reality, which brought forth somewhat

*Book Review III*

caustic reaction from their own Buddhist colleagues. The second and the third chapter are intended to develop all this argumentative discourse in a systematic manner but the actual presentation takes a rather hazy shape. The second chapter depicts the Buddhistic opposition to substantialist thesis considering in detail different versions of the latter as found in Cārvāka materialism, Jaina ontology - the two heterodox perspectives of reality, and Advaita Vedānta, Sāṃkhya, Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā - the four orthodox perspectives of reality. It is interesting to note that none of the participating schools in this debate accord substantial reality to God. The whole debate is thus this-worldly. In analysing the positions of the non-Buddhistic perspectives, the author has made certain remarks with rugged confidence that may give rise to some difference in interpretations. There is no need to go into details of these since that won't affect very much the final substantialist characterisation lent to them. The Buddhist refutation is also presented with precision to the point fully supported by footnotes, references and explanations wherever necessary. But on reading the whole chapter one may get away with the feeling that it's the author who speaks more than the thinkers themselves, and that the arguments could have been articulated much better. Critical evaluation also leaves a good deal desirable. In the third chapter, author turns to intraschool debates which kept engaged the Buddhistic participants themselves in the task of lacing the non-substantialist thesis with refinements and subtleties since philosophical anthropology was also of primary concern to them. The author pin-points the reasons for the primacy of philosophical anthropology and develops major forms of understanding of *anattā* doctrine by later scholars of Buddhism. The author concentrates on i) Puṅgalvāda ii) Skandhavāda iii) Abhidharmavāda iv) Vijñānavāda and v) Śūnyavāda. The presentation is more of historical nature, though it does indulge in somewhat semi-critical analysis of issues involved. Extension of '*anattā*' thesis to human reality is bound to create problems for their epistemological, logical, social, political and moral enterprises because they presuppose identity of human individuals right from their birth to the moment of their passing away from this world. How do we pass from the privileged access to one's own subjective experiences (sensations) to objective discourse having universal and, in some contexts, normative dimensions? Basic at issue is the problem of

other minds. There is no problem in philosophy which is more important than the problem of other minds and there is no concept that is more crucial than the concept of human action. Shorn of transcendentalism and substantialism how did Buddhist thinkers address this problem? Some scholars (e.g. Anand Coomarswamy) have suggested that in understanding what Buddha said, one must note that Buddha's meaning of almost all crucial terms is very very different from the meaning of the same term used by the scholars of the orthodox schools, and to be able to comprehend it is the real clue to our understanding of Buddha. Assuming that we are somehow able to do this, the question will still remain : Shall we have better understanding of individual and the society in which he lives in order to realise his moral goal of emancipation? or Shall we aggravate our philosophical difficulties? Any way, what is emancipation? Shall we be able to see it clearly through when there are hermeneutic differences among the Buddhists themselves? Whether inter school controversies or intra-school controversies, the basic question is, Why of these controversies? There cannot be any purely theoretical purpose-truth for truth's sake or knowledge for knowledge-sake. Philosophical revolutions are never purely theoretical formulations. They have a sociological perspective and anthropocentricity. Philosophical arguments do not emerge in vacuo. The punch of the Buddhistic arguments can be brought out only in the context of the total purpose of the perspective which they wanted to develop-presentation of a completely new vision of the universe and the human life on naturalistic and positivistic grounds-first ever expression of renaissance and humanism on moral and rational grounds. Buddhism presented clash with Vedic view and way of life. The debates within the school itself are dialectically important insofar as they serve the purpose of self-criticism and the search for identity. They become dry and arid when they get far too removed from the original purpose.

In spite of the meticulous and rather tedious exercise made by the author, on points of the logic of the arguments, it is difficult to decide whether Buddhism fared better or the non-Buddhist schools did better. The task becomes extremely difficult especially when we read and try to learn about these controversies after a lapse of about 15 to 20 centuries of interval. We have only texts before us. Difficulties of interpreting the texts get

## Book Review III

greatly enhanced because we are now living in a world which is completely different from theirs. We are living in a world which has seen Copernican, Cartesian, Newtonian and Einsteinian revolutions in Physics and Astronomy, also renaissance and Kant's Rousseauistic Revolution, Liberal Utilitarianism of Bentham and Mill and the Gandhian thought of Svaraj through non-violence. There are corresponding philosophical shifts in our ways of thinking. Developments in Logic, Language studies and philosophies of science and mathematics have enhanced in a challenging way the demands for precision and semantic transparency. Because of the non-substantialist crusade and Buddha's silence over some *avyākṛt* questions, the general impression about Buddhism is that it is anti-meta-physical. One has to note however, that as observed by Hiriyanna, "though there is no explicit metaphysics in his teaching, there is a good deal of it in an implicit form." (*Outlines of Indian Philosophy* 1951, p. 138) I see no prospects for metaphysics on either side of the parties to these controversies. Autonomy of the Philosophical anthropology naturally gets to the centre of the stage and the author has done well to emphasize its primacy and to develop the corresponding narrative in the later schools of Buddhism. Having exposed weaknesses and vulnerabilities in the non-Buddhist ontologies of Indian origin and having considered importance of issues concerning philosophical anthropology, the author has suggested the possibility of resolving them without embedding or anchoring in any sort of ontology, substantial or transcendental. The author is not explicit as to whether they can be resolved independent of Buddhist non-substantialistic framework either. The fourth chapter, which is final one, depicts some implications of which, according to the author, the following ones deserve our attention. She is very brief and sketchy in her statement. After referring to some misunderstandings about Pudgalvāda, Skandhavāda and Abhidharmavāda, she expresses her soft skepticism about the epistemological project of Vijñānavāda in according primacy and autonomy to much-aspired for philosophical anthropology. With Vijñānavāda, as the author puts it succinctly "the issue assumes the form of inquiry into the epistemology of the primacy on the one hand and the epistemological foundations of the primacy on the other" (p.171). As the investigations proceeded along the lines within the fold of Buddhism "some of the serious kinds of weaknesses and vulnerabilities in the Buddhism resulted out of

revision and reinterpretation of Vijnānavāda subsequently." p. (172). Finally the author anchors her hopes for salvaging Buddha's teachings by way of reinterpreting them and realizing their continued relevance, obviously for modern times. She has come to make some interesting comments on the Buddhistic notions of *Nirvāṇa* (emancipation) - the individuocentric and sociocentric models, and *Nairātmya Darshan* - which, according to author is a singularly pregnant expression used to convey the quintessence of Buddhism by some later Buddhists. As a skeptical reviewer, I keep my fingers crossed in view of the semantic opacity from which the two notions considerably suffer.

I have found this book to be extremely difficult for review, not because I am not a well-versed Buddhistic scholar, nor again because I am not possibly a very good student of Indian Philosophy as well but because of the formidable style of language in which the book has been written. The style is repetitiously tiresome and laborious enough. Highly involved grammatical structures could have been avoided allowing the thought underneath to have its natural and unpendantic expression. Scholarly treatises should not be very cheap but they need not be so difficult either as to defeat readers' capacity to comprehend. Buddha's teachings are perhaps the greatest contribution of our land to the World Thought. We must see to it that we do not make it inaccessible because of our own style of expression and pedagogy.

*"The only way to speak the truth is to speak lovingly".*

*I shall add - "through one's writings as well."*

S. V. BOKIL

## IS THERE NON-EPISTEMIC VAGUENESS ?

JOHN- MICHAEL KUCZYNSKI

In this paper I will argue for the following point: For any property P, and any object x, either x has P or x doesn't have P. (More precisely, for any n-place property P, and any n-tuple  $\langle x, y, z, \dots \rangle$ ,  $\langle x, y, z, \dots \rangle$  has P or it doesn't.) After doing this, I will try to say exactly what vagueness is.

### I

Something is bald just in case it falls in the class of bald things, and something is not bald (has the property of being not-bald) just in case it falls *outside* the class of bald things. It would be hard to contest either of these points.

By an 'indeterminate property' I mean a property P such that, for some possible x, it is not the case that x *has* P, and it is also not the case that x has not-P. So x 'indeterminately' has P just in case x has neither P nor not-P- just in case, to put it another way, x falls neither inside nor outside the class of things that have P. For the sake of argument, let us suppose that there are indeterminate properties. In fact, let us suppose that baldness is one of them. So there could<sup>1</sup> be some object x such that x isn't bald and x isn't not-bald-such that x falls neither inside nor outside the class of bald things.

Let x be any bald object and let y be any indeterminately bald object. x has some property that y does not have : x has the property of being bald, and y does not have that property. So by Leibniz's Law, x and y are different. So no bald object is identical with any indeterminately bald object. This means that any indeterminately bald object simply falls *outside* the class of bald objects. This in turn means that any indeterminately bald object is

*Indian Philosophical Quarterly* XXX No 2  
April 2003

simply *not* bald<sup>2</sup>.

Basically, being indeterminately bald is a way of falling *outside* the class of bald things; and to fall outside the class of bald things is to be *not* bald. So the idea that there are indeterminately bald things—things that are neither bald nor not-bald, things that fall neither inside nor *outside* the class of bald things—is not a coherent one.

Of course, this argument works for any property, not just the property of baldness. Let *a* be any molecule that is a part of Mt. Everest, and let *b* be any particle that is indeterminately a part of Mt. Everest. *a* and *b* have different properties and are therefore distinct. So *b* simply falls outside the class of particles that are a part of Mt. Everest, and therefore is not a part of Mt. Everest.

The most contentious part of the above argument is this: I assumed that if something falls *outside* the class of bald things, it is *ipso facto* *not* bald. Some might say that this assumption is question-begging: maybe something can fall outside that class without actually being *not*-bald. That, arguably, is just what the believer in objective (non-epistemic) indeterminacy is trying to prove.

I think that this objection is similar to the following:

Something can fall outside the class of white things without being *not*-white. Why? Well, to be not-white it is necessary that something fall a certain *distance* outside of the class of white things. A cream colored object may fall *outside* the class of white objects, but it doesn't fall far enough outside the class of white objects to not-white. To be not white, something has to be, at a minimum, a pale yellow.

There is nothing to being not-bald other than *failing* to be bald. If we say that, for something to be not-bald, it had to do more than just fall outside the class of bald things—that it has to fall way outside that class (that it has to be quite hairy) we would simply be redefining the word 'not'.

Another (weaker) objection to my argument is this:

Suppose *x* and *y* are exactly alike except that *x* is determinately bald while *y* is indeterminately bald. To be sure, it seems that *ipso facto* *x* has some property that *y* doesn't (and vice versa). But maybe the predicates 'indeterminately bald' and 'bald' don't correspond to any *real* properties,

*Is There Non-Epistemic Vagueness?*

so that there is no true property that *y* has that *x* doesn't. Why say this? Well, not all predicates correspond to properties. Consider the property 'is a barber who shaves all and only those who do not shave themselves'. Nothing can satisfy this predicate, so (it would seem) there is no property corresponding to it. Another predicate that arguably doesn't correspond to a real property is Nelson Goodman's 'grue'. This word corresponds to a real concept, but is there any *property* answering it? Someone *might* argue that there isn't. Maybe the predicate 'indeterminately bald' is like this.

I only bring this objection up because it appears to be in the literature.<sup>3</sup> I confess that it makes little sense to me: who could possibly deny that baldness is a real property and that, consequently, there is some property that *x* has that *y* doesn't? In any case, *even if we concede* this objection, it fails to undermine my argument. This is so for two reasons. Once again, suppose that *x* is determinately bald whereas *y* is indeterminately bald. Given this, it is plainly impossible that *x* and *y* should have the same number of hair (or, at any rate, they should be qualitatively identical in respect of their physical properties). Given that *x* is determinately bald, whereas *y* is indeterminately bald, it follows that *y* has more hair than *x*. (If *x* and *y* had the same number of hair, then they would both be bald, both be not-bald, or both be indeterminately bald.) So-regardless of whether we hold the predicates 'determinately bald' and 'indeterminately bald' to correspond to properties- as long as we assume that the former property applies to *x* and the latter doesn't, then we are committed to holding that there is some genuine property that the one has that the other doesn't. Basically the applicability of putative pseudo-predicates (predicates that don't correspond to properties) supervenes on the applicability of what are plainly legitimate predicates (predicates that do correspond to real properties).

Another counter-objection (due to Nathan Salmon<sup>4</sup>) is this. Suppose that not all predicates correspond to properties. If we assume this, then surely we must countenance the following idea: if *x* and *y* are to be distinct, it is not necessary that they differ in properties, but only that they differ in what predicates (or, equivalently, what concepts) they satisfy. If we are going to fuss about what predicates or concepts correspond to real properties, then our concept of identity is not to be explicated by saying 'x and y are

identical just in case they have the same properties', but rather by saying 'x and y are identical just in case they satisfy the same predicates (concepts).'

Here is another counter-objection (this one is by far the weakest).

By definition, someone is indeterminately bald just in case he is neither bald nor not bald. You have said that if someone is indeterminately bald, then he is distinct from anything that is bald, is therefore not bald. But given how we've defined 'indeterminately bald', you cannot legitimately arrive at that conclusion. *By hypothesis* an indeterminately bald person is *not* not-bald. So there is no way you could prove that such a person is not bald.

This argument doesn't, so far as I can tell, have much merit. Imagine the following. One day Smith says 'let  $n$  be an even prime greater than 10.' Later on, someone comes up with a proof that any number greater than 2 (and therefore greater than 10) cannot be both even and prime. In response, Smith says:

That's impossible:  $n$  is *by hypothesis* an even prime greater than 2. So your proof must have gone astray somewhere.

Obviously Smith's point has no merit. It is a hard mathematical fact that there cannot be an even prime greater than 2. So if one supposes that there is such a number, one is making an incoherent supposition. Similarly, it is a hard fact that if  $x$  is distinct from anything that has  $P$ ,  $x$  falls outside the class of things that have  $P$  and therefore has *not*- $P$ . So if one were to suppose that, for some  $x$ ,  $x$  fell outside the class of things that have  $P$  and yet nevertheless were not *not*- $P$ , one would be making an incoherent supposition.<sup>5</sup>

Here is another argument against indeterminacy. My first premise is this: For something to be bald is for it to be determinately bald, and for something to be not-bald is for it to be determinately not-bald. What is my argument for this premise? Consider the following two sentences:

(i) Bob is bald, but Bob is not determinately bald.

(ii) Bob is determinately bald, but Bob is not bald.

Both (i) and (ii) are patent falsehoods. So the property of baldness is the

## Is There Non-Epistemic Vagueness?

of determinate baldness, and the property of not-baldness is identical with the property of determinate not-baldness. Now, if something is indeterminately bald, then it obviously isn't determinately bald, and it therefore isn't bald either. So indeterminate baldness collapses into determinate *non*-baldness.<sup>6</sup>

### II

In this section I'd like to set forth a couple more arguments against the idea that there could be objective (as opposed to epistemic) indeterminacy. My first argument is against indeterminacy in the spatiotemporal world. (This argument doesn't show that Fregean concepts<sup>7</sup> cannot be indeterminate.)

If there are indeterminate spatiotemporal states of affairs, these states of affairs seem to *supervene* on precise states of affairs. It is impossible that there should be two objects (or two possible worlds) that are exactly alike *except* for their indeterminate properties. For example, it is impossible that Bob and Joe should be exactly alike *except* that Bob is bald whereas Joe is indeterminately bald. If Bob is bald, that is *in* virtue of his having (say) zero hair, and if Bob is indeterminately bald, that is *in* virtue of his having (say) fifty hair. So if two people differ in respect of whether they are bald, that difference must correlate with—must *supervene* on—some other difference, and this other difference must be a *precise* one.

It would be fair to say that whenever an object has an *indeterminate* property (I am allowing for the moment that there are such properties), that always *consists* in (or *supervenes* on) that object's having some other, precise property. Baldness may be an indeterminate property (though of course I dispute this), but any particular case of baldness consists in someone's having a *certain number of hair*—in someone's having, say, two hair. (Similarly, *beauty* may be a vague concept, but any *instance* of beauty—any one person's beauty—always consists in someone's having *precise* physical characteristics—precise dimensions, and so on.) And if a person is indeterminately bald, he is that way *in* virtue of having a certain number of hair. This shows, incidentally, that if indeed the spatiotemporal world is indeterminate, it is indeterminate only *relative to certain ways of describing it*. Described in terms of the concept *baldness*, the spatio-

temporal world is (arguably) vague. But described in terms of the concept *hair*, it is not vague. (And even if it is vague if described in terms of the concept *hair*, we could, it would seem, find *some* concept C such that it would be vague if described in terms of that concept - say *electron*.) An indeterminate state of affairs - e.g. Joe's being indeterminately bald - consists of some precise state of affairs - Joe's having fifty hair. So indeterminateness is a property not of the spatiotemporal world, but of certain *descriptions* of it.

As against this, one could conceivably argue as follows :

May be the concept *hair* is more precise than the concept *baldness*, and the concept *cell* is more precise than the concept *hair*; and the concept *molecule* is more precise than the concept *cell* - so that some concepts allow for sharper descriptions of the world in terms of others. But may be, there is no concept C such that a description of the world in terms of C would allow for *no* indeterminacy.

This point cannot be dismissed summarily. But, as I'd now like to show, it doesn't necessarily undermine our point that vagueness is not a property of the spatio-temporal world *per se* but only of certain descriptions of it (though it *may* undermine the argument just given for that view). It seems that<sup>8</sup> there is no *limit* to how precise our descriptions of the world could be.<sup>9</sup> Let me explain this. For any description D that has a certain degree of indeterminacy, it seems that we can (in principle) come up with a description D' that is less indeterminate. So even if *all* cases of indeterminacy cannot be got rid of, *any given* indeterminacy can be got rid-displaced onto another kind of indeterminacy. Consider the indeterminacy that inevitably characterizes descriptions that employ the concept *baldness*. We can get rid of any such description in favor of one that uses the concept *hair*. (John's being indeterminately bald consists in his having fifty hair. So we can, as it were, eliminate the statement 'John is a borderline case of baldness' in favour a statement like 'John has fifty hair.' So we can get rid of the indeterminacy associated with the first sentence. Now, a new kind of indeterminacy may emerge in connection with the second sentence - may be the concept *hair* is indeterminate. But the indeterminacy that characterizes 'John has fifty hair' is *different* from that which characterizes 'John is a borderline case of baldness.' So it seems that what *kinds* of

*Is There Non-Epistemic Vagueness?*

159

indeterminacy there are in the world depends on how it is described: different descriptions, different kinds of indeterminacy. From this it follows that indeterminacy is a property of descriptions, and not of spatio-temporal states of affairs, even though (perhaps) it might not be possible to produce a description that is free from any indeterminacy. To put this point more perspicuously: it seems that (even if we grant that there are indeterminate properties) what kinds of indeterminacies there are in the spatio-temporal world is contingent on how it is described: if, relative to a certain description *D*, the world contains indeterminacy *i*, there can always be found some description *D'* such that, relative to *D'*, the world does not contain *i*. (In any case, this seems plausible.) So even if no description of the world is free from indeterminacy, there is still reason to believe that it is not the spatio-temporal world *per se* that is indeterminate, but only the spatio-temporal world *as described* a certain way that is indeterminate.

But the spatio-temporal world is not *everything* that there is (or, at any rate, it is not *uncontroversially* everything that there is). In addition to spatio-temporal entities there are also concepts (I am referring to concepts in the platonic or Fregean sense: concepts in the psychological sense are spatio-temporal), and the argument just given doesn't show that concepts can't be indeterminate in some respect. (It doesn't show that for any *C*, any *x*, *x* either falls under *C* or doesn't fall under *C*-that any object is either bald or not bald.) Now I'd like to show this: *if we assume the correctness of a certain widely held, and prima facie plausible analysis of what concepts are* then with regard to the idea that there is a concept *C*, and an object *n*, such that *C* (*n*) is neither true nor false-this idea is self-defeating. If it is true, '*C* (*n*)' is meaningless (I am assuming, of course, that '*C*' denotes *C* and that '*n*' denotes *n*); and if '*C*(*n*)' is meaningless, then the very question whether *C* applies to *n* is itself meaningless and thus cannot arise.

The aforementioned assumption about concepts is this: a concept is a function from states of affairs (possible as well as actual) to truth-values. This seems like a good analysis, and it is certainly a widely held one. (Also, I will present an argument in favor of this analysis: I will not simply take it for granted.) So, just to be perfectly clear, what I am saying is this: *if this analysis of what concepts are is correct, then it is incoherent to say that,*

for some  $C$ , some  $x$ , neither  $C$  nor not- $C$  applies to  $x$ . I must make it clear that the aforementioned analysis of concepts *is* (though widely held) a contentious one. (So I am setting forth a conditional proof.)

First of all, as we saw a moment ago, if a predicate - e.g. 'is bald' - applies to someone, or fails to apply to someone, it applies (or fails to apply) to that person in virtue of his having some *specific* number of hair. Even if we grant that 'is bald' doesn't yield a truth-value when applied to certain people, we must hold that *whatever* results when we apply that predicate to someone - be it truth, falsity, or neither - that result is a consequence of that person's having some specific characteristic, of his having some specific number of hair.<sup>10</sup>

What is it to *fully* grasp the meaning of the predicate 'is bald'? It *seems* that to *fully* grasp this meaning is to know, for any number,  $n$ , whether a person with  $n$  hair satisfies that predicate. If you know, for any number  $n$ , whether 'is bald' yields truth when applied to an expression denoting a person with  $n$  hair - if you know this, then there is nothing you don't know about the meaning of the predicate 'is bald'. Of course, the meaning of this predicate is nothing other than the concept it expresses. So if you know, for any  $n$ , whether a person with  $n$  hair falls under the predicate 'is bald', then - it seems reasonable to say - you fully grasp the concept of baldness.<sup>11</sup>

Let  $B(x)$  be short for 'anyone with  $x$  hair is bald.' So ' $B(0)$ ' is true and ' $B(1,000,000)$ ' is false. Suppose that a person with 50 hair is neither bald nor not-bald - so that ' $B(50)$ ' is neither true nor false. Given that ' $B(50)$ ' is neither true nor false, it seems to follow (indeed, it *does* follow, as I will argue in a moment), that ' $B(x)$ ' isn't *defined* for the number 50. (If ' $B(x)$ ' isn't defined for 50, then ' $B(50)$ ' is indeed lacking in truth-value, but not because it expresses a proposition that lacks truth-value: it is lacking in truth value because it is *ill-formed* and therefore doesn't express *any* proposition-because, in effect, it *has no meaning*. If a predicate isn't defined for a certain object, then coupling that predicate with an expression denoting that object yields non-sense: it *doesn't* yield a proposition - not even one lacking truth-value. So if the predicate ' $B(x)$ ' isn't defined for 50, then ' $B(50)$ ' is meaningless, and so, therefore, is the sentence 'a person with 50 hair is bald'. And so, therefore, is the question 'is a person with 50 hair

bald?' Of course, this point about predicates corresponds to a point about concepts. If ' $B(x)$ ' cannot meaningfully be predicated of ' $n$ ', then  $n$  cannot meaningfully be thought of as falling under, or failing to fall under,  $B(x)$ . So there would be *no proposition* corresponding to the words 'a person with  $n$  hairs is bald' and thus *no question* corresponding to the words 'is a person with  $n$  hairs bald?' (I must stress that/am firmly convinced that, for *any*  $n$ , it is meaningful to say 'a person with  $n$  hairs is bald' - I gave my arguments for this in section I. What I am trying to show is that someone who believes in objective indeterminacy is implicitly committed to the view that this is not always meaningful.)

The argument just set forth can be given wholly in terms of concepts, as opposed to predicates. If  $B(x)$  isn't defined for the number 50, then  $B(50)$  isn't a proposition, whatever it is, it isn't the kind of object that can be the meaning of a sentence. So the question whether  $B(x)$  applies to 50 is meaningless. More precisely, *there is no such question*, there is no question corresponding to the words 'is  $B(x)$  true of 50', no proposition corresponding to the words ' $B(x)$  is true of 50' (or simply ' $B(50)$ ').

There is an obvious objection to this argument:

Just because ' $B(50)$ ' is neither true nor false, it doesn't follow that ' $B(x)$ ' isn't *defined* for '50'. Surely *it is* defined for '50': only, when applied to that expression, it yields a proposition having no truth-value. To put this point in terms of concepts, just because the concept  $B(x)$ , when applied to the number 50, doesn't yield a truth or a falsehood, it doesn't follow that  $B(x)$ , isn't *defined* for that number, it doesn't follow that  $B(50)$  is some kind of non-proposition.

This point is, at least arguably, incoherent. If you know, for any  $n$ , whether 'is bald' can or cannot be truly predicated of someone with  $n$  hair, then there is nothing left for you to know about that predicate, nothing left for you to know about its meaning. The meaning of a predicate *is* an assignment of truth-values to states of affairs. So if a state of affairs isn't assigned a truth-value by a predicate, that means that it simply isn't meaningfully applied to that state of affairs. So if ' $B(x)$ ' doesn't yield a truth-value for ' $n$ ', then ' $B(n)$ ' doesn't express a proposition. (Therefore 'Is it the case that  $B(n)$ ?' doesn't express a question.)

Of course, intuitively we think that, for any number  $n$ , the sentence 'a person with  $n$  hair' *does* express a proposition. I wholly agree. Any such sentence is, in my view, either true or false (and therefore meaningful). What I am saying is that such a sentence *couldn't* be meaningful - couldn't express a proposition - unless it did state a truth or a falsehood. For the meaning of an expression is an assignment of truth-values to states of affairs (possible as well as actual) : to put it roughly, where there is no truth-value assignment, there is, in effect, no meaning - no concept and therefore no proposition. Anyone who holds that there is nonepistemic indeterminacy must hold that 'B( $n$ )' can be meaningful even if 'B( $x$ )' isn't defined for ' $n$ '. I am trying to show that this is incorrect.

Perhaps the following consideration will lend some credence to this position. Imagine that you are constructing or defining some predicate 'P( $x$ )'. You stipulate that 'P( $x$ )' yields when applied to the expressions '1', '3', and '5' (with their current English meanings) or synonyms thereof; yields a falsehood when applied to '2', '4' and '6' or synonyms thereof, and you make *no* stipulations for any other expressions. Does 'P(10)' express a proposition (albeit one with no truth-value)? There is nothing to the predicate 'P( $x$ )' over and above its assigning truth to '1', '3' and '5' (with their current English meanings) and falsehood to '2', '4' and '6'. 'P(10)' is neither true nor false, but only because it has no meaning, not because it expresses a proposition that lacks truth-value. If you *stipulate* that 'P( $x$ )' yields no truth-value when applied to any expressions besides, does it change matters? It doesn't seem so. *Failing* to stipulate what meaning 'P( $x$ )' has for (e.g.) '10' seems no better and no worse than explicitly stipulating that 'P(10)' has no truth-value.

Of course, this point can be made in terms of the concept P ( $x$ ), as opposed to the predicate 'P( $x$ )'. There is nothing to this concept over and above its pairing of certain numbers (1, 3 and 5) with truth and others (2, 4 and 6) with falsehood. So P(10) - whatever it is - isn't a proposition.

Everything we have said about 'P( $x$ )' applies to 'B( $x$ )' ('anyone with  $x$  hair is bald'). There is nothing to this predicate other than its pairing off certain numbers with truth and others with falsehood. So if this predicate doesn't assign a truth-value to an object (a number in this case) it simply

isn't defined for that object.

The view that concepts might not pair off certain objects with truth-values is, I think, self-defeating. If  $C(x)$  isn't true of  $a$ , then we can't concatenate or put together  $C(x)$  and  $a$  in such a way as to form a proposition. We can't say that  $C(x)$  does apply to  $a$ , that  $C(x)$  doesn't apply to  $a$ , or therefore that  $C(x)$  neither applies nor fails to apply to  $a$ . So if  $C(x)$  neither applies nor doesn't apply to  $a$ , then there is no proposition to the effect that  $C(x)$  neither does nor doesn't apply to  $a$ . But if there is no such proposition, then there can be no view that  $C(x)$  neither does nor doesn't apply to  $a$ . So, with regard to the view that concepts might not pair off certain objects with truth-values, this view is incompatible with its own existence !

My own view is that any concept *can* meaningfully be applied to any object, that any predicate can be meaningfully applied to any expression.<sup>12</sup> (I tried to justify this view in section I.) I believe that, if you are defining a predicate ' $P(x)$ ' and you stipulate that this predicate can be truly applied only to '1', '3' and '5' (with their current meanings) and synonyms thereof, then *ipso facto* you have (in effect) stipulated that it will be *false* when applied to '10' or to 'Bill Clinton', that if a concept is true only of 1, 3, and 5 then it is *ipso facto false* of 10 and of Bill Clinton. But those who believe in non-epistemic indeterminacy cannot hold this. They must hold that concepts apply to certain objects but do not assign truth-values to those objects, that predicates apply to certain expressions but don't assign truth-values to them. But what I have tried to show that is that for a concept to apply to an object *is* for it to pair it off with a truth-value, that for a predicate to be defined for an expression *is* for it to pair it off with a truth-value.

Now I'd like to set forth an exactly parallel argument about propositions. So what I will try to show is this: *if we assume the correctness of a widely held and prima facie plausible analysis of what propositions are*, then it can be shown that it is incoherent - self-defeating - to suggest that propositions can be neither true nor false.

The aforementioned analysis of propositions is this: Propositions are functions from possible worlds to truth-values. So, just to be perfectly clear,

I am trying to show that *if* this analysis of a proposition is correct, *then* it is self-defeating to suggest that propositions can be neither true nor false. I admit that this is a contentious analysis of what propositions are.

Here is my argument. Every proposition corresponds to a concept. The proposition *Bob is tall* corresponds to the concept *is an object x such that Bob is tall is true in x*. (Of course, only whole worlds could fall under this concept.) The argument set forth a few paragraphs ago shows that if (*per impossibile*) a concept paired off an object with neither truth nor falsity, then we couldn't concatenate<sup>13</sup> that object with that concept to form a proposition. So if *Bob is bald* is neither true nor false of a world with such and such characteristics, then the concept *is an object x such that Bob is bald is true in x* isn't defined for that world. So there would be no proposition to the effect that *Bob is bald* would be true in such a world, false in such a world, or even neither true nor false in such a world. Of course, with regard to the view that *Bob is bald* might neither be true nor false in some worlds, that view presupposes that there is a proposition to the effect that *Bob is bald* is neither true nor false of certain worlds. So that view is incompatible with its own existence.

As we already noted, this proof assumes that propositions are functions from possible worlds to truth-values. Now I'd like to give a brief argument for that assumption. (I admit that this argument is not decisive. But it is at least suggestive.) Consider the sentence 'Bob is tall'. Under what circumstances does someone *fully* understand that sentence? As we noted earlier, even if we suppose that this sentence is non-epistemically vague, we cannot deny that, whatever truth-valuational status it has in *w* (truth, falsity, or neither), it has that status in virtue of *w*'s having *non-vague* properties - in virtue of Bob's being (say) 2.85674 meters tall in *w*. So the meaning of 'Bob is tall' can be thought of as a function from precise states of affairs to truth-values. So to *fully* grasp the meaning of this sentence would be to know, for any precisely described state of affairs (possible world), whether 'Bob is bald' paired off that state of affairs with truth or falsity. So the meaning of that sentence is just such a pairing.

Again, I admit that this analysis of what propositions are is debatable. But it is a widely accepted and also a plausible one. And, as I hope I have

shown, if this analysis is correct, then propositions can't be of indeterminate truth-value. (There can be *expressions* without truth-value: no one would ever deny that. But, supposing that what we've said is right, if an expression has no truth-value it is because it expresses *no* proposition, not because it expresses a proposition that has no truth-value.)

My own view is that it is *always* meaningful to say that *Bob is tall* is true or false in a world. I say this because *Bob is tall* is true or false in every world; *not* because it is applicable to every world but not true or false in every world. Again, for a concept to be defined for an object *is* for it to assign truth or falsity to that object. Each proposition corresponds to a concept. So, in effect, each proposition assigns a truth value to every world. (In fact, each proposition assigns a truth-value to every object. However, it will always assign falsehood to objects other than worlds.)

There is a simpler (but less interesting) way to prove that all propositions must be true or false. Let P be any proposition that is true and let Q be any proposition that is indeterminately true. P and Q have different properties. Therefore P and Q are distinct. So any indeterminately true proposition falls *outside* the class of true propositions. Therefore any indeterminately true proposition is simply false. Basically, indeterminate truth collapses into falsehood.

### III

We have seen some reason to believe that any given proposition is true or false—that there is no indeterminacy (except of the epistemic kind). Therefore vagueness cannot consist in something's being objectively indeterminate. So what is vagueness?

An answer commonly given by those who don't believe in objective vagueness is this: vagueness is a property of *symbols* or, more generally, of *representations* (perceptions, beliefs and so on).<sup>14</sup> And, we are told, for a representation to be vague is for it to be the case that it is indeterminate what it represents: more exactly, for a representation R to be vague is for it to be the case that, for some representational content C, it neither is, nor isn't, the case that R has C.

But we cannot countenance this analysis of what vagueness is.

Representations are as much a part of the spatiotemporal world as

anything else. So, given what we've said, we must hold that, for any representation R, and any property P, R must either have P or have not-P. So for any representational content C, R must either have C or not have C. Basically, representations cannot be *objectively* indeterminate in any way.

It should be pointed out that the very people who *deny* that there can be nonepistemic vagueness are often the same people who *affirm* that representations can be objectively indeterminate - i.e. that it can be indeterminate, for example, whether some object x falls within the scope of a given representation (whether e.g. Bob falls within the scope of Frank's conception of baldness).<sup>15</sup> But this point of view, as we've just seen, is incoherent: if there is no non-epistemic vagueness, then representations cannot be non-epistemically vague, and their relations to the world-these relations themselves being entities in their own right - cannot in any way be non-epistemically indeterminate. (Either Bob does, or does not, fall within Frank's conception of baldness. If not, then there is some property P such that Frank's conception neither has nor lacks P. But we have seen that this cannot be the case.) To sum up, vagueness does not consist in some *representation's* being indeterminate in respect of what it represents (or in any other respect for that matter).

So what else might vagueness be, given that there is no non-epistemic vagueness? it might be tempting to identify vagueness with *imprecision*: a representation is vague if it is imprecise. But vagueness is not imprecision: in fact, there are completely non-vague, but highly imprecise propositions, and there are vague, but relatively precise propositions.

Consider the statement

- (i) 'the number of hair on John's head is between 1 and 1,000,000'.

This statement is in no way vague (unless the concept of a hair is vague-but for argument's sake, let's suppose that it is a well-defined concept). But that statement is by no means precise. By contrast, the statement

- (ii) 'John is bald'

is vague, even though, in all likelihood, the latter gives quite a bit more information- and is therefore more precise than the statement 'John

# Is There Non-Epistemic Vagueness?

has between 1 and 1,000,000 hair'.

To take another example, the statement

(i') 'The number of stars is between 1 and 10,000,000,000'

is not vague, though it is extremely imprecise (let us assume, for argument's sake, that the concept *star* is not vague). By contrast, the statement

(ii') 'The number of stars is extremely large' is vague,

even though it probably gives more information than (i').

what is the difference between (i) and (ii)? Someone who believes in objective vagueness would say:

'There are no possible worlds where (i) and (i') lack truth-value. By contrast, there are possible worlds where (ii) and (ii') lack truth-value. Basically, vagueness is truth-valuelessness in some possible worlds.

But we've seen reason to believe that this view doesn't work. So what is vagueness? First I'd like to give a definition of vagueness for sentences. (What I say about sentences can be easily extended to cover other kinds of representations - e.g. perceptions, beliefs.) There are two kinds of vague sentences: those that concern contingent matters of fact (e.g. 'John is bald') and those that express, or purport to express, relations between concepts that hold in all possible worlds. First I will give a definition of vagueness for the former, then I will give one for the latter. Finally, I will give a definition that covers both kinds of sentences. The definition I will come up with is basically this: a sentence *S* is vague if one can understand it without fully knowing the rule that assigns it a truth-value. (This implies - what we've seen reason to hold - that nothing is vague *in itself*. A representation is vague *for someone* who lacks a certain kind of knowledge.)

An empirical sentence is vague if one can understand it without knowing how it is to be assigned a truth-value in *all* possible worlds. One cannot grasp a sentence *S* without knowing for at least *one* world *w* what *w* would have to be like for *S* to be true in *w*. But, it seems, one can grasp a sentence *S* without knowing for *every* possible world *w* what *w* would have to be like for *S* to be true in *w*. Let me elucidate this.

No cognitively normal English speaker past the age of three can be accused of not understanding sentences like 'Bob is bald'. At the same time, no English speaker (to my knowledge) knows *exactly* what the cut-off line between baldness and non-baldness is. (Let us suppose that if someone has 300 hair, then he doesn't *strike* people either as definitely being bald or as definitely not being bald.) So if you ask an ordinary English speaker to consider a possible world *w* where Bob has 300 hair, and you ask that person 'Is Bob bald in that world?', that person will say either 'I don't know' or (if he's philosophical) 'he's neither bald nor not bald.' So understanding a sentence like 'Bob is bald' is compatible with not knowing how to assign it a truth-value in *some* possible world. (This is so even though a sentence's meaning *is* such an assignment. So I am committed to the view that, in at least some cases, to understand a sentence, it is enough to *partially* grasp its meaning. This seems to be a reasonable view. Does everyone have a total grasp of the meaning of every sentence that they can be said to understand? That would be an extreme view.) At the same time, if someone had *no* idea how to assign a truth-value to 'Bob is bald' in *any possible world*, then surely that person could not be said to know what proposition it expressed. Suppose you described a world *w* where Bob has *no* hair at all, and you asked someone 'is Bob bald in *w*?' and that person said 'I don't know'. In that case, surely that person doesn't know what the predicate 'is bald' means.

As we noted earlier, whatever truth-value a 'vague' sentence (e.g. 'Bob is bald') has, it has that truth-value in virtue of there being some *precise* state of affairs-in virtue of Bob's having 37 hair. The proposition expressed by 'Bob is bald' is to be thought of as a rule going from precise numbers of hair (on Bob's head) to truth-values. The sentence 'Bob is bald' is vague because one could understand that sentence without knowing that rule *in its entirety*- without knowing what truth-value to give that sentence in a world where Bob has (say) 998 hair.

Consider the sentence 'the number of stars is extremely large'. To understand that sentence, you must surely know that, given a world *w* where there were 80 trillion stars, it would be true and that, given a world where there was one star, it would be false. But it does seem to be possible to understand that sentence without knowing whether it would be true in

## Is There Non-Epistemic Vagueness?

world where there were 1,300 stars. So 'the number of stars is extremely large' is vague because one can understand it without being able to assign it a truth-value in *all* possible worlds.

For an empirical sentence *S* to be non-vague is for it to be the case that, if one understands, if one knows for *any* world *w* what *w* has to be like for *S* to be true in it. If you understand the sentence, then you know *exactly* what any world has to be like for that sentence to be true (or false) in it. Suppose Bob were asked to consider a world *w* where there were 587 stars, and Bob were asked whether (ii') was true in it? If Bob didn't know the answer, then surely he couldn't really be said to understand (ii').

Not all vague sentences are empirical in character. Consider the following sentences:

- (i) Pride is a sin.
- (ii) Patience is a virtue.
- (iii) Cleanliness is next to Godliness.

These sentences express, or are supposed to express, truths that can be ascertained merely through reflection on the concepts involved. (Presumably one doesn't need to do empirical work to discover whether patience is a virtue or whether pride is a sin: if one is in possession of the concepts of patience and virtue, then presumably one has all the information one needs to determine whether patience is or is not a virtue.)

The following sentences, on other hand, are not vague:

- (i') A circle is a closed planar figure of uniform curvature
- (ii') Every even number is the sum of two primes.
- (iii') A straight line is the shortest distance between two points.

What is the difference between (i)-(iii) and (i')-(iii')? Here is an answer that we *cannot* accept (I bring it up because it seems plausible at first):

The sentence 'pride is a sin' is vague because it is built up out of vague concepts-because it expresses a relation between vague concepts. (This formulation is not circular because - given your definition of vagueness for empirical sentences - we in effect *already* have a definition of vagueness for

concepts: roughly, a concept *C* is vague if one can understand sentences of the form 'x is *C*' without knowing, for any world *w*, what that sentence's truth-value is in *w*.)

The problem is that there are sentences that express relations between vague concepts that are not themselves vague. Consider the sentence 'if one is obese then one is not skinny' or (what is equivalent)

(iv) 'for all *x*, if *x* is obese, then *x* is not skinny'.

Any sentence of the form 'x is obese' is vague, and so is any sentence of the form 'x is skinny'. But (iv) is not vague (it is obviously true - there is no indeterminacy about it). Here's another example:

(v) 'for all *x*, if *x* is skinny, *x* is obese'.

(v) isn't vague at all: it is obviously *false*: it's not on the borderline between truth and falsehood. But all sentences of the form 'x is skinny' and of the form 'x is obese' are vague: the concepts *skinny* and *obese* are presumably vague. So (v) counterexamples the objector's thesis. So what is the difference between (i)-(v) and (i')-(iii')?

'Pride is a sin' is vague because for some possible person *x*, in some possible world *w*, someone who *understood* that sentence could know everything there was to know about *x* and yet not know whether that person was proud or sinful or neither or both, and so wouldn't know whether *x* counter-exemplified that sentence. Let me elucidate this. A vague sentence like 'Bob is proud' or 'Bob is in a state of sin' has whatever truth-value it has in virtue of Bob's having certain *specific* properties - in virtue of certain non-vague sentences holding true of Bob. (If Bob is in a state of sin, his having that property consists in his having properties that are amenable to description in non-vague terms - in virtue of his having *specific* feelings, having committed *specific* acts, and so on. We've already seen why this is so.) Someone who understood the sentence 'pride is a sin' could know all of the facts about Bob that are relevant to his being proud and sinful and yet not be able to determine whether he constituted a counterexample to the sentence 'pride is a sin'. Basically, 'pride is a sin' is vague because one can understand that sentence without fully knowing what exactly must be the case if that sentence is to be true.

Given this, we can easily explain why the sentence 'for all *x*, if *x* is

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## Is There Non-Epistemic Vagueness?

171

skinny, then  $x$  is obese' is *not* vague' even though any sentence of the form ' $x$  is skinny' or ' $x$  is obese' is vague. If a person counter-examples this sentence, or fails to counter-example it, he does so in virtue of having certain *specific* characteristics - in virtue of having certain *specific* bodily dimensions. Let Bob be any one who understands the sentence 'for all  $x$ , if  $x$  is skinny, then  $x$  is obese.' For any person  $x$ , if Bob knows what specific bodily dimensions  $x$  has, Bob will know whether  $x$  counterexamples (or fails to counterexample) the sentence in question. Basically, one cannot possibly understand a sentence like 'for all  $x$ , if  $x$  is skinny, then  $x$  is obese' without *fully* knowing the rule that assigns it a truth-value.

To sum up, a sentence is vague if one can understand it without fully knowing the rule that assigns it a truth-value. Actually, there is a simpler way to put this. A sentence is vague if one can understand it without fully knowing its representational content. The representational content of a sentence is some proposition, and a proposition is a rule that assigns that sentence a truth-value.

How is vagueness to be defined for representations in general? What e.g. is a vague perception or a vague belief? One possible answer is: a representation is vague if its content is given by a vague sentence. But this answer is satisfactory only if all representational contents can be put into words; and it isn't clear whether this is true.

Another possible answer is as follows. A representation  $R$  is vague if it can be intelligible to someone without that person's knowing for all states of affairs (or worlds)  $S$  whether  $S$  would be consistent with  $R$  or not. Suppose you have a blurry, low resolution perceptual experience. (By a 'perceptual experience' I mean that kind of experience that, *if veridical*, qualifies as a perception.) Let  $P$  be this experience. It seems that, for a perceptual experience to be veridical, it must satisfy two requirements: (i) it must be caused by some external object, and (ii) the phenomenology of that perception must have *some* correspondence to that object.<sup>16</sup> If you had an experience that was subjectively just *like* that of seeing a dog, but that experience had been caused by a person, then that experience would not be veridical (it would be a misperception): the phenomenology of the experience wouldn't have the right correspondence to the cause of that experience. Because it is so vague,  $P$  is such that you don't know *quite*

what would make it veridical or non-veridical. You know that P would definitely be veridical if there were a squirrel or a hedgehog in front of you, and that it would definitely *not* be veridical if there were a person in front of you. (So P is not an unintelligible confusion.) But you don't know whether P would be veridical if there were, say, a small dog in front of you. Basically, P is vague because, while you do not know for *any* object O whether O's being the cause of P would make P be veridical, you do know this for *some* object O. If you knew for *any* object O whether O's being the cause of P would make P veridical, then P wouldn't be the least bit vague to you. On the other hand, if you didn't know for *any* O whether O's being the cause of P would make P veridical, then P wouldn't be *vague* to you; it would just be completely unintelligible. (If you don't speak Albanian, Albanian sentences aren't *vague* to you: they are simply unintelligible.)

Briefly and roughly, a representation R is vague if R can be intelligible to someone without that person's knowing *exactly* what makes R true or false. If a representation cannot be intelligible to someone without that person's *ipso facto* exactly what would make it true, then it is non-vague.

## REFERENCES

1. Evans, Gareth : 'Can There Be Vague Objects?' Reprinted in Keefe and Smith (ed.) *Vagueness : A Reader*, MIT Press, 1999
2. Parsons, Terrence : *Indeterminate Identity* (Oxford University Press, 1980)
3. Russell, Bertrand : 'Vagueness' reprinted in Keefe and Smith : *Op. cit.*

## NOTES

1. In the metaphysical, not the epistemic, sense of 'could'. Indeterminacy should be defined in terms of *possible*, and not merely actual, cases. Suppose that there were only two people on Earth, one of whom had a million hair, and one of whom had a million hair. In that case, there would be two cases of indeterminate baldness. But that wouldn't mean that baldness was a determinate property. For as long as there *could* be a borderline case (an indeterminate case), baldness is to be considered an indeterminate property.

*Is There Non-Epistemic Vagueness?*

property.

2. The exact same point holds of the boundary line between not-bald things and indeterminately bald things. Let  $x$  be any not-bald thing, and let  $y$  be any indeterminately bald thing.  $x$  has some property that  $y$  doesn't have:  $x$  is *not*-bald, whereas  $y$  is *not not*-bald. So the line separating indeterminately bald things from not-bald things is sharp, nothing straddles it.
3. See Terrence Parsons *Indeterminate Identity* (Oxford University Press 200), especially pp. 54-55.
4. Conveyed to me in a private communication.
5. Gareth Evans set forth a short but compelling argument to the effect that there can be no cases of indeterminate *identity*. (See Evans [1.]) His argument is basically this. For any  $x$ ,  $x$  is obviously determinately identical with itself. Given this, suppose that  $y$  is indeterminately identical with  $x$ . In that case,  $x$  and  $y$  don't have quite the same properties:  $x$  is determinately identical with  $x$  whereas  $y$  is *not* determinately identical with  $x$ . Therefore  $x$  and  $y$  are simply *different*. Basically, the relation of *indeterminate* identity collapses into that of determinate *non-identity*.

I'd like to show that our argument against indeterminacy in general does recover Evans' result—that, in fact, our argument can be seen as a kind of generalization of Evans' argument. (In any case, our argument can be seen as a general application of the main idea behind Evans' argument.) Our argument against indeterminacy in general, it will be recalled, was this. Let  $x$  be anything that has the property  $P$  and let  $y$  be anything that indeterminately has  $P$ .  $y$  is not identical with  $x$ : for  $x$  and  $y$  don't have quite the same properties ( $x$  has  $P$  whereas  $y$  is such that there is no fact of the matter as to whether it has  $P$ ). So  $y$  simply falls *outside* the class of things that have  $p$ , and therefore has not  $P$ . Applied to the problem of indeterminate *identity*, our argument becomes the following. Let  $z$  be anything that is identical with  $x$ , and let  $y$  be anything that is indeterminately identical with  $x$ .  $z$  has a property that  $y$  does not have:  $z$  is identical with  $x$ , whereas  $y$  is such that there is no fact as to whether it is identical with  $x$ . Therefore  $y$  and  $z$  have different properties and are not identical. So  $y$  ends up falling outside the class of things that are identical with  $x$ . So anything that is *indeterminately* identical with  $x$  is simply *not* identical with  $x$ .

The *basic* idea behind Evans' argument and mine seems to be the same. Only Evans happens to be concerned with a special *kind* of property: with properties of the form *is identical with x*. Evans' basic point seems to be that anything *indeterminately* having this property—anything *y* such that there is no fact of the matter as to whether *y* has this property—is distinct from anything that has this property, so that *y* is simply *not* one of the things that has this property. My point is that this argument applies not just to properties of the form *is identical with x* but to all properties—e.g. *is a part of Everest*, *is bald*, *is a talented pianist*.

6. Applied to the problem of indeterminate *identity*, this argument becomes the following. Consider the statements:

(i') *x* and *y* are identical but they are not *determinately* identical.

(ii') *x* and *y* are *determinately* identical, but they are not identical.

Both (i') and (ii') are patently false, for all values of *x* and *y*. So identity is the same thing as determinate identity. So if *x* and *y* are only indeterminately identical, then they are really just *not* identical. So this argument recovers Evans' result.

7. The word 'concept' has two different meanings or, in any case, refers to objects of two quite different kinds. Sometimes this word refers to *mental* entities and sometimes it refers to non-mental entities. In the sentence 'Einstein's concept of sub-atomic phenomena is richer than mine', the word 'concept' is being used to denote mental entities. In the sentence 'for any *x*, if *x* falls under the concept *triangle*, then it also falls under the concept *two-dimensional figure*', the word 'concept' is not being used to refer to mental entities but to some kind of Platonic (or, as we might also say, Fregean) entities.

8. Leaving aside epistemic problems, like those associated with Heisenberg's Law.

9. At any rate, *semantics* doesn't prevent this, but maybe the structure of the world does: maybe given (e.g.) Heisenberg's law it is not epistemically possible to come up with a completely indeterminacy-free description of the physical universe.

10. For the sake of simplicity, I am assuming that whether a person is bald depends *solely* on how many hair he has. This assumption may well be

*Is There Non-Epistemic Vagueness?*

175

false. Other factors are probably at work. If two people have the same number of hair, and their hair are of the same thickness, but one of those two people was fifty times larger than the other, then it could well be that one of them was bald and the other was not. So whether a person is bald depends not just on how many hair he has, but also on the thickness of his hair, on the size of his head, and possible on other variables. But if, in my discussion of indeterminacy, I always made allowances for all these variables, my discussion would be clumsy and long-winded in the extreme, and there would be absolutely no concomitant gain in substance. So I am assuming, for the sake of expository simplicity, that whether a person is bald depends only on how many hair he has.

11. It might be thought: 'look, any English speaker has a full understanding of the predicate "x is bald", but no English speaker knows for *every* n whether "n is bald" is true or false.' This objection is surely misguided. Suppose Bob knows for every n, whether 'n is bald' yields a truth, a falsehood, or neither, and that Jerry knows this only for some numbers. In that case, Bob surely has a fuller understanding of this predicate than does Jerry, even though Jerry has some understanding of it. A person can meaningfully and successfully use a predicate without knowing *everything* about it. It is not unreasonable to say that few, even no, English speakers *completely* grasp the meaning of the predicate 'is bald'. If we all did, then there would be no arguments as to whether some objects could neither have nor lack it. More generally, if every predicate were completely understood by everybody, then it is hard to see how there could be any philosophical debates. (Though, admittedly, this might be an overstatement.)
12. I admit that the theory of types may impose some restrictions on this statement. But, plausibly, a case could be made that these restrictions are peripheral to the present topic.
13. 'Concatenate' might not be the right word. Maybe 'put together' would be more appropriate, as it leaves it open how concepts and objects are to be composed to form propositions, whereas 'concatenate' seems to suggest that they must be put together in a certain way.
14. See Bertrand Russell 'Vagueness' (reprinted in *Vagueness: A Reader* edited Rosanna Keefe and Peter Smith, M.I.T. Press 1999): 'Vagueness and

precision alike are characteristics which can only belong to a representation, of which language is an example.' (p. 61)

15. See Russell *loc. cit.* I should point out that, according to Russell, no representation *per se* is indeterminate:

When knowledge is vague, this does not apply to the knowing as an occurrence, as an occurrence it is incapable of being either vague or precise. Vagueness in a cognitive occurrence is a characteristic of the *relation to that which is known* [my italics]., not of the occurrence in itself.' (p. 61)

But someone who denies the existence of non-epistemic vagueness cannot hold this view. If one says that this relation is only *epistemically* vague, then one is saying that in itself that relation is perfectly determinate - that for any mental representation R, and for any object x, it is completely determinate how R and x are related. But this is surely not what anyone who holds that representations are vague wants to say. On the other hand, if one believes that this relation is *objectively* vague, then one is countenancing the idea that there is non-epistemic vagueness. So given someone who holds that vagueness is a function of representations' - or, at any rate, of their relations to the world - being indeterminate, that person, in order to be coherent, must either countenance the existence of non-epistemic vagueness or must countenance the idea that representations (and their relations to the world) are always *precise* (but that, presumably, we are ignorant of the nature of these representations or relations). But with regard to thinkers who hold that vagueness is a property or their relations to the world, these thinkers don't seem to countenance *either* of these ideas (*vide* Russell), and are thus guilty of incoherence.

16. Actually, these are necessary but not sufficient conditions. Some third condition would have to be added to avoid Gettier problems.

## REFORMULATION OF THE JTB ACCOUNT: AN EVALUATION

SREEKALA M. NAIR

Ever since Gettier presented his hypothetical counter-examples<sup>1</sup> to the tripartite analysis of knowledge, there has been a profusion of attempts to reformulate the analysis. The Gettier-type counter-examples has led epistemologists to question virtually every aspect of the traditional analysis. The greatest effort has gone into the attempt to revise the traditional analysis in ways that will render it immune to the problems raised by Gettier. While some philosophers have been prompted to investigate theories concerning the nature of epistemic justification, still others have been inspired by the new arguments for radical forms of skepticism concerning knowledge and justification. Epistemologists have taken the task of first refining the traditional analysis to take into account the Gettier examples and then of devising subtler Gettier-type counter-examples targeted against the latest revision.

The reformulations of the JTB (justified true belief) may be classified into three groups: (1) Conservative reformulations, (2) Less Conservative reformulations, and (3) Least conservative reformulations. In the first category, namely, the conservative reformulation, attempts are made to conserve the traditional conditions and the relevant sense of justification is restricted, so that the Gettier-type counter-examples are ruled out. In the less conservative category, those reformulations are included which add an additional fourth condition to the existing three conditions in order to protect the analysis from counter-examples. The least conservative reformulations supplant some newer conditions for the traditional conditions and remain untouched by those notorious counter-examples.

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The aim of the paper is to analyse and assess the validity of the above reformulations which is attempted in the first three sections. In the fourth section, an attempt is made to see whether externalism can be a solution to the above problem.

## I

### Conservative Reformulations

Early attempts to revise the traditional analysis by taking into account the role of false proposition in one's evidence or in one's reasoning from the evidence fall under the category of conservative reformulations. These attempts are meant to strengthen the connection between justification and knowledge by reducing truth to a justification-making characteristic.

In his attempt to retain the traditional definition, Chisholm singles out a class of proposition, which he terms as, 'non-defectively evident' propositions. A non-defectively evident proposition, Chisholm observes, will have a self-presenting basis which makes no falsehood evident for  $S$ . To be precise:

$H$  is non-defectively evident for  $S = df$  Either  $h$  is certain for  $S$ , or  $h$  is evident for  $S$  and is entailed by a conjunction of proposition each having for  $S$  a basis which is not a basis of any false proposition for  $S$ .<sup>2</sup>

All those propositions that are not not-defectively evident are to be considered as defectively evident. Having defined the concept of non-defectively evident Chisholm proceeds to redefine the traditional analysis thus:  $h$  is known by  $s$  iff  $h$  is accepted by  $S$ :  $h$  is true; and  $h$  is non-defectively evident for  $S$ .

In the Gettier-counter example, the proposition  $e$  is true, is believed by Smith and it is equivalent to conjunction of propositions and of which is non-defectively evident for Smith. But the  $h$  of Gitter's example, 'Jones own a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona', is defectively evident. "The only set of self-presenting", Chisholm clarifies, "that makes  $h$  evident for Smith is one that also makes evident for Smith the false proposition  $f$ , that Jones owns a Ford"<sup>3</sup>. Therefore, with this repaired definition of knowledge, we are not required to say Smith that he knows  $h$  to be true, unlike the original traditional definition.

Chisholm acknowledges that the analysis proposed by him has at

*Reformulations of the JTB Account : An Evaluation*

179

least this disadvantage in common with other attempts to solve the Gettier problem that it is not immediately obvious that the definition is correct. In other words, the definition is one that must be defended. Chisholm himself anticipates a few objections which he puts forth in his defense. The first objection is set forth against the thesis that a non-defectively evident proposition has a self-presenting basis which makes no falsehood evident for S. Suppose S knows that ninety nine percent of the balls in an urn are black and that many drawings from the urn that are about to take place are to be random ones. This will surely make it evident to S that *h*: 'Most of the drawings will be of balls that are black'. But although *h* is true, it is false that *f* 'The next ball to be drawn will be black'. The self-presenting propositions that constitute a basis for *e* and therefore also for *h* here does constitute a basis for *f*.

Responding to this objection, Chisholm points out that although the man's evidence *e* may well make reasonable for him the false proposition *f* it can hardly be said to make it evident. At the same time *e* definitely makes *h* evident. To see the difference between the epistemic status of *h* and *f*, all that we need to do is to put ourselves in the same epistemic situation as the man in question. We would really grant him the right to say, "I know that most of the drawings will be black". But if he goes on to say, "And what is more, I know that the next ball to be drawn will be black", our reaction would be: "Either you are mistaken or else you have some evidence other than *e* that we do not have".<sup>4</sup>

The second objection comes in the following argument. Suppose a man has adequate evidence for propositions, which he might express as follows:

- (a) "Whenever the factory whistle blows, it is 5 P. M."
- (b) "Whenever the factory whistle blows, the bus will appear within five minutes".
- (c) The factory whistle is now blowing".

We may assume that in such a case, the following will also be evident:

- (d) "It is now 5 P. M."
- (e) "The bus will appear within five minutes"

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Now imagine that it is in fact 5 P. M but this time the bus had a break down and hence will not appear. Referring to this situation, Chisholm's definition might be questioned in the following manner. (For the sake of convenience, we shall number the arguments):

- (i) Surely the man knows that it is 5 P.M.
- (ii) (d) is made evident to him by (c)
- (iii) the directly evident propositions that make (c) evident for the man, will also be the ones that make (d) evident,
- (iv) (c) also makes evident the false propositions (e) that the bus will now appear.

(v) Hence, the self-presenting propositions constituting the man's basis for (d) also constitute basis for a false proposition.<sup>5</sup>

Chisholm here clarifies that in this argument the mistake lie in steps (ii) and (iii). It is a mistake to say in (ii) that it is now 5 P.M. is made evident to him by the fact that the whistle is blowing. In fact, it is made evident for him by the conjunction of (c) and (e). Analogously for step (iii), the false proposition (e) is made evident not by (c) above, but by (c) and (b). "The directly evident proposition that make (d) evident for the man are those that make evident the conjunction (a) and (c). But those that make evident the false proposition (e) are those that make evident the conjunction (a) and (c)"<sup>6</sup>. Hence step (v) of the argument is false; it is not the case that the self-presenting propositions constituting the man's basis for (d) also constitute a basis for false proposition.

Thus, the conservative reformulations though they make an appreciable attempt to reform the standard analysis within the given framework of the traditional definition, they unfortunately do not have anything much to offer to check the Gettier-type counter-examples. Probably it is not possible to form a standard analysis that is immune to Gettier type counter-examples by remodeling this tripartite analysis.

## II

### Less Conservative Reformulations

Under this category, falls those reformulations which advance a fourth condition in addition to the existing three conditions for a proper

analysis. The major analysis in this division are: (i) The presence of relevant falsehood, (ii) Epistemic explanation, (iii) Truth resistant evidence, and (iv) Defeasibility analysis. Let us discuss each of them briefly.

*(i) The presence of Relevant Falsehood*

A simple diagnosis of what has gone wrong with Gettier-type counter-examples is that the initial belief that  $f$  from which the true justified belief that  $h$  is inferred, is false. So we might add to the tripartite analysis the fourth condition that nothing can be known which is inferred from a false belief, or from a group of beliefs, of which one is false. Dreher has attempted to develop this approach to the Gettier problem. He presumed that a standard analysis of knowing employs the phrase 'justified belief' to mean believing on good evidence, in a sense of 'evidence' in which there can be no such thing as false evidence.<sup>7</sup> In other words, there can be no such thing as a false proposition describing the evidence for something. The standard analysis would then be:  $S$  knows that  $p$  iff (i)  $p$  (ii)  $S$  believes that  $p$ , (iii)  $S$  is justified in believing that  $p$ , (iv) There is no relevant falsehood in  $S$ 's justification for  $p$ .

Dreher applies his analysis to the Gettier-type counter examples in order to establish its validity. In the Nogot example Dreher observes, the false proposition  $f$  'Mr. Nogot owns a Ford', cannot be a good evidence for proposition  $h$ : 'Some one in the office owns a Ford'. Letting  $e$  describe the evidence concerning Mr. Nogot's behaviour, Dreher points out that the conjunction of  $e$  and  $f$  also cannot describe evidence for  $h$ , since the conjunction is false."<sup>8</sup> Thus, the only remaining candidate to describe evidence for  $h$  is  $e$ . If  $e$  is a good evidence for  $h$ , it is so only because  $e$  is a good evidence for  $f$  and does not support  $h$  directly.<sup>9</sup> Thus even though the teacher who does not know that  $f$  is false may mistakenly think that  $e$  describes good evidence for  $h$ , the falsity of  $f$  prevents  $e$  from describing evidence for  $h$ . Therefore, the subjects in the counter-examples do not know.

Such a conclusion is too extreme from many point of views. Many philosophers have thought it unexceptionable to regard  $e$  as describing good evidence for  $h$ . The suggestion is too strong in the sense that it might make it impossible for any of us to know anything at all. We all of us

suffer from numerous false beliefs which have some role in an inferential processes. As per this suggestion, none of our present true justified beliefs would count as knowledge. In any case, as Shope rightly remarks, "It is not clear from Dreher's own remarks how to formulate a general requirement for a true proposition  $e$  to describe good evidence for another proposition  $h$  in order to be able to deal with Gettier-type counter-examples." Yet another defect that is often pointed out with this analysis is that the variants on the Gettier theme can be written in which, though there is falsehood, there is no inference.

The more fruitful method, therefore, is to acknowledge the defect and repair the conditional by removing reference to inference and by tightening up the relation between the false-beliefs and true justified ones which are not to count as knowledge. Thus we could simply require an absence of relevant falsehood.

#### (ii) *Epistemic Explanation*

Shope assumes that our analysis of knowledge can avoid Gettier style counter-examples once we recognize that in such examples falsehood plays a certain role in relation to one's actual justification. An epistemic explanation, according to Shope, is a set of propositions explaining why some proposition is justified. When one is concerned with justified factual knowledge, one's belief or acceptance must be justified through its connection with a sequence of such explanations not involving falsehoods at those places. This he calls, 'Justification-explaining-chain (JEC)'.<sup>11</sup> With this notion of JEC, Shope suggests the following alteration in the standard analysis: 'S's believing  $p$  is justified in relation to epistemic goals through its connection with a justification-explaining-chain (JEC) related to the proposition  $p$ '.<sup>12</sup> Commenting on this, Moser observes: "The basic idea of Shope's diagnosis... is that by constructing such a JEC for a Gettier style counter-example we can expose the false propositions and thereby account for the lack of genuine propositional knowledge".<sup>13</sup>

Shope's solution to the Gettier problem exhibits a leaning towards naturalized epistemology. It seems that Shope is quite unwilling to give up the traditional epistemic conceptions. As a result of this, he is not successful. The use of a JEC does not guarantee that a knowledge-precluding falsehood

will emerge in such Gettier-style counter-examples.

### (iii) Truth-resistant Evidence

The truth-resistant evidence requirement is very similar to the epistemic explanation thesis. This theory assumes that the kind of evidence essential to propositional knowledge admits of an epistemic explanation that is not contravened by the addition of any further true propositions. Paul K. Moser, the major proponent of this thesis gives the following requirement to undercut the Gettier-type counter-examples: For S to have knowledge that  $p$  on evidence  $e$ , there must be an epistemic explanation of  $p$  that explains, solely by means of true propositions why S is justified in believing that  $p$  or  $e$  even if any other true proposition is conjoined with  $e$ .<sup>14</sup>

An epistemic explanation appropriate to knowledge is resistant to any truth even those that are not part of knower's actual evidence. The kind of evidence knowledge requires is truth-resistant in the sense that its justificatory value is not contravened by the addition of any true proposition, including true propositions of which the believer is unaware. Moser explicates the notion of truth-resistant evidence as follows: 'S' s justifying evidence  $e$  for  $p$  is truth-resistant *iff*, for every true proposition  $t$  that, when conjoined with  $e$  and  $t$  restores the justification of  $p$  for S in a way that S is actually justified in believing that  $p$ .<sup>15</sup>

With this condition of evidential truth-resistance added as the fourth condition, Moser offers the following analysis of knowledge: S knows that  $p$  *iff* (i)  $p$  is true, (ii) S has justifying evidence  $e$  for  $p$ , (iii) S believes or asserts  $p$  on the basis of  $e$ , (iv) S has justifying evidence  $e$  for  $p$  that is truth resistant in the sense, for every true proposition  $t$  that when conjoined with  $e$  contravenes S's justification for  $p$  on  $e$ , there is a true proposition  $t$  that when conjoined with  $e$  and  $t$  restores the justification of  $p$  for S in a way that S is actually justified in believing that  $p$ .<sup>16</sup>

Though there are a few advantages in this type of analysis, it shares a few defects in common with other conservative analyses. First, among the many counter-examples weaved against conservative reformulations, atleast a few would counter this theory also. The thesis in fact is a form of defeasibility analysis expressed in simpler terms.

(iv) *Defeasibility Analysis*

Some like Chisholm, Steven Levy, Pappas and Swain have proposed defeasibility analysis. Chisholm, for example, in his paper, 'The Ethical Requirement', suggests that an analogous explication can be given for the epistemic notion of defeasible *iff*... there is a body of evidence *e* such that *e* is true and *e* justifies *h*, and this justification may be over-ridden.<sup>17</sup> There is justification for *h* which has been over ridden *iff* 'there is a body of evidence *e* and a body of evidence *e'* such that: (i) *e* is true and *e* justifies *h* and (ii) *e'* is true and the conjunction of *e* and *e'* does not justify *h*. Therefore, a justification for *h* is indefeasible if there is a body of evidence *e* such that *e* is true and *e* justifies *h* and this justification cannot be over-ridden. Similarly, Steven Levy speaks of a similar defeasibility condition to that of Chisholm. According to him, a defeasibility condition in an analysis of knowledge is 'a requirement to the effect that for *S* to know that *p* there must be no other evidence against *p* strong enough to undermine *S*'s belief that *p* should this evidence come to *S*'s attention.'<sup>18</sup> Pappas and Swain had the same idea in their mind when they suggested the following requirements: 'In order for a proposition *h* to be indefeasibly justified the evidence *e* must be sufficiently complete that no further additions to *e* would result in a loss of justification and hence a loss of knowledge.'<sup>19</sup> This way of characterizing defeasibility allows that justification may be undermined by evidence, which is relevant to *p*, even though it is not evidence against *p* as in the Tom Grabit example.

Swain counters these theses forcefully. To say that justification for *h* cannot be over ridden, he observes, is just to say that there cannot be any body of evidence *e* such that *e* in conjunction with the justifying body of evidence *e* fails to justify *h*. but how are we to understand the requirement that there cannot be any body of evidence *e'*? If it is to be taken as a logical impossibility, it is too strong for, if *h* is a contingent proposition, then it is logically possible that *h* is false and that there is some body of evidence *e* such that the conjunction of *e* fails to justify.<sup>20</sup>

According to Lehrer, the defeasibility condition has to be weakened by restricting the range of defeating counter-evidence, to those for which the evidence *e* is strongly negative. In a combined article along with Paxson, Lehrer shows how Chisholm's analysis can be amended adopting the Nozick

example.<sup>21</sup> Lehrer offers the following definition of defeasibility. If  $p$  completely justifies  $S$  in believing that  $h$  then this justification is defeated by  $q$  iff (i)  $q$  is true (ii) the conjunction of  $p$  and  $q$  does not completely justify  $S$  in believing that  $h$  (iii)  $S$  is completely justified in believing  $q$  to be false, and (iv) if  $c$  is a logical consequence of  $q$  such that the conjunction of  $c$  and  $p$  does not completely justify  $S$  in believing that  $h$  then  $S$  is completely justified in believing  $c$  to be false.<sup>22</sup>

The most attractive feature of defeasibility thesis is that it allows us to indulge in two apparently conflicting intuitions regarding conditions of standard analysis - that one's evidence be inductive and that one has conclusive evidence for knowledge. The new quadripartite analysis will have a coherence that was previously lacking: it provides an explanation in the fourth clause of what was before included by mere stipulation, that knowledge requires truth. But this very advantage has dug its grave. To provide truth connection by requiring that the subject has conclusive evidence is self-negating given the human cognitive limitations and fallibilistic epistemology.

### III

#### Least Conservative Reformulations

Those analyses, in which the existing conditions are totally replaced by some set of new conditions, fall under this category. It is due to the attempts made by the epistemologists to deviate from the traditional path in search of a possible solution to the Gettier problem. The following theories come under this category: (i) Conditional theory, (ii) Conclusive Reasons Analysis, (iii) Causal Theory of Knowledge and (iv) Reliabilistic Theory of Knowledge.

##### (i) Conditional Theory

This theory owes for its origin mainly to Nozick. He suggests that the reason why we take the justified true beliefs in the Gettier-type counter-examples not to have been known is that  $S$  would have believed them even if they had been false. He takes it, therefore, that for  $S$  to know that  $p$ , we require that  $S$  would not have believed that  $p$  iff  $p$  had been false. The

analysis therefore, is specified thus:

S knows that  $p$ , iff

(i)  $p$  is true ( $p$ )

(ii) S believes that  $p$  (Bsp)

(iii) If  $p$  were not true S would not believe that  $p$  ( $\sim p \square \rightarrow \sim \text{Bsp}$ )

There are two ways by which it can be a coincidence that S's belief is true. First, if it were false, S would still believe it, and second, there may be slightly different circumstances in which  $p$  remains true but S no longer believes it. To exemplify both these, an example seems required. Suppose S believes that there is a police car in the road outside because he can hear a police siren. There is in fact such a car outside, but the siren he hears is that of the hi-fi of the Kid's in the next room. Here S does not know that there is a police car outside for two reasons: first, S would still have had the belief even if the car had not been silent, even though the car itself remained outside.

In short, this theory makes an attempt to articulate the feeling that for a belief to be knowledge, it must be peculiarly sensitive to the truth of the proposition believed. Nozick contends: "It must track the truth in the sense that if the proposition were in changed circumstances, still true, it would still be believed and if it were not true, it would not".<sup>24</sup> Tracking the truth of  $p$  is in effect a requirement that the first two clauses of the analysis should be related in a certain way. The theory does seem to have some resources with which it can explain the link between certainty and knowledge. According to this theory, someone who claims to know that  $p$  is in effect claiming that if  $p$  were not true, he would not believe it. But this claim is precisely one which he would not make if he were not certain that  $p$ .

No doubt, this theory has diagnosed it right what has gone wrong with Gettier-type counter-examples and proceeded in the right direction for a solution. But, unfortunately, Nozick provides no means by which we can track the truth and to this extent the theory is unsatisfactory.

## (ii) Conclusive Reasons Analysis

This theory proceeds from the apparently natural way to respond

the Gettier problem, namely, that a person can have knowledge on the basis of evidence  $e$  is sufficiently strong to rule out the possibility of coincidence. In other words,  $S$  has knowledge that  $h$  only if  $S$  has conclusive reasons for believing that  $h$ . It is pointed out that the evidence  $e$ , a person has for some proposition  $h$  may support  $h$  to any degree along a continuum ranging from virtually worthless to conclusive. If a person's evidence is less than conclusive, it always seems possible that the propositions for which the evidence provide support is only coincidentally true. In Gettier cases, the subject has excellent, but not conclusive evidence for  $h$  and therefore, it seems merely a coincidence that  $h$  is true. The problem is how this intuitive notion can be elevated from the level of vagueness?

A strong version of "conclusive reasons analysis" is presented by Peter Unger. Unger feels that in Gettier cases there is an element of accident in  $S$ 's being right about the fact that  $h$  is true and therefore his evidence cannot be conclusive. For,  $S$  could as well have been wrong if it is accidental that he is right. To handle the Gettier type cases, Unger provides the following analysis: 'A person  $S$ , has knowledge that  $h$  iff it is not at all accidental that  $S$  is right about its being the case that  $h$ '.<sup>25</sup>

Unfortunately, this analysis does not have the required clarity for a solution. When is it correct to say that it is not at all accidental that  $S$  is right about its being the case that  $h$ ? Unger repeatedly tells us that his notion of accidentality is not similar to the automobile accidents, but he does not tell us precisely what he intends. It is true that Gettier counter-examples do seem to be accidental. But it is not difficult to complicate the examples, by which it is not at all accidental that  $S$  is right about this conclusion, even though he still does not know. Suppose in case I of Gettier, someone has cleverly staged the entire set of circumstances described by Gettier. The employer has been bribed to mislead  $S$ , ten coins have been placed purposefully in Smith's pocket, etc. Then it seems, in this revised case, it is not accidental (in the same sense of 'accident') that  $S$  is right.<sup>26</sup> Hence Unger's notion of non-accidentality is too weak to serve the purpose.

### (iii) *Causal Theory of Knowing*

Among these philosophers who have supported a causal theory of knowing, some add a clause concerning causation as a fourth condition of

knowledge, while others substitute such a clause for the justification condition in a standard analysis. In an early analysis, Goldman suggests. "...A person can be said to have knowledge that *h* only if the fact that *h* is causally concerned in an appropriate way with S's believing that *h*." <sup>27</sup> Goldman complicates his proposition by an additional requirement to the effect that S must correctly reconstruct the important links in the relevant causal chains.

Applying his theory to the Gettier counter-examples, Goldman argues that what makes *h* true is the fact that Brown is in Barcelona, but this fact has nothing to do with Smith's believing *h*. That is, there is no causal connection between the fact that Brown is in Barcelona and Smith's believing *h*. If Smith had come to believe *h* by reading a letter from Brown postmarked in Barcelona, then we might say that Smith knew *h*. <sup>28</sup> Similarly, if Jones did own a Ford, and his owning the Ford was manifested by his offer of a ride to Smith and thus in turn, resulted in Smith's believing *h* then we would say that Smith knew *h*. Thus, one thing that seems to be missing in these examples is a causal connection between the fact that makes *h* true and Smith's belief of *h*.

In the case of perception, a causal requirement is very obvious. <sup>29</sup> Remembering like perception, according to Goldman, must be regarded as a causal process. S remembers *h* at time 't' only if S's believing *h* at an earlier time is a cause of his believing *h* at *t*. Knowledge can be acquired by a combination of perception and memory also. Apart from perception and memory, there is inferential knowledge also. Cases of knowledge based on testimony too can be analysed causally. In a genuine case of knowing, there will be continuous causal chain leading from H to S's believing *h*. In the absence of such a causal connection, though S is warranted, S cannot be said to have knowledge.

Swain attempts to establish that in standard analysis the defeasibility condition can be replaced by conditions that refer to facts about the causal connections obtained between beliefs and states of affairs. The special defeating counter-evidence can be explained in terms of the lack of a causal chain connecting S's belief that *a* with the state of affairs referred to by *p*. Whether a man's justification is defeated or undefeated is in general a function of the characteristics of such causal chains. After a considerable long discussion, Swain gives the following conditional: The causal chain

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leading to S's belief that  $e$  either (1) contains the event or state of affairs referred to by  $p$ , or (2) contains some other event or state of affairs that is either or logically sufficient for the occurrence of the event referred to by  $p$ .<sup>30</sup>

Swain's account of causal theory is, in a sense, an improvement on Goldman's proposal. For, many of Goldman's requirements, for instance, that S must correctly reconstruct the important links in the relevant causal chain is too vague to be serviceable. But even is Swain's analysis, it emerged that we have no guarantee that there is only one way in which belief come to be justified and in particular no real reasons for supposing that any acceptable way must somehow be causal, so that all justified beliefs that  $p$  must be caused by relevant facts.

#### (iv) *Reliability Theory of Knowledge*

Epistemic reliabilism is the widely held view that a true belief becomes knowledge depending on the reliability of the process that causes that belief. Reliability consists in the tendency of a process to produce true beliefs rather than false ones. The source of a given belief is minimally reliable just in case "... it has a (possibly unexercised) propensity to accurately indicate the truth about that sort of belief."<sup>31</sup> To be reliable a source would have to perform well in a wide variety of conditions; but it need not perform well in all possible conditions. For instance, in cases of visual illusions, vision performs poorly indeed, but overall it is still reliable for, circumstances in which illusions are present are relatively abnormal. It is the fact that vision does and would perform well if relied on in normal circumstances that leads us to judge it reliable. Normal circumstances relative to an individual are those in which people in his community typically find themselves. What constitutes normal conditions, the sort of situations in which members of a community typically are ensconced, will vary from one community to the next. As a consequence, the minimum level of reliability a source must possess fluctuates across a range of communities.

Goldman, the chief proponent of reliabilist theory, criticizes the traditional theories of justification. The traditional theories of justification are faulty, he says, "for ... they confer justification on to a belief without restriction, on why the belief is held, on what causally initiates the belief or

sustains it."<sup>32</sup> Here cause is construed broadly to include sustainer as well as initiator of belief. Granted that principles of justified belief must make reference to cause of belief, what kinds of causes confer justified belief? Here, Goldman reviews those belief forming processes that are intuitively justified conferring such as standard perceptual processes, remembering, good reasoning and introspection etc.

Criticisms were in abundance to Goldman's proposal. First and foremost, the requirement is too demanding. The theory assumes that the truth ratio of a belief forming process is invariant across all normal worlds. Such consistency seems not to preserve reliability. For, we can conceive of a possible world which is consistent with all our general beliefs about the actual world, but which does not feature the reliability of a particular belief forming process that is highly reliable in all normal worlds. Second, not all humans share the same general beliefs about the normal world. Normal worlds for certain humans are abnormal for others. Here we need to only mention the animism and idealistic mysticism of various tribal communities.

#### IV

#### Can Externalism be a solution to the above problem?

The brief approaches made on the various proposed analyses all point to one thing: the growing necessity to neutralize epistemology. Naturalized epistemology is "...one in which all the terms used in the analysis are ones that describe phenomena of nature, such as causation, for example, or those that can be reduced to such terms."<sup>33</sup> Quine's 'epistemology naturalised' suggests that inquiry into the nature of human knowledge is restricted to accounts of how belief arises and is altered.

Assuming that the required relationship is a causal reliability, the externalist theories are naturalistic. Externalism avoids the problems faced by foundationalism and coherentism because neither one has to posit self-justified beliefs nor assume coherence among the beliefs since the justifications of belief is either attained by some other means or justified in itself is not required to convert true belief into knowledge. The externalist theories of justification could never convincingly convey that a belief could be justified externally, for the simple reason that there are inherent

contradictions in it. The term 'justified' consists within itself an internalist conception. The most plausible theory, therefore, is those true beliefs having the appropriate sort of naturalistic external relationships to the facts as a result of such relationship, converted into knowledge without being justified. It is the way true beliefs are connected to the world that makes them knowledge rather than the way in which we might attempt to justify them. What matters for knowledge is how the belief arises, the natural history of belief, not how one might reason on behalf of it. Looked at this way, the justification requirement can be eliminated altogether in favour of the right sort of historical account.

Externalism deals neatly with skepticism, both traditional and modern also. The traditional skeptics doubt the perceptual claim, we might be deceived by an evil demon who supplies us with deceptive sensations which lead us to believe that we see a tree, for instance, when we do not see it at all. The modern skeptics replaces evil demon with a small object, a 'braino' implanted in our brain, which, when operated by a computer provides us with sensory states which are produced by the working of the computer influencing the brain rather than by the external objects one believes to exist. To all these skeptics, externalist gives a simple reply: "... if my beliefs are indeed produced by the demon or by the braino, then they are false and I am ignorant. On the other hand, if the beliefs are true and produced in the appropriate way, then I do know."<sup>34</sup> It is so simple an affair for them since the validity of the cognition does not, in any way, depend upon the cognizer.

The intuitive difficulty the majority of epistemologists face is that a person may be highly irrational and irresponsible in accepting a belief, when judged in light of his own subjective conception of the situation and may still turn out to be epistemically justified according to externalist criterion. His belief may in fact be reliable, even though he has no reason for thinking it is reliable. In short, the externalist theories attempt to escape the dilemma by invoking external justifying conditions which need not be at all within the ken of the knowing subject. "But the price of such a view" retorts Lehrer, "is the abandonment of any claim that this subject himself has any reason for accepting the basic belief and thus seemingly also of the claim that he is justified in holding either that belief or the others which depend on it."<sup>35</sup> In this way, the externalist view collapses into skepticism.

The appeal of externalist theories is their naturalistic character. They assimilate knowledge to other natural causal relationships between objects. Our attainment of knowledge is just one natural relationship between facts among all the rest. Such a theory, though escapes a number of difficulties encountered by the other theories, they have this defect that they provide accounts of the possession of information rather than attainment of knowledge. Substantiating this criticism, Lehrer noted: "The relationship in question may suffice for the recording of information. But if we are ignorant of the relationship we lack knowledge."<sup>36</sup> We need the additional information of the existence of those relationships to convert the specified relationship into knowledge. For knowledge, more than the possession of information is needed. One must have some way of knowing that the information is correct.

It is also criticized that externalist theories, typical of epistemological theories, take some sort of example that best fits for the theory and ignore less felicitous examples. The paradigm examples for externalism are perception and communication. In the case of perception, it is indeed very plausible to contend that what converts perceptual beliefs into knowledge is the way that the belief arises in perceptual experience. S's belief that he sees a tree is converted into knowledge by being caused by his actually seeing a tree. The same is the case with communication. John says Peter that Mr. Smith is the department head and that causes Peter to believe that Mr. Smith is the department head. Here Peter's knowing that Smith is department head depends on whether his informant knows that what he tells him is true. The assumption is that there is a causal chain beginning with his believing it which accounts for his knowing to it. But the realm of knowledge has more to it than perception and testimony. Not all knowing that *p* can be supposed to be caused by the fact that *p*. for instance, there are general propositions and theoretical propositions that cannot be given an account of with their theory.

Such a criticism is unwarranted. Goldman insists on logical connections that account for the knowledge of general and theoretical propositions. And after all, descriptive epistemology enlists the major means to knowledge. They are perception, inference, testimony, memory and intuition. Of these, externalism accounts for all.

*Reformulations of the JTB Account : An Evaluation*

Regarding the justification condition, those who stick on to the traditional western conception insist that a necessary normative condition of a person knowing that *p* is that it be more reasonable for him to accept that than to accept the denial of *p* on the basis of his information. Here the key notion is 'normative', this takes us to the crux of the whole problem. The term 'justified' is used in the traditional western epistemology in a deontological sense. Just as to be justified in having done something is for that action not to be in violation of any relevant rules, regulations, laws, obligations, duties or counsels, the ones that govern actions of that sort, justification of belief too means to believe something in terms with epistemic rules. On the deontological conception of the epistemic justification of belief that is as close as possible to the standard conception of the justification of action, to be justified in believing that *p* at '*t*' is for one's belief that *p* at '*t*' not to be in violation of any epistemic principles, principles that permit only those beliefs that are sufficiently likely to be true.

Many deontologists, after disavowing any commitment to direct voluntary control of belief, proceed to insist that beliefs are subject to what they term, 'indirect voluntary control'. With respect to almost all normal perceptual, introspective and memory propositions, it is absurd to think that one has any such control to accept, reject or withhold the proposition. When I look out my window and see rain falling, water dripping of the leaves of trees, ... I no more have immediate control over whether I accept those propositions than I have basic control. I form the belief that rain is falling willy-nilly. There is no way I can inhibit this belief. Of course, there is no denial of the fact that we do have a rather weak degree of 'long range' voluntary control over some of our beliefs. But the deontological notion of justification based on this indirect influence is not the sort of notion we require for the epistemological purposes to which the term justification is put.

The discussion above reveals that the justification condition the traditional western epistemology nourished for so long is nothing but the offspring of their conceiving epistemic notions comparable to ethical notions, a thesis proved unwarranted. Take away such deontological implication from propositional knowledge, it shall be clear that the justification condition vanishes. Ordinary people, for instance, routinely acquire numerous valid

perceptual beliefs. If one of them, a normal non-philosopher, Mr. Jones were asked to provide some justification for thinking that a certain one of his perceptual belief is true, very likely, he would be at a loss about what to use and how to use it. If he sees and recognizes a table under favourable observation conditions, then it is quite plausible that he is justified in believing that he sees a table. But there need not be anything else that he regards as his justification for the belief.

### NOTES

1. The dictum "knowledge is justified true belief" was questioned by Edmund L. Gettier. In his three paged article entitled "Is justified true belief knowledge?", he presented two counter-examples

Gettier aims to question, the sufficiency of the tripartite definition of knowledge. He is not confronted with any of the existing three clauses in the definition. He allows that they are individually necessary and argues only that they need supplementing. In order to explain this, he gives two counter-examples.

In Case I of Gettier's, there are two characters, Smith and Jones, who have applied for a certain job. Gettier asks us to suppose that Smith has strong evidence for the following conjunctive proposition: (f) Jones is the man who will get the job and, Jones has ten coins in his pocket.

Smith's evidence for (f) might be that he has been told by the man doing the hiring that his rival Jones is going to get the job and Smith has counted ten and only ten coins in Jones's pocket. Call this evidence *e*. Based on this evidence *e*, Smith arrives at the following proposition which is entailed by f: (h) The man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket.

Note that it is the entailment from f to h that makes Smith accept h. Thus Smith accepts h on the grounds of f for which he has strong evidence. Therefore, Smith is clearly justified in believing that h is true. To everyone's surprise, however, it is Smith who gets the job and as it happens Smith unknowingly has ten coins in his pocket. Therefore, proposition h is true, though proposition f from which Smith inferred h is false. Gettier points out here that the proposition in question namely, h: (i) is true, (ii) Smith believes

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that  $h$  is true, and (iii) Smith is justified in believing that  $h$  is true for, Gettier observes: " $h$  is true in virtue of the number of coins in Smith's pocket while Smith does not know how many coins are in Smith's pocket and bases his belief in  $e$ , on a count of the coins in Jones's pocket, whom he falsely believes to be the man who will get the job."

Case II of Gettier appeals to the logical principle of addition, affirming that if  $p$  is true, then the truth-functional disjunction of  $p$  and  $q$  is also true whatever  $q$  may happen to be: i.e. in a disjunctive statement of  $p$  and  $q$ , the proposition would be true *iff*  $p$  and  $q$  are not both false. Gettier's Case II is as follows:

Suppose Smith has strong evidence for the following propositions: (f) Jones owns a Ford. Smith's evidence for this might be the conjunctive proposition (e) Jones says he owns a Ford, has showed him certificates to the effect and has always been honest and reliable in the past. This conjunction  $e$  of propositions is said to make evident for Smith the proposition (f) namely, 'Jones owns a Ford.' Thus, Gettier supposes that Smith is completely justified in believing that Jones owns a Ford on the basis of his beliefs about Jones. Gettier asks us to imagine now that Smith has another friend, Brown, of whose whereabouts he is totally unaware of. Smith selects a place's name at random and constructs the following propositions: (h) Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona.

That is, being something of a logician Smith notice that from, 'Jones owns a Ford', it follows by the principle of addition that 'Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona' is true. This inference does not rest on any assumption about the ordinary meaning of the word 'or'. Using the term as a logician does, the deductions of  $h$  from  $f$  is valid, i.e.  $S$  may well deduce  $h$  from  $f$  even though  $S$  has no beliefs one way or the other concerning whether Brown is in Barcelona.

2. R. M. Chisholm, *Theory of Knowledge*, p. 109.

3. *ibid.*, p. 110.

4. *ibid.*, p. 111.

5. *ibid.*, p. 112.

6. *ibid.*

7. J. M. Dreher, "Evidence and Justified Belief", in *Philosophical Studies*, 23 (1974), pp. 435-439. 24.
8. R. K. Shope, *Analysis of Knowing*, p. 81. 25.
9. J. H. Dreher, *op. cit.*, p. 437. 26.
10. R. K. Shope, *op. cit.*, p. 82
11. R. K. Shope, "Knowledge and Falsity", In *Philosophical Studies*, 36 (1979), pp. 389-405. 27.
12. R. K. Shope, *Analysis of Knowing*, p. 208. 28.
13. P. K. Moser, *Knowledge and Knowing*, p. 236. 29.
14. *ibid.*, p. 242.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 245.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 247.
17. R. M. Chisholm, "The Ethics of Requirement", in *American Philosophical Quarterly*, 7 (1977), p. 115.
18. S. R. Levy, "Defeasibility Theories of Knowledge", in *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, 7 (1977), p. 115.
19. G. S. Pappas and M. Swain, *Essays on Knowledge and Justification* Introduction, p. 27. 30.
20. M. Swain, "Epistemic Defeasibility", in *Essays on Knowledge and Justification* Pappas and Swain (Ed.), pp. 163-164. 31.
21. Here S's sole justification for believing that some one in his office does own a Ford is and should be defeated by the true statement that Mr. Nogot does not own a Ford. Why does this true statement defeat S's justification? The answer is that S's justification for believing that someone in his office owns a Ford does depend on his being completely justified in believing it to be false that Mr. Nogot does not own a Ford. A defeating statement must be one, which though true, is such that the subject is completely justified in believing it to be false. 32.
22. K. Lehrer, "The Gettier Problem and the Analysis of Knowledge", in *Justification and Knowledge*, G. S. Pappas (Ed.), p. 66. 33.
23. Jonathan Dancy, *An Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology*, p. 38. 34.

## Reformulations of the JTB Account : An Evaluation

197

24. *ibid.*
25. Unger, "The Analysis of Factual Knowledge" in the *The Journal of Philosophy*, 65 (1968), pp. 157-70
26. Pappas and Swain (Ed.), *Essays on Knowledge and Justification*, Introduction, p. 20.
27. A. I. Goldman, "A Causal Theory of Knowing", in *Essays on Knowledge and Justification*, Pappas and Swain (Ed.), p. 68.
28. *ibid.*
29. Suppose that S sees that there is a vax in front of him. A necessary condition of S's seeing that there is a vax in front of him is that there be a certain kind of causal connection between the presence of the vax and S's believing that a vax is present. A certain causal - process, that which standardly takes place when we say that so and so sees such and such must occur. If that is absent, we would withhold the assertion. Suppose that although a vax is directly in front from S's view. The photograph is interposed between it blocking it from S's view. The photograph, however, is one of a vax and when it is illuminated by light waves from a laser it looks to S exactly like a real vax and S forms the belief that there is vax, for his view of the real vax is blocked so that it has no causal role in the formation of his belief.
30. M. Swain, "Knowledge, Causality and Justification" in *Essays on Knowledge and Justification*, Pappas and Swain (Ed.), p. 83.
31. Carl Ginet, "Contra Reliabilism", in *The Monist* 2, (1985), p. 179.
32. A. I. Goldman, "What is Justified Belief?" in *Justification and Knowledge*, G.S. Pappas (Ed.), p. 23.
33. K. Lehrer, *Theory of Knowledge*, p. 156.
34. *ibid.*, p. 157
35. *ibid.*, p. 162.
36. Bonjour, "Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge" in *Mid-West Studies in Philosophy* 5 (1980), p. 60.

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## DOES VERBALISING ACROSS CULTURES EMBODY QUINEAN MULTICULTURALISM?

A. KANTHAMANI

*"(Translations) are (not) diverse verbal embodiments of some intercultural propositions or meaning, --- (nor are) they better seen as the merest variants of one and the same intercultural verbalism"* (W.V.O. Quine, 1960).

The Quinean equivalent for translation is called verbalising across cultures. Theorising across languages is not as much culture-bound as verbalising across cultures is. Theory is a culture-free term. That is to say, sciences can go across cultures. Nevertheless, the translation must be thought of as an eponym of the theory. Theory is a culture free artifact whereas languages are not. This is as it should be. This is especially so, since language is a culture bound phenomenon. This is yet another way of saying that theory is holistic (in Quinean terms) and languages (in plural) are not. The apparent opposition between language and theory is only benign. If you choose a term, then we can call it inter-holistic. This is a pointer in my understanding. That is, translation is a process by which acculturation in a different culture becomes a genuine possibility, especially in the domain of science. If it were so, then questions like 'what is language?' or 'what is translation?' can never be answered within the confines of one's own language except in terms of a theory, that moves in and out of one's own language. That is the reason why they become genuine benchmarks of multiculturalism. Multiculturalism entails the view that one does not use one's own culture or language as the standard. Rather it allows culture to be as much enveloped as in theory. Nor can it accept that there is an archimedean point from which one can judge one as a

*Indian Philosophical Quarterly* XXX No 2  
April 2003

better translation than the other. One can include a theory of meaning, even so, analytical philosophy also into its fold given their scientific credentials so far as it is able to inaugurate theory of meaning on scientific terms. But we cannot identify any domain of religion because the divisive forces are too rampant to overcome.

Quine's animadversions about meaning has a unique fall-out: meaning is not culture-bound, but culture-free so long as it forms the holistic part of theory. So considered, according to recent defence of Quine (Michael McDermott, 2001), his critique of ASD (analytic-synthetic distinction) has something 'real' about it (977). This is because, it does no damage to intuitive notions of synonymy and analyticity. Hence, an 'elite' class of analytical sentences can be interlingual in the specific sense that it agrees with the intuitions of the speakers of those languages. McDermott's strategy is to argue that the premise about holism cannot be said to work because of revisibility of some sentences in response to recalcitrant experiences. Consequently, the argument from holism is invalid in either cases of analytic or synthetic set. This may have an immediate fallout not only on the possibility of interlingual translation, as those elite sentences are culture-free. They are more 'semantically important' *A fortiori*, there are a class of analytic sentences, that can be carried across languages. For me, of course, it points to yet another extraordinary gesture: there is a subtle undercurrent of social theory of multiculturalism in Quine's doctrine of indeterminacy of translation (Of course McDermott cannot accept the way I relate meaning and translation, but that apart, he will, I am sure, relish my reading of the matter). We can Christen it as verbalising-across-cultures type of multiculturalism, which I propose to be a viable alternative to other types, even more so, than multilingualism (A. Kanthamani, forthcoming). Its prospects for a third world like India needs fresh examination. Multiculturalism is a special case of multilingualism. Multilingualism places no constraints on what is being carried across the languages, and suffers indeterminacy. Multiculturalism generates an arc of science across languages while leaving a specifiable form of indeterminacy. It can free whatever science does from one's own language. Let me confine myself to the supporting nuances for holding Quinean verbalising across cultures embodying Quinean multiculturalism in this

*Quinean Multiculturalism?*

modest essay.

Let me consider a scenario that is entirely different from that of McDermott in the sequel. As against the linguisticsless view of science advanced by Quinean indeterminists of translatability, the Katzian rationalistic realist school of linguistics claims that there is a repertoire of sentences in a Platonist heaven of grammar, which will uniformly fall beneath and get distributed into every language on earth. Such a realistic extension of the Chomskyan conceptualism of universal grammar is claimed to complete the revolution of transformational grammar with its specific dimension of bilingualism as providing an empirical condition of translatability. *A fortiori*, there ought to be an *episteme* about translatability. Such a strong theoretical or metanarrativist plea sits ill with cross-cultural understanding. As I argue the point, it does not provide necessary and sufficient condition for multiculturalism, whereas multiculturalism needs a Quinean narrative of verbalising across cultures. Besides, it is dubious assumption to believe that Chomsky's universal grammar denies unique traits of languages and hence it denies variations among different languages. (Thus I will take strong exceptions to the many of the theses advocated by Ashok Gangadeen (1998) in his recent theory of global reason. I will set forth my conclusions on a different occasion). Can Quineans be fought over by Katzians and whether the former is a cultural isolationist are the two questions that we are principally concerned in the sequel.

Starting with the effability assumption that holds that the expressive power of each language remains the same, Katzians counter the argument for radical translational indeterminacy. They make a *reductio* of indeterminacy. It is difficult to know whether effability goes in tandem with translatability. The term effability is often understood to work for languages in the same way as expressibility works for a particular language. Neither of these assumptions is true. The Platonist thinks that he has no reason to believe that they radically oppose each other. This is so especially when translatability can be considered to augment the resources of effability. Hence, this can only serve as an initial assumption which leaves translatability as an open-textured activity. The claim to that indeterminacy can be countered with the *reductio* of the 'symmetric argument', is due to Jerrold Katz:

1. Radical translatability is a limiting case of actual translatability (symmetry assumption),
2. There is an implicit identity between radical and actual translatability (Quinean premise).
3. Since they are continuous, they have no distinguishable status as such (Quinean conclusion).
4. But, sense-oriented interlingual sentences are actually translatable (Katzian Premise1).
5. No such identity therefore can even be presupposed (Katzian Premise2).
6. Intentionalists are actual (virtual) translation theorists (Katzian Premise 3).
7. Intentionalists theory is not identical with radical theory (Katzian Conclusion).
8. Therefore, radical translatability is discontinuous with actual translatability.
9. Therefore, radical translatability is not a limiting case.

The above argument, in my understanding, establishes the last line of the argument (9) by *reductio* of (1). If we assume that the identity is the only thing that divides the lines of the argument, then it cannot go through when the identity is denied, the very thing Katz requires to establish interlingual identity. Premise (5) is proved to be a stumbling block irrespective of the efficacy of others like (4) for example. But this is not a butteresing point for Quineans. Katzian bilingualism does not collapse on the mere denial of identity. For, Quine also declares that the practice of 'actual translation must go on'. Therefore, he has no reason to deny any discontinuity. Therefore, he might accept premise (8) and by the same reasoning he can also agree to the conclusion about the discontinuity. So the argument can go no more further than that only to establish something which is quite compatible with Quine's first thought experiment of radical translation. Does it mean that the line that divides Quine and Katz is thinned out?

I am forced to think that it must be so. One major reason for thinking

*Quinean Multiculturalism?*

along these lines is that meaning and translation must be freed from the constraints of culture. This is best achieved by moving theories across cultures. Since this is not easily an available option, translations do not succeed. Quine's point is to be interpreted as assuming that meaning is culture bound with other cognate ingredients. Translation is moving theories across *sans* culture. Quine's point is that we cannot carry across the board theory that will make translation also to fall under it. Katz, on the other hand, thinks that freedom from the constraints of culture can be made *ex hypothesi* true. For Quine therefore, verbalising is verbalising across cultures whereas for Katz, verbalising is verbalising across languages. The former entails that either we move theories across or face constraints of culture. Culture is what we inherit of which theory forms a larger chunk. Quine's point is about theory in the above sense and Katz's effort lies in broadening it to cover non-theory as well. There are in-betweens.

Such an interlingual identity, according to Katz, is only warranted by a cognitive definition of bilingualism. Construed in this way, bilingualism means that thinking in two languages is made possible. Theory of bilingualism can explain the practice of translation. Quine's point about bilingualism is to be counterposed to the above since its emphasis is on practice. It may be taken as embodying an idea that holds that it is not possible to separate bilingualism from interactivity of two speakers (Dummett). This is especially so since it is bound up with theories. The real opposition consists in the way one offers primacy to theory in contradistinction to the other which offers primacy to practice. Quine's bilingualism is about theory where interactivity of theory is to be freed from cultural constraints, whereas Katz's bilingualism presupposes that there is a theory which governs this very activity.

If this much is agreed, then it proves that they are not in principle in disagreement with each other, except for the reason stated in the culture-clause. That is, a speaker thinking in two languages and two speakers engaging themselves in interactive communication are symbiotic to each other. Quine's only objection is that the secured *episteme* is not as empirical as any other scientific theory. No theory could tell us how to move sentences across cultures unless they are movable across theories. Quine offers the two following thought-experiments. The first holds that there is

no fact of the matter to consult in making a choice between many translations. It follows that there is no culture-neutral space within the choice of the theory. Alternativism becomes a genuine possibility. And the second argues for a case of holophrastic indeterminacy, where there is a methodological way of achieving this feat in the culture-free space. Alternativism becomes a virtual possibility. That is, such an alternativism may have agonal prospects. For Katz, on the other hand, a theory is a virtual possibility to tell us how to move across languages. Bereft of the agonal content, there is no reason why they should not become compatible with each other apart from the culture clause. This must also be understood to be nearer to the second thought experiment Quine suggests in his holophrastic indeterminacy. It has a positive potential in that it dwells only on the possibility of translation as resting upon the possibility of interaction without carrying an *episteme* across the board for both meaning and the same meaning. Translations are not vehicles of *episteme*. An interesting consequence is that our *episteme* is culture-free.

Gibson (1999), who is recognised as the most authentic interpreter of Quine, will face trouble if the above observation is agreed upon. Gibson sharply distinguishes Quine's theory of radical translation from Davidson's theory of radical interpretation on the grounds that Quine cannot identify indeterminacy of translation with indeterminacy of meaning. Consequently, the latter speaks of an *episteme* of understanding, and depends more on meaning, while the former speaks of an *episteme* of translation and depends only on 'same' meaning. Since translation requires same meaning and interactivity, meaning may not require interactivity, these epistemologies stem from two distinct notions namely meaning and same meaning (interlingual synonymy or analyticity). The former can be categorised as more broader than the latter. Such an argument can never be sustained as it will have a 'feminist' counterexample. The *episteme* of feminism may not fail to overlap with the *episteme* of the subaltern. The female principle cannot be carried across the board. The subaltern needs 'translators' as well as interpretation. There is a Quinean translational space for feminism (Sara Ahmed, 1998). Quinean bilingualism, I suggest, might entail an agonal feminism (Kanthamani, 1999).

Be that as it may, the immediate fall-out of the above argument

*Quinean Multiculturalism?*

which thrives on a certain distinction is said to be that Quinean bilingualism has the least prospects in comparison to Davidson's. This is so even if it is granted that both lead towards some sort of *episteme*. In other words, the former has to consult the linguistics of meaning while latter can allow translation even without it. Since there is no linguistics to consult, there is no intermediary of meaning, but only sameness of meaning. Quine needs less of interaction while Davidson needs more of it. Quine's indeterminacy entails how holistic nature of science significantly moves in and out of language, Davidson's indeterminacy highlights the arguments against the individualising the language and hence moves in the direction of literary theory. There is an obvious difference between the different 'cognitive' domains to which they address. While the 'cognitivism' suggested by a radical translation looks at science, the 'cognitivism' suggested by a radical interpretation goes in tandem with literary criticism.

This way of looking at it may not be too convincing as it needs the assumption which holds that meaning and same meaning are distinct. In a sense, Gibson is quite opposed to Dummett's way of reading which goes against this. If we agree with Dummett's reading, then it is easy to construe that both need interaction. But the difference is not much substantial since Davidson's theory is a special case of the former. That is, we can reach Davidson through the route provided by Dummett. Gibson's confusion is that since Davidson is a Tarskian, he is more on the side of semantics while Quine is not. Quine needs interlingual synonymy and analyticity, while Davidson is nowhere near to it. This is not too convincing as Davidson must be understood to provide a case from an angle which is designed to tell us how to ascribe from other people's cases rather than from one's own case. Such Davidsonian space is created by carrying the *episteme* across the board of truth and meaning. This means that the distinction is much more sharper or rather, much less as there is no sharp distinction between truth and meaning. Their dependence is not so much clear. Consequently, the distinction between the projects cannot be spelt out in the way Gibson construes. Quine's bilingualism will have definite prospects to succeed.

Quine, Davidson, and Dummett form a trinity with no deviation from theory that is recognised to be part of language as an articulated structure.

This is what determines the post-analytical turn which has languages rather than language in focus (see for a different 'deconstructive' reading of this trinity proposed by Samuel Wheeler III). But Katz accepts this clause but deviates from theory while arguing for translation in natural language. Davidson's idea is that we can attribute truth values to sentences spoken by others once we know how to construct a theory of truth for *that* theory. Presented thus, Davidson's theory becomes a variant of simulationism in cognitive theory (This is not the only point of difference between Quine and Davidson; other differences are: Davidson's strong anti-individualistic account of language and his overtures towards a broader spectrum that includes literary theory). For Davidson, it is theoretically possible to do so, once we hold other people's beliefs as constant (This may not be agreeable to McDermott). If this is a point that is worth considering, then the rift between Quine and Davidson is not as wide as between Quine and Katz. The point about holophrastic indeterminacy allows us however to reinforce the idea that there is not much incompatibility between Quine and Katz.

Katz's perspective is woven around the acceptance of three metanarratives namely translatability, metaphysics and grammar and his point about the determinacy of translation arises on account of a combination of these three streams. Though Katz's idea of the third has its ancestry in the notion of universal grammar, it remains at the level of a metanarrative and it can very well be called a deadwood today for the very reason that the systems of deviance of each particular language change the parameters. I take this to be the main philosophical merit of recent minimalist claims of Chomskyan grammar. Accordingly, languages can be differentiated according to the ways they have access to expert knowledge systems. The underlying principles may remain the same but they could be subjected to individual variation. The syntax of particular languages may be individualistic, because the parameters of those languages warrant this. But the semantics may not after all be indifferent to transfer across languages.

To hold therefore that effability requires that there is some possible world in which it could be expressed, is to point only at the virtual possibility. This goes against the spirit of Chomskyan linguistics. The merit of Chomskyan linguistics is that it makes a fundamental distinction between

*Quinean Multiculturalism?*

languages and the way we have access to expert knowledge systems. Katz is willing to collapse such a distinction. For Katzians, what all it boils down to is that expressive powers of a given language could be augmented by carrying it across the board. We must remember that there is a wide spectrum of possibilities: there may be sentences that are not inter-translatable, or there may be approximations and near perfection as well. But there cannot be what is called exact one-to-one translation. This is the major bone of contention for Quineans. If this were so, then the 'Exact Translation Hypothesis' fails. That is, we cannot provide a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for an exact translation. Nor could we say that translations are always inexact. The practice of translation goes on and on. Thus, there is a hiatus between theory and practice. This really seems to be a point against Katz since he invariably thinks that translatability, like computability, is equivocal with that which is translated. In other words, there is a theory, which tells us how to translate each sentence of object language to some sentence in the target language.

That this is so is evidenced in the following dictum which holds that translation opens one's linguistic and cognitive practices across cultures different from his own and enables us to mutually verbalise thereby carrying across a chunk of our theory of the world. This is because each language may have a distinct *Weltanschauung*, carving up the world in a different way than others. This is sometimes enunciated as the linguistic relativity hypothesis. Each language bespeaks of a distinct hypothesis about its metaphysics. This is the classical social scientific model which needs a thorough revamping today. we can understand that Quine is poised to achieve this in one way and Katz is trying to achieve it in yet another way. We will suggest a new thought experiment. This starts with an assumption that we think in languages. We think in formal/natural languages. That is, we think in our languages. We think in natural languages alone. Each one of the above conveys a distinct dimension of understanding language. Nevertheless, it is difficult to differentiate between them. We know what it is to think in a formal language. Does it distinguish formal from natural languages? We have no idea of what it is to think in natural languages. Unless we know how to explain this we have no means by which to distinguish natural from formal languages. Once we have some idea, the

fall-out will be greater. That is, we can proceed to accept that there are analytical truths (Peter Carruthers 1996). Quine's denial of analytic-synthetic distinction may not matter. If translation is quite a possibility, we can inferentially go from one language to another. That might run parallel to the way we carry inferential mechanism with other speakers of the same language. For Quineans, however, to make it work, we need to posit certain 'analytical mechanism' by which we execute such a transfer. This is the rug on which Quineans also hang their clothes. This is exactly where they pick up the bones of contention with Katzians.

Can we assert that translation is essentially indeterminate? It is a hard question to answer. A challenge such as the above has been issued by philosopher Quine (1960, 1970, 1987 and 1995). It is directed against our pre-theoretical practices or what is called the proto-theory. Within Quine's corpus, one comes across two distinct thought-experiments. His earlier thought-experiment was poised to argue for a radical indeterminacy of translation between two radically different languages (English and Junglese). It expounds the thesis according to which, between competing translation manuals, it is difficult to decide with reference to empirical standards, which one is the correct one: symmetrical translations may turn out to be incompatible. To say that 'x is a dog' and to say that 'x is a life-long filament of a dog that occupies space-time' are two distinct ways of expressing the ontological features of the world. That ontologies are relative is a direct consequence of this. To say that 'Neutrinos have no mass' and to say that 'Neutrinos have a mass' are two ways of differentiating the ontological features though they look contradictory to each other. As far as I know, no one has succeeded to refute this (McDermott discusses the example of 'If philogiston exists, it is an element' along with another example from Lewis: 'If unobtainium exists, it is an element'). The second thought experiment argues for holophrastic indeterminacy. The argument goes through the following motions, starting with the thesis about ontological relativity:

1. Ontologies are relative to each other.
2. The indeterminacy has to do with the internal structure of sentences.
3. Observation sentences are indifferent to ontology.

*Quinean Multiculturalism?*

4. Each one translation is holophrastic in the sense that it may have independent yes/no verdicts (this is different from the first type of indeterminacy in which the truth values are radically changed),

Katz (1978, 1988, 1990 and 1992) however is an exception with regard to the first, and hence his objection to the second premise is that such an indeterminacy can be actually overcome by being more holophrastic than Quine as he is not against holism as such. If we agree that the third premise also goes through, then there could possibly be only a minimal disagreement between them. In a sense, therefore, the second premise is compatible with Katz's semantic markers which hypothesise gavagai as rabbit, in a rather circumscribed way by asking more questions with the native. So, I take there is deep agreement between them. Nevertheless, Katz always claims himself to be an architect of new intentionalism, trying always to meet the foregoing challenge. His plea is directed against the first part of the above quote. Calling it a 'slippery slope argument', he has devised an elaborate methodological machinery to prove that *contra* Quine, translation is essentially determinate. Other critics harp on the ranking of hypotheses. Accordingly they hold that we can rank the hypotheses of many translations, by means of a 'contrastive analysis' and this can show that Quine stands refuted on his own grounds (Dorit Bar-On 1993). This brings to the fore the differences between cultures. But Katz carries on the campaign against Quine for the last twenty years in a more or less consistent way by premising on the assumption that there need not be variations among different cultures (Kanthamani, 1989).

Consider the word '*Kāla*' that is carried across the cultures, only by retaining its original link. It might be translated into 'time', 'temporality', 'continuum', 'eternal time', 'intimations of time' etc. A similar case arises when you carry across the sentence 'Neutrinos lack mass' into a culture, which has not reached the optimum level of scientific conceptualisation. Carry it across as we must but there is no guarantee that it has succeeded to augment the cognitive activity of the native. Especially so, when they lack requisite concepts or they know too little physics. On the face of it, this appears to be too much to ask. But the point must be intuitively obvious. Augmenting it must inevitably pull the native across the cultures and force them to think in the source language as well. May be the skilled bilingual is

a go between who can make the cultural boundaries look fuzzy. Nevertheless, the resources of the target language cannot be as much helpful as the resources of the source language. There is no language-neutral theory so much so that sentence of one language can receive an automatic meaning-transfer or sense-transfer. Translation across radically different languages is indeterminate. Two sentences are inter translatable if and only if there is a linguistically neutral meaning, which is expressed in both of these languages. Such a cultural artifact is simply non-existent. Meaning is what they share, but it does not have any entitative status whatsoever. Quine's argument is not going from 'meaning is indeterminate, to saying that translation is indeterminate (Dummett, 1978), but it goes in the reverse direction: since translation is indeterminate, same meaning is indeterminate. *A fortiori*, since translation is indeterminate, meaning is indeterminate, since the only plausible way of making sense of meaning is through same meaning. Meaning and translation are thus inseparable: methodically, semantics is to be modelled on translation: meaning and translation are their flip sides (Kanthamani, 1993). Quinean bilingualism cannot be denied simply on the grounds that there is no linguistics of meaning to consult. Translation needs as much interaction as meaning does. It is inconsistent to deny one without the other.

Synonymy of terms as well as sentences is the scourge. The problem here is one about substitutivity of synonymous (coextensive) expressions for one another. The use-mention confusion cannot be ruled out here for two sentences like

(1) The morning star = the evening star (use)  
and

(2) The morning star is the same as the evening star (mention)

They do not meet substitution criteria unless they flank identity sign. But what about synonymy of sentences which are equivalent in meaning? The above distinction makes them vulnerable again. They violate use-mention distinction. Translation of the first sentence and the second sentence will show a marked difference. The latter invariably quote the two words. They fail to capture the same sense if they are paraphrased or translated. Their analyticity cannot therefore be established. For logicians of the

*Quinean Multiculturalism?*

Quinean bent, synonymy of sentences can be defined only by the analyticity of the biconditional as in (1) above. But the problem here is that we cannot make such a biconditional between sentences (1) and (2) without violating use-mention distinction. Further, linguists admit that synonymy is non-inferential, but they are reluctant to allow logic to have monopoly. This is exactly where Katz's theory barges in. So for them, the inferentiality squarely depends upon the underlying sense structure (sense  $O_1$  = sense  $O_2$ ). Katz's argument is premised on the idea that synonymy can be carried across languages. So, if this is granted then sense in L1 and sense in L2 are equivalent. Hence, they can be said to be analytic in a weak sense. In order for the theory to succeed, Katz requires that the above notion of sense has a certain autonomy on the one hand, and an all-inclusive bilingual sense of sense on the other so as to prove that it is partly independent from both reference as well as truth of the languages in question. Such a claim appears to be too metanarrativist and hence its feasibility is dubious.

There is no guarantee about its success, if the above objection is held valid. For Frege's solution in terms of sense offers no guarantee. by parity of reasoning, Katzian solution is likely to pose problems. So, Katz does not use meaning as key for the simple reason that sense includes both meaningfulness as well as meaninglessness (ambiguity is a trait of natural language). Accordingly, the decompositional sense structure of bachelor is given in terms of <male>, <adult>, <unmarried> and that of spinster is given as <women> <never>, <married>. This provides answer to the above question only on condition that translation is made to depend squarely on decompositional structure of sentences belonging to different languages. Such an argument looks vulnerable and is open to objection. Katz has an alternative argument which suggests that the idea is to manage redundancy of sense, as shown in the following:

John is a bachelor

John is an unmarried bachelor

Now, the above two sentences are equivalent in meaning but not synonymous but linguists call it as semantic redundancy. From this, Katz deduces that synonymy cannot be defined in terms of the analyticity of the biconditional. This will not do. Katz counterposes this with an argument

which holds that it is analyticity (in his sense) of the biconditional that is defined in terms of synonymy (some such clause is operative in McDermott as well). Synonymy must be categorised as having the same sense structure (not necessarily meaning structure). It is by no means clear that Katz is working with language as an articulated structure or languages which bank on interaction. His sense of effability is aimed to do a limited job. When identity of meaning is replaced by identity of sense, inferential relations can go from

John is a bachelor

to

John is unmarried.

With this, the claim can succeed. But such a uniform substitution of identity in statements is, according to Quine, cannot escape a major objection as illustrated in the following counterexamples:

‘Tully’ has five letters,

Tully = Cicero,

Therefore, Cicero has five letters (false).

Moreover substitution in oblique contexts leads to false conclusions as shown by

I believe that Mt. Everest is Mt. Everest.

Mt. Everest is Chomolungma.

Therefore, I believe that Mt. Everest is Chomolungma (false).

It was this that led Frege to make a distinction between sense that is the mode of presentation and reference which speaks about the mountain. Linguists are wary of such a distinction. It fails the Church's test of translatability (Kenneth Taylor, 1998). But for Katz, the reasons are different. Frege's intentionalism has no value, because his (plant-in-the-seed) sense of analyticity is too broad. What we need is a narrow (beam-in-the-house) sense of analyticity. Natural languages are better understood with help of the latter rather than with the former. Translation turns on this specific sense of analyticity to which Quine is directly opposed. This much is argued for in Katz's writings, but its plausibility remains dubious. The difficulty about this is that analyticity, broad or narrow, might also face

*Quinean Multiculturalism?*

empirical reckonings. It suffers from the same confusion as use-mention and hence they cannot cut across languages.

Let me capture the above thesis with the help of a second thought-experiment, which is aimed to disturb the coherence of translated sentences: suppose two field linguists spent long years in a remote valley without seeing each other. And they try to learn the original language from the native. While doing so they compile translation manuals that tell us how to translate the native language into target language which is English. A translation manual is a set of hypotheses, which tell us how to go from one language to another. Using these two manuals, now alternately, if we translate a native sentence, can we presume that we will have a coherent translation? That is, we take one sentence from one translation and the second sentence from the second translation, and the third from the first and so on. Let us present the case by saying the first translator decides to adopt a policy according to which the sentences are properly combined so as to preserve meaning. Whereas the second translator thinks that it is worthwhile to split the sentences if only to preserve the meaning. Now suppose that our combined translation shows crack, will we be able to pinpoint which manual is defective. In all probability, we may not.

What exactly the challenge does it throw over Katz's bilingual assumption? Bilingualism of this type assumes too much. Firstly, it assumes that one and the same speaker can think in two languages at one and the same time. Secondly, there is a certain coherence about the set of sentences thus thought of. Thirdly, there is no flaw in the coherence. Besides it contains the metaphysical presupposition of a subject as a speaker of the language. Quine's challenge forces us only to think of the same scenario as involving two speakers engaged in communication or better put, two translators translating them differently. His point is that the coherence of the above can hardly be checked by means of interlingual structures, but he can concede that they require a check by means of intralingual structures. This is what is augmented by the expressive power of the interactive chip, so to say, which therefore provides empirical support from a computational cognitivist point of view of interactive computing (Kanthamani 1999). The point to be understood here is that chips need the notion of understanding that is essential for interactivity. Quine can very well draw support from

interactive computing which needs understanding which is not after all computational (Hence I think that McDermott's proposal which hypothesises that his holism is a functionalist holism, needs to be given a wider thrust of cognitivism). This is for the precise reason that even a bilingual should think only in the pattern of monolingual mode, though the sentences may be picked up from two distinct languages. Thus, it does not look like a formidable challenge any more than the former. On Katz's understanding, we can settle on the question and hence, this poses no challenge to Quine. It transpires therefore that the dispute about *episteme* seems to be a mere verbal quibble.

Is it plausible to think that Quine's challenge is met with his effability? I guess that the answer must be negative. Katz makes synonymous sense structures as equivalent to the metaphysics that underlie natural language. Such a trans-metaphysical assumption, seen from the linguistic relativity thesis, requires us to take natural languages as embodying sentences, which remain the same for each of the languages. This may not be true at all, if linguistic relativity hypothesis is true. People who believe that there is an underlying metaphysics that governs each one's way of carving up the world, therefore, commits a fallacy in that they equivocate the underlying structure of language with metaphysics. The underlying structure is grammatical or syntactical and at the most it is logical. Keenan challenges the claim that the sameness of syntactic or semantic structures will do for exact translation. No doubt grammar may be isotopical with logic. But no globality is thereby implied. Science can bend the primary conceptual system. The only metaphysics we can imagine in this context is one that binds language to a theory of the world. That is, the way we cognise about the world. Natural languages are amorphous. Alternately, we can see language as an articulated structure. Thus, the basic logical structure is the only conceptual system we have, but we are constrained by expert systems to bend it, even rejecting logical laws in the process. That is, whenever we regiment language for the purpose of science, we may change its course. Thus, we have to find ways for science to express in that system. Consequently, our linguistic and cognitive practices are subject to change in a language as an articulated system. Grammar has no parallel to semantics. The hypothesis about the allegedly buried underlying semantic

*Quinean Multiculturalism?*

structure of language may be agreeable only on condition that it works like Quine's primary system but it is not agreeable when it is supposed to lend credence to an additional metaphysics. That is, grammar can be a theory of language only in the sense that such a 'theory' can be carried across the board. But since we cannot do so, grammar cannot be regarded as a theory. Grammar, in other words, can be carried only as much as a theory can be. Katz's message is that by positing a sense-structure, we can presume an underlying thought structure, that is common to many or every language for that matter. Nothing flows from such a structure, unless it is presumed run along the lines of Quine. It appears that the incompatibility between them may be only a facade. This is the reason why Chomsky does not say much about the semantic structure of language. Syntax can be represented in an axiomatic system, and to some extent semantics follows suit. No parallel has ever been suggested. Axiomatic system is found to be wanting because, it cannot posit meaning postulates such as Carnap admitted. Carnap's Strategy is worked out as follows:

(x) (If x is a bachelor, then x is unmarried)

John is a bachelor

Therefore, he is unmarried

The first step is called 'meaning postulate' by virtue of which the conclusion is deduced. Quine is not satisfied on the grounds that extensionally equivalent terms cannot imply intentionally equivalent ones (e.g. creature with a kidney and creature with a heart). Like Frege's old intentionalism, Carnap's old intentionalism is also dismissed by Katz. The defect of each is that it is restricted to extensionalist analysis of language. Katz's new intentionalism, on the other hand takes the buried decompositional structure of sense as contributing towards the understanding of any logical property of language and hence it is the only one in the market that is available today. There is a specific argument which goes against it.

Analyticity is only redunadant predication and analytic entailment is redundant entailment. All these may not vitiate the alleged *episteme* unless it is strongly presupposed that there is no close correlation between language and expert systems of knowledge and hence they can be disjoint. Quine is obviously opposed to this idea. He intends to bring the idea of language as

an articulated structure to become closer to the language of expert systems, especially science as seen from the holistic character of theory. For Katz, the structure of ordinary language is poised to sense-transfer between them. This is achieved by valorizing one unique expert system of knowledge namely mathematics. For Katz, this is the model for considering language as abstract objects. This might seem to be a totally dubious move since it embodies a narrowed down version that *ex hypothesi* excludes other expert systems from its purview. If their linguistics of sense does not survive, so much is the worse for the linguistics of translation. Whereof the linguistics of sense cannot work, thereof linguistics of translation is to remain silent.

## NOTES

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*Quinean Multiculturalism?*

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## HOW PERFORMATIVES EXACTLY WORK

RISHI KANT PANDEY

Language is the medium of communication. However, the most critical question is; how language works? Some eminent contemporary philosophers have argued either in favour of standardization or conventionalization, as down to earth touchstones facilitating the functioning of language. Secondly, when the speaker uses any utterance, does the hearer directly or indirectly infer its performativity?

Austin delineated the nature of utterances in his celebrated book *How to Do things with Words* (1962). He made a clear cut distinction between the constative and the performative utterances, by virtue of description and action respectively. Later on, he himself rejected this distinction and purported as to every speech is an act. In other words, an utterance not only informs or describes something but also performs some act, which is known as speech act theory. By and large, there is no controversy about this issue.

The philosophers, who express their agreement about Austin's doctrine solely, consider this problem in the context of the hearer's perspectives. This approach, however, ignores an indispensable dimension of an utterance, like *the intention of the speaker*, which has a major role in our communication. Lack of consideration of intention causes communication gap between the speaker and the hearer. Although, an utterance is constative and performative both, nonetheless on the basis of the speaker's intention, one can plainly distinguish between the two aspects. *A speaker does not always use a performative sentence for doing; sometimes he simply wants to inform the hearer or listener.* For instance,

*Indian Philosophical Quarterly* XXX No 2  
April 2003

at the end of a ceremony, someone announces; *this was the best arrangement*. Of course, this utterance may be simply informative or it may be a sort of stimulation for others to arrange such sort of ceremony. The meaning of utterances relies upon the judgment of the hearer and his interpretation of the intention of the speaker. If we ignore the speaker's intention, we will not be able to judge the actual meaning of this utterance. In my article, *Why to distinguish performative and constative utterances?*, I have argued,

"Thus, the intention of the speaker is critically important in understanding the meaning of utterances. Merely knowledge of the context in which an utterance takes place may not be adequate in understanding the meaning assigned by the speaker. The hearer also attempts to make inference regarding intention of the speaker."<sup>1</sup>

Later on, Searle discussed the problems of how performatives work with regard to self-guaranteeing and *self-referential* characters. While considering the self-guaranteeing character, he raised a crucial question: Why is it possible as to in some cases, the performative utterance can't be lie or mistake or false while, some utterances, on the other hand, can be lie or mistake or false. For instance, *Ram promises to come and see you next week*, this utterance may be false or mistake. Whereas, when we say, *I promise to come and see you next week*, this utterance can't be false or mistake. Searle pretended as to when we say, *I promise to come and see you next week*, we emphasise on the force of utterance, i.e., utterance of the sentence and its literal meaning both are identical. Searle called it *self-guaranteeing* character of an utterance.

Searle, further, defined *self-referential* character in terms of the word *hereby*. When a person, for example, utters, *I hereby promise to do so and so*, then he does not describe or report about his promise. Indeed, he promises or he guarantees about his promises, which betoken the real intention of the speaker. Otherwise, an utterance may be confused between *actual intention* and *pseudo intention*. Searle, therefore introduced *hereby* as an useful torchstone, which reveals the self-referential character of the performative. By virtue of the word *hereby*, he, therefore, distinguished between the constative and the performative utterance. Constative utterance underlies merely its literal meaning. However, when we use the word *hereby*, the utterance is treated as performative utterance,

## How Performatives Exactly Work

to the extent that, it not only includes its literal meaning but also speaker's intention. as Searle wrote,

"Performative speaker meaning includes sentence meaning but goes beyond it. In the case of the performative utterance, the intention is that the utterance should constitute the performance of the act named by the verb. The word 'hereby' makes this explicit, and with the addition of this word, sentence meaning and performative speaker meaning coincide."<sup>2</sup>

Searle endeavoured to make a clear-cut distinction between the constative and the performative utterance by virtue of the word *hereby*, which is problematic. Firstly, *hereby* is not common language, it is an official language. It has been used in the various offices for various legal proceedings. Secondly, it must demand some written documents. In our conversational talk, therefore, this word may not be used, and if it were used, it would be redundant. Thirdly, the word 'hereby' has always been used for continuing the processing, discussed prior. Fourthly, even if a speaker uses the word 'hereby' notwithstanding, his intention may be confused between actual and pseudo intention. Nonetheless, without using the word 'hereby', a speaker may express his real intention. It rests upon speaker's personality, sincerity, character, nature and so forth, If the speaker is sincere, he must express his real intention. At that juncture, it is meaningless to consider whether the word 'hereby' was used or not. On the other hand, if the speaker is insincerer and cunning, then in spite of using the word 'hereby', he may actually hide his real intention and report a pseudo intention, making task of the hearer much difficult. 'Hereby', therefore, would not be an appropriate touchstone for deciding the actual and pseudo intention. Fifthly, 'hereby' may be a sort of information or description. For example, *I hereby inform that professor x is appointed as a vice-chancellor of Allahabad University*. This utterance plainly, is informative. Regarding the above discussion, we may say as to 'hereby' is not an accurate criterion for deciding the character of the performatives.

Likewise, when Searle discussed the *self-guaranteeing* character of an utterance, he emphasised on the *force* of an utterance, which underlies that utterance of the sentence and its literal meaning. both are identical. For example, *I promise to do so and so*. Of course, when the speaker uses the word 'I .....', then he emphasises on the *force* of the utterance,

and it would be awry to say that we emphasis on something, insincerely. Although, Searle's contention appears correct, at first glance, nonetheless, he did not discuss an inevitable dimension of communication, like the *speaker's personality*, i.e., the speaker is sincere or insincere, honest or dishonest and the like. If the speaker is sincere and honest, indeed, his intention and force would be indetical, even if he uses the utterance in the third person. On the other hand, when the speaker is insincere and dishonest, he uses an utterance even in the first person, nonetheless, it would not be the performative, in as much as the speaker may hide his real intention and express pseudo intention. We therefore, argue that even self-guaranteeing character would not facilitate an appropriate criterion for the performatives. Thus, the only way for deciding the constative and the performative is the *intention of the speaker*.

However, it is important to mention that when an utterance is used in conformity with certain convention, the role of intention of the speaker is retrenched in communication. Although, the speaker's intention may be wrong, nevertheless the act must be performed. For example, in the law court, in the law court in front of the Registrar, a man asserts looking at a woman that *I do you my lawful wedded spouse*. In such circumstances, merely utterance of certain words is adequate for the successful performative and in this regard, the question of the intention of the speaker is meaningless. Likewise, on the occasion of inauguration of the seminar the chairperson of the seminar announces as to *I inaugurate this seminar*. This utterance must perform the act of inauguration and what is the intention of the speaker, is irrelevant. While, in the absence of conventionalization, the intention of the speaker plays a major role in communication between the speaker and the hearer. In such circumstances, there are no norms, whereby, the hearer may succeed to judge the real intention of the speaker. He therefore, indirectly endeavours to infer the real intention of the speaker by Gricean mechanism. Apparently, *convention does not reflect the intention and intention may not be easily revealed by convention*. In this regard, we may say as to Searl's contention is untenable, because, he emphasises too much in favour of the intention of the speaker, even in the case of convention, as he wrote;

## How Performatives Exactly Work

—“A special convention that certain literal sentences of natural languages count as the performances of ascertain declarations within the institution.

— The intention by the speaker in the utterance of those sentences that his utterance has a declarational status, that it creates a fact corresponding to the propositional content.”<sup>3</sup>

Searle, furthermore, purported that performative utterance must be overt and explicit.

“There are a number of semantic features which *block* a performative occurrence. So for example, famously, ‘*hint*’ ‘*insinuate*’ and ‘*boast*’ can’t be used performatively, because they imply that the act was performed in a way that was not explicit and overt, and performative utterances are completely explicit and overt.”<sup>4</sup>

However, Searle’s argument creates a controversy. On the one hand, Searle emphasises that performative utterances must be explicit and overt; on the other hand, he advocates on the force of utterance, i.e., the self-guaranteeing character. The question is ; *Is the force of an utterance explicit and overt?* Obviously, there are several cases, wherein it is very difficult to chalk out, where the force of an utterance is. For example, *have you purchased this horse in ten thousand rupees?* On the variations of its force or emphasis, its meanings may change. Although this utterance sounds like a *question*, however, with variation of emphasis on different fragment or word of this utterance, its meaning does change. when emphasis is on *have you*, its meaning would be that you can’t purchase this horse, because this is beyond your income or status. Here, the intention of the hearer would be sarcastic. The speaker does not think that the horse is really purchased by the person, who is being addressed. Again, when emphasis is on *this horse*, its meaning would be as to this horse is vicious, weak or not competent to serve the purpose of the buyer. Likewise, when emphasis is on *ten thousand*, its meaning would be that this amount is too much for this horse. Furthermore, when emphasis is put on *purchase*, its meaning would be that you have not purchased this horse. it may even imply that you have stolen or hired this horse for sometimes and so forth. Indeed, the context of utterance, the intention of the speaker, variations in emphasis on certain words of utterances seems to be the most important factor for determining the meaning of a sentence. Thus, the variation of

pitch, intonation, and cadence of the utterance make different meanings of the utterance. So for as, this utterance must be performative, nonetheless, it is hard to decide, where the force in this utterance is.

Likewise, all sorts of *indirect speech* act must be performative. Searle himself uttered,

"In indirect speech acts the speaker communicates to the hearer more than he actually says by way of relying on their mutually shared background information, both linguistic and non-linguistic. ....Many confusions in recent moral philosophy rest on a failure to understand the nature of such indirect speech acts."<sup>5</sup>

However, its form is not very clear and overt. Suppose, someone asks his son, *do you know how much is the telephone bill ?* This utterance is a sort of indirect speech act. However, what does he want to say by this utterance, is not very obvious. By and large, this utterance appears like a *question* i.e., the father would like to know about telephone bill. Besides, it may be possible that the father *indirectly instructs his son to avoid unnecessary calls*, on account of too much telephone bill. Indirect speech act, therefore, is not very clear and overt; however, its performativity is undoubted.

Similarly, all sorts of *non-verbal speech acts* are performative. For example, Austin claimed,

"We may accompany the utterance of the words by gesture (winks, pointings, shruggings, frowns & c) or by ceremonial non-verbal actions. These may sometimes serve without the utterance of any words, and their importance is very obvious"<sup>6</sup>

Again, "the situation in the case of actions which are non-linguistic but similar to performative utterances-----"<sup>7</sup> However, it is very difficult to judge its performativity. For example, If someone asks you about anything but you don't speak and remain silent. What would you like to communicate, by your silence? It is not an easy task for the hearer to judge. It's meaning may be that you would like to ignore this question; it may be that your question is irrelevant in this context; you may express your agreement and disagreement by your silence; apart from this, it may even be possible as to the answer of this question is indescribable, because

*How Performatives Exactly Work*

it is beyond our mind, intellect and language, so we can't say anything at all regarding your question.

Furthermore, for successful communication, *the intention of the speaker* is very important. However, it is also very difficult to infer the intention of the speaker. Intention may be confused between actual and pseudo intention. More precisely, intention is subjective, lacking objective way to judge it and therefore, nobody can provide any clear-cut touchstones for inferring it. Even a speaker may assert that he is telling his the very intention; however, he may actually hide his real intention and report a pseudo intention.

*All the four sorts of utterances, therefore, must be performatives, nonetheless its performativity is not very clear and overt. In so far as, these are not only bound up with the speaker but also with the hearer's personality, talent, calibre, subtle and extensive thinking and also his skill. If hearer is very dull and layman, then there is less possibility that he would succeed to identify their performativity. So, it would not be appropriate to pretend as to whether performative utterances are explicit and overt.*

Later on, Searle endeavoured to distinguish between *linguistic declaration* and *extra-linguistic declaration*, by virtue of semantic property. Linguistic declaration creates a linguistic fact like, *promise, order* and so forth. Whereas, extra-linguistic declaration creates an extralinguistic fact, i.e., it must perform some act in actual world vis-a-vis merely saying something, for example, *adjourning the meeting, declaring wars* and so forth. Well, Searle claimed as to there are some utterances, which literal utterance is adequate in itself because, "Language is itself an institution"<sup>8</sup>. It quite likely implies that these utterances do not perform any sort of act in the actual world, except saying something. Thus, they work *between word to word* and *not word to world*. On the other hand, there are enormous utterances, which literal utterance is inadequate in itself. In other words, their success relies upon the performance of some act in the actual world. They, therefore, work *between words to world, not solely word to word*.

The above distinction is untenable. Every utterance is bound up with action rather than limited to its literal meaning. For example, Searle purported as to I promise, it does not create any extra-linguistic fact. However, the

question is; *May I promise by saying literally that 'I promise'*. Of course, '*I promise*' must insinuate some action, i.e. 'promise about something. Suppose, we utter that *I promise to come and see you next week* but my intention may not be fair and vehemently, I would not like to meet with you. In those circumstances, we may not say that I have promised. Secondly, If we suppose that this utterance does not create any extra-linguistic fact, then the second part of this utterance, i.e. *come and see you next week* would be redundant, which is incorrect. Likewise, *I order you to leave the room*. However, the question is *what sort of order?* Indeed, *order* is bound up with *leave the room*, which is not merely literal but also actual. We therefore, can't lay down that language is in itself an institution and its literal utterance is adequate, in itself. instead, we may distinguish between linguistic and extra-linguistic declaration, regarding following grounds:

- *Extra-linguistic declaration* directly bound up with action, whereas, *linguistic declaration* does it indirectly.

- The former is *past-oriented*, while, the later is *future-oriented*.

Searle's puzzle is, therefore, unnecessary when he utters,

"-----how could any verbs have such remarkable properties just as a matter of semantics ? I can't fix the roof by saying, "I fix the roof" and I can't fry an egg by saying, "I fry an egg," but I can promise to come and see you just by saying, "I promise to come and see you" and I can order you to leave the room just by saying, "I order you to leave the room. Now why the one and not the other?"

Another crucial question is; *whether the hearer directly or indirectly infers the speech act?* viz., the performative sentence is direct speech act or indirect speech act. A group of philosophers like *Lewis, Genet, Bach* and *Harnish* pretended as to an utterance is primarily statement and the hearer indirectly infers its performativity by Gricean mechanism. Performative utterances are, therefore, treated as an indirect speech act. If someone utters, for example, *can you pass the salt?*, then the speaker is indirectly requesting to pass the salt. The hearer directly uptakes it as a statement, and indirectly, he judges its performativity. Likewise, when a person comes from outside and alleges, *I feel suffocation in this room*. This utterance directly is a statement and indirectly, it is a performative, inasmuch as, the speaker wants to open the door and windows of this

## How Performatives Exactly Work

227

room. These utterances are, therefore, directly a statement and indirectly performatives. As Bach and Harnish argued,

"On our account, a performative sentence when used performatively is used literally, directly to make a statement and indirectly to perform the further speech act of the type (an order, say) named by the performative verb ('order') ..... In our view, the performative formula is but one of a wide variety of forms of words which have become standardized for specific indirect uses, forms which serve to streamline or compress the audience's inference process. Familiar examples include "Can you....?", "I'd like you to ....." and "It would be nice if you would .....", not to mention a hedged performative like "I must ask you .....", each standardly used to make a request indirectly."<sup>10</sup>

They, therefore, defined performative utterances as *standardized indirect* speech acts.

Obviously, there are two specific terms *Standardization* and *Indirection*. While defining the Standardization, Bach and Harnish wrote,

".....(sentence form) *T* is standardly used to *F* in group *G* if and only if :

(i) It is mutually believed in *G* that generally when a member of *G* utters *T*, his illocutionary intend is to *F*, and (ii) Generally when a member of *G* utters *T* in a context in which it would violate the conversational presumptions to utter *T* with (merely) its literally determined force, his illocutionary intend is to *F*."<sup>11</sup>

With regard to the above definition, an utterance may be used standardly; firstly, when it is rested upon *mutual belief* between the speaker and the hearer, in a certain context. Secondly, it must avoid the *conversational presumptions*. For example, *I order you to leave the room*, here the word order has always been used for *order* by English speakers, because it is rested upon mutual belief and secondly, it also ignores the *conversational presumption* and therefore, it must be treated as an order. Whereas, *indirection* means, an utterance is a direct statement and indirect speech act.

Later, Searle admitted that he thought like most of his colleagues for many years. He, however, changed his position when he observed certain problems in this argument. "The mistake is that the argument confuses being committed to having an intention with actually *having the intention*."<sup>12</sup>

Suppose, if a person utters 'I promise to come and see you next week,' then it may be possible that he made his promise insincerely and there are no such criteria which plainly distinguish between actual intention and expressed intention. Expressed intention may not be actual intention of any person, while for successful communication, actual intention is inevitable. Searle, therefore argued that we can't derive the performative from a statement. A statement or an assertion does not guarantee the actual intention of any speaker. However, when an assertion is self-referential, it must indicate assurance of actual intention. As he argued, "I have come to the unfortunate conclusion that any attempt to derive performatives from assertives is doomed to failure because assertives fail to produce the self-guaranteeing feature of performatives, and in failing to account for the self-guaranteeing feature, the analysis fails to account for performativity." <sup>13</sup> Accordingly, Searle has shown that the performative is primarily speech act and an assertion bound up with such an utterance is derived from it.

Kent Bach and R.M. Harnish, later, refuted Searle's contention as to there are differences between actual intention and expressed intention or pseudo intention. "But there is no question about his being sincere in the communicative intention itself- what one can be insincere about is actually having the attitude one is expressing." <sup>14</sup> They, further, argued that a speaker firstly thinks and then he expresses it, in words. It is not correct as to a speaker firstly speaks and then he thinks, whatever, he spoke. The distinction between actual and pseudo intention is, therefore, blurred. As they admitted, "As Humpty Dumpty evidently appreciated, you choose your words to fit your intention, not your intention to fit your words" <sup>15</sup> However, when we subtly consider the above discussion, we feel some mistake in Bach and Harnish's contention. Although, Bach and Harnish's endorsement is uncontroversial that a person firstly thinks and then he expresses it, in appropriate language and not vice-versa. *Our thinking, however, may be distinguished between actual thinking and hidden thinking. A person may hide his actual thinking and report his hidden thinking and there is nothing wrong in it. For example, I promise to do so and so, however my actual thinking may not be do so and so. Thus, it is not appropriate to say that intention may not be confused between actual intention and pseudo intention.*

Moreover, Bach and Harnish argued that an utterance is primarily a statement and speech act indirectly derives from it. It is argued that the seminal point of an utterance is securing uptake, implying that the hearer must understand the speaker's intention. If securing uptake is indispensable, then the question is, "*Does the hearer uptake speech act, indirectly?*" So far as the hearer uptakes those things, which are inevitable for his job, viz., hearer's job is to achieve his goal whatever, the speaker expresses by his utterance. At that juncture, it would be redundant to argue that the hearer firstly uptakes it as a statement and then he indirectly infers its performativity by Gricean mechanism. For instance, if the landlord of the house commands his rentier that *I order you to leave this house* then the rentier ipso facto uptakes it as an order. He does not think that primarily this is a statement and indirectly he infers its performativity, i.e., *order*, which is the seminal point of this utterance, not only from the speaker's point of view but also from the hearer's point of view.

Secondly, if we pretended that an utterance is a direct statement and indirect speech act, then on what ground, we will be able to distinguish between *direct speech act* and *indirect speech act*. For example, we consider two utterances; Firstly, *I order you to leave the room* and secondly, *I feel suffocation in this room*. Superficially, both utterances appear similar. However, when we consider it subtly, we observe that the former instance is a sort of direct speech act, while the latter instance is a sort of *indirect speech act*. Whereas, on account of Bach and Harnish's contention, both instances would be a sort of *indirect speech act*, because, the hearer indirectly infers it performativity. The dichotomy between direct speech act and indirect speech act is, therefore, blurred and it would be more difficult for the hearer to judge; whether this utterance is direct speech act or indirect speech act.

Moreover, if every meaningful utterance is a statement, then it would be redundant to think that primarily this is a statement and then it is a performative. Regarding this issue, we may argue that by virtue of Occam's razor or law of parsimony, we should not consider irrelevant things, which are not inevitable for our jobs. By and large, an utterance is treated by the hearer as speech act. However, sometimes, it may fail to give concrete result according to its inwardness and then the hearer indirectly endeavours to judge its performativity. Thus, they treat it as an indirect speech act. In

addition, there are a number of utterances, which directly behave like indirect speech act, for example, *can you pass the salt ? " It would be nice.....",* and so forth, which are known as indirect speech act.

Bach, further, attempted to make a nuance distinction between *hedged performatives* and *embedded performatives* on the basis of certainty, which must be inherent with the intention of the speaker. By and large, when a person utters something in the normal sense, then it does not force the hearer to perform the act regarding this utterance. On the other hand, when the speaker utters something forcefully then it does not endow with any sort of relaxation for the hearer, i.e., it must underlie compulsion or certainty for the hearer to do as per the utterance. For instance, *I order you to leave the room*; this utterance has two dimensions; firstly, *hedged performative like I order you to leave the room* and *embedded performative like I must order you to leave the room*. Although, both utterances have plainly shown,

"-----it is necessary for the speaker to order the hearer to leave. That is the belief the speaker is expressing in making the statement. Notice that in these cases this belief is distinct from the belief associated with the order itself, namely, the belief that the speaker is ordering the hearer to leave. The latter belief is not expressed, but it is implicated in the speaker's intention to be ordering ."<sup>16</sup>

Well, on the one hand, Bach made a subtle distinction between hedged performative and embedded performative by virtue of the certainty or compulsion, because, it must underlie the intention of the speaker. On the other hand, he emphasised *standardization*. I think that both approaches are contradictory to each other and it would not be acceptable anyhow. In the case of standardization, speaker's intention is redundant, because, in such circumstances language works as per certain norms, which are objective and also observable. For example, in the law court, in front of the Registrar, someone signs on the written documents as to *I give and bequeath my house to my sister*, at that place, the question of the intention of the speaker is meaningless, even without intention, the act must be performed. Apparently, there is a standardized form of language, which are used in various contexts and must perform some acts. Indeed, this is not the characteristic of language, but the characteristic of standardization,

## How Performatives Exactly Work

which is determined by society and culture. It does not happen simply that intention is not considerable or it is redundant. It may be considerable, in the absence of standardization. Apparently, in the absence of standardization language works as per intention of the speaker. Thus, standardization does not demand intention, viz., it is adequate in itself to perform some acts. On this account it would be untenable to distinguish between *hedged performatives* and *embedded performatives*. In the case of standardization, for example, the director of the institute utters as to *you are hereby suspended*. This utterance does not provide any sort of relaxation for the hearer to distinguish between hedged performative and embedded performative. It is quite likely implied that *you must be suspended*. The distinction between the hedged performatives and the embedded performatives is, therefore, awry. However, It may be useful in the absence of standardization.

The above discussion highlights the fact that Bach and Harnish's contention as to performatives work as per standardized indirect speech act, is problematic. So far as, standardization and indirection both are contradictory to each other. In the case of standardization, which is rested upon *mutual belief* and *avoidance of conversational presumption*, as defined by Bach and Harnish, the hearer directly conceives the speech act. However, in the absence of standardization, the hearer endeavours to infer the intention of the speaker indirectly, inasmuch as there are no standardized touchstones which facilitate the inference process. so, when Bach and Harnish pretended that even in the presence of the standardization, the hearer indirectly infers the speech act. It simply unfolds that *even standardization is not very clear, viz., standardization is also confused, unclear, equivocal, complex, vague, and the like. The hearer, therefore, indirectly endeavours to take away this confusion by inference process.*

It does not imply that Searle's argument is appropriate, i.e., an utterance is primarily performative and an assertion derives from it. This argument is also worth considerable from a certain point of view. Of course, in the presence of conventionalization, the hearer directly infers the speech act. Thus, an utterance is directly treated as a speech act. However, in the absence of conventionalization, performatives work regarding the intention of the speaker or mutual understanding between the speaker and

the hearer. In these circumstances, an utterance is directly treated as an assertion or a statement and the hearer, indirectly infers the intention of the speaker. Thus, an utterance is direct statement and indirect speech act.

Various arguments presented in this paper identify conventionalization and standardization as two major dimensions for understanding the nature of performative utterances. The question of relative importance of conventionalization and standardization appears irrelevant. Standardization of performative utterance is a gradual process taking place in a socio-cultural context. By and large, conventionalized forms of performative utterances have been prevalently accepted and used. Later on, certain forms of conventional performative utterances acquire standardized form. Conventional performative utterances, therefore, evolve as standardized performative utterances. It may not be understood as to standardized performative utterances are perfect and ossify. The process of standardization of performative utterance is dynamic and continuous. When it has been used in our daily life, it becomes an indispensable fraction of conventionalization. Of course, conventionalization and standardization may not diametrically be converse aspects. Conventionalization underlies all sorts of standardization. It may not deem that conventionalization is ultimate, static and ossified. Socio-cultural contexts endowed with strength and fecundity, which facilitate the process of conventionalization and standardization. Due to *variation in socio-cultural contexts, convention may vary. Plainly, the functioning of performatives is relative to a socio-cultural context.* For example, I promise to do so and so, there may be a culture, wherein you can promise by saying merely that *I promise* while, in the same culture, in case of conventionalization and standardization, *you can't promise by saying solely that I promise. In such circumstances, you can promise, by signing some special legal documents.* Of course, the realm of standardization is very limited, which betoken solely formal and legal situations. The whole society, therefore, doesn't work as per the norms of standardization. Broadly, standardization is an aspect of conventionalization whereas, conventionalization relies upon socio-cultural contexts. *We, therefore, conclude that performatives work as per socio-cultural contexts. Conventionalization and standardization are embedded in the larger socio-cultural context to the extent that they*

*How Performatives Exactly Work*

become inseparable fragment of it.

Socio-cultural contexts, however, should not be taken as static and ossified. It is dynamic and continuous, like conventionalization and standardization. When a culture comes in contact with other culture, it leads to the process of *acculturation*. For example, when some persons of a culture interact with persons of another culture, they extensively observe nuances of the other culture and compare it with regard to their own culture. This process of acculturation leads to evolution of some novel values and norms, adopted by the persons involved in such process. Gradually, these logical, rational and congruent novelties become an inevitable aspect of their culture and eventually, get adopted as a standardized form. These innovations through the medium of conventionalization are standardized. *The process of acculturation is unique and amenable for introducing dynamism in socio-cultural contexts.*

Another cardinal process of *rationcination* also affects the socio-cultural contexts. In every culture, some persons of intellectual class belong to peer-groups. On the basis of logical and intellectual thinking, they dissent conservatism, fundamentalism and obscurantism, prevalent in their society. They, therefore, organize and participate in various intellectual discourses, meetings, seminars, etc., and argue against the fundamentalism; in as much as, these are obstacles for the development of the society. While criticizing negative aspects of the society, they introduce some novel values and norms for its betterment. Although, fundamentalists always vehemently dissent such sort of innovations, so that obscurantism continues in minds and actions of people. They fail to provide some logical argument in favour of obscurantism. They, therefore, endeavour to use and arouse emotions and feelings of masses, asserting that the founder of the society, i.e., religious Gurus desire us to be like of obscurantism. They never accept that those norms may become irrelevant in the context of changing society and contemporary world. With the advent of information technology, the world is converting into a global village. In such circumstances, it is very difficult to lay by stereotypes of obscurantism, which are noxious for the development of the society. So, majority of the people endeavour to adopt these innovations in their behaviours. Thus, innovations and changes gradually evolve as an indispensable fragment of the society and eventually it achieves the status of conventionalization and standardization, respectively. Such

sort of societal phenomena may be observed even in contemporary society. Nowadays, Pakistan and Afganistan are good examples of such societal phenomena. Lately, General Parvez Musharruf proclaimed numerous reforms, which uptake as a radical step towards the reform in Pakistan. Likewise, in Afganistan, with the establishment of the new government, numerous traditional values, which were imposed by fundamentalists are assuaged and replaced by some innovations. Apparently, performatives work as per socio-cultural contexts, which may change with regard to acculturation. Conventionalization and standardization, therefore, must be deemed with reference to dynamic character of socio-cultural context.

However, in the absence of socio-cultural contexts of conventionalization and standardization, language may work as per following grounds. Firstly, mutual understanding between the speaker and the hearer may develop to facilitate functionality of a specific linguistic communication. Suppose two persons belonging to different cultures, meet each other. Obviously, their languages and cultures would be different. In such circumstances, they may not have common standardized and conventionalized form of language required for their communication. However, in such situation, they may evolve mutual understanding regarding language including signs, symbols etc. for their communication. Thus, mutual understanding is an outstanding phenomenon for communication.

Secondly, job orientations are also cardinal factor for performing the work in lack of conventionalization and standardization. Job orientation is bound up with common interest, goal and purpose. Thus, even if the speaker and the hearer differ in their calibre and mental status, however, due to similarity of job, they succeed in communicating their ideas, without ambiguity. In such circumstances, performatives work by virtue of the common purposes between the speaker and the hearer, i.e., *language works between words to work*.

Thirdly, in this regard, *hearer's motivation and propensity* are unavoidable. In several cases, it has been seen that the hearer uptakes the meaning of an utterance, according to their propensity. For instance, when a person utters that we should not beat our wife. Obviously, regarding their propensity or motivation and even intellect, the hearers adopt it in various manners. Some persons may think that we should beat others, besides our

*How Performatives Exactly Work*

wives, while, on the other hand, some person think that we should not beat anybody including our wives. Another example may be; someone of the family members utters as to *it is Sunday today*. This utterance may be taken in various ways by various family members depending upon their motivations. Firstly, someone may think that it is Sunday today, so we should go to the Church. Secondly, someone may think that today is holiday, so there is no ere long, viz., we should take rest too much vis-a-vis other days. Thirdly, some others may think that Kṛṣṇa T.V. Serial will come today at 8.30 A.M. because ; it is Sunday today; while, if you have commenced a meeting on Sunday, then you will uptake it in other manner.

Likewise, Upaniṣadik statement, '*Eko Brahman Dvitiyo Nasti*' Śamkara interpreted it, Brahman is the only real and everything except Brahman is unreal, appearance, Māyā, Avidyā etc. On the basis of this interpretation, he sets forth his noteworthy theory of *non-dualism*. On the other hand, Ramanuja interpreted this statement in different way. He argued that it does not mean as to Brahman is the only real. Apart from Brahman, Jiva (Chit) and Matter (Aчит) are also real , eternal and independent of each other, however, their existence rely upon God. It may imply that in addition to God, Chit and Aчит are also real but these are not on a par with God. God is substance while, Chit and Aчит are attributes of god. Ramanuja, therefore, laid down his cardinal theory of *Vishistadvaita*. Thus, the nature, propensity, motivation, etc. of the hearer are also very important for our communication. In addition, we can't deny the intention of the speaker, which we have discussed earlier, for successful communication.

Eventually we may attempt recapitulate our seminal ideas in foregoing discussion. Prevalently, performative sentences are directly treated as a speech act. Sometimes, it may fail to produce some consequential result regarding its inwardness, then the hearer, indirectly endeavours to infer its performativity. These utterances are' therefore, treated as indiredct speech act. On the other hand, there may be some utterances, which are, naturally, indirect speech act. Secondly, performatives work as per socio-cultural contexts. Conventionalization and standardization are, embedded in the larger socio-cultural context, inasmuch as they become an inseparable fraction of it. However, in the absence of conventionalization and standardization, performatives work with regard to follwing grounds:

- Mutual understanding between the speaker and the hearer.
- Job orientations among the person.
- Motivations and propensities of the hearer.
- The intention of the speaker.

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## THE ARGUMENT FROM ILLUSION

K. SRINIVAS

### I

Parmenides, the ancient Greek monist, claimed that there are two basic ways of inquiry. The first confirms that whatever is (i.e. being) "is and cannot not-be". This is the right path of truth that makes us realise that being is one and cannot be created, destroyed, or changed. If any one of these alterations is permissible within being, then being would no longer be what "is" and would become what "is not". But by definition there is no "is not" from which being could come into existence or into which being could change. Being is one seamless immutable whole. The other path of inquiry is mere opinion, which claims that something arises from not-being.<sup>1</sup> Analogously, the Upaniṣadic tradition equates Brahman, the supreme Reality, with Being (sat). This Being of the Upaniṣadic is an infinite pure Existence, which is immutable. Thus there is a striking similarity of views between Parmenides and the Upaniṣadic tradition as regards the nature of ultimate Reality. Any tradition that aims at constructing higher order metaphysics is bound to adopt the first way of inquiry as suggested by Parmenides.

A legitimate inquiry into the beginnings of any philosophical tradition inevitably suggests us that the key concepts used in that tradition must be construed within its framework of reference. This must be the first prerequisite for any hermeneutic exercise, for otherwise there is every possibility of misinterpretation of the tradition in question. Therefore, one must be circumspect enough while interpreting the meaning of the concepts that one comes across in any tradition. Advaita is one such tradition that is

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April 2003

often misinterpreted and misunderstood by many a scholar. The chief objective of Advaita is to inquire into the nature of supreme reality (Brahman) as stated in the Upaniṣads. In order to accomplish this objective there is every need to make distinction between appearance and reality, for they are considered to be two most important philosophical categories of experience. No genuine metaphysical system ever fails to recognise the distinction between these two categories, for they are very fundamental and important to construct higher order metaphysics. To invoke polar concept argument here, each category derives its philosophical significance from its opposite. When we normally say that these two categories are mutually interdependent for any philosophical explanation, it is not the case that the existence of reality is necessarily dependent on its appearances. In fact, the latter owe their existence to the former, but not vice-versa. Western epistemologists, especially those who subscribe to the doctrine of phenomenalism<sup>2</sup>, employed the "argument from illusion" mainly to abolish the distinction between "what is the case" and "what appears to be the case". They accorded ontological priority to the latter but not to the former on the ground that the former can never be perceived directly. At the most one can say that their existence is inferred from what is given in sense-experience. Consequently, anything that is not given in sense-experience is treated as secondary, derivative, or even fictitious. "Seeing" for them is not only just believing, but also knowing. In other words, "to see" is "to know". Therefore, our claims to knowledge are inevitably dependent on what we perceive. This implies that what we perceive exists in some sense. This may be true insofar as our experiences concerning the world of objects. But, the protagonists of phenomenalism are least interested in any inquiry into the nature of such existence. This becomes the starting point for Advaita. The Advaitin is also concerned with "existence", but his inquiry into the true nature of existence transcends the limits of ordinary sense-experience, although his inquiry proceeds from our day-to-day experiences. For instance, when Parmenides cast doubt upon the apparent features of sensible world, it was not his intention to doubt whether we know anything about the world at all, but whether it is real.<sup>3</sup> He was more concerned with the true nature of the world rather than the apparent forms of existence. In the similar fashion, the Advaitin looks at the nature of existence from two

*The Argument From Illusion*

different perspectives. On the one hand, he has to account for the world of objects (appearances) and on the other hand, he was to establish the view that Brahman (Reality) alone exists. This necessitates the Advaitin to distinguish between empirical/relative (*vyāvahārika*) and Trans-empirical/Absolute (*pāramārthika*) points of view. Therefore, one needs to keep in mind that what holds good from one point of view does not hold good from the other. The philosophical logic<sup>4</sup> employed by Advaita to unravel this philosophical truth (*satya*) viz. Brahman alone is real, is worth consideration. The Advaitin too makes use of the argument from illusion, but only to substantiate the view that there is a distinction between "what is the case" and "what appears to be the case". The latter is necessarily rooted in the former. My principal objective in this paper is to show that we know (realise)"what is the case" only from our experience of "what appears to be the case". In other words, the latter refers to our experiences of empirical reality (*vyāvahārika-sattā*), while the former refers to our realisation of the trans-empirical reality (*pāramārthika-sattā*).

## II

In one of his major works entitled *The Naiṣkarmyasiddhi* of Sureśvara, Balasubramanian characterises Advaita Vedānta as "transcendental phenomenology" and "metaphysics of experience"<sup>5</sup>. These two appellations given to advaita can be justified on the following ground. First of all, the Self (Ātman), which is none other than Brahman, is the transcendental principle whose evidence is apodictic. Secondly, the phenomenological method employed by Advaita makes us realise that we experience various levels of reality, although the supreme Reality *per se* does not possess any levels or degrees. They are as follows: (1) the reality viewed from phenomenal level, (2) the reality viewed from empirical level, and (3) the reality viewed from the absolute level. The transcendental principle (Brahman/Ātman) is absolutely real, one and non-dual. Thus its first appellation is justified. It can be argued that Advaita is a "Metaphysics of experience" for the method of Advaita aims at a rigorous inquiry of the nature of empirical world, the world of lived experience, as presented to consciousness. What is presented to consciousness consists of both the objects of the external world and also the cogitations of the mind that belong to the inner world. In this way, the method of inquiry adopted by

Advaita proceeds from what is known (appearances) viz. the physical world of daily life, to what is hitherto unknown (Reality).

The metaphysics of Advaita is primarily concerned with the vindication of the view that Brahman/Ātman is the only reality as stated in the Upaniṣads, and the world of objects does not have any independent existence apart from Brahman. In a sense, Brahman is the ground of all beings. It is mentioned in the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*: "That from which these beings arise, by which the created beings are sustained, that into which they lapse back at the time of dissolution---seek to know that ; that is Brahman."<sup>6</sup> In other words, the world of objects is caused by Brahman. In order to demonstrate that the existence of the world of objects is rooted in the very being of Brahman/Ātman, Advaita has to explain the role of Brahman in the creation of the world of objects. However, such a process of creation should not affect the very plenitude and perfection of Brahman. For this purpose advaita found the concept of *māyā/aviyā* or illusion, the principle of inexplicability, as the most suitable one. But one should keep in mind that this concept is purely an explanatory concept. It does not have evaluative significance. To put it in the words of Balasubramanian, "The means utilised by the Advaitin for the explanation of the one reality appearing as the many is the principle of *māyā*."

The Upaniṣads speak about the nature of supreme Reality in so many ways . They are as follows : "All this Brahman."<sup>8</sup> "Ātman being known everything is known."<sup>9</sup> "There was only being at the beginning, it was one without a second "<sup>10</sup> "all this is Brahman"<sup>11</sup> "This Self is the Brahman."<sup>12</sup> "I am Brahman."<sup>13</sup> But , ultimately all these descriptions boil down to three important constitutive characteristics of Brahman. They are pure Being (*sat*), pure Consciousness (*cit*), and pure Bliss (*ānanda*). These constitutive characteristics of Brahman should not be mistaken for its qualities; since Brahman is free from all qualifications (*nirguṇa*), and is also free from any kind of differentiation. To put it more succinctly, it is free from *sajātīya-bheda*, *vijātīya-bheda*, and *svagata-bheda*. It is not the case, there is another entity like Brahman so that Brahman is distinguished from that. Also, there are no parts within Brahman, therefore, it is free from any internal differentiation.

From the above discussion it is clear that there is no other entity

excepting Brahman. However, for the critical mind it is important to show that the teachings of the Upaniṣads that belong to the tradition of infallible literature do not conflict with the reason or ordinary experience. A significant move in this direction would be to prove the opposing claims about reality are self-contradictory and implausible. Now the question arises as to how Brahman which is pure Existence (*sat*), pure Consciousness (*cit*), and pure Bliss (*ānanda*) could give rise to the world of object. It is mentioned in the *Śvetāśvetara Upaniṣad*: "know *māyā* to be the primal cause of the universe and Maheśvara as possessing *māyā*."<sup>14</sup> The import of this statement is that *māyā* or cosmic illusion is the principal cause of the world of objects. The expression "Maheśvara" refers to Brahman, which is pure Existence. Since *māyā* cannot have an independent existence apart from Brahman, the former in association with the latter becomes *saguṇa* Brahman or *Īśvara* or God. *Māyā* as potency (*śakti*) possesses two important powers. They are the power of concealment (*āvaraṇa-śakti*) and the power of projection (*vikṣepa-śakti*). *Māyā* with its mysterious creative powers conceals the real nature of Brahman and projects it as something other than what it is. This is what is technically known as superimposition (*adhyāsa*). As a matter of fact, the Advaitin does not make any distinction between *māyā* and *avidyā*. The former is known as cosmic illusion, which is the creative force behind the world of objects, and the latter individual illusion. They are one and the same. *Māyā/avidyā* as illusion has a peculiar nature. It is neither real (*sat*), nor unreal (*asat*), but an inexplicable principle (*anirvacanīya*). *Māyā* contains the element of self-contradictoriness within itself.

In fact, it is stated in the *Vedānta-sūtra*<sup>15</sup> that Brahman is that to which the birth, maintenance, and destruction of the world have to be attributed. When it is said that Brahman is the cause of the world of objects, since it is ontically prior to everything, it is not Brahman *per se* or *nirguṇa* Brahman, rather it is *Brahma* associated with *māyā* or *saguṇa* Brahman that is the source of the world of objects. If Brahman is pure Consciousness, then *māyā*, the unconscious principle, cannot be part of it. Then, where did *māyā* originate from? Although *māyā* is not a part of Brahman, the latter is both the locus and content of the former. For instance, when we mistake a rope for the snake, there are two different cognitions. First of all, there is

a cognition of the snake, and this cognition is sublated by a subsequent cognition when we see rope as it is. Then what is the source of illusory snake? Where did it come from? What is the logical relationship between the rope and the snake? Although the locus and content of the snake is the rope, there is no logical relationship between them. Not only that, to look for a relationship, where there is none, results in superimposition of some kind or the other. Similarly, *māyā* is rooted in Brahman since there is no other reality than Brahman. It is true that Brahman is the ground of everything. This does not in any way mean that there is a logical relationship between them.

The kind of causation that one comes across in Advaita Vedānta is something unique. Brahman in association with *māyā* creates the world of objects. Therefore, Brahman is treated as the material cause of the world of objects. But this process does not affect the real nature of Brahman. It amounts to saying that Brahman is the transfigurative or non self-transforming material cause (*vivartopādāna-kāraṇa*), while *māyā*, whose potency (*śakti*) veils the real nature of Brahman, is the transformative or self-transforming material cause (*pariṇāmyupādānakāraṇa*) of the world of objects. In other words, it is *māyā* that undergoes transformation for creating the world of objects.<sup>16</sup> Thus there are two types of material cause. One can illustrate this point with the help of the following examples. A lump of clay can be moulded into various types of objects such as a jar, pot, mug, etc. But the clay remains intact in all these modes of existence. Similar is the case with Brahman. As regards the nature of *māyā*, we can explain it from the following example. It is a known fact that milk is the cause of buttermilk. When milk gets transformed into buttermilk, then the latter alone is available but not the former. Similar is the cause with *māyā*. it gets itself transformed into the world of objects (*jagat*). Therefore, the world of objects is none other than *māyā*.

There is another interesting thing to notice here. Brahman is also treated as the efficient cause of the world of objects. This is because there is no such thing that can be so. The difference between Brahman and its potency (*śakti*) *māyā* is that the former is *sat* or real and the latter *bhāva-padārtha* or existent. The world of objects, which is the product of *māyā* is experienced by all of us. Advaita does not deny this fact. In fact, the

*The Argument From Illusion*

world of objects is an ordered whole in which the laws of space, time, and causation hold good but, ultimately the world of objects is not real for it is of self-contradictory nature. Advaita is quite clear about the meanings of the words "real (*sat*)" and "unreal (*asat*)". Anything that has existence is real, and the unreal is that which does not exist at all. When Advaita holds that anything that has existence is real, it means that the object or the entity in question must possess unsublatable existence. As seen in the rope-snake example, when we come to know that the object is really a rope, we believe that the snake no more exists. But what is to be noticed here is that the snake did not exist even when we perceived it. This is what is technically called the inexplicable (*anirvacanīya*). In other words, the snake is a self-contradictory percept that contains its own contradiction.

So far the thought of Advaita is restricted to the world of objects which is experienced by us. It is world that is conditioned by the categories of space-time relations, causal relations, and substance-attribute relations, etc. But, are these categories free from self-contradiction? If they are not, the world which is held together by these categories should also be self-contradictory. Some Advaitins, like Śrīharṣa and Citsukha, employed the method of destructive dialectic to show that these categories are self-contradictory.<sup>17</sup> Let us examine whether these categories are self-consistent. Space is an extended entity, therefore is divisible. If the simplest units of space are bereft of any extension, then any number of these units can hardly give rise to extension. If parts have extension, then they are further divisible. Not only that, an extension of the foot has infinite number of parts, and so also an extension of a yard. Does it mean that an extension of a foot is equivalent to an extension of a yard? This is a logical absurdity. Similar is the case with time.

As regards causation, we generally hold the view that an event *X* is the cause of the event *Y*. We hold such a view when *X* has changed into *Y*. But before *Y* came into existence there is only *X*. When *Y* came into existence there is no sign of *X*. When we experience only *X* we cannot certainly say that it is the cause of *Y*, and when we see *Y* there is no *X*, which is supposed to be its cause. We can hold that *X* is the cause only with reference to *Y*. It amounts to saying that *Y* is the ground for *X* being its cause. In other words, *Y* causes *X* to be its cause. But the problem does

not end there. If *X* cannot exist when *Y* exists, how can *Y* have any influence on *X*? Therefore, we cannot say that *X* was the cause of *Y* in the absence of the former. So causation is a self-contradictory category.

Even substance and attributes are also self-contradictory categories. Has anyone ever seen pure substance? The subjective idealist Berkeley raised the same question. What we normally perceive are qualities like colours, sounds, etc. Does it mean that objects are mere conglomerations of qualities?<sup>18</sup> Can qualities exist independent of a substratum? Here, one has to make a distinction between existence and subsistence. Substance has existence, but qualities have mere subsistence. When someone breaks an object, does he break a cluster of qualities? If substance and qualities are related, what is the nature of such a relation? Any relation is said to exist between two entities or terms. How is the relation related to these terms? If it is related by other relations, then they are related by other relations. This process leads to infinite regress (*anavasthā*). If it is not related, then it is difficult to explain how the relation can pull the terms or entities in question together. The destructive dialectic employed by the Advaitins attempts to establish the self-contradictory nature of these categories. Nevertheless, this attempt is not to uphold or establish acosmism (*niṣprapañca*) as believed by many philosophers, but only to vindicate that there is something higher and deeper than the world of objects. The philosophical logic of Advaita is that everything that is self-contradictory presupposes something that is not self-contradictory (*abādhyā*).

There is another significant move made by the Advaitin to show that the perceived changes cannot be rationally accepted as real, unless they clear the test of the criterion of non-sublatability. First of all, it must be noticed that this criterion essentially presupposes a dualism between the experiencing subject and the experienced, the subject and the object, consciousness and the content of the consciousness. Secondly, the criterion suggests us that anything that is in principle sublatale possesses lesser degree of endurance and value than that which replaces it as a result of sublation. The degrees of endurance possessed by various things are treated as degrees or levels of reality or existence by the various interpreters of Advaita. Śaṅkara made use of the criterion of non-sublatability to distinguish reality from mere appearances. For instance, the objects of imagination do

not have existence of any sort. Therefore, they are of no use for any epistemological inquiry. All that one can say is that they have the imaginary existence.<sup>19</sup> Such objects are called *tuccha* by the Advaitins. They are the true representations of *asat* or non existence. Let us imagine an object called "round-square". It is an imaginary object, which is both circular and square. This is an obvious self-contradiction both in terms of description and definition. Also, one can presume that the logic of advaita is such that it does not make any distinction between what is logically possible like "round-square" and an empirical absurdity like a "white crow". The subjective side of the cognition of such objects is not false, for they are the objects of our imagination. One can very well imagine a crow, which is white. But, they are treated as false only when our reason (*buddhi*) makes any assertion about them.<sup>20</sup>

Unlike the objects of imagination, there are objects of apparent existence (*prātibhāśka-sattā*) which are experienced by us. In all these cases, our reason makes assertions about the contents of such experiences. For instance, based on the content of my present perceptual experience, I assert: "That is snake" But, the content of my subsequent perceptual experience makes me assert: "that it is not the snake" A clear case of sublation is experienced here. The content of my earlier perceptual experience is sublated by the content of my later one. It amounts to saying that unlike the objects of apparent existence, there are objects of pragmatic or empirical existence (*vyāvahārika-sattā*). Now the onus rests on the Advaitin to show that the latter differ from the former only in terms of degree, but not in kind. In other words, the objects of apparent existence have less endurance when compared to the objects of pragmatic or empirical existence. Another important thing to be noticed here is that the former are sublated by perceptual experience and also by the experience of action within this world of objects, while the latter are sublated by dialectical reason and intuition of Brahman (*pāramārthika-sattā*). Excepting the objects of imagination, both the objects of apparent existence and pragmatic or empirical existence have a peculiar nature, according to Advaita. They are not real (*sat*), for otherwise they are not sublated, and they are not unreal (*asat*), for otherwise they are not experienced. Their nature is such that they are neither real nor unreal (*sadasat-vilakṣṇa*). Therefore, they

are *anirvacanīya*.<sup>21</sup> Being the projections of *māyā*, they share its nature. Thus the logic of Advaita introduces a new category of experience which is not admitted by the truth-functional or binary logic.

It is already shown that the world of objects which is held together by the categories of space-time relations, causal relations, substance-attribute relations is self-contradictory, for the categories themselves are self-contradictory. Now the Advaitin proceeds to show that the world of objects is not only self-contradictory, but also false. The Advaitin uses the expression "*māyā*" to mean falsity. The term "falsity" is a relative term. As seen in the rope-snake example, the snake is false with reference to rope, but the rope is false only with reference to Brahman. The rope cannot be false with reference to any other object at its level. Suppose we did not have the experience of rope, then the experience of the snake cannot be false. It should be viewed as a mystery that the snake appears as an independent object, although the rope is a real object. In the similar fashion, it is a mystery that we are living acting in this world of objects which is ultimately self-contradictory. What is self-contradictory cannot have independent existence. the term "*māyā*" expresses this mystery. If the world of objects is an illusion, it is an illusion to every human being. But, it is not necessary that everyone experiences the illusory snake. Therefore, the world of objects is a cosmic illusion, and the specific experience of an illusory snake is an individual illusion. So long as *māyā/avidyā* lasts, one can only presuppose Brahman as the supreme Reality. To realise the presence of Brahman one has to mediate and transcend the ordinary means of valid cognition. The highest kind of knowledge (*aparāvidyā*) is that in which knowledge and Being are one. In this context "to know is to become".

### III

To conclude: the argument from illusion intends to establish the view that the immutable, eternal, and infinite Brahman is ontically prior to its ontological existence. In its ontic state Brahman is *nirguṇa*. Its ontological existence as *saguṇa* Brahman or *Īśvara*, which is viewed as the creator of this world of object, in association with *māyā*, is purely accidental (*taṭastha*). To the ordinary human mind the world of objects appears to be real, although it is an appearance of the Absolute (Brahman). the world of

of objects is not the absolute itself, but only the phenomenal field of the absolute. It exists, for otherwise one cannot experience it. Therefore, it is empirical and objective (*bhāvapadārtha*) as an existent, but not real (*sat*). to quote Śaṅkara here in this context: "...as long as a person has not reached the true knowledge of the unity of self, so long it does not enter his mind that the world of effects with its means and objects of right knowledge and its results of action is untrue; he rather, in consequence of his ignorance, looks on mere effects ....as forming part and belonging to his self, forgetful of Brahman being in reality the self of all." <sup>22</sup>

*Māyā* as the cosmic illusion has a positive role to play in explaining the self-contradictory nature of the world of objects. One should not interpret this concept in a derogatory sense. *Māyā* is an illusion, but not a delusion.<sup>23</sup> The former is different from the latter. In the case of an illusory experience, something is experienced as something else, while in the case of a delusory experience, something is conjured out of nothing or a non-existent phenomenon. Thus Advaita upholds the view that *ex nihilo nihil fit*. The argument from illusion provides us with an explanation for the existence of the world of objects. But the very ground of its existence is Brahman. We realise this fact. only when we are totally disillusioned.

## NOTES

\* This is the revised version of the paper presented in ICPR seminar on "The Thought and Works of Professor R. Balasubramanian" held in New Delhi in March 2001. I am highly indebted to Professor R. Balasubramanian for his invaluable suggestions in writing this paper.

1. Forrest E. Baird and Walter Kaufman, *Ancient Philosophy* (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1996), 2<sup>nd</sup> edn., p20.
2. According to phenomenalism, everything that is perceived is real. There is no external reality independent of one's own perceptual experience.
3. D.W. Hamlyn, *Sensation and Perception: A History of the Philosophy of Perception* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969), p.9
4. Unlike formal logic, which operates within the framework of laws of thought, philosophical logic follows from the philosophical presuppositions of a

- given system or thought to substantiate and justify them.
5. R. Balasubramanian, *The Naiṣkarmyasiddhi of Śuresvara* (Madras: Radhakrishna Institute for Advanced study in Philosophy, 1988), p. XIX.
  6. *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*, 3.1.1.
  7. R. Balasubramanian (ed.), *The Tradition of Advaita: Essays in Honour of Bhāṣyabhāva V.R. Klyanasundara Sāstrī* (New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers Pvt Ltd, 1994), p.7.
  8. *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, 7.25.2.
  9. *Bṛhadārṇyaka Upaniṣad*, 4.5.6.
  10. *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, 6.2.1.
  11. *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad*, 2.2.2., *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, 3.14.1.
  12. *Bṛhadārṇyaka Upaniṣad*, 2.5.19.
  13. *Ibid*, 1.4.10.
  14. *Śvetāśvetara Upaniṣad*, 4.10.
  15. *Veḍanta-sūtra*, 1.1.2.
  16. R. Balasubramanian, "The One and the Many "in his edited book *The Tradition of Advaita*, p.47.
  17. Śrīharṣa in his *Khaṇḍakhāṇḍakhādhya*, Citsukha in his *Tatvapradīpikā* employed the method of destructive dialectic to prove that the categories such as space and time, cause and effect, substance and attribute, are self-contradictory. Even Bradley employed such a method in his *Appearance and Reality*
  18. In the west, the phenomenologists like Berkeley in his *Principles of Human Knowledge*, and Hume in his *Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding* held the view that the objects are nothing but a cluster of sensible qualities. Both Berkeley and Hume held that there is no material substance.
  19. According to Alexius Meinong, the objects with imaginary existence have so-existence (*sosein*). They exist in some sense of existence. They are called "ideal objects."
  20. P.T. Raju, *Structural Depths of Indian Thought* (New Delhi : South Asia Publishers, 1985), p.388

*The Argument From Illusion*

21. One should not get confused when it is said that both Brahman and *māyā* are *anirvacanāya*. The former is inexplicable as it is nirguṇa, while the latter is inexplicable since it is of self-contradictory nature.
22. *Vedānta-sūtra*, 2.1.14.
23. J.L. Austin explains the distinction between the terms "illusion" and "delusion" in his *Sense and Sensibilia*. An illusion is a case of seeing something for something else. Contrary to this, a delusion is a situation where we create something out of nothing.

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## ALIENATION AND PHILOSOPHICAL IDEAS OF RABINDRANATH TAGORE

GAYATRI MITRA

### I

The present paper is intended as an essay on the human predicaments as reviewed by Rabindranath Tagore. The title, rather the theme, of the essay is suggested by Robert Blauner's book *Alienation and Freedom*. There is a sense in which the theme looks back to Kant's polarity between *phenomena and noumena* or *nature and freedom*. If alienation is taken to describe the human situation, then it must have been sensed earlier, long before Marx or the existentialists spoke of it. The Isa Upanisad (verse 3) speaks of *atmahanojanah*, the people who will kill themselves by alienating themselves from their ontological source. The *Dhammapada* (III.2) speaks of men in the dominion of death as languishing in pain as the fish taken out of water. The *Yoga-Sūtras* suggest that freedom consists in abiding in one's true native *svarupe avasthānām*. These are a few of the instances that go to show how alienation has been a malady of the human situation, entailing loss of selfhood, anxiety, melancholy and boredom. Ever since the Renaissance the symptoms have perpetrated. *The Merchant of Venice* opens with the sentence: "I do not know why I am so sad" As Walter Pater has pointed out, the mother of love in Botticelli's "The Birth of Venus" looks forlorn and sad. Such great European poets as Rike and Holderlin have lent expression and voice to the alienated spirit of the European man.

Hegel made alienation an ontological issue, while Marx referred it to the moral failure of capitalism. The faces of alienation are many and diverse. It could be ontological, moral, political, religious and aesthetic. We

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April 2003

should refer to the ontological dimension of alienation in Hegel. But its earliest form could be discerned in Plato, the alienation between the world of real ideas and the world of sensible shadows. Commonsense theory of knowledge alienates the knowing subject from the object of knowledge. For Kant there is the alienation of the constitutive and regulative principles, that of inclination and reason. Colonialism illustrates the political alienation between the colonizer and the colonized. St. Paul's dualism of the carnal and the spiritual epitomizes the alienation between God and man, and it provides the basis of Kierkegaard's religious anxiety. The work of art stands on an altogether different ontological footing from that of its creator.

The paper opens with an introductory note on Tagore's concept of alienation, and enters into a discussion of the concept of alienation itself. Then a synoptic view of the Indian philosophical scenario is undertaken to show that the concept of the particular or the individual is underplayed in the general tenor of Indian philosophical thinkers, be it metaphysics, or grammar or aesthetics. Even the *Viśeṣa* is a category and it behaves as though it was a universal. This fact itself is a distinguishing feature between Indian and Western thought. The latter, from Aristotle to Strwson has always looked for basic particulars. The irreducibility of the individuals or the particulars provides the ground for alienation. The word "alienation" need not always be taken in a pejorative sense. It is a description, but also a value. The road which separates me from my destination also brings me closer to it as well. By traversing the path we realize the destination at every step. This image of the road is from Tagore.

The present paper is undertaken with special reference to Tagore, who operates with the twin polarities of separation (*viraha*) and union (*Milan*). In one of his songs he speaks of building a bridge across the chasm between the two separate individuals. The bridge is the aesthetic analogue of a striving. For Tagore union is the value for overcoming alienation. Or, as he puts it, alienation is the given fact of life while union is the *truth*. The argument is carried on within the framework of a humanistic tradition and the union as value operates ubiquitously both at personal and interpersonal levels. Hence alienation and union, interchangeably called freedom, is a dialectical challenge, and calls for creativity in order to solve it.

Tagore's philosophical thought and ideas have not yet enjoyed public currency, and in that respect they require to be clearly stated and enunciated before they can be philosophically evaluated. Schopenhauer remarks perceptively that the value of the original is ever more than all the critical commentaries. There is then the question of dealing at length with a poet rather than a philosopher. We should remind ourselves the thesis of the vedantic epistemology that *Sruti* is weightier than both perception and inference. Śamkara's commentaries are philosophical achievements of highest order, yet they are but illuminations of the implications of the cryptic aphorisms and high poetry of the *Upaniṣads*. Long before Śamkara's commentaries were written, the verses of the *Upaniṣads* had sustained generation of aspirants in their quest of spiritual truths. Much of Tagore's writings are of that order, they bear unmistakably upon the intimations of immortality. Again, Heidegger does not fight shy of admitting that what he tells us in *Being and Time* are but musings on the poetry of Holderlin. One should be honest in answering the question, which philosopher outstrips Rilke or Holderlin in sheer philosophical depth and probing, if of course we care for solving the riddle of human existence. Holderlin had his Heidegger, but Tagore waits for one, in spite of Radhakrishnan.

## II

Our intention thus far has been to consider and explicate some of the cardinal issues of Rabindranath's philosophical position. I have tried to show that he has rethought the whole foundation of our lives and finds its meaning and purpose in human terms alone. This philosophical anthropology is based on a non-naturalistic theory of man. Summarily, the theory of man can be stated in the following manner.

Rabindranath believes that man has a *nature*, and this nature is man's truth. Human truth is *regulative* rather than constitutive of the human mode of being. There is in man a tension between the opening elements of life, ideas, aspirations and actual facts, freedom and necessity, surplus and utility, finitude and infinity, separateness of the ego and the harmony of human relationships. Man finds himself in a crisis, and his humanity consists in the conscious criticism of the crisis. He starts as an ego, but it cannot be the centre of his personality forever, he needs and seeks for a wider life, unity and relationship.

Rabindranath's concept of man has moral and aesthetic overtones. With him the evidence of the aesthetic and the ethical carry greater weight than the logical, philosophy, for Rabindranath brings by taking into account the spirit of alienation, the obscurations of man in the human world. By 'freedom' he understands the perfection of human relationship. Man finds himself in alienation, yet he refuses to be what he is. He searches for his identity. The search may be inconclusive, yet it is a human prerogative, forced upon him by his self-consciousness. Man's refusal to be what he is cannot be a matter of theoretical awareness alone, it entails assent to an imperative concerning the 'real' or 'true' nature of man. Theory of man suggests a course of action. Rabindranath's philosophical writings exhibit such elements as a theory of the nature of man, a diagnosis of what is wrong in man, and a prescription for putting it right.

I have endeavoured to formulate the so-called Indian way of thinking in connection with showing the role of the individual *vis-a-vis* the universal in Rabindranath's philosophical thought. Various influences have been at work in forming his views. He inherits and incorporates a great deal of the Indian way of thinking. This only shows the relation of a philosophy to the culture in which it has grown up. But to say that in Rabindranath's thoughts there is a genuine manifestation of Indian spirit would be an unqualified assertion. One can hardly say that without eliminating from his philosophical outlook a substantial western content. Conscious formulation of theories of man has never been in vogue in the philosophical tradition in India. The so-called Indian theories of man have only been incidental. With Rabindranath it is a primary concern, and should be considered, in part at least, as an inheritance from the positivistic influence of the West. In spite of his own statements about the vedic ancestry of his ideas, his human philosophy is essentially European in spirit. This is a fascinating story of our cultural renaissance.

I should like to make a brief mention of some specific conceptual issues with a view to clarifying finally Rabindranath's philosophical position.

When we consider such statements about man's true or real nature as "Man is an angel of surplus" etc. we must decide what sort of statement is being made. These statements may turn out to be value judgments saying what ought to be the case, rather than statements of facts, about what is

the case. If what is being asserted is evaluative and not factual, then it becomes impervious to evidence. Statements about human nature are especially subject to a kind of ambiguity. When Rabindranath says that man is an artist or a creative spirit, does he mean that all or most of human beings are actually so, or that we should all be so, or what? In this distinguishing value judgements from statements of fact I am not implying that Rabindranath's statements are merely expressions of individual taste, that they cannot be given objectively valid reasons, whether for or against. I am just pointing out that the above kind of clarifying question is often essential when discussing theories of human nature. Rabindranath's statements have often been taken to be ontologically descriptive. But this makes him committed in the wrong direction. He defines his terms persuasively, i.e., he changes the descriptive meaning of his favourite *Upanishadic* terms without altering their emotive meaning. Even theological notions undergo a process of secularization at his hands. *Homo homini deus* : for Rabindranath there cannot be any reference point beyond man. This protagonic element in his thought has most often been profaned.

What reason can we give for accepting Rabindranath's statements about man's nature? Many of them are concealed definitions, and may be held to be impregnable to contrary evidence. They reveal a part of what he means by the word 'man'. Not all matters of definition are trivial, however. Sometimes Rabindranath introduces new terms (e.g. 'angel of surplus') in new ways. It is then indeed necessary for definitions to be given, and for it to be made clear they are not claims about any sort of fact. Definitions are not the sort of statements which can be proved or disproved merely by investigation of the evidence as empirical statements can be. Now, if a statement does not fall into any of the three categories, viz. Evaluative, analytic or empirical, then we have really a difficult case. Some of Rabindranath's assertions about human truth try to say something about what in a sense is the case, and in another sense, what ought to be the case. They assert some fundamental truth about man's nature, and hence are not matters of definition. It is clear, at least, that these assertions are not genuinely empirical.

Rabindranath would not like to win too easily by explaining away all possible evidence against his statements. They are too mixed a bag, and

many deserve individual attention. It is of no use suggesting testability by observation, for it is a criterion not of meaningfulness, but of a statement's being scientific. The emphasis can, of course, be put on falsification. Rabindranath's statements are unfalsifiable, and this is an important fact to establish about them. The criterion of unfalsifiability characterizes the class of statements called 'metaphysical', i.e., statements of the highest generalization. It would be rash to suppose that the metaphysical is coextensive with the ontological, as some of Rabindranath's critics have done. The reasons for accepting his metaphysical statements are to be sought in man's capacity for intuiting truths about himself. These statements have a self-certifying character in speculative philosophy. Rabindranath, in points of facts, has endeavoured to form a coherent system of general ideas in terms of which every element of an experience can be interpreted. With him we are to pursue, in a single hypothesis, the general and the concrete. 'Freedom' is his word for the purpose.

Rabindranath makes some general statements about the human mode of consciousness or imagination. The ability to conceive of what is not the case is the freedom to imagine other possibilities. As men, we can never reach a state in which there are no possibilities unfulfilled for whatever state we are in; we can always conceive of things being otherwise. Rabindranath refers to the human faculty of imagination, a word almost never used in the Indian context. The imagination reveals a new dimension, an ampler ether of significance, meaning and fulfillment. This is his description of the intensionality of human consciousness. There is for Rabindranath a sort of conceptual connection between human freedom and imagination. Man's consciousness, if not unhappy, is creative. Man is an artist who freely fashions his possible image and tries to actualize it. Herein lies man's authenticity. Human reality need not necessarily be what it is but must be able to be what it is not. Rabindranath's basic point is that to be conscious at all is to be free.

Rabindranath gives the impression that the reality value of the ideals of man's further development are ontologically prior to man. This is partly owing to his ambivalent use of language and should be inconsistent with his intention expressed in such assertions as "Reality is human". Man's ideal being must be different from his actual mode of existence since the

ideal can be real for man alone ; hence no ontological priority could be ascribed to it. We do find him in moods such as saying that which is "eternal" is realizing itself in history", but such expressions are misleading. The so-called 'eternal' is no other than "man's own infinity", otherwise, Rabindranath says, it would have no justification to exist. To be precise, to exist is to be creative, and accordingly, human existence encompasses the ideal. In a similar fashion his favourite term 'infinite' is a regulative notion, beckoning man's self-transcendence. It is hardly constitutive of human destiny. The term 'infinite' connotes more than it denotes; it is a short hand expression for man's intentional consciousness, his value-positing freedom. There seems to be no reason for supposing that man's self-discovery should culminate in some final event marking the consummation of a hitherto creative process. What Rabindranath means by man's infinity is that no set of predicates, however adequate, can descriptively exhaust what the notion 'man' implies. 'Man' is an open-ended term. His remarkable phrase '*manavik bhuma*' brings out the positivistic presuppositions of his humanism.

Rabindranath does not allow the concept of man to be subsumed under the category of God. In point of fact 'God' is a term he rarely used and even when he uses it, it is rhetorical in effect. Man, he says, aspires for rising in the dignity of being, and religion is only one of the ways in which human aspiration finds itself expressed. In 'religion of man' the idea of God presupposes the idea of man. Had there not been in man a search for his own supreme value, had he not asked the question, 'what is it to be man-like ?' the idea of God as a vision of a being would not have arisen at all. And having arisen, the idea is no definitive answer to the question. Man is greater than his own creations. The concept of man for Rabindranath is a necessary precondition of the idea of God.

I have considered Rabindranath's idea of nature and found that nature, unrelated to the human mind, does not exist in his philosophical discourse. Some remarks concerning the unity of man and nature may now be made. Rabindranath's Berkeleyan-Kantian conception of nature is farthest from Locke and has striking similarities with that of Aristotle. Nature, according to him, occasions our self discovery. "As we know the truth of the stars, we know the great comprehensive mind of man" (*Religion of Man*, p.15). Nature is a human achievement ; it is what is

revealed to man as nature : "It is included in himself and therefore there is a commingling of his mind with it, and in that he finds his own being" (*Religion of Man*, P.72). The unity of man and nature is then possible because unity is a human principle.

Rabindranath assimilated society to nature in respect of man. Society, or for that matter, culture and civilization are human creations. They are organs of man's self-realization. Man creates his society, building his culture and civilization by an inner necessity whereby he can embody his values. Rabindranath uses the same methodological device for explaining the unity of man and society as he does for that of man and nature. Society, conceived along the premises of Rabindranath's concept of man, cannot be a system of windowless monads interacting by a pre-established harmony. The generative principle for harmony should lie within the social individuals. Thus envisaged, Rabindranath's society is as distant from Rabindranath's as it is from that of Hobbes. It cannot be modeled on the bee-hive (*Religion of Man*, p.22) either. Short of freedom or harmony, a society becomes closed, and its members alienated.

How can the truth of general propositions about man be ascertained? Aeschelus, in speaking of the office of intuition, says that when the mind sleeps it is bright with eyes. With Rabindranath the relationship between intellect and intuition is not one of war with the knife. Man is a unity of intellect, emotion and will. Since man is a unity of the three, these elements need not conflict with each other, and *a fortiori* no one of them be complete without gathering into itself the other two. There should be no divorce between intellect and intuition. "The understanding mind of man", says Rabindranath, "comprehends both the reasoning mind and the creative imagination". His word for intuition is 'imagination'. It is very much like Kant's notion of reflective judgment, except perhaps in the fact that it is endowed with a poetic quality. "The details of reality must be studied in their differences by science, but it can never know the character of the grand unity of relationship pervading it, which can only be realized immediately by the human spirit" (*Religion of Man*, pp.63-4). If it be possible to put our thrust in the mind in one of its functions, it should not be wrong to crust it in another of its capacities.

It is not enough for Rabindranath, to assent intellectually to a theory of man; it must be held with a certain intensity and depth of feeling. Unless the theory is distilled from life, if it is obly argued about it would remain merely abstract and conceptual. This explains the primacy of the aesthetic in Rabindranath's philosophy. Art is essentially *Sahitya*, which etymologically suggests Sahitativa or communication. It overlaps with the domain of the moral. The same spiritual plenitude, man's will to communicate accounts for both beauty and goodness. As a creator of beauty man builds bridges between the self and the not-self. Art is a pathway to freedom; it frees us by disengaging the mind from its imprisonment in the web of customary associations and routine ideas. An aesthetic view of life not only rescues morality from stagnation but also is presupposed by it. Man's self-expression in art is its own object and helps him to leap free of the filters that obscure his real nature. Man *qua* man is an artist, a citizen of the kingdom of freedom. What practical reason is for Kant, art is for Rabindranath. It implies a non-solipsistic human world and transcendence of alienation. The word 'love' sums up all these.

"Goodness is the freedom of our self in the world of man, as is love" (*Religion of Man*, p.121). It may be debated whether 'love' is an aesthetic or ethical notion. For Rabindranath it is both. Love illuminates our consciousness and beauty bears its everlasting meaning. The notions of beauty, goodness and love are revelatory of the human message of our experience. 'Freedom', 'harmony' and 'surplus', are interchangeable terms, are key-notions in Rabindranath's philosophical anthropology. Whatever term is predictable of man must be either derivable from or definable in terms of these. This is a point of methodological significance. Working through the imagination, the surplus in man renders possible a plethora of man's adventure of ideas and actions. It "finds its manifestation in science, philosophy and the arts, in social ethics, in all things that carry their ultimate value in themselves" (*Religion of Man*, pp.36-7). Against the claim of every abstract ideas Rabindranath has pleaded the cause of the complete man. This continues to be a desideratum of any theory of man. "The history of the growth of freedom is the history of the perfection of human relationship" (*Religion of Man*, p.116).

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## GANDHI ON CONVERSION

R. K. GUPTA

In this paper, I wish to bring to light some of Gandhi's main theses about conversion, and then make a few observations concerning these.

1. There is a sense of conversion which Gandhi opposes, and one which he does not.

Gandhi opposes conversion in the sense in which it is normally understood, whether in that sense it is called *shuddhi* by Hindus, *tabligh* by Muslims, or proselytizing by Christians. He does not oppose it in the sense of internal change, which a person who is free and mature may undergo without force or fraud or material inducement (the kind of change which Saul is reported to have undergone before he became Paul). He points out that it is difficult to know, whether in the case of other people or in one's own case, whether an internal change has really taken place. According to him, God alone can know that. And that is why he calls conversion as internal change as a matter between an individual and his God. As he finds, conversion in the sense in which it is normally understood will not exclude people who are not free and mature, and not exclude the methods of force or fraud or material inducement.<sup>1</sup>

Here we may define conversion in the sense in which it is normally understood as formal or ritualistic affiliation of a person to a different faith by one means or another, say, by preaching merely, or even by force or fraud or material inducement.

Although Gandhi opposes conversion in the sense in which it is normally understood, he will not ban it legally. It should be obvious here

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that, when Gandhi says this, it can only mean that he will not legally ban formal affiliation of a person to a different faith. It cannot mean that he will not legally ban this being brought about by any means whatsoever. Thus, for example, while he will not legally ban this being brought about by means of preaching, he will indeed legally ban this being brought about by means of force or fraud or material inducement. That means to say that, when Gandhi says that he will not legally ban conversion in the sense in which it is normally understood, it can only obviously mean that he will not legally ban formal affiliation of a person to a different faith and this being brought about by some of the means. It cannot mean that he will not legally ban this being brought about by some of the other means.

2. According to Gandhi, all the great religions of the world are equally true, thus deserving the same respect (and not just tolerance, because that "may imply a gratuitous assumption of the inferiority of other faiths to one's own").<sup>2</sup> As a result, there is no need of conversion in the sense in which it is normally understood.

"For me the different religions are beautiful flowers from the same garden, or they are branches of the same majestic tree. Therefore, they are equally true, though being received and interpreted through human instruments equally imperfect. It is impossible for me to reconcile myself to the idea of conversion after the style that goes on in India and elsewhere today. It is an error which is perhaps the greatest impediment to the world's progress towards peace. 'Warring creeds' is a blasphemous expression. And it fitly describes the state of things in India, the mother as I believe her to be of Religion or religious. If she is truly the mother, the motherhood is on trial. Why should a Christian want to convert a Hindu to Christianity and vice versa? Why should he not be satisfied if the Hindu is a good or godly man?"<sup>3</sup>

"I believe that there is no such thing as conversion from one faith to another in the accepted sense of the term. It is a highly personal matter for the individual and his God. I may not have any design upon my neighbour as to his faith which I must honour even as I honour my own. For I regard all the great religions of the world as true at any rate for the people professing them as mine is true for me. Having reverently studied the scriptures of the world, I have no difficulty in perceiving the beauties in all of them. I could

*Gandhi on Conversion*

no more think of asking a Christian or a Musalman or a Parsi or a Jew to change his faith than I would think of changing my own"<sup>4</sup>

Gandhi considers it a travesty of true religion to believe that one's own religion is the only true one.

According to him : given that all the great religions of the world are equally true, and none of them is the only true one; what is wanted is a friendly contact among their followers, rather than a clash when the followers of any of them are trying to show their own religion to be the only true one.

3. Gandhi maintains that missionaries should render their humanitarian service selflessly, without the ulterior motive of conversion. To do so with that motive is not really to render service, but to do bargaining or business. It also rouses suspicion and hostility among people.

"I hold that proselytizing under the cloak of humanitarian work is, to say the least, unhealthy. It is most certainly resented by the people here. Religion after all is a deeply personal matter, it touches the heart. Why should I change my religion because a doctor who professes Christianity as his religion has cured me of some disease or why should the doctor expect or suggest such a change whilst I am under his influence ? Is not medical relief its own reward and satisfaction? Or why should I, whilst I am in a missionary educational institution, have Cristian teaching thrust upon me ? In my opinion these practices are not uplifting and give rise to suspicion if not even secret hostility. The methods of conversion must be like Ceasar's wife above suspicion"<sup>5</sup>

"I have not had the time or desire to evangellize," one of them (one of the missionary interlocutors)<sup>6</sup> said, "The Church at home would be happy if through our hospital more people would be led to Christian lives."

"But whilst you give medical help you expect the reward in the shape of your patients becoming Christian."

"Yes, the reward is expected. Otherwise there are many other places in the world which need our service. But instead of going there, we come here."

"There is the kink. At the back of your mind there is not pure service for its sake, but the result of service in the shape of many people coming to Christian fold."

"In my work there is no ulterior motive. I care for people. I alleviate pain, because I cannot do otherwise. The source of this is my loyalty to Jesus who ministered to suffering humanity. At the back of my mind there is, I admit, the desire that people may find the same joy in Jesus that I find. Where is the kink?"

The kink is in the Church thinking that there are people in whom certain things are lacking and that you must supply them whether they want them or not. If you simply say to your patients, 'you have taken the medicine I gave you. Thank god. He has healed you. Don't come again, you have done your duty. But if you also say, 'how nice it would be if you had the same faith in Christianity as I have,' you do not make of your medicine a free gift.'

4. According to Gandhi, if a person lives his faith, rather than preach it, there will be no need of conversion in the sense in which it is normally understood. Then this faith will spread its aroma like a rose spreads its scent. And there will also not be any distrust, suspicion, jealousy, or dissensions.

"Life is its own expression. I take the simile of the rose I used years ago. The rose does not need to write a book or deliver a sermon on the scent it sheds all round, nor on the beauty which everyone who has eyes can see. Well, spiritual life is infinitely superior to the beautiful and fragrant rose, and I make bold to say that the moment there is a spiritual expression in life, the surroundings will readily respond. There are passages in the Bible, the Gita, the *Bhagvata*, the Koran, which eloquently show this. "Wherever", we read, "Krishna appeared, people acted like those possessed." The same thing about Jesus."

"I say that we do not need to proselytize or do *shuddhi* or *tabligh* through our speech or writing. We can only do it really with our lives. Let them be open books for all to study. Would that I could persuade the missionary friends to take this view of their mission. Then there will be no distrust, no suspicion, no jealousy and no dissensions."

"I have ventured at several missionary meetings to tell English and American missionaries that if they could have refrained from 'telling' India about Christ and had merely lived the life enjoined upon them by the

*Gandhi on Conversion*

sermon on the Mount, India, instead of suspecting them, would have appreciated their living in the midst of her children and directly profited by their presence, Holding this view, I can 'tell' American friends nothing about 'Hinduism' by way of 'return'. I do not believe in telling others of their faith, especially with a view to conversion. Faith does not admit of telling. It has to be lived and then it becomes selfpropagating.<sup>10</sup>

5. Gandhi maintains that one should not prevent a person from leaving his religion, even if he does so for the wrong reason. And one should not keep him from his doing so, by material inducement. What one should rather do is to remedy the cause for which he is leaving his religion.

"Ever since Dr. Ambedkar has thrown his bombshell in the midst of Hindu society in the shape of threatened conversion, frantic efforts have been made to wean him from the proposed step. Dr. Ambedkar's threat has had its repercussions on Harijans too, who are at all literate and are able to read newspapers. They have begun to approach Hindu institutions or reformers with a demand for posts, scholarships, or the like, accompanying it with the statement that the writer might, in the event of refusal, be obliged to change to another faith, aid having been offered on behalf of the representatives of that faith.

"Without a doubt these threats are a portent and a matter of grave concern to those who care at all for the religion of their forefathers. But it will not be served by coming to terms with those who have lost faith in Hinduism or for that matter in any religion. Religion is not matter of barter. It is a matter for every individual to decide for himself to which faith he will belong. It does not lend itself to purchase in any shape or form. Or if such an expression can be used in connection with things of the spirit, religion, can only be purchased with one's own blood. If, therefore, any Harijan wants to give up Hinduism, he should be entirely free to do so.

"There must be a searching of heart for the reformer. Has his practice or that of his neighbour's caused the defection? If it has and it is found to be improper, it must be changed."

Further, Gandhi maintains that there is a need to reconvert a person who has gone over to some other religion, who now repents his having done so. He comes to belong to his original faith by that very act of

repentance.

"I would... unhesitatingly readmit to the Hindu fold all such repentants without ado, certainly without any *shuddhi*. *Shuddhi* is not applicable to such cases. And, as I believe in the equality of all the great religions of the earth, I regard no man as polluted because he has forsaken the branch on which he was sitting and gone over to another of the same tree. If he comes back to the original branch, he deserves to be welcomed and not told that he has committed a sin by reason of his having forsaken the family to which he belonged. In so far as he may be deemed to have erred; he has sufficiently purged himself of it when he repents of the error and retraces his step."<sup>12</sup>

6. I would now like to make some observations relating to the various things which Gandhi says about conversion. These observations correspond in their order, to these various things.

(1) One would like to think that conversion really means internal change. If this is so, then conversion in the sense in which it is normally understood. i.e., as formal affiliation of a person to a different faith brought about by one means or another, will be no more than adding a number to the members belonging to that faith. It will obviously not mean somebody coming to belong to that faith in the real sense of that term.

(2) I would not like to go here into the following contentions: Whether all religions are equally true; or whether some religions are true and some false; or whether some religions are more true than others. I would also not like to go here into the question about how, if at all, the truth of religion is to be established. Gandhi mentions three criteria for determining true religion, namely : (a) is it consistent with truth ?; (b) is it consistent with non-violence? ; and (c) is it consistent with reason, where reason is possible?<sup>13</sup> I would leave them undiscussed.

What I would like to do here is to make two remarks, which Gandhi himself makes and which enormous number of other people are bound to have made also. (i) The claim that one's own religion is the only true religion over reaches human capacity, i.e. it assumes that human beings have a degree of knowledge and infallibility which they are not actually found to have. (ii) It causes resistance amongst adherents of some other

*Gandhi on Conversion*

religion or religions who may make the same or a similar claim, and generates conflict amongst the sides concerned. One can safely say that one cannot maintain that one's religion is one of peace and good will and brotherhood, and at the same time maintain that one's religion is the only true religion. One can also safely say that a good deal of conflict in this world is a result of religious dogmatism involved in the given claim.

(3) (i) If service is a selfless undertaking, i.e., if it is to selflessly work for the good of other people, and (ii) if business is to do one thing or another with a view to or in expectation of an extraneous reward, as Gandhi himself could be said to clearly imply in what he says; then he is evidently right in maintaining that the humanitarian service which the missionaries render, not selflessly but with the motive of conversion, is not service proper but business, whatever its other merits may be. He is also right in maintaining that this service as so rendered arouses suspicion and hostility among people.

(4) A person may belong to a certain faith. While doing so : (i) he may not live in accordance with this faith, (ii) he may live in accordance with the opposite of this faith; (iii) he may not live in accordance with this faith, or he may live in accordance with the opposite of this faith, but he may still preach it; or (iv) he may live in accordance with this faith. Now, as far as the first three alternatives are concerned, we may take it that this person would be an object of our moral censure, more or less. But we find that all these things need not stand in the way of his converting somebody to this faith in the sense in which conversion is normally understood, through fear or fraud or material inducement. Further, as far as the fourth alternative is concerned, we may take it that this person may inspire greater or less respect for him in some or many people. We may also take it that he may inspire some or many people to live like him to some extent. But it is difficult to say, as Gandhi does, that he will spread his aroma in that general kind of way in which a rose spreads its scent.

(5) It is a part of the freedom of an individual whether he belongs to some faith or leaves it, or whether he belongs to this faith or that faith; and he may do so for whatever reason. It would be a violation of this freedom to prevent him from doing so. Gandhi is opposed to conversion in the sense in which it is normally understood, say, by material inducement. There is just as well no wonder that he is opposed to keeping a person from

conversion in that sense by the same means. Gandhi is right in saying that people who would not like the members of their faith to leave it should remedy the cause for which they are leaving it, they should undertake an exercise in self-rectification. It is again a part of the freedom of an individual that he can come back to the faith which he had left. Gandhi's contention that a person comes back to his original faith as a result of his act of repentance and thus there is no need of reconversion, is beside the point.

## NOTES

1. Throughout the territories of the Mogul missionaries do much for the service of God by baptizing many infants (for in regard to grown persons that is an impossibility), and to be able to confer on infants this benefit it is necessary that they know the art of medicine. They must be able to cure ulcers and to bleed. They will then be in demand in many places; and when they see that the infants are at the point of death, they can sprinkle them with the water of baptism. In this way not a day would pass that they would not gain for heaven some soul or other." Niccolao Manucci's *Mogul India*, Low Price Publications, Volume III, Part III, p.187.
2. *From Yervada Mandir*, 1957, Chapters X and XI (M.K. Gandhi's *In Search of the Supreme*, Navajivan Publishing House, 1962), Volume III, p.29).
3. *Harijan*, 30.1.1937, p.406 (*In Search of the Supreme*, Volume III, p.4).
4. *Harijan*, 28.9.1935, p.260 (*In Search of the Supreme*, Volume III, p.66).
5. *Young India*, 23.4.1931, p.83. (*In Search of the Supreme*, Volume III, p.68).
6. Words within brackets my own.
7. *Harijan*, 18.7.1936, p.177 (*In Search of the Supreme*, Volume III, p.23).
8. *Harijan*, 12.12.1936, p.353 (*In Search of the Supreme*, Volume III, p.84).
9. *Young India*, 8.12.1927, p.413. (*In Search of the Supreme*, Volume III, p.85).
10. *Young India*, 20.10.1927, p.352. (*In Search of the Supreme*, Volume III, p.112).
11. *Harijan*, 21.3.1936, p.44 (*In Search of the Supreme*, Volume III, p.77).
12. *Harijan*, 25.9.1937, p.272 (*In Search of the Supreme*, Volume III, p.756).
13. *Harijan*, 6.3.1937, p.25 (*In Search of the Supreme*, Volume III, p.18).

## HINDUISM - A LEGACY IN DISPUTE : SAVARKAR AND GANDHI

BINDU PURI

Gandhi and Savarkar represented two alternative and opposed concepts of nationalism and Hinduism. Gandhi's acquaintance with Savarkar probably started around 1906 when Savarkar went to London on a scholarship from Shyamji Krishna Varma on the recommendation of Lokamanya Tilak. About the same time i.e., October 1906. Gandhi and Haji Ojer Ally were in London on a second deputation from South Africa. Arriving in London on 20 October, Gandhi and Ally were taken by Leius Ritch to stay at India House. The very next morning they met the young Indians staying at India House. It is quite probable that Gandhi met Veer Vinayak Damodar Savarkar for the first time on this occasion though there is no historical evidence of the meeting. He could definitely have met him during this period in London as he met Shyamji Krishna Varma for discussions. The second meeting for which there is historical evidence was in 1909 when Gandhi was again on a deputation from South Africa. This was immediately after the assassination of Sir Gurson Willie on 1<sup>st</sup> July 1909 By Madanlal Dhingra. Both Gandhi and Savarkar were present at a Dussehra dinner in Bayswater at Nazimuddin's Indian restaurant. The meeting marked a clash between them. A Police agent reporting the meeting recorded "24" October M.K. Gandhi of Transval presided in the dinner party and expressed disagreement with Savarkar. So he was criticized by Chatto and Savarkar."<sup>1</sup> Gandhi and Savarkar were both in Yeravda Jail in 1922. In 1927, Savarkar was in Ratnagiri on 1<sup>st</sup> March. At a public address Gandhi referred to Veer Savarkar whom he said he had known well in England and whose sacrifices and patriotism were well

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known. Savarkar invited Gandhi to his residence and this was their first meeting after nearly 18 years, i.e., after London. They discussed political problems, and the problem of shudhi. Neither was convinced of the other side. This was their last meeting.

Gandhi and Savarkar stood for alternative visions of Indianness, the Indian identity, nationalism and Hinduism. They were both strongly committed to India and Indian nationalism. The relationship was adversarial, for Savarkar stood strongly against the Gandhian programme and Gandhian ahimsa. They were both leaders representing the Hindu community albeit in totally different ways. The relationship contributed to making both of them think out their own ideologies because of the adversarial dialogue that went on between them in the field of political action. Thus Gandhi wrote *Hind Swaraj* on the voyage from London to South Africa between 13 and 22 November 1909 on board the ship Kildonan Castle. Gandhi himself made it clear in the preface to the book that it was intended to address the Indian school of violence that he had encountered in London and in South Africa.

"My countrymen, therefore, believe that they should adopt modern civilization and modern methods of violence to drive out the English, *Hind Swaraj* has been written in order to show that they were following a suicidal policy, and if they would but revert to their once glorious civilization, either the English would adopt the latter and become Indianised or find their occupation of India gone."<sup>2</sup> (*Hind Swaraj* p.7) The impact of the encounter with Savarkar and his strong ideas of militant nationalism is also seen in the letter Gandhi wrote just before leaving London to Lord Amphil (20 October, 1909). He wrote:

"Opposed as I am to violence in any shape or form, I have endeavored specially to come into contact with the so-called extremists who may be better described as the party of violence<sup>3</sup> and."

"I have practically met no one who believes that India can ever become free without resort to violence."<sup>4</sup> (p.134 HS).

For Savarkar also the relationship made him think out and articulate his own ideology in response to the Gandhian scheme. Thus, his biographer D. Keer says that he wrote "Hindutva" largely as a response to the

Gandhian ideology.<sup>5</sup>

In the context of Indian politics, it is relevant to look at and understand clearly the argument advanced by Savarkar. That argument propounds and legitimizes hindutva and gives it an institutional programme in terms of nation building. In Gandhi we have a clear alternative ideology that encounters a hostile militant hindutva, subjects it to a powerful critique and gives a philosophical and deeply spiritual interpretation of Hinduism. Gandhi then provides a critique that is internal to Hinduism and from within the discourse that the hindutva argument appropriates completely. This encounter is part of a religious and philosophical debate on the politics of Hinduism.

In this paper I shall concentrate on understanding Savarkar and the hindutva ideology. I shall further attempt a critique of the same along Gandhian lines.

To begin with, however, it will be interesting to look at the term 'Hindu'. The word "Hindu" appeared in Gaudiya Vaisnava texts of the 16th century. It was at that point used primarily to distinguish the "natives" from Muslims as foreigners.<sup>6</sup> The term ; 'Hindu dharma' also appeared in several early Bengali texts.<sup>7</sup> Yet it was not then felt necessary to articulate its precise implications. In the indigenous discourse then the Hindu was self evidently different in terms of his religious beliefs and cultural, social and linguistic characteristics. The connection between 'Hindu' and 'Indian' is also important. It is fairly well documented that Hindu as a general label for things Indian goes back to remote antiquity.<sup>8</sup> Savarkar, made a distinction between 'Hinduism' and 'hindutva'. He introduced into the centuries old tradition of discourse around the word 'hindu' the new world 'hindutva'. Savarkar said that hindutva was broader than Hinduism, which related to the religious system of the Hindus, their theology and dogma. Hindutva was far more complex and comprehensive. It referred not only to the religious aspect of the Hindus but also to their cultural, social, political and linguistic aspects. Thus Savarkar declared "Let Hinduism concern itself with the salvation of life after death, the concept of god and the universe. Let individuals be free to form opinions about the trio. The whole universe from one end to the other is the real book of religion. But so far as the materialistic and secular aspect is concerned,

the Hindus are a nation bound by a common culture, a common history, a common language, a common country and a common religion.”<sup>9</sup> For Savarkar then, the secular cultural, linguistic, historical, elements that bind the Hindus constituted hindutva as “hinduhood” or the hindu identity.

It stressed the fact that historical, cultural, linguistic factors that form the custom and belief framework and the cultural linguistic context of a religious identity are definitive of that identity and essential for the survival of that identity. This factor was, it should be noted, equally important to Gandhi.

Of the two, Hinduism was clearly seen to be dependent on the cultural linguistic factors. Yet the relationship of the latter to Hinduism as the God-universe-Salvation trio was not clearly seen.

Religion is one part of hindutva not the only, main or dominant part. The other factors in the complex are equally important. They are so important that Hinduism would be lost without them. Yet, while religion i.e. Hinduism could be a intensely private reading of, and , reflection on, the God-Universe-Salvation trio and confined to the religious spiritual space, hindutva was not private but a public reality. A shared commonality that existed in and by its public person.

These reflections should help in understanding hindutva nationalism and the concept of Indianness, the Indian identity, advanced by Savarkar. Savarkar had a clear cut and well defined political ideology, which represented his reflections on Hinduism, the composite Hindu identity and the Hindu nation.

Savarkar in his definition of Indianness and the Hindu nation uses a historical argument For him :

“Every person is a Hindu who regards and owns this Bharat Bhoomi, this land from the Indus to the seas, as his fatherland and Holy land, the land of the origin of his religion and the cradle of his faith”.<sup>10</sup>

According to this definition the term ‘Hindu’ covers, the followers of Vedism as well as Buddhism, Sikhism and all the tribal religions. Hinduism, itself is only a derivative and a small part of Hindutva. Hindutva, for Savarkar is not particularly theocratic, a religious dogma or a creed. It embraces all the departments of thought and activity of the whole being of

the Hindu "race". This, explains Savarkar's, definition of "Hindu" as including Buddhist etc. for they all- (i) share a common allegiance to Bharat as their Motherland and ; (ii) all acknowledge Bharat as their Holyland and the birth place of their religion.

Though their specific religious beliefs may not accord with the systems of orthodox Hindu thought they are all bound together by Hindutva. What is important here is that those who are not Hindus on the above two counts, according to Savarkar, cannot have a total commitment to Bharat Bhoomi as their religious allegiance would go beyond her frontiers.

Savarkar argues from here that by virtue of their commonality, their Hindutva, the Hindus constituted a nation. All tests that go to demonstrate a common country: race, religion, language entitle the Hindus to form a nation, 'Hindudom'.

"The ancient and the modern history of the Hindus are common. They have friends and enemies in common. They have faced common dangers and won victories in common. One in national despair and one in national hope, the Hindus by an admirable process through assimilation, elimination and consolidation are welded together during the aeons of a common life and common habitat."<sup>11</sup>

Further, for Savarkar this Hindu nationalism is exclusive and belongs only to the Hindus and no other community in India. Territorial occupation, even acceptance of India as a motherland is not enough. Communities which cannot give an allegiance to India as the source of their religion, their Holyland cannot make the Indian nation as, the center of religious commitment is external to the country of one's birth. The political commitment itself becomes divided and somehow incomplete. In terms of Savarkar's arguments . the history of the Hindu race legitimizes their claim to the Hindu/Indian Nation. Other communities which do not share the history of the race and furthermore allegiance to an external and alien religion, to that extent, cannot be part of the social cultural fabric of Hindutva and the Hindu Nation. The political commitment for Savarkar must be coincident with a religious commitment. The Nation must be seen as the source of one's religion. However the way in which religion and politics interact here is very different from the Gandhian conception. That difference

stemmed from Savarkar's understanding of Hindu religion. He saw Hinduism as necessarily grounded in a particular socio linguistic cultural historical framework of beliefs and practices i.e. Hindutva. History legitimised the rightful equation between Hindu and Indian, the Hindu Nation was really the Indian nation. The political sphere of national life then is the sphere to enact out a complete commitment to the hindutva legacy.

The legitimacy of the exclusivity of the Hindu-Indian equation derives from history. Further history if gone back far enough into, shows that the Hindus alone constitute a nation in India and the other people were communities and numerically minorities. The argument from history is further strengthened by Savarkar's belief that those whose religious commitment is external to the country of their birth, cannot owe an exclusive commitment to that nation and are not on that count genuine claimants to the nation. This argument about legitimate nationhood and legitimate claim based on genuine allegiance to that nation given the historical context, was particularly relevant to the Muslims. Thus for Savarkar the Muslims who owe allegiance to an external Holy land could not have the right to be genuine claimants to the Indian Nation. Since that right was, first, denied to them by history, and secondly, denied to them as they did not have the requisite political religious cultural commitment to the Hindu/Indian Nation. Savarkar said,

"Muslims in general and the Indian Muslims in particular have not yet grown out of the historical stage, of intense religiosity and the theological concepts of state. Their theological politics divide the human world into two groups only-the Muslim land and the enemy land. All lands which are either inhabited entirely by the Muslims or ruled over by the Muslims are Muslim lands. To any other land no faithful Muslim is allowed to bear any loyalty." <sup>12</sup>

"But the Muslims remained Muslims first and Muslims last and Indians never !" <sup>13</sup>

Thus the Indian nation was a Hindu nation. The argument from history depended crucially on going back far enough to look for the genuine claimants to the nation. The more recent history for example of the Muslims in India could not legitimize their nationhood. Savarkar then made the

distinction between the Indian Nation and the Indian State. Though the Indian nation was legitimately equivalent to the Hindu nation, Savarkar believed that the Hindus could form a political state with other minorities.

"Congress committed the serious mistake at its very start of overlooking this fundamental social and political principle that in the formation of nations, religious, racial, cultural and historical affinities count immensely more than their territorial unity."<sup>14</sup>

To answer the charge that such an exclusive concept of nationalism, as in, Hindu nationalism, was parochial, Savarkar's argument was that, that was the case because in essence all nationalism and patriotism was parochial and communal. Nationalism in fact proceeded by demarcating the other and asserting the rights of a particular nation. "Why are you an Indian patriot and not an Abyssinian one, and go there and fight for their freedom. Some Englishmen born in this territory are and may continue to be Indians. can therefore the overlordship of these Anglo-Indians be a Swaraj to the Hindus ?"<sup>15</sup>

Savarkar's defense of the exclusive hindutva nationalism is very clear. He maintains that the Indian nationalism as resisting the British is itself parochial and communal. If it can be considered legitimate in its exclusivity to the Indians; why should Hindu nationalism be illegitimate on the same charge? The world commonwealth was a good but distant ideal and in the meanwhile the survival of the fittest nations was the rule. The Hindus had to defend their Hindu nation to survive as a cultural and political unit. Savarkar warned them; Therefore, before you make out a case for unity you must make out a case for survival as a national or social unit.<sup>16</sup> The ground realities presented the world in which conflicts between nations and communities were endemic and inevitable. Therefore for Savarkar liberal humanism and its all embracing universalism were acceptable as distant ideals, while the moment demanded the aggressive defense of one's own nation, religion and culture.

This defensive nationalism was basically supported along three different lines- practical, ethical and religious. How ever the three arguments were not clearly differentiated. Practically Savarkar entreated the hindus to survive. "As long as every other 'ism' has not disowned its special

dogmas, whichever tend into dangerous war cries, so long no cultural or rational unit can afford to loosen the bonds, especially those of a common name and a common banner that are the mighty sources of organic cohesion and strength."<sup>17</sup>

This fight for survival was also ethically justifiable since it was for Savarkar purely a defense of legitimate hindutva nationalism. The legitimacy of the Hindu claim already having been established. For Savarkar as long as a nation tries to defend its legitimate just, and fundamental rights against the overbearing aggression of other human aggregates and does not infringe upon the equal and just rights of others, it is ethically acceptable. Witness the following passage; "Therefore, ye, O Hindus consolidate and strengthen Hindu Nationality, not to give wanton offense to any of our non-hindu compatriots in fact to any one in the world but in just and urgent self-defense of our race and land, to render it impossible for others to betray her or to subject her to unprovoked attacks by any of those pan-isms that are struggling from continent to continent"<sup>18</sup>

Defensive hindutva nationalism, is not just a matter of the practical survival of the hindu race, and the hindu identity but it is backed by moral and religious force. The ethical and religious arguments internal to the hindutva ideology are crucially important or they give the movement the character of a crusade for justice and God. The internal acceptance of this religious and moral confidence is completely non-hesitant. The ideology is not theoretically open to a critique from within Hinduism itself whose religious authority it completely appropriates.

Savarkar's argument for hindutva gives it the character of a fight for justice, for legitimate rights, and for the good. It becomes for him a matter of righteousness. The "ethical" again needs to be expanded. It is not enough simply to say that ethical language is part of the hindutva nationalist discourse. Freedom to flourish is the need of the motherland, the race, the culture and the religion. without freedom to have evolution and development, hindutva will be lost. And Hinduism which is so bound up with and crucially dependent on hindutva, will disintegrate. Thus Savarkar can speak of defensive hindutva in terms of moral duties. The language of moral duties, righteousness, are applicable to this discourse.

*Hinduism- A Legacy in Dispute : Savarkar and Gandhi*

The religious and moral arguments are mixed up to give the politics of hindutva the character of a religious and moral crusade. The crusade is supported by an extravagant use of religious historical symbolism. The epics become religious history and Rama and Krishna are the heroes all providing powerful arguments to strengthen the hindutva argument. In Savarkar then there is a reading of history and if religious texts to draw support for the defensive hindu nationalism. The epics like *Ramayana* and *Mahabharata* offer power precursors in terms of the hindus waging righteous wars. The whole concept of a righteous war was used to translate the politics of establishing the hindutva social cultural linguistic mileau, into a self righteous just and religious war.

"If ever I deemed it legitimate to have recourse to the exceptional and severe rules of emergency, it was only because duty led me and my generation into circumstances so abnormal and urgent as to render them indispensable in the interest of righteousness itself." <sup>19</sup>

Very interesting in this connection is the poem Savarkar wrote in jail in 1922.

"Even so this our motherland  
craving the assistance  
of the Lord that she too be rescued from the crocodile.  
Cultures of bondage, enters our garden plucks a fresh flower  
from the bough and offers it at his feet in worship." <sup>20</sup>

Here the identification of God and Hindu nation is complete. God and Bharat Mata have a coincident aim and welfare. So hindutva is not a political programme alone. It is a fight for justice, demanded by the religious commitment to Hindusim. It is indeed as if the gods are restless without the hindutva social-cultural-linguistic custom and belief framework, and crave the establishment of the Hindu nation or Indian State.

The transition to militancy and the advocacy of violence from the above reasoning is not too difficult since all moral, religious, political authority, rests exclusively with the Hindus, the supremely worthwhile 'end' of establishing hindutva justifies all means. Militancy, and violence, are therefore justified. There are certain factors here,

- (1) For Savarkar the practical, ethical, and religious justification, of the hindu nation argument, translates in the language of morals into a universal moral blueprint.
- (2) Consequently, the all-embracing goal of the religious, moral and political life of the hindu identity is itself sufficient justification for the employment of any means.
- (3) The means are not morally indifferent but assertions of Kshatriya hood and sacred actions in defense of religion and morality.

The translation of the hindutva ideology in the field of political action, leads to an advocacy of violence, militancy and revolution. This translation becomes very significant. The argument uses history to legitimize the Hindu nation claim, clarifies the content of Hinduism as having the very important hindutva framework. It then uses a complex three-tier justification of hindutva and Hindu nation: practical, moral and religious. Thereafter this all-embracing universal moral blueprint becomes the significant legitimization of hindu militancy. With Savarkar and after Savarkar the argument is obviously very significant:

1. Historically this ideology provided commitment and zeal to Hindu youth during the pre-independence days. This led to murders, assassinations etc.
2. The *Gita*, *Ramayana* etc. were said to be precursors in the Indian tradition. Through terrorism, and militancy could not be said to be part of the traditional Hindu thought, these texts were seen as legitimizing the notion of a war for righteousness or dharma.
3. What is more interesting is that Hinduism and Hindu history is completely appropriated and yet the Hindu militancy argument is not subjected to a reflection and criticism with the Hindu tradition itself. The means are sacred as means, which serve the end of hindutva. Yet hindutva represents, in fact, appropriates Hinduism. Hinduism though bound up with a cultural social political milieu, does yet stand for a complex network of religious beliefs as well as allegiance to certain purusarthas. Again, Jainism, Buddhism as well as orthodox systems of Hindu philosophy, locate the moral life with certain virtues like asteya, ahimsa, aparigraha, satya and

*Hinduism- A Legacy in Dispute : Savarkar and Gandhi*

brahmacarya. A critique is therefore available within tradition itself and it is in this context that the Gandhi-Savarkar relationship becomes so significant. It is also especially relevant, given the politics of present day Hinduism. A self criticism of method and chosen end, is not admitted theoretically or practically by Savarkar's hindutva ideology even in terms of principles internal to Hinduism, which it appropriates completely.

4. The hindutva appropriation also seems to be completely unmindful of the complexity of the Hindu tradition. At one level it overlooks the internal problem within the Hindu identity, and at another deeper level it fails to see different kinds of spiritual relationships that are possible within the self same Hindu framework. To look here at the surface level itself: Revolution and militancy are not permitted to dissensions within the Hindu identity itself. So Savarkar maintains with confidence that : "the moment the foreign power is destroyed, in order to guard the country from the evils of anarchy, a constitution liked by the majority of the people should be at once established and that constitution should be obeyed with reverence by all. In short, the rule should be revolution outside and law within"<sup>21</sup>

However Savarkar disregards the possibility that the self same hindutva programme and legitimization can also be used internally by separate identities within hindutva framework, to then, fight that framework from within. The hindutva legitimization of militancy and violence can surely be used with the same moral and spiritual confidence by smaller internal groups. Savarkar fails to see the absence of self contained spaces in the moral life. Moral life and norms are not exclusive to moments and identities. There cannot really be a moral justification of militancy for one particular identity which is exclusive to it and none else. Nor is morality confined to the ends and not to the means used.

The problem with Savarkar and his hindutva argument is a misappropriation of the moral argument. In his argument from justice Savarkar sees justice as belonging exclusively to the Hindu cause. Savarkar thus understands hindutva in the sense of Indian undivided state and Hindu nation as a just and righteous end. The ethical argument needs to be at the very least, evaluated. Savarkar speaks strongly of fighting a just war and

so on. and thus appeals to the oral instinct of the masses. Therefore it is important to understand the strength of his and the hindutva moral claim. Justice is certainly central to morality. However "Justice" must be seen not only in the sense that my assessment of human situations and my fellow human beings must be capable of being justified- but also, more importantly, that my perception and assessment of the other must do justice to him. A necessary condition for ensuring justice is that I remove all traces of ego from my perception and assessment. Thus it is that the Gandhian ideas of truth and of ahimsa (taken from the same Hindu tradition) become central to an adequate conception of the moral life. These ideas can be read as related to moral episteme: real or genuine knowledge of the other and of the self. The central idea here is of the conquest of deception rather of self-deception. Once self-deception is removed by the conquest of the powerful ego centered framework, man can be in touch with the truth of his being. Deception involves distorting one's own reality as well as that of the other.

In terms of real or genuine knowledge of oneself and of the other, of developing the capacity to attempt to do justice to the hostile other i.e. to live the moral life, Gandhian ahimsa becomes relevant. The first and the major step in the overcoming of the ego is the practice of ahimsa in Gandhi's sense of the term. Ahimsa is frequently taken to mean "non-violence". A more accurate translation of the word would be 'non-injury'. The practice of non-injury involves abstaining from physical injury as well as injury to the soul; as we might say genuine ahimsa is incompatible with the demands of the ego. To use a person only as a means is to do him a moral injury. The way of ahimsa is the way of the gradual overcoming of the ego and therefore the achievement of the truth of being. "It may entail continuous suffering and the cultivation of endless patience. Thus, step-by-step we learn to make friends with the entire world; we realise the greatness of god or truth. Our peace of mind increases in spite of suffering. We become braver and more enterprising; we understand more clearly the difference between what is everlasting and what is not. Our pride melts away, and we become humble. Our worldly attachments diminish and so does the evil within us from day-to-day."<sup>22</sup> Ahimsa and truth are thus very important to the concept of justice as central to the moral life. In this context the

*Hinduism- A Legacy in Dispute : Savarkar and Gandhi*

Gandhian critique of Hindu militancy and terrorism, particularly in *Hind Swaraj* becomes very relevant. Gandhi tries therein to point out the lacuna in the moral stance adopted by the terrorists.

"Do you not tremble to think of freeing India by assassination. What we need to do is kill ourselves. It is a cowardly thought, that of killing others. Those who will rise to power by murders will certainly not make the nation happy." <sup>23</sup>

The whole notion of 'swaraj' as self rule, control of the ego by ahimsa and truth is relevant to the above argument. Gandhi speaks of 'swaraj' as moral self-rule which is true freedom. Gandhian swaraj is about self-control, ego-control and about the self-denial, fearlessness and the self-discipline it involves. In short it is nothing if not the moral enterprise itself. This inward freedom is according to Gandhi the condition of political freedom. His stance against the militant terrorist movement then involves a moral argument.

That argument points out the lack of understanding of the moral life on the part of militant ideology. He sees their adoption of the just and moral stance as problematic in its complete disregard for genuine understanding of the other, for doing justice to the other's reality, for attempting to reach political freedom. Gandhi was able to see that despite pretensions to a morally upright position Savarkarian ideology was not from within an authentic moral life. Thus Gandhi says in *Hind Swaraj* ;

"It is swaraj when we learn to rule ourselves." <sup>24</sup>

Another problem with Savarkar's adoption of the moral stance for Hindutva and militancy is that it sees the moral life as fragmented and mechanical. For Savarkar, noble ideals are good as ideals while ground realities dictate practical i.e. militant terms. Ends need to be ethically upright and the means adopted become sacred in their moral light. In other words the moral life functions in mechanical and fragmented ways. There are moral and practical spaces, it is morally possible to separate ends from means adopted. Savarkar thus missed the idea of the moral life as permeated by a sense of dynamic unity. The moral life is one whose motivating force is the virtues; it is also a life that is free from self-deception; and it is truth that gathers the virtues into the vital unity of the moral life, while it is

ahimsa as love that is the surest way to truth. This makes it possible to understand moral life as non-fragmented and pervasive. It is then not possible to restrict morality to ends or ideals. To so restrict the moral life is to disrupt its dynamic unity and harmonious exercise of virtues, and therefore, to destroy the moral motive altogether. Gandhi tried to make the latter point in *Hind Swaraj* where he stressed the problematic at the heart of the militant distinction of end and means adopted.

"Your belief that there is no connection between the means and the end is a great mistake. Through that mistake even men who have been considered religious have committed grievous crime."<sup>25</sup>

"The means may be likened to a seed, the end to a tree and there is just the same inviolable connection between the means and the end as there is between the seed and the tree."<sup>26</sup>

Related to the above moral problematic at the heart of Savarkar's vision, is also the complete epistemic confidence from which Savarkar uses his argument about justice, righteousness and duty. There is no consciousness of the complexity of moral life, of the possibility of being mistaken. Basically, there is no space for moral indeterminacy. The last meeting of Gandhi and Savarkar is really interesting on this point. It appears that when Gandhi was leaving, he said to Savarkar : "It is clear that we disagree on some problems. But I hope you have no objection to my making experiments". Savarkar replied in a moment. "You know the story of the boys and frogs. You will be making the experiment at the cost of nation".<sup>27</sup> Thus, it is that Savarkar's justification for violence, revolution, militancy, and assassinations makes use of this hindutva ideology with frightening and confident disregard for other ways of being. The enterprise of moral episteme, real knowledge of the other from outside one's own scheme is not even attempted. So this militant defensive Hindu nationalism is inherently incapable of doing justice to the other.

Yet, it is avowedly fighting for justice all the time. In "The Indian War of Independence of 1857" for e.g. Savarkar maintains, "But so long that divine age has not arrived, so long as the highly auspicious end remains only in the lines of saintly poets and in the prophecies of the divinely inspired, and so long as even to make that state of human justice possible,

*Hinduism- A Legacy in Dispute : Savarkar and Gandhi*

the human mind has to be busy eradicating sinful and aggressive tendencies, so long rebellion, bloodshed and revenge cannot be purely sinful: ”<sup>28</sup>

He proceeded : “And when justice uses these terrible means for her salvation, the blame of it does not lie, on justice but on the preceding cruel injustice, the power and insolence of which called forth the means. We do not hold the justice which gives the death sentence responsible for bloodshed, but rather the injustice which is taken to the gallows. ”<sup>29</sup>

The moral epistemic confidence involved here is therefore completely unaware of indeterminacy in *human-and-moral* knowledge situations. The justice involved is itself incapable by definition of doing justice to the other. It is a justice of revenge and bloodshed and translates into injustice. The moral argument thus fails to hold and its adoption by Savarkar’s militant stance is problematic.

The adoption of the argument for justice along with the spiritual call of god, makes the appeal of the ideology frightening. Frightening because of its complete moral religious and epistemic confidence, frightening because it’s call for justice, has injustice as its major motivator. Frightening again because of the elaborate deception involved here; self-deception in the appropriation of the morally upright stance with complete disregard for the other - whether British, Muslim or Hindu. Given that this disregard is practical, political, moral and academic, it becomes frightening indeed.

Savarkar himself was a supporter of modern science and civilization and wanted to model India after the Western mode; witness for e.g. the letter he writes to his brother from the Andamans;

“The Americans need Vedanta philosophy and so does England, for they have developed their life to that fullness, richness and manliness to Kshatryahood and so stand on the threshold of Brahminhood wherein alone the capacity to read and realize such philosophy can co-exist. ”<sup>30</sup>

The India that Savarkar envisaged, the goal of hindutva, defensive Hindu nationalism’ would therefore be one closely modelled along modern Western lines. He basically envisaged a democratic state based on one man one vote where minorities could live with equal rights. Hindustan would remain one undivided state. Science would lead to material progress and there would be the spread of modern rational scientific temper.

However in the Indian state the Hindus would constitute the majority group. The Indian state would still remain primarily the Hindu nation. Though the majority would be just and fair, yet they would not allow themselves to be exploited by minorities.

"Thirty crores of people with India for their basis of operation, for their Fatherland and Holy land, with such a history behind them, bound together by ties of a common blood and common culture can dictate terms to the whole world. A day will come when mankind will have to face the force. Equally certain it is that whenever the Hindus come to hold such a position whence they could dictate terms those terms cannot be very different from the terms which the Geeta dictates or the Buddha lays down. A Hindu is most intensely so when he ceases to be a Hindu, and with a Shankar claims the whole earth for a Benares -Varanasi, Medini. Or with a Tukaran exclaims ; my country Oh brothers the limits of the universe- there the frontiers of my country lie."<sup>31</sup>

What then does Savarkar's position about hindutva amount to ? The India of Savarkar vision is a modern state. Such a state would be committed to defensive Hindu nationalism in order to safeguard the identity of the Hindu community. However given the distinction between Hinduism and hindutva basically the defensive Hindu nationalism would be committed to safeguarding the Hindu culture, language, history, politics etc. The hindutva programme as envisaged by Savarkar would involve an aggressive defense of the hindutva identity. That identity defined in terms of certain socio-cultural linguistic elements; the definition itself being internal to the hindutva programme.

Moreover the interesting philosophical issue here is, to my mind, how this agenda would promote hinduism. What for Savarkar is the relation between the use of Sanskrit and Hindi, the Hindu culture and social norms, the vigorous participation in Shivaji and Ganesh festivals, and Hinduism? For Gandhi as well as for Savarkar the socio-linguistic cultural framework of a religion was crucial to the religious identity. However for Savarkar the secular and socio-linguistic cultural elements that accompanied Hinduism and constituted hindutva were the all important and the only ideological programme. Hinduism, as in, the specifically religious beliefs, would take

care of themselves once hindutva was actualized. For then, Hindus would be truly Hindu and, "cease to be Hindus" attain a sense of Vedantic oneness.

If Hindus are indeed Hindu when they attain a vision of Vedantic oneness with all of humanity according to Savarkar, one fails to understand, how such Hinduism could be actualized by the defensive Hindu nationalism of aggressively assuming the dominant role. The dominant role model would necessarily be one where the Hindus would demonstrate strength and majority power. Issues here would be a display of religious power by the use of religious symbolism the vigorous revival of Shivaji and Ganesh festivals (in Savarkar's times) to e.g. display strength and to keep the minorities in their place.

Yet this kind of hindutva would not strengthen the specifically religious core or make the Hindus "cease to be Hindus". On the contrary it would if anything, entrench them firmly in exclusivity. It would far from taking them to Sankara, Buddha, or the Geeta's vision, entrench them in power displays and symbolism of control.

I see here the crucial problem with Savarkar's hindutva ideology and its understanding of Hinduism. An aggressive defensive hindutva would not be able to actualize a Hindu vision which participated in Vedantic oneness.

Savarkar's hindutva ideology builds up a legitimizing argument from history, nationalism to the dominant Hindu majority being the true claimants, to the Hindu nation. The Hindus would then be in a position to dictate terms. Savarkar then claims that such terms would be non-exclusive open and one informed by a vision of oneness. Coupled with defensive Hindu nationalism the state hindutva envisages is an aggressive defensive military state enlightened by modern science and technology. How can this kind of institutional framework coupled with an aggressive espousal of Hindu symbolism, make Hindus truly Hindus in Savarkar's sense? A modern state and society totally secular as far as specifically religious beliefs are concerned which would develop rational scientific temper in place of religiosity. Yet, in terms of material and secular spaces such a state would be non-secular sectarian and decidedly Hindu. It would then ideologically work to a state of affairs where Hinduism would be replaced by enlightened rational modern scientific temper and hindutva would be aggressively

established. The hindutva ideology theoretically suffers from this serious lacuna. Its distinction of Hinduism and hindutva disperses hinduism and espouses hindutva. A commitment to hindutva gathers strength- following from the specifically religious argument- yet it only pretends to be a religious movement, ideologically it is clearly a cultural, linguistic social and political movement. Yet this clarity is not given even to a thinker like Savarkar who assumes that Hinduism will simply happen, no matter if the means adopted work systematically at the destruction of all its specifically religious beliefs. No wonder then that the movement could lead to a Ram Mandir and no Ram.

Savarkar and his hindutva ideology was certainly correct in apprehending the difference between Hinduism and the semitic religions like Islam, Christianity and Judaism, in as much as, unlike the latter, hinduism cannot be located within any centralized body of canonical teaching. It is not associated with the sacred personage of any one founder, it developed over centuries of thought in which millions of men contributed. It is a complex network of beliefs that are specifically religious in character as also other beliefs and practices which are social in character.<sup>32</sup> The point is that Gandhi was also equally appreciative of the cultural, linguistic and social identity of the Hindus. He stressed the importance of the cultural tradition inherited from the ancestors. Yet for Gandhi the "truth-ahimsa-God" trio made up the core of Hinduism and all the other elements could be internally understood and evaluated from within an authentic religious way of life. It was the religious that breathed life into culture and society.

The problem with hindutva was then, that it failed to see the complexity of the religion-culture relationship in Hinduism. It failed to appreciate that different kinds of sustenance were drawn from the self same Hindu religious tradition and the complex question of the Hindu identity could not be simply reduced to hindutva.

#### NOTES

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## AHIMSĀ AND INDIAN SECULARISM

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### Introduction

India is a land of many religions. The vast majority of the Indians follow one of the following religions, namely, Hinduism, Islam, Buddhism, Sikhism, Jainism, Christianity, Zoroastrianism and Judaism. Over and above these, there are many distinct groups of the aborigines with their animism. Their number runs into tens of millions. The democratic Indian constitution guarantees religious freedom to all in a manner, which is impossible as things are at present to the neighbours of India like Pakistan and Nepal. India is a secular nation, although the original Indian Constitution did not explicitly designate her as being such until the forty-second amendment, which modified the Preamble.

In secular India, "Religious liberty is based not on considerations of political expediency but on the conviction of the ultimate oneness of the religious quest, however numerous the different paths which might be followed."<sup>1</sup> Our purpose in the following pages is to dwell at some length on this Indian conviction while trying to understand Gandhi's religion and his conviction that all religions are equal. However, before we take up these two topics a few observations on the multi-religious nature of the population of India seem to be necessary.

### The Religious Quest

Hinduism is the religion of by far the largest section of the Indian population. It is quite aware of the many *mārgas* or paths of liberation and *mukti*. There are within the fold *mārgas* as disparate as *jñānamārga* (the

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April 2003

path of knowledge and enlightenment), *bhktimārga* (the path of devotion), *yogamārga* (the path of *yoga* or selfcontrol and meditation), *karmamārga* (the path of duty), and so on. Even the use of the word, *fold*, has to be understood loosely, not as indicative of any central organization or unity of doctrine and ritual. Monistic Shankara has an equally dignified and revered name as the monotheistic Madhva. If Vishnu is the supreme god of the Vaishnavites, Shiva is the divinity of the Shivites. Neither of the groups may frown upon Krishna the divine *avatāra* of the *Bhagaadgtīā*, because one may say, *ēkaṃ sād vīprā bahudhā vadanti*: "The wise poets (Rṣis) call the one reality by many names."<sup>2</sup> There are innumerable gods and goddesses, who are worshipped in temples, wayside shrines, on hilltops and river-banks, on the mountains and at the lakes, in homes, and so on. The cults too vary from the most esoteric forms to those held during the most popular annual pilgrimages and festivities, which used to be performances of the altogether rare ancient Vedic *yajñas* or sacrifices in certain parts of this vast country.

Even a superficial knowledge of Buddhism will convince anyone that the *yāna* (i.e., vehicle, course, career or way<sup>3</sup>) is dual, which shows the way to *nirvāṇa*. Āśvaghoṣa and Nāgārjuna are poles apart from each other. Āśvaghoṣa's *tathatā* doctrine of the absolute, unchangeable and ultimate reality is the very opposite of Nāgārjuna's *nairātmya* doctrine or *śūnyavāda*, i.e., the doctrine of the 'essencelessness' or 'voidness' of all appearance.<sup>4</sup> The two great thinkers were contemporaries. They lived towards the end of the first century, A.D.

Jainism is at least as old as Buddhism. It agrees in the protest against the ritualistic sacrifice of the Brahminic priesthood.<sup>5</sup> *Ahimsā* (i.e., non-killing) may be said to be the fundamental ethical virtue of Jainism.<sup>6</sup> Jainism strikes a middle course between the Upaniṣadic absolutism of the ultimate reality and the absolute momentariness or the pluralism of the *śūnyavāda*. Buddhism in that it admits a kind of relative pluralism known as *syādvāda* (*syāt* means 'may be,' but adapted to mean 'somehow,' 'in a way', the second element, *vāda* means 'doctrine').<sup>7</sup> Jainism is indeed the religion of *ahimsā*, it follows the way of *ahimsā*. *Ahimsā* is the greatest duty or law: *ahimsā paramo dharmaḥ*. Together with their followers, the Jina and the Buddha struck out to find each his own distinct way of liberation from the

*Ahimsā and Indian Secularism*

cycle of sin and suffering, of transmigration and rebirth.

The advent of Islam with its strict monotheism and its political and religious dominance heightened the conflict in the hearts and minds of the people of India. We can detect clearly the inner conflict and its solution in Guru Nanak, who sang, "At God's gate there dwell thousands of Muhammeds, thousands of Brahmas, of Vishnus, of Sivas; thousands upon thousands of exalted Ramas. There is one Lord over all spiritual lords, the creator whose name is true."<sup>8</sup> Kabir, coming after Nanak, spoke in similar tones, "O servant, where doest thou seek me, Lo, I am beside thee. I am neither in Kaaba nor in Kailash: neither am I in rites and ceremonies, nor in yoga and renunciation."<sup>9</sup>

Almost a century after Nanak, at the peak of the glory of the Moghul Empire, Akhbar's Thursday discussions in the Ibadat Khana brought together Muslims and Hindus, Jains and Buddhists, Christians and Zoroastrians.<sup>10</sup> The famed chronicler, Abul Fazl, the Emperor's Jonathan. the author of *Ain-i-Akhbari*, puts the consternation in Akhbar's mind thus:

"...There gradually grew in his mind the conviction that there were sensible men in all religions, and austere thinkers and men with miraculous gifts in all nations. If some truths were thus found everywhere, why should truth be restricted to one religion or to a comparatively new creed like Islam, scarcely a thousand years old."<sup>11</sup>

Abul Fazl gave vent to his own restlessness when he wrote,

"A while I frequent the Christian cloister, anon the mosque, but Thee only I seek from fane to fane."<sup>12</sup>

However, the people living on this side of the Sindhu found themselves on an equal footing with Islam only when the imperial British became the rulers of India, thus ending over 700 years of Muslim superiority.<sup>13</sup> With the political presence of Christian England, the Muslims in India were made to feel equal with their Hindu brothers and perhaps could voice the sentiment of Mangu Khan of Peking (middle of XIII cent.), namely, "Like the five fingers of the hand are the several ways to Paradise."<sup>14</sup> But it was equality in political and cultural subjection to the ruling western Christian overlords.

Of this conflict of cultures were born men like Raja Ram Mohan Roy and Vivekananda, Mahatma Phule and Rajendra Prasad, C.

Rajagopalachari and Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, Jawaharlal Nehru and Zakir Hussain, Rabindranath Tagore and Mahatma Gandhi, and many others, who shone in the socio-political firmament.

When Ram Mohan Roy established Brahmo Samaj in the early XIX century as a church open to all for "the worship and adoration of the Eternal, Unsearchable and Immortal Being Who is the Author and Preserver of the Universe," he was in search of a universalism, which would embrace all irrespective of their religious affiliations.<sup>15</sup> The search for universalism in religion is not a search for the divine only, but it is also a search for equal dignity with the rest of mankind. It is a search for human and personal dignity and honour among the worshippers of one and the same God. India's quest for self-realization has taken a new turn. Ram Mohan declared, "Reason and conscience were henceforth to be regarded as the highest authority and the teachings of Scripture were to be accepted only in so far as they harmonized with the light within us."<sup>16</sup> In order to understand him, we have to keep in mind not only the contemporary rationalistic world of Europe, but also the multi-religious and multi-racial Indian milieu with its religious and cultural differences, disparities and conflicts.

We hear the same voice from Gandhi when he says, "I decline to be bound by any interpretation, however learned it may be, if it is repugnant to reason and moral sense."<sup>17</sup> Again he says, "Let us not deceive ourselves into belief that everything that is written in Sanskrit and printed in shastra has any binding effect upon us."<sup>18</sup> He repeated, "That which is opposed to the fundamental maxims of morality, that which is opposed to trained reason, cannot be claimed no matter how ancient it may be."<sup>19</sup> This attitude does smack of rationalism, but what is more pertinent and to the point is this Indian's search for self-realization and self-appropriation of the dignity of the human conscience.

It may fairly be concluded from the foregoing observations that the mental attitude which holds that all religions are equal is not an exclusively Hindu phenomenon, let alone exclusively Gandhian, and that it contains an implicit humanism in search of a universalism with equal and personal human dignity in spite of political, cultural and religious differences. Before we attend to Gandhi's position that all religions are equal, let us take up the prior question of his religion.

*Ahimsā and Indian Secularism***Gandhi's Religion**

It may not be altogether wrong to say that it is a common experience that the title of Gandhi's *An Autobiography or The Story of My Experiments with Truth* causes uncertainty in the minds of the readers and unleashes speculation. It is a matter of curiosity why Gandhi did not write at the top of his book "*The Story of My Experiments with Ahimsā*," or "*The Story of My Experiments with Satyagraha and Ahimsā*," or simply "*The Story of My Experiments with My Religion*." For he has said towards the end of the book,

"My uniform experience has convinced me that there is no other God than Truth. And if every page of these chapters does not proclaim to the reader that the only means for the realization of Truth is Ahimsā, I shall deem all my labour in writing these chapters to have been in vain.. But this much I can say with assurance, as a result of my experiments that a perfect vision of Truth can only follow a complete realization of Ahimsā."<sup>20</sup>

He has also said, "Satyagraha is search for Truth; and God is Truth. Ahimsā or nonviolence is the light that reveals that Truth to me."<sup>21</sup> In the context, these are religious terms: search for Truth, realization of truth, realization of God, self-realization, complete realization of Ahimsā.

"The term 'religion' I am using," Gandhi wrote in his Autobiography, "in its broadest sense meaning thereby self-realization or knowledge of self."<sup>22</sup> Religion is in the "search of God and striving for self-realization."<sup>23</sup> That is why he was confirmed in his belief that "religion and morality were synonymous."<sup>24</sup> He was convinced that "morality was the basis of things and that truth is the substance of all morality"<sup>25</sup> and that "the only means for the realization of Truth is Ahimsā."<sup>26</sup> "My love for non-violence," he said, "is superior to every other thing mundane or supramundane. It is equalled only by my love for Truth which is to me synonymous with non-violence through which and which alone I can see and reach Truth."<sup>27</sup> The discerning may discover that what is meant by Truth is not what is obviously meant by the term in the ancient Greek and the western culture. It is not the intellectual and rational appropriation of Truth, but it is closer to the appropriation of Truth according to one's moral consciousness, which is

another name for conscience as it is manifested in one's courage to be consistent between one's knowing and doing.<sup>28</sup> This is the way to the realization of Truth and self. It stands to reason, therefore, that "The experiments I am about to relate are not such [i.e., not incommunicable]. But they are spiritual, or rather moral, for the essence of religion is morality."<sup>29</sup> It is a similar thought, which is contained in the statement, "To develop the spirit is to build character and enable one to work towards a knowledge of God and self-realization."<sup>30</sup> One may ask what God's part in one's self-realization or *ātmasākṣātkāra* is. "He is no God who merely satisfies the intellect, if He ever does. God to be God must rule the heart and transform it. He must express Himself in every smallest act of His votary."<sup>31</sup>

Speaking of in the Introduction, entitled *Anasaktiyoga*, to his translation of the *Gita*, he hints at his concept of religion and self-realization thus:

"In Hinduism, incarnation is ascribed to one who has performed some extraordinary service of mankind. All embodied life is in reality an incarnation of God, but it is not usual to consider every living being an incarnation. ...And therefore he who is the most religiously behaved has most of the divine spark in him. It is in accordance with this train of thought, that Krishna enjoys, in Hinduism, the status of the most perfect incarnation.

"This belief in incarnation is a testimony of man's lofty spiritual ambition. Man is not at peace with himself till he has become like unto God. The endeavour to reach this state is the supreme, the only ambition worth having. And this is self-realization. This self-realization is the subject of the *Gñā*, as it is of all scriptures."<sup>33</sup>

Perhaps, the transformation of the heart and the moral integrity he expected to find in his christian friends, he failed to discover in them. For, he gives his evaluation as he writes, "The pious lives of Christians did not give me anything that the lives of men of other faiths had failed to give. I had seen in other lives just the same reformation that I had heard of among Christians."<sup>33</sup>

Gandhi has described above what he meant by self-realization. To let oneself be ruled in everything by God is what brings peace and self-fulfilment. Gandhi wanted to go beyond, transcend, the present mediocrity

*Ahimsā and Indian Secularism*

and be in God's presence in his daily activities. He wanted his body to be a temple of God in all his activities.<sup>34</sup> He describes the characteristics of a devotee according to *Gṇā* thus:

"He is the devotee who is jealous of none, who is fount of mercy, who is without egotism, who is selfless, who treats alike cold and heat, happiness and misery, who is ever forgiving, who is always contented, whose resolutions are firm, who has dedicated mind and soul to God, who causes no dread, who is not afraid of others, who is free from exultation, sorrow and fear, who is pure, who is versed in action and yet remains unaffected by it, who renounces all fruit, good or bad, who treats friend and foe alike, who is untouched by respect or disrespect, who is not puffed up by praise, who does not go under when people speak ill of him, who loves silence and solitude, who has a disciplined reason. Such devotion is inconsistent with the existence at the same time of strong attachments.

"We thus see that to be a real devotee is to realize oneself. Self-realization is not something apart."<sup>35</sup>

Man's highest self-realization, according to Gandhi, is through love, the love of God above all and the love and service of human beings. In other words, "man's self-realization is by self-transcendence."<sup>36</sup>

Gandhi wrote in *Young India* (12 May, 1920), elaborating his concept of religion and expressing it more precisely, as follows:

"...I have been experimenting with myself and my friends by introducing religion into politics. Let me explain what I mean by religion. It is not the Hindu religion, which I certainly prize above all other religions, but the religion which transcends Hinduism, which changes one's very nature, which binds one indissolubly to the truth within and which ever purifies. It is the permanent element in human nature which counts no cost too great in order to find full expression and which leaves the soul utterly restless until it has found itself, known its Maker and appreciated its true correspondence between the Maker and itself."<sup>37</sup>

It seems, therefore, that he was not a Hindu. However, he also asserted that "all religions are almost as dear to me as my own Hinduism"<sup>38</sup> and that "My own veneration for other faiths is the same as that for my own faith, therefore, no thought of conversion is possible."<sup>39</sup> He asked his countrymen, moreover to "remember that his own religion is the truest to every man even if it stands low in the scales of philosophical comparison."<sup>40</sup> The above sentiment is not unlike the thought of Ramakrishna Paramahansa

(born: 1834), who said, "Every man should follow his own religion. A Christian should follow Christianity, a Muhammedan should follow Muhammedanism. For Hindus, the ancient path, the path of the Aryas Rishis, is the best."<sup>41</sup> The Bhagavadgita speaks in a similar tone, "Better one's own duty, bereft of merit, than another's well-performed; better is death in the discharge of one's duty, another's duty is fraught with danger,"<sup>42</sup> And Gandhi knew his *Gṇā* very well, since he has a complete translation of the book to his credit. Besides, he claims he has a practical knowledge of its teachings unlike any other translator, for he says, "But I am not aware of the claim made by the translators of enforcing their meaning of the *Gṇā* in their own lives. At the back of my reading there is the claim of an endeavour to enforce the meaning in my own conduct for an unbroken period of forty years."<sup>43</sup> This is indeed most remarkable. He says again in the introduction to his translation, "But after forty years" unremitting endeavour fully to enforce the teaching of the *Gṇā* in my own life, I have, in all humility, felt that perfect renunciation is impossible without perfect observance of *ahimsa* in every shape and form."<sup>44</sup> The message of the *Gṇā* according to Gandhi, is contained in one word, namely, *anāśaktiyoga* (i.e., the "yoga of non-attachment").<sup>45</sup> It is the yoga of selflessness in action. This would mean that one has to be dispassionate and detached and free from all inordinate desire for personal gain, if one is in pursuit of what is truly good for oneself and for others.

Some of Gandhi's contemporaries understood him rightly. What Acharya J. B. Kripalani says about Gandhi may be considered as the summing up of the latter's world-view as culled from and developed according to the *Gṇā*:

"He also says that whenever in difficulty he had recourse to the *Gṇā* and it was the solace of his life. He held that through work, done as sacrifice, without hankering after desired results and with equanimity, one could get the *summum bonum* of life, 'salvation' or as he often said in accordance with the best thought of Hinduism, 'self-realization'. About this he says: 'Man's ultimate aim is the realization of God, and all his activities, political, social and religious, have to be guided by the ultimate aim of the vision of God.'"<sup>46</sup>

It need not be pointed out that the Bhagavadgītā is the most revered of books among the Hindus in modern times. The Ācāryas, like Shankara

*Ahimsā and Indian Secularism*

and Ramanuja, held it as such centuries ago. The common man and woman did not know it for lack of translations of the original Sanskrit text. From the above observations we may infer that Gandhi was indeed a Hindu.

The above denial and affirmation are dialectical, and they show that Gandhi was a "Hindu-with-a-difference." Let us now name the "Hinduism-with-a-difference" as Transcendental Hinduism, according to his own descriptions.<sup>47</sup> What is the chief characteristic of this qualified Hinduism? It is Non-violence or Ahimsā, which is the most important characteristic, for he says, "My religion has no geographical limits. If I have a living faith in it, it will transcend my love for India herself. My life is dedicated to service of India through the religion of non-violence which I believe to be the root of Hinduism."<sup>48</sup> He has also said, "Satyagraha is the search for Truth; and God is Truth. Ahimsā or non-violence is the light that reveals that Truth to me."<sup>49</sup>

The Ahimsā which is peculiar to Transcendental Hinduism, or Gandhian Ahimsa, is what we may correspondingly describe as "Ahimsa-with-a-difference." Gandhi contends that it is not restricted to Hinduism only when he says, "I have been asked wherefrom in Hinduism I have unearthed Ahimsa. I say that Ahimsa is in Hinduism, it is in Christianity as well as in Islam. Whether you agree with me or not, it is my bounden duty to preach what I believe to be the Truth as I see it."<sup>50</sup>

What, then, is Ahimsā? The word, *ahimsā*, comes from *a-himsā*, which means "non-killing" or "not taking any life even by mistake or unmindfulness."<sup>51</sup> The doctrine of ahimsā of *Jainayoga*

"according to a householder, according to *anubrata* (i.e., small vows), would require abstinence from killing any animals, but according to *Mahābrata* (i.e., great vows) it would entail all the rigour and carefulness to prevent oneself from being the cause of any kind of injury to any living being in any way."<sup>52</sup>

Ahimsā is the fundamental ethical virtue of Jainism; judgement on all actions may be passed in accordance with the standard of *ahimsā*. The other vows of *sūnṛta* (i.e., *satya* speaking in such a way as is true, good and pleasing), *asteya* (i.e., not stealing, not taking which has not been given) and *brahmacarya* (i.e., chastity, abandoning lust for all kinds of object in

mind, speech and body) are regarded as virtues because their transgression leads to *hiṃsā* or injury to beings.<sup>53</sup> It is the opinion of A. N. Upadhye that "Jainism is perhaps the only Indian Religion which has explained the doctrine of *ahimsā* in a systematic manner, because all other values were elaborated on this basis."<sup>54</sup> Gandhi hailed from Gujarat, and Gujarat has been the stronghold of Jainism from the earliest times.

What did Gandhi mean by the term, *ahimsa*? He used the term to mean passive resistance, non-injury, non-violence, pure love, and so on. He wrote, "I accept the interpretation of *ahimsa*, namely, that it is not merely a negative state of harmlessness, but it is a positive state of love, of doing good even to the evil-doer. But it does not mean helping the evil-doer to continue the wrong or tolerating it by passive acquiescence..."<sup>55</sup> similarly he wrote in *Young India* (20 Feb., 1930),

"The true rendering of the word (*Ahimsa*) in English is love or charity. And does not the Bible say

'Love worketh no ill to his neighbour,

Believeth all things,

Hopeth all things,

Never faileth."<sup>56</sup>

He wrote in the same paper (on 31 Dec. 1931), "But I then found that love has many meanings in the English language at least and that human love in the sense of passion could become a degrading thing also. I found, too, that love in the sense of *ahimsā* had only a limited number of votaries in the world."<sup>57</sup> Gandhi's finding points to a very uncommon understanding of the word. One naturally asks what kind of *ahimsā* it is that has only a limited number of votaries.

We have already found that "Truth" meant something special, that it is above all the moral sense of the word, indicative of the voice of conscience, which serves as the basis of all morality and self-realization.<sup>58</sup> It has to do with the judgements of true and genuine value, of what is worth striving after and what we would call the highest good and value in human life. In relation to this Truth, we may discover that something which is special to *Ahimsā*. After all, "the only means for the realization of Truth is *Ahimsā*."<sup>59</sup> Therefore, we may surmise that, apart from the ordinary and general meaning of *Ahimsā*, namely, non-violence and love of all beings,

*Ahimsā and Indian Secularism*

there is a special meaning and that is the "non-violence" of Truth. It is an application of the concept of non-violence to the inner self and to conscience. It is the "non-violence" of the light within. It is properly called non-violation, rather than non-violence. But there is only one word to indicate both the concepts, and that word is "Ahimsā." Therefore, Ahimsā would mean, in its positive aspect, utter sincerity of self, absolute consistency with and adherence to the dictates of one's conscience. To put it negatively, Ahimsa is the inviolability of one's own self. In its active sense, it is a search for perfect integrity. This is the "love in the sense of ahimsa," which has "only a limited number of votaries in the world."<sup>60</sup> "Non-violence" of self is the means to self-realization. To be true to the inviolable inner self is the source of transcendence. Let us proceed to verify, if possible, the above meaning of transcendental ahimsā.

The word, integrity, comes from the Latin word, *integer* (adj.), or *integritas* (noun.). The word is formed with the negative particle, *in* (note the negative particle in *a-himsā*) and the infinitive, *tangere* (i.e., "to touch"). *Integer* comes to mean "untouched," "intact" (note *tactum*, pp. of *tangere*), "uninjured" "untainted," "whole and upright," and so on. Integrity implies that one is to be true to oneself and that one has the courage to live up to one's convictions. It implies that one should seek consistency between one's knowing and doing. Then the moral concept of integrity has to do with the "in-violability" of self and of conscience. Ahimsā, first and foremost, is the non-violation or the inviolability of one's own self and secondly the non-violation of the human person, especially, the other person, irrespective of who the other person is.

Gandhi gives in the autobiography his personal reflection - call it spiritual, moral or intellectual - on an incident in the manner of a confession. He reflects on his prick of conscience in having agreed with his doctor to add goat's milk to his diet against his vow to exclude interpretively all milk. He says,

"It seems to me that I understand the ideal of truth better than that of Ahimsā, and experience tells me that, if I let go my hold of truth, I shall never be able to solve the riddle of Ahimsa. The ideal of truth requires that vows taken should be fulfilled in the spirit as well as in the letter. In the

case I killed the spirit- the soul of my vow-by adhering to its outer form only, and that is what galls me. But in spite of this clear knowledge I cannot see my way straight before me."<sup>61</sup>

What galls him is the violation of truth in his own inner self. There is no doubt that he is talking about the inviolability of self. No wonder that "*ahimsā* is the basis of the search for truth. I am realizing every day that the search is vain unless it is founded on *ahimsā* as the basis."<sup>62</sup>

Another dilemma of *ahimsa* is indicated in the narration of the sickness of his own son, Manilal. Gandhi decided against eggs and chicken-broth for his sick son. He writes,

"To my mind it is only on such occasions, that a man's faith is truly tested. Rightly or wrongly it is part of my religious conviction that man may not eat meat, eggs, and the like. There should be a limit even to the means of keeping ourselves alive. Even for life itself we may not do certain things. Religion, as I understand it, does not permit me to use meat or eggs for me or mine on occasions like this, and I must therefore take the risk that you say is likely."<sup>63</sup>

The commitment to *ahimsa*, according to which he tries to be consistent with his judgement, is beyond question.

A touching episode of Gandhi's boyhood days, together with his mature reflections at the time of writing, is beautifully narrated by him in the autobiography. The narration is simple. It throws much light on the working of the lad's mind and heart. He shows us how he came to terms with his own conscience as a boy of fifteen and set things right after a fall:

"It was not difficult to clip a bit out of it (of the armlet.). Well, it was done, and the debt cleared. But this became more than I could bear. I resolved never to steal again. I also made up my mind to confess it to my father. But I did not dare to speak. Not that I was afraid of my father beating me... I was afraid of the pain that I should cause him. But I felt that the risk should be taken, that there could not be a cleansing without a clean confession.

"I decided at last to write out the confession, to submit it to my father, and ask his forgiveness. I wrote it on a slip of paper and handed it to him myself. In this note not only did I confess my guilt, but I asked adequate punishment for it and closed with a request to him not to punish himself for my offence. I also pledged myself never to steal in future.

"I was trembling as I handed the confession to my father... He read it

*Ahimsā and Indian Secularism*

through, and the pearl-drops trickled down his cheeks, wetting the paper...

"Those pearl drops of love cleansed my heart, and washed my sin away. Only he who has experienced such love can know what it is....

"This was, for me, an object lesson in *Ahimsa*. Then I could read in it nothing more than a father's love, but today I know that it was pure *Ahimsā*. When such *Ahimsa* becomes all-embracing, it transforms everything it touches. There is no limit to its power."<sup>64</sup>

One may contend that the person who practised *Ahimsa* in the above incident was his father. However, the important moment to capture is the moment when the boy resolved never to steal again and decided to make peace with his own conscience. What followed were nothing but the attending circumstances and consequences, although these are more visible. The boy had violated his own inner being inasmuch as he went against the dictates of his own conscience and filial love. Whatever he did afterwards was aimed at winning back and re-establishing his own integrity. Between the son and the father, the one who stood up against himself and the other person was the son, who had committed the sin. By the time the father came to know of the crime, the son had been asking for parental forgiveness. The change of heart in the son had already taken place, it could not have been the result of *ahimsā* on the part of the father. The subsequent events show how the conscience was pacified, the conversion, sealed, the son, re-established in filial love by the "pearl drops of love."

Gandhi tells us of an episode, which took place among the indigo cultivators of Champaranya, to whose succour he hastened as a stranger from Gujarat. There was absolutely no violence, in spite of the fact that the government officers had threatened Gandhi with serious consequences if he went ahead with his visit. Notices were served on him, but he decided to offer civil disobedience and visit the peasants. However, as the events unfolded, he even struck up amity and friendship with the officers. The final outcome was that there was a spontaneous and unprecedented upsurge of the people. "The people had for the moment lost all fear of punishment and yielded obedience to the power of love which their new friend exercised," says Gandhi.<sup>65</sup> The officers themselves helped in regulating the crowds. He comments briefly how he came face to face with God, *Ahimsā* and Truth:

"And yet they (namely, the peasants of Champaran, the cultivators of indigo, among whom neither propaganda nor any political work had been done by Gandhi and the Congress party) received me as though we had been age-long friends. It is no exaggeration, but the literal truth, to say that in this meeting with the peasants I was face to face with God, Ahimsā and Truth.

"When I come to examine my title to this realization, I find nothing but my love for the people. And this in turn is nothing but an expression of my unshakable faith in Ahimsā."<sup>66</sup>

Gandhi felt that in going to the help of the helpless and listening to their grievances he was doing the right thing. He was almost alone but confident in this venture. He was true to himself and the dictates of love and conscience in rendering service to the distressed peasants with full trust in God, in Ahimsa and in the people. Such a quest for justice and self-sacrificing love has a redemptive role in society. An observation made by Lonergan is quite appropriate and applicable to Ahimsā in its social dimension:

"..., we may note that a religion that promotes self-transcendence to the point, not merely of justice, but of self-sacrificing love, will have a redemptive role in human society inasmuch as such love can undo the mischief of decline and restore cumulative process of progress."<sup>67</sup>

There is yet another instance of the transcendental Ahimsā in what Gandhi wrote in *Young India* as follows,

"I would say with those who say God is love, God is Love. But deep down in me I used to say that though God may be God, God is truth above all... But two years ago, I went a step further and said Truth is God... I then found that the nearest approach to truth was through love... I found, too, that love in the sense of ahimsā had only a limited number of votaries in the world. But I never found a double meaning in connection with truth and not even the atheists had demurred to the necessity or power of truth. But in their passion for discovering truth the atheists have not hesitated to deny the very existence of God-from their own point of view rightly. And it was because of this reason that I saw that rather than say God is Truth I should say Truth is God."<sup>68</sup>

It was because of his conviction that the atheists were sincere and that even they were hemmed in by their conscience, that is, by the demand for actions consistent with their convictions and principles, in short, it was because of the atheist's respect for 'ahimsa,' that Gandhi modified his

*Ahimsā and Indian Secularism*

definition into Truth is God. However, eight years later he wrote in *Harijan* (3 June 1939), following upon a question asked by one of the members of the Seva Sangh whether those socialists and communists who did not believe in God could be Satyagrahis, thus:

"I am afraid not. For a Satyagrahi has no other stay but God, and he who has any other stay or depends on any other help cannot offer Satyagraha. he may be a passive resister, non-cooperator and so on, but not a true Satyagrahi. It is open to you to argue that this excludes brave comrades whereas it may include men who profess a belief in God but who in their daily lives are untrue to their profession. I am not talking of those who are untrue to their profession, I am talking of those who are prepared in the name of God to stake their all for the sake of their principle. Don't ask me again why I am enunciating this principle today and did not do so 20 years ago. I can only say that I am no prophet, I am but an erring mortal, progressing from blunder towards truth. 'What about the Buddhists and Jains, then?' someone has asked. Well, I will say that if the Buddhists and Jains raise this objection themselves and say that they would be disqualified if such a strict rule were observed, I should, say to them that I agree with them."<sup>69</sup>

The atheists and the others who did not believe or trust in God could be accommodated before. The reason for dropping them on the way is spelt out more clearly, as he writes,

"But far be it from me to suggest that you should believe in the God that I believe in. Maybe your definition is different from mine, but your belief in that God must be your ultimate mainstay. It may be some Supreme Power or some Being even indefinable, but belief in it is indispensable. To bear all kinds of tortures without a murmur of resentment is impossible for a human being without that strength that comes from God. Only in His strength we are strong. And only those who can cast their care and their fears on that immeasurable Power have faith in God."<sup>70</sup>

Ahimsā in the face of hatred, tyranny and injustice demands that a man may not yield or bow down if he wishes to keep his integrity inviolate and his conscience unsullied. The consequence is the untold suffering of the Satyagrahi. He may even have to lay down his life. Gandhi is quite unequivocal in his statement that one cannot undergo the sufferings with equanimity without trust in God. In spite of the sufferings, there is no guarantee that they will be instrumental in bringing about a change, a

conversion, in the mind and heart of the tyrant or the oppressor.<sup>71</sup> But the Satyagrahi perseveres. The dynamics of Ahimsā is such that it transcends itself, because it is not any more just inviolate integrity but it has got modified into the God-loving search for inviolable integrity and the surrender to God, in whom the Satyagrahi places all his trust and hope. If so, the Jain and Hindu principle of ahimsā has undergone a sea change.

There is a most telling confession by Gandhi, which proclaims his faith in God and attributes to Him the power and the grace that come to the ailing human being. Gandhi wrote in *Harijan*, 29.2 1936 about his observance of *brahmacharya* and a relapse from it, together with the "confession of the wretched experience," which brought much relief to him,

"How far I must be from Him, He alone knows. Thank God, my much-vaunted Mahatmaship has never fooled me. But this enforced rest has humbled me as never before. It has brought to the surface my limitations and imperfections. But I am not so much ashamed of them as I should be of hiding them from the public. My faith in the message of the *Gītā* is as bright as ever. Unwearied ceaseless effort is the price that must be paid for turning that faith into rich infallible experience. But the same *Gītā* says without any equivocation that the experience is not to be had without divine grace. We should develop swelled heads if Divinity has not made that ample reservation."<sup>72</sup>

He is indeed a great believer in God and in divine providence even in the most trying circumstances and personal experiences. He bears witness to his faith early on in his autobiography, when he says,

"Man, as soon as he gets back his consciousness of right, is thankful to the Divine mercy for the escape. As we know a man often succumbs to temptation, however much he may resist it, we also know that Providence often intercedes and saves him in spite of himself. How all this happens, - how far free-will comes into play and where fate enters on the scene, - all this is a mystery and will remain a mystery."<sup>73</sup>

The Gandhian Ahimsa may now be described as the spiritual principle or imperative within a person for the unflinching pursuit of personal integrity, which urges him to oppose injustice and evil wherever these are found with utter reliance on God in suffering, but without in any way violating the person of the opponent who is the root cause of disorder and the concomitant

*Ahimsā and Indian Secularism*

suffering, which in its turn evokes a change in the heart and mind of the opponent.

Erik H. Erikson, the author of *Gandhi's Truth*, comes closest to our understanding of ahimsa, when he writes,

"With all respect for the traditional translations of *ahimsa*, I think Gandhi implied in it, besides a refusal to do physical harm, a determination *not to violate another person's essence* (emphasis added). For even where one may not be able to avoid harming or hurting, forcing or demeaning another whenever one must coerce him, one should try even in doing so, not to violate his essence, for such violence can only produce counter-violence, which may end in a kind of truce, but not in truth. For *ahimsā* as acted upon by Gandhi not only means not to hurt another, it means to respect the truth in him."<sup>74</sup>

The main differences between the above two descriptions are shown by 1) the fact that the determination not to violate another person's "essence" is made out to be a corollary, as it were, to a more fundamental principle, namely, the inviolability of one's own self—which is a principle more in consonance with the Indian preoccupation with the self (*ātman*) within—that urges one to strive after personal integrity at all costs, 2) the function of suffering in the scheme of Ahimsā and 3) Gandhi's reliance on God in suffering.

The first of the two statements above has three parts. The first part, namely, "the spiritual principle or imperative within a person for the unflinching pursuit of personal integrity," implies the determination not to violate one's own self, one's own conscience, one's own essence. It is indeed a reflective statement, which throws light on the nature of conscience, one's own inner self. The second part, namely, "which urges him to oppose injustice and evil wherever these are found with utter reliance on God in suffering, but without in any way violating the person of the opponent who is the root cause of disorder and the concomitant suffering," implies the determination not only not to injure the opponent physically, but also not to violate his essence, his truth, his inner self, in spite of the fact that he is the cause of great suffering, which has to be endured with superhuman strength and with utter reliance on God's help. The last part, namely, "which (suffering) in its turn evokes a change in the heart and mind of the opponent,"

which merely puts down the consequence of the pursuit. The sufferings are taken upon oneself neither in silence nor passive resignation. The sufferings are made to speak loudly and forcefully to the opponent who represents or wields power and authority and let him know of the great evil he causes to others through evil deeds, unsound policies, partisan laws, and so on. The choice lies between punishment of the perpetrator of injustice and suffering of the Satyagrahi in pursuit of the greater common good.

The first part of the descriptive definition indicates the inner ahimsā or what we may call transcendental ahimsa, since there is a conscious transition to the facts of the inner depths of the human person. The second and the third part are what are popularly known as ahimsa, or non-violence. The discovery we have to make is that the one and the same word, ahimsa, is indicative of a number of closely related concepts, namely, "non-violence," "non-violation" or "inviolability," and "integrity."

An insight like the one above into Ahimsa helps us to see clearly how Gandhi discovered and accepted the inviolability and dignity of the human person and the basic equality and freedom of all men. It was Ahimsā, which made him fight for the dignity and equality of the Hindu outcast and the untouchable. He declared very clearly, "Untouchability is the sin of the Hindus. They must suffer for it, they must purify themselves, they must pay the debt they owe to their suppressed brothers and sisters. Theirs is the shame and theirs must be the glory when they have purged themselves of the black sin."<sup>75</sup> It is again the realization of the inviolability of conscience and the dignity of man that led him to assert, "We are all equal before our maker-Hindus, Musalmans, Parsis, Christians-worshippers of one God."<sup>76</sup> He says in his autobiography,

"A variety of incidents in my life have conspired to bring me in close contact with people of many creeds and many communities, and my experience with all of them warrants the statement that I have known no distinction between relatives and strangers, countrymen and foreigners, white and coloured, Hindus and Indians of other faiths, whether Musalmans, Parsis, Christians or Jews. I may say that my heart has been incapable of making any such distinction."<sup>77</sup>

The same insight helps us see why he rendered Ahimsa into English as Love, love being the only sane and rational attitude towards persons, who by nature enjoy inviolable and sacred dignity.<sup>78</sup> It gave him "ineffable joy

*Ahimsā and Indian Secularism*

to make experiments proving that love (meaning, Ahimsa) is the supreme and only law of life."<sup>79</sup> Love is the supreme law: *ahimsā paramo dharma*. "For me," he said, "the law of complete Love is the Law of my being."<sup>80</sup> Ahimsa, as he understood it, is a new creed and a new faith.<sup>81</sup> Speaking of the essential qualities of a true Satyagrahi, he says, "He must believe in truth and non-violence as his creed and have faith in the inherent goodness of human nature which he expects to evoke by his truth and love expressed through his suffering."<sup>82</sup> Gandhi was the Satyagrahi *par excellence* and his religion was the religion of Ahimsa: "My life is dedicated to service of India through the religion of non-violence which I believe to be the root of Hinduism."<sup>83</sup> Now we understand more adequately why he was so emphatic in saying, "And if every page of these chapters does not proclaim to the reader that only means for the realization of Truth is Ahimsa, I shall deem all my labour in writing these chapters to have been in vain."<sup>84</sup> There is no doubt that this was indeed a statement about his personal religion. The title, therefore, of his autobiography could very well have been, 'The Story of My Experiments with Ahimsa' or "The Story of My Experiments with My Religion."

Let us conclude this section with a summary. Gandhi's religion is what we have called Transcendental Hinduism. The distinguishing characteristic of Transcendental Hinduism is Transcendental Ahimsa or the ahimsa which is specifically his own. Transcendental Ahimsa is the God-loving realization of inviolable personal integrity, in the pursuit of which Gandhi and the others like him encounter suffering on account of non-violent disobedience to unjust authority. The serious study of *Gītā* accompanied by his religious effort to live and labour according to its teaching gives him an insight into a life of detachment and a determination to adhere unflinchingly to the highest moral standards in every avenue of life. One may say that Ahimsā in praxis is spelt out by Gandhi as he sums up on an intellectual level, one may say, his philosophy of life in the introduction, *anāsaktiyoga*, to his translation of the *Gītā*. Gandhi discovers the inviolable nature of the moral imperative and of the human person. He discovers in his life man's dynamic orientation to the divine, which is his highest good. Because of the simplicity, universality and sublimity of Ahimsā, Gandhi does not hesitate to call it his religion. The follower of this religion is a

Satyagrahi. The Satyagrahi is ready to undergo suffering in order to remain true to his commitment. It is his conviction that Ahimsā or Love is the supreme law.

### Equality of All Religions

Gandhi did not discriminate between the followers of various religions.<sup>85</sup> However, we cannot but notice a process of reductionism in the working of his mind and making itself felt in his writings. It is a process, which reduces the various religions like Hinduism, Islam, Christianity, to their followers, that is, to Hindus, Musalmans, and Christians. This process will not run into serious problems when someone steers clear of the history of the religions and the historically important writings about them— an attitude, which obviously an historian cannot take without violating his methodical spirit of inquiry. For it is history that makes every follower of every religion what he is at any given time. When an individual differs significantly, his biography and personal history in its wider context are important to have an insight into his personality. Even a historian is the product of history; he is not above history. It is this, which accounts for many differences in the historical perspective of the writers of history. The process, mentioned above, goes one step further in that the Hindus, Musalmans and others are reduced to men and women, who enjoy honour, dignity and equality by the very fact that they are human beings. This reductionism is discernible when Gandhi winds up his thoughts in the words of Robert Burns, "My Scheme of life, if it draws no distinction between different religionists in India, it also draws none between different races. For me 'man is a man for a' that."<sup>86</sup> To the well-meaning Christian missionaries he said, "Make us better Hindus, i.e., better men and women."<sup>87</sup> Yet again, he says ,

"...all religions are almost as dear to me as my own Hinduism, in as much as *all human beings* should be as dear to one as one's own close relatives....The aim of the Fellowship is to help a Hindu to become a better Hindu, a Musalman to become a better Musalman, and a Christian a better Christian...Pray merely that your friends may become better men, whatever their form of religion (emphasis added)"<sup>88</sup>

It may be suggested that the prototype for this reduction is Gandhi himself. Hinduism is first reduced to the Hindu and then the Hindu is further

*Ahimsā and Indian Secularism*

reduced to this man whom people called Gandhi. However, the downward movement is matched by an upward integration. But there is an operator, which is the popular Ahimsā. Through his "experiments," he transforms first of all the popular Ahimsā into the Transcendental Ahimsā and he rediscovers his religion in the latter which is the religion of the Satyagrahi. He becomes the true Satyagrahi, whom people ultimately begin to call the Mahatma.<sup>89</sup> The process of the dialectical transformation in the emergence of the Mahatma is now complete. At the end of the process his religion is Hinduism, yet not Hinduism but Ahimsā. He is a Hindu, yet not a Hindu, but a Satyagrahi. He is whom they called Gandhi, yet not Gandhi, but whom they begin to call Mahatma Gandhi.

The two related vertices or evolutes of the downward and upward movements in the above process, namely, Man and Mahatma, show us easily that Transcendental Ahimsā, based on a doctrine of the human nature, could be for Gandhi the "Religion of Man," the universal religion.<sup>90</sup> And indeed he declared, "My religion is Hinduism which, for me, is religion of humanity and includes the best of all the religions known to me."<sup>91</sup> But Ahimsā is the root of Hinduism, for he has said, "My religion has no geographical limits. If I have a living faith in it, it will transcend my love for India herself. My life is dedicated to service of India through the religion of non-violence which I believe to be the root of Hinduism."<sup>92</sup> Gandhi holds that his Hinduism includes the best of all religions, because Ahimsā, the root of Hinduism, is its "firm foundation,"<sup>93</sup> and because it is the "rock-bottom unity of all religions."<sup>94</sup> "Non-violence is the end of all religions."<sup>95</sup>

Thus, Ahimsā is for Gandhi the religion of man. Gandhi may be said to have demonstrated convincingly in practice that the universality and catholicity, which Ram Mohan Roy and Rabindranath Tagore longed to achieve theoretically and in life, were contained in his Ahimsā. Ahimsā by definition and as the Religion of Man, enjoying universality, is a transcendental humanism, that is, a humanism, which is ever on the move to discover further horizons only to transcend them or go beyond them into the Ultimate, the Supreme. It is a humanism, which goes beyond itself. Ahimsā is not merely the achievement of personal integrity, but it is the god-loving realization of the inviolable self through universal love. These and other similar considerations make it abundantly clear why Gandhi said

that "love is the supreme and only law of life,"<sup>96</sup> that "every problem lends itself to solution if we are determined to make the law of truth and non-violence the law of life."<sup>97</sup> Ahimsā is the supreme law of life: *ahimsā paramo dharmaḥ*.

It may be proposed with confidence that Transcendental Ahimsa was the fundamental reason why Gandhi held that all religions are equal. In it he discovered the religion which "transcends Hinduism, Islam and Christianity" and others.<sup>98</sup> just as he held that "ahimsā is the unity of all life,"<sup>99</sup> he also thought and acted upon the conviction that Ahimsa is "the rock-bottom unity of all religions."<sup>100</sup> He stated, "Ahimsā is in Hinduism, it is in Christianity as well as in Islam. Whether you agree with me or not, it is my bounden duty to preach what I believe to be the truth as I see It."<sup>101</sup> Gandhi found in Ahimsā what is best in all the religions, their supreme-message and perfection.

Friedrich Heiler has contributed his thoughts under "The History of Religions as a Preparation for the Cooperation of Religions" to *The History of Religions*. He treats of a number of areas, which are more or less common to many world religions as they are practised. Lonergan sets forth his appreciation of the author in the following words,

"But there is at least one scholar on whom one may call for an explicit statement on the areas common to such world religions as Christianity, Judaism, Islam, Zoroastrian Mazdaism, Hinduism, Buddhism, Taoism. For Friedrich Heiler has described at some length seven such common areas. While I cannot reproduce here the rich texture of his thought, I must, at least, give a list of the topics he treats: that there is a transcendent reality; that he is immanent in human hearts; that he is supreme beauty, truth, righteousness, goodness; that he is love, mercy, compassion; that the way to him is repentance, self-denial, prayer; that the way is love of one's neighbour, even of one's enemies; that the way is love of God, so that bliss is conceived as knowledge of God, union with him, or dissolution into him."<sup>102</sup>

Many of the ideas contained in the above description are clearly present in explicit terms also in Gandhi's religion of Ahimsā.

Gandhi has given us other reasons too for his *sarvadharmasamānātva*, the equality of all religions, or for "having equal regard for all faiths and creeds," as he puts it.<sup>103</sup> He explains this tenet

*Ahimsā and Indian Secularism*

and gives its consequence in the following words:

"After long study and experience, I have come to the conclusion that (1) all religions are true; (2) that all religions have some error in them; (3) all religions are almost as dear to me as my own Hinduism, in as much as all human beings should be as dear to one as one's own close relatives. My own veneration for other faiths is the same as that for my own faith; therefore, no thought of conversion is possible." <sup>104</sup>

He found imperfections in all the religions he had known: "There is no religion that is absolutely perfect. All are equally imperfect, or more or less perfect. Hence, the conclusion that Christianity is as good and true as my own religion." <sup>105</sup> He came to the conclusion that every religion was "imperfect naturally and necessarily, because they were interpreted with our poor intellects, sometimes with our poor hearts, and more often misinterpreted." <sup>106</sup> However, his statement that all the religions are true is basic to his contention that all the religions are equal. For he has said elsewhere that for him all the principal religions were "equal in the sense that they are all true" <sup>107</sup> It is not our purpose to question the logic of his argument just as we have not examined the wisdom of his earlier reduction, nor is it our purpose to explicate how his mind could have worked in alternate channels theoretically built to find out how it worked as a matter of fact. Perhaps the reader has also noticed that no question was raised about Gandhi's idea or philosophy of human action, its fruit, merit and demerit ensuing from action, liberation from karma and so on, which he had in his own way absorbed from the *Gītā*. We have not gone into his notions of self and human consciousness. An understanding of the interrelationship between human identity and consciousness as manifested on the various levels of conscious operations, in other words, a philosophical theory of intelligence and of the human subject, is of the greatest value when one has to deal with the discourses on the self. No question was raised about what he knew about the dynamic self of the human subject, the dynamics of moral consciousness and the mysterious working of human love in daily affairs, its distortions and ultimate unfolding in every human life. Nor have we gleaned his ideas of human history. There was no inquiry into his concept of God and Providence as operative in the hearts of men. An account by a person of his own love for God cannot but be conditioned according to the

personal history and culture, which means that the accounts will diverge widely among persons of different religions. The accounts will depend on the ideas each person has of God, self, consciousness, divine and human operation, love, intellect, history and so on, which the person has imbibed from childhood onwards. A language is not always a means of personal liberation; it can imprison as well, e.g., an ideology based on the distorted facts about man and his labour in a society. Gandhi was a man of action. He worked hard to make himself dispassionate and free from unworthy attachments so that he could make momentous decisions for the good of an emerging nation. He was not one given to endless theoretical meditations. Suffice it, then, to notice that all religions, according to Gandhi, are equal if they are true. They are true if they contain Truth. But Truth is another name for Ahimsa, which is his religion.<sup>108</sup> Hence, the great importance Gandhi attached to his statement that "....Ahimsā is in Hinduism, it is in Christianity as well as in Islam."<sup>109</sup> These and the other religions are therefore equal.

Dr. Zakir Hussain, who was the President of India in the 1960's and who was an admirer of Gandhi and co-worker, seems to have understood the reason behind the latter's *sarvadharmasamānātva* when he says, "To him (Gandhi) the core of every religion was truth and non-violence, with love linking the tow. From this belief flowed his teaching of unreserved reverence for all the great religions in the world"<sup>110</sup>

From what has been said already, it is clear that Gandhi thought that he had found in Ahimsā, or in "Love is the supreme law," the central message of Christianity. His friends and close associates thought that he had realized in his life the Christian message. Tagore was one of them, who said.

"Charity, benevolence, and the like, no doubt have an important place in the religions of our country as well, but there they are in practice circumscribed within such narrower limits, and are only partially inspired by love of man. And to our great good fortune, Gandhiji was able to receive this teaching of Christ in a living way...For it was this great gift that our country had all along been waiting"<sup>111</sup>

Nò one but men of good will may feel inclined to believe what Tagore has said. But, no Christian will be surprised to be told that Love is the

*Ahimsā and Indian Secularism*

supreme law of life or Ahimsā, as we have understood it, is quite central to Christianity and that the Bible bears ample testimony that love must be a distinctive mark of a follower of Jesus Christ <sup>112</sup> It is also true that no committed and educated Christian will accept without qualification Gandhi's statement that all religions are equal in every aspect even if the comparison is to be made between the religion of Gandhi's forefathers and his own Transcendental Ahimsa with its popular Christian message of love. So also is the case with the followers of Islam, not to mention the followers of other religions like Sikhism, Judaism, and so on. However, it is hoped that our attempt in unravelling the meaning of Ahimsa and finding in it the fundamental tenet of his religion and in its transcendental humanism the reason why he said all religions are equal will help us to appreciate this great Indian of all times and make us less inclined to uninformed criticism of the Mahatma, especially when millions quote him as an excuse for religious indifferentism and thus blunt the edge of the religious quest. In the Introduction to the autobiography, he spoke about his own religious quest, saying, "But I worship God as Truth only. I have not yet found him, but I am seeking after him. I am prepared to sacrifice the things dearest to me in pursuit of this quest. Even if the sacrifice demanded be my very life, I hope I may be prepared to give it." <sup>113</sup> The quest was carried out with great earnestness. Did he not know that God Himself had taken hold of him through this ultimate concern and was leading him through unknown ways for his own sake and for the sake of his country? In their journey towards an indeterminate finality, men and women have the experience of events in the very depths of their conscious selves and among peoples, magnitude of which they are incapable of immediately grasping, for behind the happenings there are only vague intimations of the Unknown. Of this upward ascend of man in order to win untarnished authenticity, self-realisation or self-transcendence, Lonergan writes in *Insight* as follows :

"In brief, there is a dimension to human experience that takes man beyond the domesticated, familiar, common sphere, in which a spade is just a spade. In correspondence with that strange dynamic component of sensitive living, there is the openness of inquiry and reflection and the paradoxical 'known unknown' of unanswered questions. Such directed but, in a sense, indeterminate dynamism is what we have called finality. But

whither finality heads, is a question that receives countless answers, pragmatic or conceptual, naturalistic, humanistic, or religious, enthusiastically positive or militantly negative"<sup>114</sup>

Certain events within the seekers and in history are commensurate to God's power, but not proportionate to the wisdom and knowledge of man or woman. It is presumption for the subjects of these events to try to assign adequate causes and give a true and systematic account of all those facts of the inner life and of the twists and turns of human history itself by leaving out the gradual unfolding of an unknown design in human destiny, which men of good will may gradually find less and less dark and puzzling. Bereft of certain divine dispensations and providence, the relatively free, creative and responsible social beings that human beings are remain mostly mystified about the objective, genuine sources and directions of the conscious unfolding. They experience certain inner events and are witnesses to the happenings, but they are in no way able and competent systematically to objectify the subject and the subject's experiences. The ordinary intellectual striving fails as a matter of fact to fathom systematically the depths of the dynamic state of being in love with God with its antecedents and consequences, because such an understanding is possible only with the explicit self-knowledge arising from the personal appropriation of one's own rational and religious self-consciousness in its subjection to God's own liberating and illuminating operation in personal history, which is but part of the wider general religious history. Languages, cultures and religions differ; the formulations of the inner experiences differ accordingly not in a superficial manner but radically, because the difficulties in coming to grips with self-consciousness, especially of those favoured with divine love, are at the root of many an insurmountable problem of systematic understanding and of the manner of formulation and communication. Notions and ideas about faith in God differ radically, because the intellectual grasp of the dynamic and transcending human subject, for example, differs radically. Beside the search for understanding, there are also fights from understanding. Authenticity is often mixed with unauthenticity. We have understood that authenticity is the achievement of self-transcendence. Anyone who is striving for self-transcendence in life is aware of personal

*Ahimsā and Indian Secularism*

shortcomings, just as Gandhi was in his confession to his father. We must admit with Lonergan, who points out that

"...self-transcendence is so radically and so completely the inner dynamism of human reality that one cannot but be aware when one is moving towards it, and on the other hand, one cannot but feel constrained to conceal the fact one is evading the abiding imperative of what it is to be human."<sup>115</sup>

The inner dynamism reveals, however feeble the revelation might be at times, the abiding imperative to every man and woman: "Be self-transcendent," or "Strive after authenticity." It is an invitation always to go beyond by reaching out for what is true and good and genuinely valuable in order to act and live accordingly.

Human development has inbuilt stages; cultures too have levels of development and, unfortunately, of decadence too. Worldviews differ specifically. We may approach the difficulties of true understanding from the point of view of the depth of the human subject and his experience:

"To say that this dynamic state (of being in love in an unrestricted fashion, i.e., of being in love with God) is conscious is not to say that it is known. For consciousness is just experience, but knowledge is a compound of experience, understanding and judging. Because the dynamic state is conscious without being known, it is an experience of mystery. Because it is being in love, the mystery is not merely attractive but fascinating; to it one belongs; by it one is possessed. Because it is unmeasured love, the mystery evokes awe. Of itself, then, inasmuch as it is conscious without being known, the gift of God's love is an experience of the holy, of Rudolf Otto's *mysterium fascinans et tremendum*. It is what Paul Tillich named a being grasped by ultimate concern."<sup>116</sup>

Human beings are not the full-fledged individual creators of what they are to be personally in society, but only co-creators within societies and history itself. There is no doubt that the Mahatma could not possibly account adequately for all the inner and outer events, which led him on. His knowledge, therefore, was naturally of one who was a seeker, a sincere seeker after personal authenticity, and it was so by his own admission. His humility is unbounded before the Ultimate Unknown as he worked diligently and waited patiently for sufficient awareness and knowledge to dawn in a continuous self-sacrificing self-surrender.

## CONCLUSION

India has suffered from the lack of equality and social justice as the Kothari Report on Education affirms, and the social reformers proclaim.<sup>117</sup> The movements of the Dalits are the unmistakable signs of the times. Multitudes of her people have lived in inequality and bondage in the caste-ridden societies. They were denied even the basic human dignity, which is the foundation of social virtues and of enlightened societies. It is impossible to affirm without doing violence to one's own conscience that all men and women, the citizens and the would-be citizens, of India are held and treated as equal despite the fact that they are declared to be equal before law irrespective of their religion. There is no equality in practice. In order to obviate the evils and regain the dignity of the individual, it is more profitable for an Indian to study *An Autobiography or The Story of My Experiments with Truth* than the French Revolution and the philosophy of Marx, as the same Report seems to advocate.<sup>118</sup> For, Gandhi awakened the conscience of India and helped her to regain self-respect, freedom, autonomy and dignity. I believe that his greatest contribution to Indian culture and India's search for self-realization lies in his Transcendental Ahimsa with its doctrine of the inviolability of the human conscience and the dignity and equality of the human person, no matter whether he is a Dalit or Brahmin, an Indian or an Englishman, Black or White, theist or atheist, Adivasi or settler, Christian or Hindu, Jew or Muslim. It is the distinctive humanism of Ahimsa that prompted the founding fathers of Indian Democracy to opt for the emergence of a nation with a secular ethos. Religious liberty guaranteed in the Constitution of India is based solidly on Ahimsa as preached by the Mahatma. The liberation from the yoke of the foreign rule was the first step, which could be taken only after decades of striving for independence. The next step was to be the formal declarations of human dignity, freedom and equality as enshrined in the Constitution. If Babasaheb Ambedkar was the leading light in its formulation, he had the experiences of a personal nature and of the wider world, which he grasped critically in the contemporary Indian multireligious society with its inbuilt caricatures of human dignity and equality. The dialogue of the men and women of good will in a multi-religious and multicultural society is the unfortunately belated third step of the utmost importance for the people to come together in

mutual understanding and for the purpose of building an enlightened and progressive modern nation.

## NOTES

1. *India as a Secular State*, by Donald Eugene Smith, Princeton University Press at Princeton, New Jersey, 1963, p.493. Cf. also *The Concept of The Secular State in India*, by Ved Prakash Luthera, Oxford University Press, 1964, pp. 146-47. The author is emphatic in his statement that India is not a Secular State in the technical sense of the term, secular. However, he agrees that in India "It (secularism) proclaims that it lays stress on the universality of spiritual values which may be attained by a variety of ways" (*ibid.* p. 155).
2. *Rgveda*, 1.164.46c.
3. *A History of Indian Philosophy* (abbr. HIP.) by Surendranath Dasgupta, Cambridge University Press, 1932, vol.1, p.125, fn.2.
4. *See Indian Idealism*, by Surendranath Dasgupta, Cambridge, at the University Press, 1933, pp.99, 105.
5. Cf. HIP., vol.1, p.210.
6. *Ibid.*, p.200. The different ways of writing the word, Ahimsā, in the following pages do not show any significant difference in meaning. It is only a matter of transliteration.
7. *Ibid.*, p.175.
8. *The History and Culture of the Indian People*, ed., R.C. Majumdar, Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay, 2<sup>nd</sup> Print, 1967, vol.6, p.571.
9. *Ibid.*, p.572.
10. *Indian, A Short Cultural History* (abbr. ISCH.), by H.G. Rawlinson, Publisher, Frederick A. Praeger, New York, 4<sup>th</sup> Print, 197, p.309.
11. *Ibid.*, pp.309f.
12. *Loc. cit.*
13. Cf. *Asia and Western Dominance*, by K.M. Panikkar, George Allen and

Unwin Ltd., London, 1965, p.240.

14. *Ibid.*, p.279..

15. *Cf. ISCH.*, p.410.

16. *Hinduism*, by R.C. Zaener, Oxford University Press, 1966, p.152.

17. *All Religions Are True*, (abbr.ART), by M.K. Gandhi, ed., Anand T. Hingorani, Pearl Publications Private Ltd., 1962, p.17.

18. *Conquest of Violence, The Gandhian Philosophy of Conflict* (abbr. CV.), by Joan V. Bondurant, University of California Press, revised ed. 1967, p.152. One is reminded of the famous lines from Kalidasa's *Mālavikāgnimitram*, which run as follows:

*Purāṇamityeva na sādhu sarvaṃ na cāpi kāvyam navamityavadyam/  
santaḥ parikṣyānyatarad bhajante mūḍh parapratyayaneyabudhiḥ//*

"Not everything is good just because it is ancient ; nor, again, is a poem censurable just because it is new. The wise take to one or the other after examining it ; the ignorant person has a mind that can be led by the ideas of the others."

19. *Loc. cit.*

20. *An Autobiography or The Story of my Experiments with Truth* (abbr. *An Autobiography*), by M.K. Gandhi, trans., Mahadev Desai, Navjeevan Publishing House, Ahmedabad, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., reprint, 1945, p.615.

21. *Non-Violent Resistance* (abbr.NR.), by M.K. Gandhi. ed., Bharatan Kummarappa, Schocken Books, New York, 1957, p.176.

22. *An Autobiography*, p.47.

23. *Ibid.*, p.197.

24. *Ibid.*, p.207.

25. *Ibid.*, pp.50f.

26. *An Autobiography*, p.615.

27. NR., p.357.

28. *Cf. Insight: A Study of Human Understanding* (abbr. *Insight*), by Bernard J.F. Lonergan, Longmans, Green and Co, London, revised ed., 1958, (reprint, Harper & Row, Publishers, New York, 1978), p.599.

*Ahimsā and Indian Secularism*

29. *An Autobiography*, Introduction, p.5.
30. *Ibid.*, p.413.
31. *The Philosophy of Mahatma Gandhi* (abbr.PMG), by Dharendra Mohan Dutta, The University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 1961, p.41.
32. *The Gospel of Selfless Action OR The Gītā According to Gandhi*, (abbr. TGSA). Translation of the original Gujarati, with an additional introduction and commentary, by Mahadev Desai, Navjivan Publishing House, Ahmedabad, 4th impression, 1956, pp.128f. The book contains the entire translation of the Bhagavadgita by Gandhi, the original of which is in Gujarati, Gandhi's own mother tongue. The word, *Anāsaktiyoga*, is pronounced as *Anāsaktiyoga*.

*Anāsaktiyoga: The Message of the Gītā*, is the subtitle of Gandhi's own introduction (pp.125-134), which is followed by his translation of the XVIII Discourses, which comprise the *Gītā*. Gandhi's thought is similar to that of St. Thomas' "omnia appetunt Deum," ("all things seek God," *De Veritate*, question 2, at 2) and "omnia intendunt assimilari Deo" ("all things intend (i.e., have the tendency) to be similar to God," *Contra Gentiles*, 3, corpus 19), especially when it is applied to human beings.

33. *An Autobiography*, p. 171.
34. *Cf. TGSA.*, p.129.
35. *Ibid.*, p.130.
36. *A Third Collection*, Papers by Bernard J.F. Lonergan, S.J., Frederick E. Crowe, S.J., Geoffrey Chapman, London, 1985, p.92.
37. *NR.*, p.109.
38. *PMG.*, p.45.
39. *Loc.cit.*
40. *CV.*, p.152.
41. *ISCH.*, p.414.
42. The Bhagavadgītā (or *Gītā*), 3.35:  
*śreyān svadharmo vigrahaḥ paradharmāt sv aniṣṭitāt /*  
*svadharme nidhanam śreyāḥ paradharmo bhayāvahaḥ //*

The translation is from TGSA., p. 188. The book contains the entire translation of the Bhagavadgītā by Gandhi, the original of which is in Gujarati, Gandhi's own mother tongue.

43. TGSA., p.127.

44. *Ibid.*, pp.133f.

45. Accordingly, two of the most important texts of the *Gṛā* for Gandhi undoubtedly are,

*karmany evādhikāras te mā phaleṣu kadācana /*

*mā karmaphalahetur bhūr mā te sango stv akarmaṇi//*

*yogasthaḥ kuru karmāṇi saṃgaṃ tyaktvā dhanaṃjaya /*

*siddhy asiddhyoḥ samo bhūtvā samatvaṃ yoga ucyate //* (*Gṛā*, 2.47f.)

"Action alone is thy province, never the fruits thereof ; let not thy motive be the fruit of action, nor shouldst thou desire to avoid action."

"Act thou, O Dhananjaya, without attachment, steadfast in *Yoga*, even-minded in success and failure. Even-mindedness is *Yoga*." (Gandhi's trans. of Discourse II, vv. 47-8, pp.161f.)

Desai's comment on the same verse in TGSA, p.162 reads,

"Gandhiji explained the verse (2.47)" in another connection:

"There should be no selfish purpose behind our actions. And to be detached from the fruits of actions is not to be ignorant of them or to disregard or disown them. To be detached is never to abandon action, because the contemplated result may not follow. On the contrary, it is proof of the immovable faith in the certainty of the contemplated result following in due course (*Young India*, 15-3-28.)"

46. *Gandhi Life and Thought*, by J.B. Kripalani, Government of India Publications Division(place and year?), p.338.

47. *Cf. NR.*, 109; PMG., p.49.

48. *NR.*, p.135.

49. *Ibid.*, p.176.

50. *ART.*, p.128.

51. *HIP.*, vol.1, p.199.

*Ahimsā and Indian Secularism*

52. *Ibid.*, p.200. The two words are the Bengali equivalents of *anuvrata* and *mahāvratā*.
53. *Cf. loc. cit.* The ancient text of *Manusmṛiti* defines *dharma* somewhat similarly, although the definition is more comprehensive:  
*ahiṃsā satyaṃ asteyaṃ śaucam indriyanigrahaḥ /*  
*etaṃ sāmāsikaṃ dharmam c āturvarṇye brāhṇa manuḥ* // (*Manusmṛiti*, 10.63)
54. *A Cultural History of India*, ed.A.L.Basham, Clarendon Press, Oxford, London, 1995, ch. IX, *Jainism*, by A.N.Upadhye, p.106.
55. *NR.*, p.161.
56. *Ibid.*, 221. *Cf. e.g.*, 1 Cor., 13.7.
57. *PMG.*, p.35
58. Gandhi says in his *Autobiography*, Introduction, p.5, "...the essence of religion is morality." *Cf. also* pp.50f.
59. *An Autobiography*, p.615.
60. *PMG.*, p.35. See fn.51 above.
61. *An Autobiography*, p.557. In his own words, the context of his remorse is as follows:  

"For although I had only the milk of the cow and the she-buffalo in mind when I took the vow, by natural implication it covered the milk of all animals. Not could it be right for me to use milk at all, so long as I held that milk is not the natural diet of man. Yet knowing all this I agreed to take goat's milk. The will to live proved stronger than the devotion to truth, and for once the votary of truth compromised his sacred ideal by his eagerness to take up the Satyagraha fight. The memory of this action even now rankles in my breast and fills me with remorse; and I am constantly thinking how to give up goat's milk. But I cannot yet free myself from that subtlest of temptations, to desire to serve, which still holds me. " (*Ibid.*, p.557)
62. *Ibid.*, p.337..
63. *Ibid.*, pp.302f.
64. *Ibid.*, pp.40f..
65. *An Autobiography*, p.503.
66. *Ibid.*, p.504.

67. *Method in Theology*, by Bernard J.F. Lonergan, S.J., Herder and Herder, New York, 1972, p.55.
68. *PMG.*, p.35., *Young India*, 31 Dec., 1931.
69. *NR.*, pp. 364f., *Harijan*, 3 June, 1939.
70. *Loc.cit.*
71. *Cf.NR.*, pp.169f.
72. Quoted from *Gandhi In India, In His Own Words*, Ed. Martin Green, University Press of New England, Hanover and London, 1987, p.238. The mention of the phrase, "confession of the wretched experience," occurs on p.237.
73. *An Autobiography*, p. 37.
74. *Gandhi's Truth: On the Origins of Militant Non-violence*, by Erik H. Erikson, W. W. Norton and Company,
75. *NR.*, pp.180f.
76. *Loc.cit.*, *Harijan*, 30 March, 1940.
77. *An Autobiography*, p.338.
78. *Cf. NR.*, p.221., *Young India*, 20 Feb., 1930.
79. *NR.*, p.387., *Harijan*, 13 April, 1940.
80. *PMG.*, p.76.
81. *Cf. NR.*, pp. 88,233f.
82. *NR.*, p.88.
83. *Ibid.*, p.135.
84. *An Autobiography*, p.615.
85. *Cf. An Autobiography*, p.615.
86. *NR.*, p.357.
87. *PMG.*, p.45.
88. *Loc. cit.*
89. It was Rabindranath Tagore who called Gandhi for the first time Mahatma Gandhi.
90. *Religion of Man* is the title of one of Tagore's books.

*Ahimsā and Indian Secularism*

91. ART., p231.
92. NR., p.135.
93. ART., p127.
94. PMG., p.49.
95. ART., p129., *Young India*, 29 May, 1924.
96. NR., p.387., *Harijan*, 13 April, 1940.
97. NR., pp.383f.
98. PMG., p.49.
99. *An Autobiography*, p.428.
100. PMG., p.49.
101. ART., p128.
102. *Method in Theology*, p.109. See *The History of Religions*, ed., M. Eliade and J. Kitagawa, Chicago University Press, Chicago, 1959, pp.142-153.
103. *Ibid.*, p.7.
104. PMG., p.45.
105. ART., p 45.
106. *Ibid.*, p.74.
107. *Ibid.*, p.4.
108. NR., p357.
109. ART., p 128
110. *World Religions and World Peace*, ed., Homer A. Jack, The International Inter-Religious Symposium on Peace, 1968, Preface.
111. *A Tagore Reader*, ed., Amiya Chakravarty, Beacon Press Boston, 1967, p.271.
112. Cf. Gal., 5.14; Rom., 13.9; I John, 3.11; Lev., 29.18.
113. *An Autobiography*, Introduction p. 6.
114. Cf. *Insight*, p.54. See also *ibid.*, pp.472f.
115. *A Third Collection*, pp.133-34.
116. *Method in Theology*, p. 106.

117. *Report of the Education Commission 1964-66: Education and National Development*, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Educ., Govt. of India Press, New Delhi, First Ed., 1966, p.20.
118. *Loc. cit.* The Report also speaks rightly of the importance of Ahimsa, cf. *ibid.*, p.22.

## BOOK REVIEW : I

*Human Cognition : A Multidisciplinary Perspective* (EDS.) Indramani Singh and Raja Parasuraman New Delhi/Thousand Oaks/ London:Sage Publications, 1998, pp. 372, Price Rs. 425(cloth).

The rise of the *Cognitive Paradigm* has been one of the most exciting achievements in the last 40 years in developing a framework for the scientific study of cognition, cognitive phenomena and intelligent systems. This is responsible for the dramatic shift away from Behaviorism that dominated the field since around 1913.

The emergence of the Cognitive Paradigm allowed one to study not just learning (E.C.Tolman, 1930, 1938<sup>1</sup>) but memory (F.C. Bartlett 1932<sup>2</sup>) not just speech but language (George A. Miller and Noam Chomsky, 1963, G.A. Miller 1956, 1986, N. Chomsky 1957<sup>3</sup>); and not just stimulus and response but the representations (Kenneth Craik 1943<sup>4</sup>) and processes (J.R. Anderson 1983<sup>5</sup>) that mediate them.

The paradigm eventually resulted in an integrative discipline, called *Cognitive Science*. Its objective is to study human cognition "scientifically", i.e. instead of addressing questions relating to human cognition in a purely speculative fashion, Cognitive Science formulates empirically assessable statements and theories about a wide range of mental phenomena and devises powerful falsification procedures to test them.

Cognitive Science is a product of the interaction among several disciplines- psychology, linguistics, philosophy, anthropology, neurobiology, Artificial Intelligence- all of which are engaged in understanding cognition. This interdisciplinary area has come a long way from its nascent form in the formalism of mathematical psychology through the work on language, information theory and neuroscience-with interchange among psychologists, linguists, philosophers, neuro-biologists-to the current stage of hopeful maturity.

We are beginning to appreciate Kant's contribution, what he himself called the *Copernican Revolution* in epistemology: the revolution of construing the mind as active in the accrual, construction, storage, representation, development and deployment of knowledge, in our attempts to understand and explain human intentional behaviour. This *mind's new*

science resurrected the mentalistic explanations, mental states and processes, and demonstrated their necessity, proving that the Behaviourists are wrong in their claim that mental states and processes are redundant and unscientific. Ulric Neisser says,

"The basic reason for studying cognitive processes has become as clear as the reason for studying anything else : they are there ...Cognitive processes exist, so it can hardly be unscientific to study them."

Johnson-Laird remarked that

"if cognitive Science does not exist then it is necessary to invent it".

Robert C. Richardson states,

"It was unfashionable to think we can think. Fortunately fashions Among philosophers and psychologists alike, it has once again become common to speak and think in terms of mental acts, cognitive processes, internal representations, information, interpretations, or any of a host of related conceptions when attempting to explain or understand human behaviour."

Nevertheless, some researchers have accused that Cognitive Science does not have a common research paradigm and is often treated merely as an umbrella discipline. This has provoked N.E. Sharkey to say that the experts in the constituent disciplines get together in search of research funds and confuse each other about how to proceed with their research. The remnants of the Behaviourist tradition of strict experimental control and the use of quantification still persist in certain areas of research in Cognitive Science. This led Gilbert Harman to remark that specialists in Cognitive Science often differ in their ideas about what the relevant issues are, how they should be addressed and their research paradigms are often very different. In spite of this diversity, the common concern with the issues relating to human cognition appear to unify the field. The diverse disciplines play the complementary role which provide a bond that seems to be as strong as the one binding microphysics and astrophysics together. We must see why people are not right when they reach dismissive conclusions and reject Cognitive Science as a coherent discipline.

However, in order to get a feel for what binds these disparate disciplines together it is very important that any student, researcher or professional concerned with human cognition is able to form a clear perception as to what the pertinent issues are, how they are to be addressed,

## Book Review I

and what the dominant research paradigms are. The book under review not only exhibits the richness of the contemporary research on cognition, but provides evidence for the diverse methodologies and the difficult choices that remain to be made in studying cognition.

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In the *introductory article* the editors acknowledge this *diversity in Cognitive Theory* and then go on to identify the most dominant approaches. The book does not, however, pretend to provide a comprehensive survey of the field, but does a very good job in delineating some of the most important research paradigms and areas of concern.

There are three sections in the book. The papers are grouped in terms of their relevance to the following topics:

(i) elaborating one of the most important research paradigms, viz., Cognitive Neuroscience,

(ii) providing explanations of some of the most important cognitive phenomena, viz., attention, memory, language and emotion, and

(iii) applying the cognitive paradigm to two real world issues, viz., human factors and medical education.

(i) **Cognitive Neuroscience**

Cognitive Neuroscience is an interdisciplinary field that grew out of dialogue between Cognitive Psychologists and Neuroscientists (LeDoux

117. *Report of the Education Commission 1964-66: Education and National Development*, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Educ., Govt. of India Press, New Delhi, First Ed., 1966, p.20.
118. *Loc. cit.* The Report also speaks rightly of the importance of Ahimsā, cf. *ibid.*, p.22.

## BOOK REVIEW : I

*Human Cognition : A Multidisciplinary Perspective* (EDS.) Indramani Singh and Raja Parasuraman New Delhi/Thousand Oaks/ London:Sage Publications, 1998, pp. 372, Price Rs. 425(cloth).

The rise of the *Cognitive Paradigm* has been one of the most exciting achievements in the last 40 years in developing a framework for the scientific study of cognition, cognitive phenomena and intelligent systems. This is responsible for the dramatic shift away from Behaviorism that dominated the field since around 1913.

The emergence of the Cognitive Paradigm allowed one to study not just learning (E.C.Tolman, 1930, 1938<sup>1</sup>) but memory (F.C. Bartlett 1932<sup>2</sup>) not just speech but language (George A. Miller and Noam Chomsky, 1963, G.A. Miller 1956, 1986, N. Chomsky 1957<sup>3</sup>); and not just stimulus and response but the representations (Kenneth Craik 1943<sup>4</sup>) and processes (J.R. Anderson 1983<sup>5</sup>) that mediate them.

The paradigm eventually resulted in an integrative discipline, called *Cognitive Science*. Its objective is to study human cognition "scientifically", i.e. instead of addressing questions relating to human cognition in a purely speculative fashion, Cognitive Science formulates empirically assessable statements and theories about a wide range of mental phenomena and devises powerful falsification procedures to test them.

Cognitive Science is a product of the interaction among several disciplines- psychology, linguistics, philosophy, anthropology, neurobiology, Artificial Intelligence- all of which are engaged in understanding cognition. This interdisciplinary area has come a long way from its nascent form in the formalism of mathematical psychology through the work on language, information theory and neuroscience-with interchange among psychologists, linguists, philosophers, neuro-biologists-to the current stage of hopeful maturity.

We are beginning to appreciate Kant's contribution, what he himself called the *Copernican Revolution* in epistemology: the revolution of construing the mind as active in the accrual, construction, storage, representation, development and deployment of knowledge, in our attempts to understand and explain human intentional behaviour. This *mind's new*

*science* resurrected the mentalistic explanations, mental states and processes, and demonstrated their necessity, proving that the Behaviourists are wrong in their claim that mental states and processes are redundant and unscientific. Ulric Neisser says,

"The basic reason for studying cognitive processes has become as clear as the reason for studying anything else : they are there ...Cognitive processes exist, so it can hardly be unscientific to study them."

Johnson-Laird remarked that

"if cognitive Science does not exist then it is necessary to invent it".

Robert C. Richardson states,

"It was unfashionable to think we can think. Fortunately fashions Among philosophers and psychologists alike, it has once again become common to speak and think in terms of mental acts, cognitive processes, internal representations, information, interpretations, or any of a host of related conceptions when attempting to explain or understand human behaviour."

Nevertheless, some researchers have accused that Cognitive Science does not have a common research paradigm and is often treated merely as an umbrella discipline. This has provoked N.E. Sharkey to say that the experts in the constituent disciplines get together in search of research funds and confuse each other about how to proceed with their research. The remnants of the Behaviourist tradition of strict experimental control and the use of quantification still persist in certain areas of research in Cognitive Science. This led Gilbert Harman to remark that specialists in Cognitive Science often differ in their ideas about what the relevant issues are, how they should be addressed and their research paradigms are often very different. In spite of this diversity, the common concern with the issues relating to human cognition appear to unify the field. The diverse disciplines play the complementary role which provide a bond that seems to be as strong as the one binding microphysics and astrophysics together. We must see why people are not right when they reach dismissive conclusions and reject Cognitive Science as a coherent discipline.

However, in order to get a feel for what binds these disparate disciplines together it is very important that any student, researcher or professional concerned with human cognition is able to form a clear perception as to what the pertinent issues are, how they are to be addressed.

## Book Review I

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- (ii) providing explanations of some of the most important cognitive phenomena, viz., attention, memory, language and emotion, and
- (iii) applying the cognitive paradigm to two real world issues, viz., human factors and medical education.

(i) **Cognitive Neuroscience**

Cognitive Neuroscience is an interdisciplinary field that grew out of dialogue between Cognitive Psychologists and Neuroscientists (LeDoux

and Hirst, 1986)<sup>10</sup>. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, many Cognitive Psychologists took pains to distinguish their endeavour from neuroscience under the influence of a philosophical view, known as *functionalism* (forcefully articulated later by Putnam 1975, Fodor 1983)<sup>11</sup> and an argument called **the multiple realisability argument** (Neisser 1967, pp.6-7, and made popular by Marr 1982)<sup>12</sup>. In short, it was claimed that the models of the mind could be devised independent of any consideration of the nature and function of the brain. However, this attitude changed gradually due to the success of neuroscience in clarifying issues important to the cognitive psychologists.

In the recent past considerable progress has been made in our understanding of the nervous system and brain functions based on the analysis at

- (1) the molecular level,
- (2) the cellular and intercellular level,
- (3) the behavioural level, and
- (4) the level of systemic breakdowns i.e., brain pathology

### 1. Analysis at the molecular level

At the molecular level the neuroscientists have been able to isolate and identify the specific molecules used by nerve cells for maintaining their functional identity. The information about molecules peculiar to certain classes of nerve and non-nerve cells can now be obtained from extremely specific antibodies. Moreover by using certain biophysical techniques, such as mass spectrometry, nuclear magnetic resonance and liquid chromatography, it is possible to give more detailed chemical descriptions of the nervous system.

Recent developments in genetic engineering have made it possible to isolate and describe specific proteins of certain neurons which play a role in synaptic transmission and in the functioning of the nervous system, especially peptides and receptors. The classical biochemical techniques failed to detect them.

### 2. Analysis at the cellular and intercellular level

At this level an improved understanding of the biology of nerve cells

*Book Review I*

and better insight into the molecular bases underlying communication between them have enabled us to comprehend the nature neuronal circuits. Based on the advances made in enzymology, immunology and cell physiology the neuroscientists and anatomists today can identify specific classes of cells and trace the pathways linking one neuron to another by using techniques of cell marking and staining. Our knowledge of interneuronal communication has also improved because of the insights provided by our knowledge of circuits on synaptic transmission. The synthesis and simulation of new neurotransmitters have led not only to a better understanding of certain illness and diseases, but also to devising new diagnosis and methods for their treatment as well.

### 3. Analysis at the behavioural level

In the recent past the range of techniques available to record the electrical and biochemical activities of the brain during the performance of a strictly monitored task or behaviour has improved considerably. These techniques vary from those recording unitary activity of an isolated neuron within a specific brain structure to various non-invasive techniques.

With the help of microelectrodes which register the action potentials emitted by the neuron in response to a particular stimulus it is now possible to record the electrical or biochemical activities of the brain corresponding to clearly defined behavioural tasks of freely moving subjects. However, the microelectrodes provide information only of the activity of a precisely located individual cell in the immediate vicinity of the microelectrode, but fail to give comprehensive information about brain activities involving aggregate of concurrently active neurons.

There are several non-invasive techniques that can gather electrophysiological indices for spatial and temporal distribution of brain activities, known as *event related potentials*, viz., measurement of blood flow and the local brain metabolism that reflect regional variations in brain activity, advanced brain imaging techniques, such as positron emission tomography (PET), the use of unclear magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) for obtaining images of tissue metabolism, functional MRI (fMRI),

electroencephalography (EEG), event-related potentials (ERP) etc. These highly efficient techniques enable the cognitive psychologists and neuroscientists to describe the normal mode of functioning of the brain when the subjects are at rest or enhanced in performing such tasks as memorizing, paying attention, solving problems, recognizing objects, dreaming, and so on.

An example of such research can be given from the work done in *language learning*. The instinct to learn, speak and understand language has ever remained a mysterious cognitive feat. Research in *language learning* is one of the most active areas in Cognitive Science as it goes beyond the conventional Behavioural approach that language acquisition and development is merely the result of vocabulary growth based on stimulus-response and operant conditioning. Computational Science and Technology is also extremely interested in this problem because of the need to reduce the man-machine gap so that computers become easier to interact with and the benefits of information technology are available to a much wider cross-section of people.

The Cognitive approach to language learning implies the construction of *models* in order to explain the cognitive processes that are involved and provides the *representation* of the rules at several levels that define the conditions of well-formedness of sentences, e.g. at the levels of phonology, morphology, syntax, semantics and pragmatics.

Considerable effort has been made ( by Osherson et al and Wexler et al<sup>13</sup> ) to understand the *formal properties of systems* for language acquisition. However, such *studies on learnability* must relate to natural language<sup>14</sup> and need to be supplemented by data from psycholinguistics, psychobiology<sup>15</sup>, infant studies<sup>16</sup> and the effects of the linguistic environment that illustrate the use of the experimental method in Cognitive Science, in order to

- understand the boundary conditions of the initial state of the cognitive system, e.g., infant studies,
- uncover the characteristics of language processing units across

## Book Review I

languages, e.g., the ability to discriminate phonemic categories, and

- determine at what level environmental effects, say speech perception in a multilingual environment, modify functional architecture, e.g., 'the modularity of mind.'

One of the active areas of research is infant study. Lenneberg (1967) claims that at birth the brain is equipotential and that the left hemispheric localization of language is a by-product of language acquisition. However, several other infant studies (cited in the endnote 7) carried out using PET technique with the objective of understanding the boundary conditions of the initial state of the cognitive system suggest that the brain is lateralized at birth for all languages and becomes progressively attuned to the maternal tongue. Besides, the studies reveal that from birth infants are able to discriminate foreign languages from the prosodic information present in the speech signal.

The fundamental issues mentioned above have inspired investigations into the computational aspects of language acquisition and construction of machinery which automatically acquire language. Fundamental insights into cognitive processes of language learning can lead to the development of actual *algorithms*<sup>17</sup> and *computational structures*<sup>18</sup> for lexical, syntactic, semantic and pragmatic knowledge underlying language acquisition.

In the very first article of the book *Posner* surveys the research findings in Cognitive Neuroscience relating to the structure and function of the underlying neural circuitry of the human brain which form the basis for the understanding and explanation of various cognitive processes. The findings reveal four important properties of the cognitive tasks, viz., localization, networks, attentional modulation and plasticity. The studies of the cognitive tasks mentioned in Posner's article include selective attention, lexical access and number processing. Posner shows how the imaging techniques, like PET, MRI and ERP, were used in order to detect increased local neural activity and the mechanism underlying cognitive processes.

*Rammsayer's* paper emphasizes the significance of the

pharmacopsychological approach in cognitive-neuroscience by examining the effects of drugs on the neurochemical systems in the brain that mediate specific cognition, e.g. time perception. His studies show how time estimation or temporal processing of very brief durations, say below 100 msec, are largely automatic and are based on the activity at lower level of the brain. The studies also enhance our understanding of the role played by DA (dopamine) receptor activity in the basal ganglia for the lower sensitivity to time. Therefore, the author concludes that temporal processing of very small durations is beyond cognitive control and independent of pharmacologically induced deteriorating brain mechanism and cortical arousal. However, the author maintains that discrimination or temporal processing of longer durations, say in the range of seconds or more, is primarily based on memory processes and the processing is done at a higher level of the central nervous system. Thus, the paper elucidates the mechanisms underlying temporal information processing.

In the third paper *Panicker* and *Parasuraman* review the research on the neurochemical basis of cognitive functions, for example attention. The sophisticated brain imaging techniques, such as PET, MRI, fMRI, EEG, ERP etc have provided us with a better understanding of the role of subcortical neurochemical systems in the modulation of cortical functioning. Moreover, attentional deficits that accompany such diseases as Alzheimer have also given us valuable insights into our understanding of neurochemistry of attention. The authors identify different neural mechanisms controlling specific functions for attention:

- the noradrenergic system originating in the locus ceruleus appear to perform a *general* arousal or altering of attention,
- the midbrain mesocorticolimbic and nigrostriatal dopaminergic system play a *specialized* role in activational or motoric aspects of attention, and finally
- the basal forebrain cholinergic system is responsible for the selective modulation of sensory inputs that are transmitted to the cortex via thalamocortical projections.

These systems, however, function as interacting networks operating in

## Book Review I

parallel substantiating the validity of the subsymbolic connectionist approach.

The review of research presented in the last paper of this section by *Matthews, Harley and Davies* provides a model involving two levels of explanation for extraversion and arousal effects on attentional task performance. On the one hand, the model links individual differences in arousal and extraversion to specific information processing mechanisms, such as visual attentional resources, for attention. On the other hand, the model incorporates the psychobiological interactive effects of extraversion and arousal with diurnal regulation of activity. For example, the extraverts benefit from high arousal in the morning because of the energy-intensive motor and cognitive responses at that time of the day.

#### 4. Analysis at the level of systemic breakdowns, i.e., brain pathologies:

The analysis indicates the way in which psychological functions or dementia are affected by disease, genetic disorder, neurosurgical intervention and physical injuries to the nervous system resulting in a profound deterioration in cognitive abilities. Such studies not only have obvious bearing on clinical diagnosis, treatment and rehabilitation, but also reveal the way the complex neurophysiological system breaks down and thereby provide valuable data for developing theories of cognitive function for both human beings and artificial systems as well.

The earliest impetus for the development of Cognitive Neuroscience came from the studies on adults suffering from reading and writing disorders, known as *dyslexia* (e.g. unable to read non-words, such as *Thork*, or making semantic errors in reading, such as *little* read as small.) Disorders in object recognition was another important research area. In the late 1970s David Marr developed a detailed information processing model of *object recognition*. This provided some understanding of impairment of object recognition by patients suffering from agnosia. For example, some patients are unable to classify an object, say chair, although they are capable of discriminating more elementary visual properties such as colour, shape, size and texture.

(ii) Cognitive- Neuroscientific explanations of some of the most important cognitive phenomena :

**Memory**

One area in which the interaction between the Cognitive Psychologists and the Neuroscientists have been most intense is the field of memory. The reason for this is that the question as to how information is stored and retrieved is basic to all cognitive systems. However, the two disciplines, viz., Cognitive Psychology and Neuroscience, consider what each of them take to be important and tractable questions. The interest of the Cognitive Psychologist on memory center around such question as why recognition is much better than recall, why visual material is remembered better than verbal material. On the other hand the Neuroscientist may be more concerned with questions of the following kind: what areas of the brain mediate memory? Or which brain areas are connected to which other area ? Some aspects of Neuroscience of memory may provide answers to questions posed by the Cognitive Psychologists, others may be of little relevance. The overlaps may lead to fruitful interactions, which has certainly increased over the years.

Till late 1970s the study of amnesia provided the main basis for constructing the architecture of the memory system. The information processing models of human memory distinguishes several processes of storage and retrieval, and have subdivided memory stores according to the type of information they handle. Studies on brain damage have shown that such damages have selective effects on memory. It has been found, for example, that some patients with brain damage are unable to recall past events and suffer from, what is known as *retrograde amnesia*, whereas others are unable to recall recent events. Paradoxically, however, both types of patients have little difficulty remembering words, numbers and other types of information having no relationship with particular events. This has led to the conclusion that amnesia involves impairments in storage and retrieval of *episodic* information, and not of *semantic* kind.

In the book under review, the article by *Dwivedi and Srivastava* raises the important question as to whether episodic and semantic memories are structurally and functionally independent. The author's work based on

*Book Review I*

famous and nonfamous names seem to support Tulving's contention that episodic memory is a unique extension of semantic memory, rather than a separate, parallel system<sup>19</sup>. The authors maintain that "...memory is an integrative, holistic, associationistic, conscious and cognitive structure, which calls for an interactive rather than a fully independent functional unitary system" (pp.201).

*Attention*

The other research area of Cognitive pathology covered in the book relates to *attention*, caused by Alzheimer's disease (as reported in the article by *Parasuraman and Greenwood*) and insidious onset and progressively worsening of brain functions due to normal aging (as investigated by *Fisk and Rogers*). Apart from causing loss in the *detection* efficiency, the impairment in the cortical network due to *Alzheimer's disease* and *normal aging* may also affect other cognitive abilities such as memory and learning. A comprehensive review of the research on *Alzheimer's disease* and attention (Parasuraman and Haxby, 1993)<sup>20</sup> sheds light on how such studies of brain impairments can enhance our understanding of the underlying cognitive architecture and mechanism. *Deaton* and *Parasuraman* claim that age difference shows a greater performance decrement in *monitoring* sensory, cognitive tactical or vigilance tasks. However, no overall *performance* differences are noticeable between age groups for both sensory and cognitive vigilance tasks. This has implications for monitoring efficiency in pilots of different age groups.

*Language and Communication*

At the center of the study of human cognitive system lies the study of language. The reason for this is that language is widely regarded as the distinguishing characteristic of human cognition. Moreover, language use is ubiquitous and often forms a vital component of an enormous range of human activities.

According to some cognitive scientists (Pinker, 1994)<sup>21</sup>, the *instinct* to learn, speak and understand language explains the remarkable communicative ability so characteristic of human species. The ability to use language normally involves the ability to deploy knowledge of words and grammatical rules in the service of communication intent. If the relevant

genes, neurons or the identifiable part of the brain are disrupted, linguistic ability suffers while the other parts of intelligence carry on.

Studies on patients suffering from *Broca's aphasia* show that our knowledge of words is subdivided into semantic categories. For example, some patients have relatively preserved vocabulary for concrete words while others for abstract words. Similarly, the ability to structure speech grammatically can be impaired, a condition called *agrammatism*, even though general vocabulary is relatively preserved.

In his paper *G.C. Gupta* emphasizes the factors that are different from the biological ones. Some researchers<sup>22</sup> have claimed that apart from the biological factors, which provided the main basis for Chomsky's *theory of competence*, there are *contextual macro-and micro-environmental* or *ecological* factors that contribute in shaping the language faculty in natural language generation based on human interaction in non-imaginary societies. These factors have effects on several aspects of language use and competence, such as translation, deep structure and idioms. Hence, the limits of *language-universal*, (i.e., those properties of grammar which are universally available to a child by virtue of his innate ability for language or understood to form part of the biological endowment of the mind/brain system with an initial state  $S_0$  common to the species) needs to be compared with such language specific knowledge and processes that result in subsequent relatively stable steady state. Gupta uses the *competition model*<sup>23</sup> to explain cross-linguistic data in a linguistically diverse society, such as India, in order to justify his claim that "the change from the initial state of the *universal grammar* to the *acquired grammar* involves a process of enrichment of the language faculty constrained by the UG template" (pp.209)

Analysis of the acquisition of linguistic skills involves three levels : (a) biological, defining the boundary conditions of the initial state of the cognitive system, (b) sub-symbolic activation for the lexical access, and (c) the symbolic representation.

### **Emotion**

*Stewart and Singh* also emphasize factors other than biological ones in their study on facial emotions. Non-verbal communication through

*Book Review I*

*recognition and production of facial expressions* is a basic cognitive mechanism for social interaction<sup>24</sup>. Studies show that mentally retarded children and people with psychiatric disorder are found to lack the skill to recognize and produce facial expressions. Such lack of skill may not necessarily be caused by neurological impairment or function, rather it may be due to the inability to acquire the relevant processing routines or formal operational rules. Stewart and Singh claim that such skills in social interaction require the "ability to translate visual representations of the face into verbal representations (Comprehension of emotion) and verbal representations (instructions) into motor codes necessary to produce facial expression". The authors maintain that deficits in such skills can be remedied through instructions, training and directed rehearsal of the distinguishing features of the six basic facial expressions of emotion.

(iii) **applying the cognitive paradigm to two real world issues, viz., human factors and medical education.**

*Automation and Human Factors*

Modern control systems use advanced information technology for providing support to human decision making during supervisory control tasks and emergency management. Models of human information-processing abilities and limitations are prerequisites for the basic conceptual design of such systems.

The experience with early computer installations aiding human beings in their supervisory control tasks clearly indicated the pressing need for an analysis of operator's *cognitive* tasks and guidelines for *interface design*. The developments in psychology and AI, i.e., the transition in psychological research away from Behaviourism and the preoccupation of the early research in AI with games and theorem proving, did not provide the necessary guidelines for the analysis of cognitive tasks and interface design. The researchers in this area had to rely on the verbal protocols derived from real work situations in order to develop the conceptual framework.

Broadbent (1971)<sup>25</sup> suggested a model of human information processing and identified three distinct mechanisms: perceptual encoding, translation process, and response selection and execution. In this model Man-Machine interaction can be seen as a complex, multidimensional

demand-resource matching process tuning of the sensorimotor schemata of the internal cognitive model to the time-space features in the environment. Breakdowns in such interaction take place whenever human-machine or human-task mismatches occur. For example, Broadbent and Sternberg (1969)<sup>26</sup> considered the influence of stress on the elements in the information process model. In order to try out these models it was necessary to perform experiments involving real tasks. The classic experiment that did precisely this was the one carried out by Bartlett (1943)<sup>27</sup> based on his analysis of the influence of fatigue on pilot performance.

The paper by *Indramani Singh et al* reveals another mechanism, viz., improper human adaptation to system changes, responsible for Man-Machine mismatch. Ironically this type of Man-Machine mismatch takes place in highly automated systems, e.g., automated cockpits, due to the pilot's loss of active adaptive control resulting from complacency or automation induced monitoring inefficiency. The most important effect of complacency or monitoring inefficiency is that they interfere with conscious attention, higher-level co-ordination and the smooth operation of cognitive processes. Under normal conditions the pilot perceives instrument indications as a whole and relates control actions to overall performance of the aircraft. Complacency of the pilot due to a highly automated cockpit results in the dissociation of the *stimulus field and actions* and hence loss of active adaptive control and automation induced monitoring inefficiency.

The next paper by *Ambardar* relates to the general area of investigation known as *Human-Computer interaction*. Ambardar in this paper addresses herself to the problem of interface design and the role supposedly played in interface design by individual cognitive styles and fundamental individual differences.

Human -Computer-Interaction (HCI) is often viewed as a typical human activity. Any human activity is considered to be goal directed. And the goals are linked with *tasks* and the solution of the *problems* that are given to a person or are developed by him/her. Hence, *besides task analysis*, HCI includes various aspects of *problem solving* as well. In order to achieve his goal the operator in the context of HCI is required to solve two types of problems: (i) the content problem, i.e., the task to be

*Book Review I*

performed, and (ii) the interaction problem, appropriate use of the computer system to facilitate the realization of the tasks to be performed.

While the content problem requires domain knowledge, Cognitive Science provides a framework for HCI based on the relevant *cognitive functions, viz., perception, language, inference and memory, and action*. In HCI the major perceptual information comes from the visual display unit or terminal. There are studies relating to this aspect of HCI that are concerned with visual search or readability of computer displays influenced by differences in display modes e.g., menu. The comparison of the different modes is dependent on their capabilities in arranging and structuring information during visual search. Obviously, visual search is highly dependent on the *subjective* organization of meaningful material. The problem to determine what might be the optimal principle of organization of menus requires search on semantic categories and memory structure in general. In this the study of certain perceptual cues together with general characteristics of the visual system is not enough. It is necessary to supplement such studies by further investigations into general aspects of memory structures, domain-specific knowledge representation. In addition one must incorporate in the interface design features pertaining to individual cognitive styles.

In the next paper *Patel and Arocha* undertake a cognitive psychological study of medical expertise and the characteristic form of reasoning used as strategies for arriving at a diagnosis as part of the general investigation into our understanding of medical cognition. They claim that clinical expertise is domain specific to the extent that the relevant cognitive processes and their modes, viz., reasoning, knowledge representation, perception, comprehension, problem solving and decision-making, differ in important ways not only between experts in medicine and in other domains but also between expert and novices and between the novices and intermediates in medicine itself. Whereas the knowledge representation structure in other domains generally conforms to rule-based representation, in medical expertise semantic network representation is found to be more common. Moreover, the investigations into the nature of diagnostic reasoning reveals that the medical experts normally use forward-directed reasoning while dealing with routine problems, but resort to backward-directed

reasoning when they are confronted with complex problems or abnormalities in the clinical data or what the authors call dealing with "loose-ends". Besides, the authors observe that hypothesis generation and evaluation for the experts take place at an earlier point in the diagnostic process, but the interpretation of case information by the novice and intermediates is guided by text-books. The heuristics for advanced students involves more encompassing diagnostic hypothesis, which indicates a shift from depth-first strategies.

*Kaufman and Patel* in the next paper are concerned with the cognitive psychological research on expert-novice comparison, but from a different point of view. Their main concern is to assess one dominating paradigm in knowledge representation research, viz., mental model. Their research findings show that the change, revision or progression of mental models is a function of expertise. The authors in their case study on understanding cardiovascular and circulatory physiology maintain that transition from novice to expert can be construed as a process of model evolution in which students develop increasingly elaborate and consistent mental models adequate for solving increasingly complex problems involving intricate causal reasoning and increasingly robust knowledge structures as opposed to models that are fragmentary and isolated. The improved models and the related graphs must exhibit functional relationships, the relevant causal reasoning and advanced knowledge pertaining to cardiac output, venous return and the fluid mechanical properties of the cardiovascular system than the naive models.

In the final paper *Sivaramakrishnan and Patel* report the findings of their study on the mechanism involved in the revision of belief from naive, folk, commonsense everyday knowledge held by womenfolk in rural India encapsulated in the traditional medicines relating to the major childhood nutritional problem, viz., protein energy malnutrition, to explanations provided by biomedical models. The study was conducted in rural south India where the mother's concept of child nutrition is based on *Siddha* and *Ayurveda* systems of traditional medicine. The mechanism of the revision and restructuring of knowledge from folk knowledge, which is more story-like, to relevant biomedical knowledge with increasing differentiation and without any radical change in concepts, has been referred to as weak restructuring

## Book Review I

of knowledge.<sup>28</sup> The traditional knowledge, say about the use of herbs to treat indigestion associated with childhood malnutrition, could be part of this weak restructuring and may also be beneficial. As opposed to this a radical or strong restructuring would involve increased schooling and presentation of the new theory alone, ignoring what one already knows. Implications of such findings may have significant impact on instructional strategies, which aim at modifying the existing traditional approaches by replacing some of the unfounded conceptual connections by ones that are justified.

Although in the introductory essay the editors dwell on the Indian tradition in the study of cognition, there is hardly any contribution from that tradition. One would have expected some contribution, especially the work on the concept of language accessor or *anuseraka* that has emerged based on the *Paninian* framework of *Karakas* representing semantico-syntactic relations. These relations play a crucial role in mediating between surface structure and meaning and can lead to a study of free word order languages. Since most of the human languages have free word order this approach has the potential to overcome the language barrier in this country but other world languages as well.

Nevertheless this book has much to recommend itself. It is a great relief to see a book in Cognitive Science that provides much scientific content and eschews the facetious patter, which characterises some of the writings in this area. This is indeed a good book for the students, researchers, teachers and scholars. All of them, I am sure, will derive much benefit from the survey of the various paradigms, research tools and research areas that are covered by the book.

AMITABHA GUPTA

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## BOOK REVIEW : II

Alston, William P. : *Illocutionary Acts and Sentence Meaning*, 2000, Ithaca (N.Y.), Cornell University Press, PP. xvi+325 (HB)

This book is a recent addition to the bewildering variety and diversity in philosophical literature that is available on the subject of linguistic meaning which has been in a way at the centre of the stage during the 20th century. But it deals with the problem of linguistic meaning in a distinctively novel way. What was adumbrated in his around 40 years old but small work viz. *Philosophy of Language* (Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1964) has now received a fuller treatment and exposition of a perspective that is analytic and critical. The book is meant exclusively for those who are interested in the philosophical analysis of the problem and not for those who are of intuitionistic and mystical persuasions. Taking language as an object of philosophic inquiry and considering seriously the limits and drawbacks of ordinary language and further labouring under some philosophical assumptions, many philosophers have indulged in Reform of Language Programmes or again there have been those influenced by later Wittgenstein or by J.L. Austin who think that ordinary language is quite alright. But surely there is one important question that has bothered philosophers all along and which keeps them bothering still is: How does any linguistic expression, whether word or sentence, become meaningful and whether communication, ordinary or on some special purpose, must have some or the other philosophical presuppositions concerning linguistic meaning? Even before any one asserts truth of any proposition whatsoever, question of its meaningfulness has taken priority in recent philosophical developments and many philosophers have been forced to develop an explicit theory as to what it is for any linguistic expression to have a certain meaning and under what conditions two different expressions can be said to have the same meaning. Many philosophers have indulged in what is called 'Ontology of Meanings'. The major question according to Alston is: 'What are we saying about a linguistic expression when we specify its meaning?' or 'How is the concept of linguistic meaning to be analysed?' This is a philosophical question and Alston tries to tackle with it through a good deal of conceptual analysis.

Before we get to Alston's analysis, a few preliminaries will not be out of place. Firstly, it is important to note that when we speak of linguistic meaning we are talking about words, phrases or sentences. The expression 'mean' itself in English language is used to do various things. There are several uses to which that expression is put. In his 1964 book, viz. *Philosophy of Language* (already referred to above) Alston starts with showing at least ten such uses which have nothing to do with linguistic meaning of that word. He then went on to show how oversimplification and some philosophical (or/and metaphysical) presuppositions have marred the project of presenting a reasonably accurate account of (or analysis of) linguistic meaning as a function of what members of community do with the linguistic expressions. In order to present such an analysis, the promising place to start with would be speaker himself. The three types of theories which have been prominently canvassed by thinkers in the field viz. Referential, Ideational, and Behaviorial- have failed to see this because they have either supposed that the speaker does not do anything more than merely utter the expression, phrase, or sentence or else they have ignored the speaker altogether in the search of locating linguistic meaning elsewhere, i.e. in the referent or idea or some behaviorial criteria. Alston recognizes the insights contained in the three types of the theories but, as it happens with several theories, it's the failure that becomes more eloquent than the mere insights. The theory which Alston puts forth in the book under review exploits the insights of both Wittgenstein and Austin, certainly goes beyond them and comes up with reasonably good account of what linguistic meaning is, until critics come up with its defects and difficulties. The present review is restricted to its presentation.

Alston's analysis begins with J.L. Austin's famous distinction between 'locutionary speech act', 'illocutionary speech act' and perlocutionary speech act 'made by Austin in his posthumously published small book *How To Do Things with Words*' (Oxford, 1962). The first category includes three levels: phonetic, phatic and rhetic. The phonetic act is the act of merely uttering certain noises. The phatic act is the uttering of certain vocables or words; rhetic act is the performance of an act of using those vocables with a certain more or less definite sense and reference.

*Book Review II*

These are not distinct acts on the same level but are nested inside each other. Let us say they constitute successive strata of a complete locutionary act. The phatic level is identified by Austin as sentential act- the act of uttering roughly what we call sentence. An illocutionary act, for Austin, is the act of issuing a locution with a certain force, e.g. force of a question, or a warning or a promise. To perform a perlocutionary act is to produce certain effects on audience by one's utterance. The three types of speech acts form strata- the perlocutionary presupposes illocutionary which in turn presupposes locutionary but not vice versa. On the basis of this trichotomy of Austin, Alston develops his own trichotomy of speech-acts: sentential acts, illocutionary acts and perlocutionary acts. These three are three different types of speech acts. I shall not go into the details of these three but concentrate on Illocutionary speech acts which are crucial for Alston in his analysis of linguistic meaning. Alston's trichotomy, like that of Austin, is also stratified : perlocutionary presupposes illocutionary which in turn presupposes sentential act. Illocutionary acts presuppose sentential acts but not vice versa. Perlocutionary acts presuppose sentential acts but not vice versa. Thus the relations between the three types of speech acts are asymmetrical. In bringing out the centrality of illocutionary speech act, Alston first works out illocutionary act concept - a concept the application of which to a person makes explicit the content of his utterance. It is a concept the application of which to a person constitutes an oratio obliqua report. Taking into account what endows an utterance with a certain content, Alston contemplates five distinct types or categories of illocutionary speech acts. These constitute what he calls total illocutionary act field. The five categories and the variety of acts performed under each of them are as follows:

1. Assertives : allege, report, insist, claim, maintain, answer, agree, concede, remark, mention announce, testify, remind, admit, disclose, deny, complain, predict, state...
2. Directives: ask, request, beseech, implore, tell, command, enjoin, order, forbid, advise, recommend, suggest, propose...
3. Commissives : Promise, bet, guarantee, invite, offer, pledge, swear...

4. Expressives: thank, apologize, commiserate, compliment, congratulate, express: enthusiasm, contempt, interest, relief, desire, willingness, intention, opinion, opposition, agreement, determination, unhappiness, delight, hatred, pleasure, pain...
5. Exercitives : adjourn, postpone, appoint, pardon, name, nominate, bequeath, sentence, hire, fire, approve..

This is just a small sample of what falls under each category. Assertives are ways of putting forward a proposition, its truthclaim- asserting a proposition. Directives are concerned with guiding the behaviour of others. Commissives commit the speaker to a certain line of action. Expressives express some psychological state of the speaker. Exercitives are verbal exercises of authority, verbal ways of altering the "social status" of something-an act that is made possible by one's social or institutional role or status.

While sentential acts must be performed in order to perform illocutionary speech acts, the latter cannot be reduced to doing something with an intention to produce effects on hearers, i.e. on audience. Stephen R. Schiffer, in his *Meaning* (Oxford, 1972) had taken perlocutionary speech acts- concentrating on hearer effects- had indulged in reducing illocutionary acts to perlocutionary ones. Alston argues at length to show why such reduction cannot be effected. He also rejects Grice's account of meaning, which makes speaker's utterance- i.e. its meaning a function of what kind of effect the speaker intended to produce on his audience. As against this Alston claims that to perform an illocutionary act of certain type is to give one's utterance (sentential act) a certain normative status. Alston puts this initially puts this initially in terms of *taking responsibility* for certain conditions to hold while making utterance of sentence. e.g. To ask someone to open a certain door is to issue utterance, taking responsibility for its being the case that the door in question is closed and that the speaker is interested in getting it opened. The relevant notion of *taking responsibility* for satisfaction of certain conditions is initially explored in terms of rendering oneself liable to correction, blame, reproach, or sanctions in case the conditions in question are not satisfied. Alston argues that such liability presupposes *rules* in the background. It is when one's utterance is subject

## Book Review II

to rules that require satisfaction of certain conditions for correct utterance that one is liable to negative reactions in case the conditions are not satisfied. All this discussion is prompted and studded with insights drawn from Searle's analysis of 'making a promise'. We have here an analysis- though tentative, yet reasonable- which touches on the normative aspects involved in semantic enterprise of our day-to-day language world. Every now and then we take responsibility for the satisfaction of condition, 'C' in terms of uttering a sentence as subject to a rule that requires 'C' as a condition for correct utterance. In a fairly unified pattern of analysis for illocutionary act types in all categories, Alston tries to show how in all categories except assertives, to perform an illocutionary act of a particular type is simply to perform a sentential act, taking responsibility for the holding of certain conditions. Different particular types are distinguished by the detailed content of those conditions, while the major categories are distinguished by the general pattern of the conditions for which one takes responsibility. Thus an exercitive involves taking responsibility for one's having a certain kind of authority, while a commissive involves one's having a certain intention. As for assertives though there too what one takes responsibility for is heart of the matter, it is also required that one's sentential vehicle, if one is not speaking elliptically, presents the propositional content in a fully explicit fashion. All this constitutes part I of his work.

With this foundational work on illocutionary speech acts, Alston proceeds to build up his analysis of linguistic meaning. He takes sentential meaning to be primary. Firstly he reiterates his observation that the word 'mean' and its cognates spread over a considerable stretch of semantic territory but a lot of that is excluded by the fact that our issue concerns the meanings of linguistic expressions. A linguistic expression is a constituent of a language; hence it is something of an abstract order; something that can have many realizations of different sorts. Expression in this context is thus a *type* and not a *token*. Alston also makes it clear that by utterance of a linguistic expression he covers any employment of language., i.e. speech, writing or any other means. He avoids any suggestion that each expression has only one meaning. Nor does he assume that all linguistic meanings are completely precise or determinate.

Alston's main thesis is that *sentence meaning is a matter of*

*illocutionary act potential*. In order to defend the thesis, in part II of the book, he has to make several theoretical moves. His objective is to show that for a sentence to mean so-and-so is for it to be usable (standardly) to perform illocutionary acts of a certain type and that this is the basic way in which the semantic aspect of language as an abstract system is a function of what speakers of language do in their communicative use of it. It should be noted here that since Alston's lodestar for semantics is the idea that the meaning of a linguistic unit is a function of what it is used by speakers to do (The Use Principle), the appropriate entry point for the elucidation of the nature of meaning has to do with the units that can be used to perform complete speech acts and these are sentences or lesser units doing duty as ellipticals for sentences. (These are referred to as sentence surrogates). Alston argues for the priority of sentence meaning to the concept of word meaning and considers it to be quite compatible with the priority of words to sentences in the description of the semantic structure of any language. For developing his thesis, Alston sets up the following axioms whose truth is not, and cannot be, a matter of debate.

- A.1 A fluent speaker of a language *ipso facto* knows the meanings of many of the expressions of that language.
- A.2. The fact that an expression has a certain meaning is what it enables to play a distinctive role in communication.
- A.3. Knowledge of the meaning of the sentence uttered is the linguistic knowledge hearer needs in order to understand what is being said.
- A.4. The meaning of a sentence is a function of the meanings of its constituents plus relevant facts about its structure.
- A.5. Reference is, usually, only partly determined by meaning.
- A.6. The truth conditions of a statement are at least partly determined by the meaning(s) of the sentence used to make that statement.

I shall not go into details of their justification but will remark that they provide a sort of theoretical setting for the genuine comprehension of Alston's theory. It is on this setting that one has to decipher what Alston is

## Book Review II

looking for in a theory of meaning. He highlights the point that the kind of theory which he has developed is ontological in character. He is seeking to understand what it is for a sentence to have a certain meaning. His sole concern is with the ontological status of semantic facts- what kind of fact is the fact that a sentence or any other kind of linguistic unit means what it does. His quest is not method for discovering the meaning of linguistic expressions, much less a method for discovering the semantics of a language. His is not a reductionist analysis. He is not looking for a criterion or a discovery procedure that will enable us to determine the meaning of a given expression. His enterprise is a sort of quest for an adequate theoretical characterization of a certain "phenomenon" or a fruitful account of the kind of fact that constitutes an expression's meaning something or other. For accomplishing this, Alston has of course to qualify his Illocutionary act potential account in a significant way. This he has to do in order to prevent a possible implication that for every difference in IA potential there is difference in meaning. It is obvious that a sentence can be used with one and the same meaning to perform illocutionary acts of many different types; e.g. the sentence 'The door is open' can be used with one and the same meaning to perform illocutionary acts of the following types and many many more :

1. Asserting of a certain door that it is open.
2. Asserting that the only kitchen door of speaker's residential flat is open.
3. Admitting that the door which the speaker was supposed to close was left open by him.
4. Expressing surprise that the door is open when speaker himself had closed it a short while ago.

.....and so on and so forth.

To accommodate this obvious possibility Alston introduces the concept of a *matching illocutionary act* for a given sentence meaning and purports to claim that an illocutionary act type matches a given sentence meaning if and only if a hearer thereby knows that the speaker intended to perform an illocutionary act of that type. Thus the matching illocutionary type for the normal meaning of 'the door is open' is one above but it will

be three above if the act is of admission. IA potential thesis thus says that for a sentence to have a certain meaning is for it to perform illocutionary acts of matching type. The distinction between illocutionary force and the content of the speech act helps us to identify the matching type to which the illocutionary act belongs.

To talk of illocutionary acts the way Alston does- the content, the force, illocutionary act types and IA potential- all grounded in the Use Principle of Wittgenstein one should not be disposed to think that there is no rule-governance to which the semantic territory is subject. Quite the contrary. Alston does admit that there are illocutionary rules (I-Rules) which regulate semantic enterprise. To perform an illocutionary act of a certain type is to utter a sentence (or sentence surrogate) as subject to a rule that requires the satisfaction of certain conditions for permissible utterance. What gives sentence a potential for being used or usable to perform illocutionary act of a certain type is its being governed by a certain I-rule. Alston puts in a considerable effort to investigate in detail such I-rules and finds that a number of thorny issues have got to be resolved before we have a satisfactory schema for the formulation of such rules. This mission can never be complete by its very nature since living language is an open system replacing old uses and bringing in ever-fresh new ones. Semantic investigations and dictionaries of words and phrases require revisions again and again. Living languages reflect forms of life just for this reason. It would be also interesting to see whether the I-Rules are 'regulative' rules or constitutive principles. Philosophers are familiar with this distinction since Kant's times but with regard to speech acts it was John Searle who had introduced this distinction in his work *Speech Acts* (1969) and had opined that constitutive rules bulk large in the semantics of any natural language. Alston does not deny the constitutive role played by illocutionary rules but at the same time argues that these two are not disjoint classes of rules. The same rule can be termed correctly- regulative or constitutive- depending on what we think of it as governing. Alston's I-rules regulate sentential acts but are constitutive as well of illocutionary acts. They give conditions of the permissible utterance of sentences and by uttering a sentence as subject to such regulative rule, the utterance is thereby constituted as an illocutionary act of a certain type. But what is, it

*Book Review II*

may be asked, the mode of reality these rules have? Since these are not formulated anywhere in clear cut fashion, what is it for such rules to be in force in the society which uses the language for communication? Can they be considered as mere conventions? These matters also receive attention at the hands of Alston. He brings out 'the rule vs. convention' debate in recent philosophical literature and prefers to speak of rules since they are the base of his analysis. Conventions are there but they supervene on meaning. As such they can be regulative but not constitutive. I have mentioned that for Alston rules are regulative as also constitutive depending on what they are taken by us to govern. Hence appeal to conventions rather than to rules is not a live option open to Alston. I shall not stay long on this point. There are deeper differences between Alston's analysis of linguistic meaning and the accounts of linguistic meaning given by those who rely more on conventions.

Finally Alston defends his view of linguistic meaning as superior to its rivals. The view that sentence meaning is illocutionary act potential may be objected to on a few grounds. The objections are stated by Alston and they are ably answered. Alston makes it clear that his perspective concentrates on what speakers of the language do, not on what effects the illocutionary acts have on hearers. He is careful enough to make a fine distinction between speaker's meaning and linguistic meaning. His approach is not that of a linguist. Special attention is given to referential theories of varying degrees of sophistication and to truth condition theories. Alston argues ably that all these rivals suffer from disabilities from which his IA potential theory of sentence meaning is free. But to cover all this in a small review like this would be too strenuous job. Alston's theory may be named as 'Philosophical Naturalism in the field of Semantics' or on Quine's lines as 'Semantics Naturalised'.

-S. V. BOKIL

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## NATURE OF THE SUBJECT THAT OWNS STATES OF CONSCIOUSNESS

SURESH CHANDRA

If Descartes and the Christian theologians are accepted, then animals are qualitatively different from human beings. Animals lack consciousness. Consciousness is something that is a special virtue of human beings. A Newton and a Russell share this virtue with a fisherman and a horse-rider, but not with a fish or a horse. The rigid distinction between human beings and animals is as old as the *Old Testament*. God informs the newly created man, 'I am putting you in charge of the fish, the birds, and all the wild animals.' May be, since man has come to own the earth, he also owns what grows and moves on the earth. Though God created both, the fish and the fisherman, he did not create fish in his own image. Animals were deprived of the image of God. As the *Old Testament* tells us, 'God created human beings, making them to be like himself.'<sup>2</sup> If God had created animals also in his own image, perhaps it would have been quite difficult for the man to treat animals in the fashion in which he liked. Perhaps there would have arisen "moral guilt" in him if he decided to torture or kill an animal. The concept of the "Image of God" can be given a Cartesian interpretation. What is meant is simply that men have consciousness, animals do not. Therefore the possibility of torturing an animal is ruled out, for torture presupposes having of pain. But animals are mere automata, they are very like machines without owning mind. The domain, not only of Ethics, but also of Bio-Ethics, is restricted to the horizon of men. Animals are excluded from both these domains. Concerning the aim of Descartes, Hookway thinks that 'his aim was to provide foundations for science and religion by refuting Scepticism.'<sup>3</sup> It is not so much the discovery of mind or

*Indian Philosophical Quarterly* XXX No 3  
July 2003

consciousness, but its restriction to human beings that has provided a secure foundation to religion. Descartes has undoubtedly helped religions more than helping science.

The *Old Testament* uses the "image of God" as the principle that demarcates human beings from animals. It is possible to imagine that God had not created man in his own image, that he created man also in the same fashion in which he created animals. In that situation men would not have been demarcated from fishes, horses, birds etc. Would that situation have favoured man or disfavoured him? Obviously, in that situation there would have been no civil society, no crimes and punishment, no sins and no kind of Commandments to guide the human life. A man would have been as free or as much in bondage as a fish or a horse. God wished man to be quite unlike a beast, therefore, he imposed his own image on him. He wished to use man to look after his creation. The very purpose of his creation would have been defeated, if the man had not been created in the image of God.

The early Indian and Greek thinking was quite unlike the early Jewish and Christian thinking on the nature of man and his relationship with such things as fishes, birds and plants. The early thinkers from both India and Greece posited "soul" as the subject of consciousness. Material bodies, by definition, were deprived of consciousness. Once the soul enters into a material body, the body becomes conscious. And as soon as the soul departs from the body, the body is dead, it has lost all consciousness. These early thinkers did not find any qualitative distinction between the bodies of human beings and the bodies of animals. If there was any distinction, it was quantitative. The complexities of a human body were missing in the body of a fish or a horse. If the "Image of God" demarcated men from fishes, birds and plants, "the principle of soul" assimilated men to fishes, birds and plants.

Concerning the place of human body, in the scheme of bodies, early Wittgenstein exhibits a view that is similar to the view of the early Indian and Greek thinkers. In his *Notebooks* Wittgenstein remarks, 'The human body.... is a part of the world among others, among beasts, plants, stones etc. etc.'<sup>14</sup> This realisation does not occur to us because of our philosophical prejudices. 'Whoever realises this will not want to procure a pre-eminent

place for his own body or for the human body... He will regard humans and beasts quite naively as objects which are similar and which belong together.<sup>5</sup> The *Old Testament* certainly gave a pre-eminent place for the human body by creating it in the image of God. Wittgenstein brings humans and beasts together by observing qualitative identity between them. The later Wittgenstein brought humans further closer to the beasts by distinguishing them from stones, chairs etc. He wished to see whether a stone can have a pain, so that it would be possible for us to say that a stone has a soul. He reacts... 'can we say of the stone that it has a soul and that is what has the pain? What has a soul, or pain, to do with a stone?'<sup>6</sup> It is obvious, if a stone cannot have a soul, consciousness cannot be ascribed to it. It is only about humans and beasts that one can say that they have souls, and therefore, they are the proper subjects for the ascription of experiences. Consider further the following remark. 'Look at a stone and imagine it having sensations. - One says to oneself How could one so much as get the idea of ascribing a *sensation* to a *thing*? One might as well ascribe it to a number! - And now look at a wriggling fly and at once these difficulties vanish and pain seems able to get a foothold here, where before everything was, so to speak, too smooth for it.'<sup>7</sup> Wittgenstein finds a "wriggling fly" quite like a man "writhing with pain", and both are quite unlike a stone or a number.

If the body of a beast is qualitatively like the body of a human being then there is no reason to prohibit a soul from entering into the body of a beast. The body of a beast is as good a house for the soul as is the body of a human being. Plato cites cases where souls preferred the bodies of beasts over the bodies of human beings. In the myth of Er, Book X of the *Republic*, Er narrates, 'he saw the soul, which had once been that of Orpheus, choosing the life of a swan... And he saw the soul of Thamyras choosing the life of a nightingale. He saw also a swan changing its nature, and selecting the life of a man, and its example was followed by other animals.'<sup>8</sup> Thus fishes may prefer in their next birth to become fishermen, horses to become horse-riders and the hunted to become hunters. And the fishermen, horse-riders and hunters may follow the opposite course. The myth has many lessons to teach. The most important lesson is that we should not restrict the ascription of consciousness only to human beings. For the reason that

the animals are as good claimants for the ascription of consciousness as are the human beings. We unhesitatingly ascribe consciousness to Orpheus and Thamyras. But we should do the same to the swan and the nightangle. For the reason that the soul of Orpheus now resides in the swan, and that of Thamyras in the nightangle. We ascribe consciousness to the souls, and not to the bodies, be they the bodies of Orpheus and Thamyras or those of the swan and the nightangle.

Not only Plato's views on the relation between soul and the body, but also his theory of ideas and the theory of knowledge, had their source in Pythagoras. As Russell points out, 'When Plato is mentioned one thinks at once of the theory of ideas. It is set out by Socrates in several dialogues... Its origins are Pythagorean.' Similarly, Plato's view that knowing is remembering (recollecting) is directly based on the transmigration of the soul. As Russell points out on this issue, 'As for the notion of remembering or amnesia, it is based on the view that the soul goes through a series of alternate embodied and disembodied states, a view that has obvious links with the theory of transmigration as held by Pythagoras. The disembodied soul is as if asleep, and that is why, when it is in a waking and embodied state, what it has learned in a previous existence must be awakened too.' Plato's acceptance of the transmigration has been interpreted by Russell in his own way. According to Russell a soul is conscious, or consciousness could be ascribed to it, only when it is embodied. So body plays the dominant role for a soul to become conscious. Perhaps Russell means to say that a soul cannot see if there are no eyes, it cannot hear if there are no eardrums, it cannot smell if there is no nose, and so on. Consciousness has a necessary connection with the existence of a body. But how would a disembodied soul be rewarded or punished? What is the meaning of reward if one does not enjoy it? So also what is the meaning of punishment if one does not suffer it? Interpreting the myth of Er, Flew comments, 'At the end of one life souls are dispatched for reward or punishment as the case may be. But these rewards and punishment come to an end, and afterwards the souls have to start new lives in new bodies, and so on, indefinitely.' If Flew is right then the disembodied souls too have to be conscious.

If one studies the views of Plato and Pythagoras one would feel that the East was in contact with the West long before Alexander's invasion

*Nature of The Subject That Owns States of Consciousness* 361

of India. There is a good amount of similarity between the views of Pythagoras and Plato and the ancient Hindu thinkers on some fundamental philosophico-religious issues. Even socio-political issues are not ruled out. The Pythagorean Platonic three-fold division of society coincides with the Vedic four-fold division of society. Since Pythagoras and Plato do not consider slaves as humans belonging to human society, which stops them to reach the four-fold division, they stop at three-fold division. Referring to the Pythagorean division of society, Russell remarks, 'We have a division of men into three ways of life. Just as there are three kinds of men who come to attend the Olympic games, so there are three kinds of men in society. At the lowest level, there are those who come to buy and sell : next we have those who take part in the contest, and finally we have the spectators who come to see, the theoreticians in the literal sense. These last correspond to the philosophers. The philosophic way of life is the only one which holds out some hope for transcending the fortuities of existence, it provides an escape from the wheel of birth. For, according to the Pythagoreans, the soul is subject to a sequence of transmigrations.'<sup>12</sup>

The question of slavery would naturally attract attention in this context. Those who came to 'buy and sell' were certainly not slaves, though they belonged to the lowest segment of society. They were business men of some sort. Perhaps the slaves were not allowed to attend the Olympic games, in either of the three capacities, therefore, they were not considered by the Pythagoreans as human beings performing any sort of social function. If this is true then the Greeks were more extremists than the Hindus who allowed Śūdras to occupy their position in the Varna-hierarchy.

A Hindu would be attracted towards the Pythagorean interest in 'escaping from the wheel of birth' and the means to be adopted for such an escape. To obtain liberation from the wheel of birth, according to Hinduism, is to obtain Mokṣa. The path of knowledge, in Hinduism, has been one of the most favoured means for obtaining Mokṣa, corresponding to the Pythagorean 'philosophic way of life.' There is reference to three means for obtaining liberation, knowledges (gyan), action (karma) and devotion (bhakti). The Vedantins claim that action and devotion in themselves would not lead to liberation. Action and devotion are simply means for producing knowledge, and it is ultimately knowledge that would liberate a

man from the wheel of birth and death.

Contemplation about the meeting point between the Pythagorean thinking and the Indian thinking is relevant. Egypt seems to be such a point. There is convincing evidence that India had sea-trade with Egypt even before the Greeks started emerging as the sea-traders or the Intellectual victors. It is said about both Pythagoras and Plato that they visited Egypt. Pythagoras left his native town in the island of Samos, and before settling down in Croton which is situated in the mainland, he visited Egypt. The story is repeated in the case of Plato. He travelled to many places after the execution of Socrates in 399 B.C., and before his setting down in Athens in 387 B.C. Like Pythagoras, Plato is supposed to have visited Egypt during this period. The other Greek philosophers of that age, the Milesians, namely, Thales, Anaximander and Anaximenes, who never visited Egypt, developed views quite unlike the views of Pythagoras.

Pythagoras is supposed to have obtained his source-material on Mathematics from Egypt. But the source of his metaphysics could not be Egypt. Egypt, which gave so much importance to the bodies, which buried its dead in the Pyramids, could not have led the Pythagoreans to believe in the independence of the soul from the body. The transmigration of souls or the division of society into rigid classes are peculiarly Indian concepts. Egypt may perhaps be the place from where the Indian thinking migrated to Greece. Intellectual achievements of a people are also a form of goods which the traders carry from one place to the other. Concerning the contact of the Greeks with the East during the days of its sea-trading activity, Russell remarks, 'From the middle of the eighth to the middle of the sixth century B.C. the shores of Sicily, Southern Italy, and the Black Sea became dotted with Greek cities. With the rise of colonies trade developed, and the Greeks came into the renewed contact with the East.'<sup>14</sup> The eastern influence on the Greek thought which originated at the time of Pythagoras increased during, and after, Alexander's invasion of the East. After his visit to India with Alexander, Pyrrho became the founder of scepticism, which became the most powerful school of Western thought.

The other foreign influence which the Greek sea-trading period observed was the emergence of a new funeral custom, the custom of cremation. Referring to this period Russell points out, 'Bodies are cremated,

*Nature of The Subject That Owns States of Consciousness* 363

not buried as we know they were in the Mycenaean times.<sup>1</sup> And the custom of cremating the bodies lingered on till the days of Plato, if not afterwards. This is proved by the fact that Crito asks Socrates about the fashion in which his body should be treated after his death. Referring to the request of Crito, Socrates remarks, 'He thinks that I am the thing which he will be seeing as a corpse in a short time, and he asks how to bury me. And all that I have been saying at great length just now about how when I drink the poison I shall no longer remain with you but shall go away to the joys of the blessed.' ... 'I shall not remain when I die but shall up and begone, in order that Crito may bear it more easily, and, when he sees my body either being burnt or being buried, not to be distressed on my account as if I were suffering something terrible.' ... 'You must keep your spirits up, and say that you bury my body and bury it as you think fit, and as seems to you most proper.'<sup>15</sup> Socrates thinks that the soul is independent of the body, therefore, it hardly matters whether the body is burnt or buried once the soul departs from the body. Socrates allows "custom of the day" to be followed in treating his dead body. There were certainly two customs, and not one, otherwise Crito would have never asked Socrates about the custom to be followed, whether to burn the body or to bury it.

Socrates overlooks the fact that the cremation of bodies involves certain metaphysical presuppositions which the burial of bodies does not. The cremation presupposes a cyclic order of the universe, and the corresponding belief in the transmigration of soul. The custom of burial presupposes the preservation of bodies. But why should the body be preserved? In preserving the body, the man associated with the body is also preserved. When a man dies he does not depart from his body to any other destinations, he continues to live in his dead body. This view is best exhibited by the Egyptians. Russell writes, 'In Egypt religion was much concerned with life after death. The Pyramids are funeral monuments.'<sup>16</sup> But what sort of "life after death" is this? Why were the material treasures buried along with the dead body? Neither the souls can eat nor can they wear ornaments, it is only bodies that make use of the material possessions. The life after death which the Egyptians might have contemplated, is not the life of the soul surviving the death of the body, but the life of the body itself surviving its death at an earlier time. The survival of the body, which

is vaguely conceived at the Egyptian level, is clearly conceived afterwards in the christian doctrine of the Resurrection of the body.

Though not explicitly, the Western scholars implicitly recognise the influence of Indian thinking on the thinking of Pythagoras. Describing the nature of the Pythagorean school and its founder director, Flew writes, 'Pythagoras, however, was as much or more the *guru* of a religious *ashram* as the head of a research institute, his school constituted a sort of order, the Pythagorean Brotherhood.'<sup>17</sup> It is quite natural on the part of the Greek citizens to be suspicious about the activities of this *Guru* and his *Ashram*. The *Guru* was involved in preaching ideas and ideals which were quite foreign to the Greek soil. His *Ashram* might have appeared to the Greek citizens as some sort of foreign agency involved in washing the brain of the innocent citizens. The *Ashram's* life at Croton lasted hardly for twenty years when the people revolted against it, and Pythagoras was driven out of Croton. About the closure of the Pythagorean school at Croton, Russell writes, 'Why Pythagoras and his school had been expelled from Croton in 510 B.C. we shall probably never know'<sup>18</sup> Russell seems to think that there were grounds other than the ground of the unusual ideas preached by Pythagoras. Preaching of unusual foreign ideas should be considered as a good ground against the existence of Pythagoras and his school in Croton.

Pythagoras was perhaps the contemporary of Buddha. Buddha was born around 566 B.C., and Pythagoras according to Russell was expelled from Croton in 510 B.C. Rebirth and transmigration had such a widespread acceptance in India, that even the Buddhists accepted them, in spite of the fact that they rejected the continuity of both, the soul and the body. It is not only on the metaphysical ground that rebirth was accepted, the moral ground also required it. Each wrong action of man involves a given quantity of suffering. There is considerable quantity of suffering that a man accumulates in his lifetime, over and above the suffering that he inherits from his past life. A man has to undergo that much suffering which he has accumulated, whatever number of births he requires. Incidentally, mercy-killing is ruled out with this theoretical approach. If you kill someone to stop his suffering, you are forcing him to suffer more in his coming birth. There is no way to escape the punishment that the Law of Karma has

*Nature of The Subject That Owns States of Consciousness* 365

allotted for your misdeeds.

Though the philosophers continued puzzling themselves over the distinction between the soul and the body from the time of Pythagoras to the time of Wittgenstein, the impact of this distinction decreased from the time of Descartes. Because of the Cartesian influence, the soul-body distinction was replaced by the mind-body distinction. The major reason for removing "soul" and replacing it by "mind" was that the former concept led to undermine the human body. Once the human body was assimilated to the body of a fish or a horse, special importance to the human body was given up. Then Pythagoras and Plato gave more importance to the disembodied existence than to the embodied existence. Embodied existence appeared to them as the degradation of the soul. The soul is spiritual. In entering into a body, soul has de-spiritualised itself, it has degraded itself. We have already seen how Socrates remarked that after drinking the poison he will go away "to the joys of the blessed." Blessed are those who live in the disembodied world, the world of souls. The high respect that the Pythagoreans gave to the "soul" led to its fall. The introduction of "mind" was the introduction of a less important entity, correlated with another less important entity, the body. The issues of consciousness are now being discussed under the title of Mental Philosophy or the Philosophy of Mind. The Wittgensteinians prefer to call it Philosophical Psychology.

The Cartesian "mind", however, continues to have the hangover of the Pythagorean "soul". The former differs from the latter only in two respects: one, the former does not have rebirth or transmigration. Secondly, it does not enter into an animal body. In all other respects they are the same. Therefore, Descartes does not mind on occasions to equate the mind with the soul. He is a thinking substance simply because he happens to be a soul. Consider his remark from the *Discourse on Method*, 'I knew that I was a substance the whole essence or nature of which is to think, and that for its existence there is no need of any place, nor does it depend on any material thing, so that this "me" that is to say, the soul by which I am what I am, is entirely distinct from body, and is even more easy to know than is the latter, and even if body were not, the soul would not cease to be what it is.'<sup>19</sup> Embodied existence of a mind is contingent, it could very well exist as a disembodied being, without any change in its

essential nature. It thinks while in the body, and it would continue thinking while outside the body. According to Russell, the "disembodied soul is as if asleep". One may feel that while one is sleeping, one is not thinking. This seems to be true while one is having a dreamless sleep. Perhaps, it would have been safer for the position of Descartes if he had defined "mind" in terms of "the potentiality to think". The man who is asleep has potentiality to think, and this potentiality is actualised when he wakes up. The possibility of disembodied existence of mind shows that the mind need not be *in* the body to control it. It may exist *outside* the body, and may function like a remote control, controlling the body from any distance. The ghost need not be *in* the machine as Ryle thought.

Consider now Strawson's views on the disembodied subjects of consciousness. Strawson too, like Russell, does not find any incoherence in the idea of disembodied existence. But he has come to a different conclusion from the conclusion of Russell. According to Russell, as we have already seen, as soon as a soul becomes disembodied it goes to sleep, it loses consciousness. But Strawson's disembodied persons are always engaged in thinking. Referring to a disembodied person Strawson says, '.... in order to retain his idea of himself as an individual, he must always think of himself as *disembodied*, as a *former* person.'<sup>20</sup> Thus Strawson's disembodied person is an active thinker, continuously involved in thinking, therefore avoids Locke's objection to Descartes. Strawson's disembodied person has no drowsy nod that would lead him to non-existence. Descartes would prefer Strawson's position over that of Russell. Where there is mind, there is also thinking, otherwise how could thinking function as the essence of mind !

According to Strawson 'The strictly disembodied individual is strictly solitary, and it must remain for him indeed an utterly empty, though not meaningless speculation, as to whether there are any other members of his class.'<sup>21</sup> All this follows from the fact that he has lost his body. He is not in a position to identify others, for he has lost his hands to touch them, he has lost his eyes to see them, he has lost his vocal chords to talk to them. There is no way in which his body could be in touch with the bodies of others. Though he could speculate that there are other disembodied persons, this speculation however would be empty in the sense that there

*Nature of The Subject That Owns States of Consciousness* 367

is a logical barrier which does not allow one disembodied person to peep into the mind of another disembodied person. The disembodied persons of Pythagoras and Plato are wholly unlike the disembodied persons of Russell and Strawson. Neither Russell nor Strawson allows any social gatherings of the disembodied persons. They are forced to live isolated lives. Is not their existence miserable?

Strawson has certainly not presented any threat to the position of the Pythagorean souls. These souls happen to be in direct contact with one another, simply because the barriers of bodies have been abolished. They are not in "communication" with one another, they are in "communion" with one another. The former concept presupposes the use of written or spoken words. But the existence of a human body is essential whether the language is written or spoken. The abolition of the body would lead to the abolition of the present communication net-work. Not the "communication net-work" but the "communion net-work" starts functioning. With embodied existence, the consciousness that is associated with the soul, remains crippled. The soul becomes highly sensitive and conscious once the curtain of the body is withdrawn. Withdrawal of the body, according to Strawson, would lead a soul to live a solipsistic life. Strawson is unable to see that the bodily withdrawal would lead the souls to come in direct contact with one another. It is the body that leads a soul to live a solipsistic life. Each soul remains imprisoned in its own body. Bodies do not allow souls to have direct contact with one another. Disembodied existence removes all those barriers which were created by the embodied existence.

Strawson knows about the identity crisis that would emerge once the bodies are withdrawn. If there are only minds, how would one mind be distinguished from the other mind? Hume's worry has its resurrection in Strawson. Therefore, Strawson follows Hume's solution. Hume introduces "memory" to explain personal identity. All those experiences that are remembered by "me" are my experiences. But what is "me" or "My" doing here? I am already identified before my memories are identified, before some memory-experiences are described as mine. Strawson says concerning a disembodied person that since he has 'no personal life of his own to lead, he must live much in the memories of the personal life he did lead.'<sup>22</sup> Once a disembodied person becomes isolated from his friends and

foes, be they embodied or disembodied, he has no other option but to live in the memories of those experiences which he had when he was embodied. Disembodied existence can be described as the resurrection of the mind. What has arisen after the bodily death of a person is his mind. Resurrection of the mind is as different from the resurrection of the body as is mind different from the body. Strawson is as a matter of fact arguing against the resurrection of the mind. It is obvious that he favours the resurrection of the body. But he favours the resurrection of the body in a very subtle way. He pleads in favour of the resurrection of the mind, but quite weakly.

Memory may at the initial stages confer the status of an individual to a disembodied person. But this is a fact that human memories become weak as one grows old, the images which occur to one's mind fade away. Sometimes memories totally desert a person, and a person starts living a vegetative life. 'In proportion as the memories fade', according to Strawson, 'to that degree his concept of himself as an individual becomes attenuated.'<sup>23</sup> So Strawson correlates the fading of memory with the fading of the individuality of a disembodied person. The conclusive step of Strawson's argument is very interesting. After rejecting the "disembodied survival" or "the resurrection of the mind" he praises the orthodox for their wisdom in insisting on the resurrection of the body. May be Strawson thinks that the bodies do not decay. Only the minds decay. Consider the final remarks of Strawson, 'At the limit of attenuation there is, *from the point of view of his survival as an individual*, no difference between the continuance of experience and its cessation. Disembodied survival, on such terms as these, may well seem unattractive. No doubt it is for this reason that the orthodox have wisely insisted on the resurrection of the body.'<sup>24</sup> Strawson takes for granted that the disembodied memories would behave in the same fashion as the embodied memories. But neither the disembodied mind behaves in the same fashion as an embodied mind nor the disembodied memories behave in the same fashion as the embodied memories. The aging of body leads to the weakening of the brain-traces or brain-impressions which are causally responsible for the generation of memory experiences. Weak brain traces would lead to the blurring of memory-experiences. The memory problems of the old people are well known. But once memories acquire independence from the brain of the aging body, how would they decay?

*Nature of The Subject That Owns States of Consciousness* 369

Then for the impaired memories we can take the help of Divine Grace. Those who believe in the Resurrection of the body require such a help. The Divine Grace cures the mutilated bodies. Why should it not cure the mutilated memories? Mental disorders are no less significant than the physical disorders. Sometimes prayer is advised as the last medical dose.

The belief in the resurrection of the body is the foundational belief of Christianity. The foundational beliefs are those that require no justification. The demand for justification in their case is absurd. Each religion has its own foundational beliefs. Christianity is one of the several religions. There are other faiths and other religions. The belief in the resurrection of the mind is common to many faiths, particularly of the ancient people. In modern times this belief has attracted the attention of philosophers more than the attention of religious people. The issue of personal identity has led philosophers to this belief. These philosophers are busy in performing all kinds of thought-experiments. They wish to see, for example, whether it is possible for a mind to switch over from one body to the other. Whether it is possible for several bodies to share the same mind, and so on. These thought experiments are quite interesting, but lie beyond the scope of this paper. I have discussed them elsewhere.<sup>25</sup>

## NOTES

This is the revised version of a paper presented in the ICPR seminar of 'Language, Mind and the Evolution of Consciousness', July 2000, Butler Palace, Lucknow.

1. *Old Testament*, American Bible Society, 1976, Genesis I, p. 4.
2. *Ibid.*
3. Christopher Hookway, *Scepticism*, Routledge, London, 1992, p. 42.
4. Wittgenstein, *Notebooks*, p. 82.
5. *Ibid.*
6. *Philosophical Investigations*, trs. G.E.M. Anscombe, 281.
7. *Ibid.*
8. Plato, *Republic*, Book X, 620. Plato's view on this issue has been discussed

- fully in my recent book, *Wittgenstein : New Perspectives*, Indian Council of Philosophical Research, 2002, chapter 1.
9. Russell, *Wisdom of the West*, London, 1959, p. 60.
  10. *Ibid.* p. 69.
  11. Flew, *Western Philosophy*, London, 1971, p. 127
  12. *Wisdom of the West*, p. 21
  13. *Ibdi.* p. 12.
  14. *Ibid.*
  15. Plato, *Phaedo*, 115 C-E.
  16. *Wisdom of the West*, p. 11.
  17. *Western Philosophy*, p. 376 Italics on 'guru' and 'ashram' are mine.
  18. *Wisdom of the West*, p. 38.
  19. *The Philosophical Works of Descartes*, trans. by Elizabeth S. Haldane and G.R.T. Ross, Vol. I., Cambridge University Press, 1978, p. 101.
  20. Strawson, *Individuals*, Methuen, London, Paperback, 1959, p. 116
  21. *Ibid.*, pp. 115-116
  22. *Ibid.*, p. 116
  23. *Ibid.*
  24. *Ibid.*
  25. I have discussed these thought-experiments in my book *Identity and Thought Experiments*, Indian Institute of Advanced Study, Shimla, 1977.

## EMERGENT EVOLUTION AND ĀRAMBHAVĀDA - A COMPARISON

K. CHENCHULAKSHMI

According to Lloyd Morgan, evolution "is the name we give to the comprehensive plan of sequence in all natural events" and emergent evolution is the hypothesis that this plan displays at certain points something which is genuinely new, not a mere re-grouping of pre-existent events<sup>1</sup>. This hypothesis is based on the conviction that there is in reality a natural, consistent, and coherent plan of relations. Its aim is to set forth a constructive philosophy which will explain all the occurrences in the world of experience.

Referring to Emergent Evolution Lloyd Morgan says, "in the old sense, evolution meant the unfolding of what is already being but enfolded. Emergence is the coming into view of that which has hitherto been submerged-virtually there but hidden, latent and not as yet patent. Now-a-days the word 'evolution' has supplanted the older word 'epigenesis' (formation of organic germ as a new product) and means the coming into existence of something in some sense 'new', and this something new, is what Lewes labelled 'emergent' as contrasted with 'resultant'""<sup>2</sup>. By 'emergent', he claimed, that which is unpredictable before its de-facto epigenesis, the resultant is calculable before the event. In this way emergent evolution is naturalistic. It protests against mechanism. The mechanistic interpretation is in terms of re-grouping of pre-existing events with no real novelty. It also differs from various forms of vitalism. These theories introduce at a particular point in the series a "supplementary concept of entelechy, vital-force or elan, from some disparate order of being", thus breaking the continuity of evolution<sup>3</sup>.

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Lloyd Morgan's characterisation of emergent evolution by contrasting it with the conception of evolution "in the old sense", as of re-grouping of pre-existing events, reminds us the controversy between *asatkāryavāda* and *satkāryavāda* in Indian Philosophy. It is appropriate to compare and contrast the effects of *satkāryavāda* and *asatkāryavāda* with the emergents and resultants of emergent evolution<sup>4</sup>. According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of causation, an effect which is altogether non-existent comes into existence after the operation of its causes. The system advances a theory called *asatkāryavāda*<sup>5</sup>. According to it, an effect, like cloth brought into existence after causal operation, cannot be held to be already existent. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika effect is a new creation *ārambha*<sup>6</sup>. Hence, its theory of causation is specially termed as *ārambhavāda*. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika effect resembles for all practical purposes with an 'emergent' in the language of Lloyd Morgan. The Sāṃkhya-Yoga theory is technically called *satkāryavāda*<sup>7</sup>, the 'theory of origination of the already existent effect'. It differs from the theory which holds an effect, like cloth, to be an emergent or a new entity, i.e., a reality which did not exist before. On the contrary it declares that the effect already exists in the form of its cause and its production means merely its manifestation from its unmanifested condition. Accordingly the Sāṃkhya-Yoga effect approximates itself to the 'resultant', as it is predictable or calculable even before its de-facto epigenesis.

A point of central importance regarding the 'effects' of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Sāṃkhya-Yoga in terms of the emergent and the resultant respectively is an enquiry into the nature and source of novelty present as the characteristic of the one and is conspicuously absent in the other. But before we come to pass a judgment on the appropriateness of treating the effects of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Sāṃkhya-Yoga in terms of the emergent and resultant, it behoves on us to examine the definition of the emergent as Morgan offers it. We must see whether his conception of emergent evolution really offers any real protest against the mechanistic interpretation of the world, and succeeds itself in delivering a criterion of evolution as something other than or different from a mere re-arrangement or re-grouping of pre-existent events.

According to Morgan an emergent stands for a new form of

*Emergent Evolution and Ārambhavāda*

relatedness<sup>8</sup>. "New" means, for him, unpredictable from pre-existent events<sup>9</sup>. A term is the function of a relation. It is the part which it plays in any given relationship since a term is the part played by any entity or element in a specific relation. It is obvious that one term can be in only one relation. A new relation makes of the given entity a new term. Therefore, a new form of relatedness would mean new terms as well as new forms of relation. So, an emergent consists in new terms in new relations such that they could not have been predicted from earlier forms of relatedness. Relations are of two kinds : intrinsic and extrinsic<sup>10</sup>. Intrinsic relations are called qualities, those which are of the nature of the thing itself. These depend solely on inner reality. On the other hand, extrinsic relations are relations to other things. According to Morgan intrinsic relations are those of space, time, physio-chemical structures and processes, and the physiological and psychical processes in living and conscious beings. Extrinsic relations are those of weight, since it depends on gravitation, colour and other secondary qualities. These depend on the distance-receptors of the organism. The relation of atom to atom in the molecule is an extrinsic relation. The inner relation of the molecule to the atoms which constitute it is an intrinsic relation. But the sum-total of the intrinsic relations of the molecule is not the same thing as the sum-total of the extrinsic relations of the atoms which constitute it, since these are different forms of relations and their terms are different. With the result the emergent, as a new form of relatedness would hardly involve a necessary difference from the mechanistic interpretation of higher forms of integration as a re-arrangement or re-grouping of the pre-existent events. The new form of relatedness certainly means new terms in relation as well as new relations between the terms. But on the above interpretation of relation, the term of a new relation becomes by the very fact of being the new relation a new term. It need not necessarily be a new entity, since any entity entering a new relation becomes by the very fact of the new relation a new term. The pure event with its "intrinsic spacio-temporal relatedness"<sup>11</sup>, on entering into more complex physio-chemical relations would become a physio-chemical event as such. This is certainly more complicated, more highly organised relation which becomes a living event, a term, i.e., in some form of conscious relation. If this is so, even the most uncompromising mechanist

would not object to and we are at no loss to make out the "protest against mechanical interpretation" that the doctrine of emergence boasts of.

The criterion of the 'new' can be illustrated by molecules and liquidity<sup>12</sup>. Molecules being in a state of vapour, one could not predict that by cooling the vapour turns into liquid. Liquidity is claimed as an emergent, because no amount of knowledge of gases would enable one who had never experienced liquid to predict moisture as the quality. Similarly, solidity is an emergent, life is an emergent, mind is an emergent. The emergent does not cease to be an emergent since it can be predicted. It is an emergent since it could not be predicted by one who had no experience. On this basis the peculiar taste resulting from inadvertently putting both cream and lemon in one's tea would be an emergent as truly as life or mind is an emergent. The same would be true of fire from rubbing sticks, of the growth of plants from the sunshine, flowering roses in June. All these are emergents only because they could not be predicted unless something of the same sort had been experienced before.

The definition of an emergent as something which could not be predicted before its coming into existence seems to suggest that "resultants" could be predicted before their occurrence. The example offered in this connection is that of weight<sup>13</sup>. An examination of this example would show that unless someone has had experience of the fact that two weights added together will result in a simple sum of their individual weights, it is impossible to predict the result beyond all shadow of doubt. For instance, one could imagine that larger weight might absorb the smaller. The new weight resulting from the addition of the two previously existing weights will become in all probability a new property of the new system. It may turn out to be a new form of relatedness with a whole series of new qualities and properties, which an emergent is. But the difference in predictability between the results in this case and the usual case of added weight lies in the degree of knowledge of the observer. In the one case, the observer has less knowledge of the general plan of emergence than he has in the other. The whole principle behind modern bridge-building consists in learning the plan of emergence, as it relates to the addition of weights to the closest possible degree. The fact that the addition of two weights results in the simple sum of their separate weights is certainly no less dependent on experience than

the later learned facts of the varying strength of materials. The aim of our discussion on the meaning of emergence is to show that every new particular is a new emergent and the apparent defference between emergent and resultants only points out in regard to certain classes of particulars we can predict certain classes of results. But even in this restricted sense, we do not predict the whole of the resulting qualities and properties but only those which have been experienced.

Now, let us consider the tenability of any suggestion to read the "effect" of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of *asatkāryavāda* in terms of the "emergent" of Lloyd Morgan's emergent evolution. According to *asatkāryavāda*, an effect which was altogether non-existent comes into existence after the operation of its causes. Therefore, an effect, according to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, is a new event. As the effect was altogether non-existent before, the question does arise as to where from the effect derives its existence. According to *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* an effect has come into existence through the operation of its causes. It is not produced out of its cause, but in its cause. A piece of cloth is not produced out of the yarn which continues to exist separately and simultaneously with the piece of cloth. Although a piece of cloth subsists in the yarn which is claimed to be its inherent cause (*samavāyī-kāraṇa*), the essence of cloth does not come out of the yarn, since even after the production of the cloth, the yarn continues to exist intact as it did before. Then, where from does an effect derive its essence?

Therefore, the question of the source of the essence of the effect poses a problem for the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. According to this system, it seems as though the essence of an effect comes into being out of the void, despite the systems denial of such a position and its defense that causes have actually worked to bring about an effect. The position of the system as formulated by Vācaspati Miśra<sup>14</sup> is - *sataḥ asat jāyate*, i.e. from the existent cause comes into being an effect which was non-existent before. But the existent cause does not impart essence to its effect. The principal cause is not conceived by the system, as material cause (*upādāna-kāraṇa*) but inherent cause (*samavāyī-kāraṇa*) because the implication of the material cause is that it should impart its essence to its effect. Again, to the

Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system, the samavāyī-kāraṇa is always in the form of parts (*avayavas*), while an effect is in the form of a whole (*avayavin*). This position of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika lends itself to 'the concept of a whole' as something more than an aggregate of its parts, and entirely new entity different from them. This is equivalent to saying that an effect is different in essence from its cause in which it resides by inherent relation as separate entity.

When it comes to the question of a comparative study of the position of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika with emergent evolution, it must be pointed out that there are basic differences between the two in respect of the relation between the cause and the effect. For emergent evolution, as opposed to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the 'emergent' owes its essence to its cause. The universe is made of some physical fore-runner of matter which is homogeneous and independent and indefinite, but is distributed in systems of simplest organisations. Now these systems become more and more complex. Protons and electrons appear in varied systems. These systems may be supposed to appear as chemical elements, oxygen, hydrogen, iron, sulphur etc. From these emerge their properties and from these properties again new events appear. For instance, water emerges from the properties of oxygen and hydrogen combined. Now, water with its peculiar properties is an emergent, a novelty. But the novelty of water as compared with hydrogen and oxygen is only an actualisation of what was potentially existing in hydrogen and oxygen. Therefore, it is the combination or what the emergentists call 'relatedness' that makes the molecules of water, a novelty as compared with the pure state of hydrogen and oxygen. "The new kind of relatedness" is 'intrinsic' to the system. The emergence of the new qualities and properties does not depend upon 'new eternal' relations of any kind<sup>15</sup>.

The above discussion on emergent evolution reveals that the effect or the emergent owes its essence to its material cause, a position, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika rejects. In fact, what renders novelty to its effect, to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, is its distinctness from its cause both in its existence as well as in essence. But for the emergentists it is the combination or relatedness of the causal factors that renders novelty to the emergent. This means that an emergent shares its essence from its cause to which it

*Emergent Evolution and Ārambhavāda*

is intrinsically related. This position of emergent evolution is closer to the Sāṃkhya-Yoga theory of satkāryavāda. For instance, a piece of cloth, according to the Sāṃkhya-Yoga is only a different arrangement of yarn. The yarn imparts essence to the cloth. The essence of both is the same. But the samavāyī-kāraṇa, of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika continues to exist simultaneously and along with its effect. As such it retains all its essence to itself and cannot in any form, pass its essence to its effect.

An examination of the meaning and the general treatment of the concept of emergent evolution on the one hand and the implications of *asatkāryavāda* in respect of the cause-effect-essence on the other, is undertaken to show that any tendency to regard emergent theory of evolution as a modern version of the theory of satkāryavāda is only ill-conceived and not warranted by facts. A new form or relatedness, according to the emergentist's own interpretation of relationship, the emergent is not necessarily other than a new grouping of preexistent events. Therefore, there appears to be no emergent in any assignable sense of the term. As related to experience and defined as unpredictable without experience in the final analysis, the description of emergent covers all particular events, so that everything is an emergent. We are left with the contradiction that everything is an emergent and that nothing is an emergent. The conclusion is also forced on us that evolution is a mere re-grouping of preexisting events. That there can be no evolution in the sense of an unbroken and continuous development but merely a succession of unrelated changes. Finally, the universe is an absolute one and is also an absolute many.

The problem of the separate essence of cause and of its effect has been a puzzling one to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. A defensible answer is that an inherent cause, without transferring its own essence and retaining it intact, imparts in some way essence to its effect which resides in it by an inherent relation. The essence of an effect is constituted by the fact of its residing in its cause by *samavāya* relation. We may say that the same essence-stuff simultaneously serves the purpose of being the essence of the cause as well as its effects. To commonsense, it is difficult to believe that the yarn and the cloth are two separate substances with their separate size, colour and measure and separate weights. There appears to be an inconsistency in holding the continuity of the existence of cause after the

origination of effect.

### NOTES

1. C. Lloyd Morgan, *Gifford Lectures*, 1992, pp. 1, 113, 194.
2. ....' *A Philosophy of Evolution in Contemporary British Philosophy*, 1<sup>st</sup> series, p. 297.
3. ....' *Gifford Lectures*, 1992, pp. 5, 8, 12.
4. Sri Venkatarama Iyer, "Darwin, Alexander, Aurobindo and Śāṅkara on Evolution", *Prabuddha Bharata*, Vol. LXIX, March, 1964, pp. 103, 104.
5. *Nyāya Sūtra*, IV, i. 48-50.  
*Nyāya Kusamāñjalī*, p. 58.
6. Bhimal Krishna Matilal, "Causality in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school", *Philosophy East and West*, Vol. XXV, No. 1, Jan. 1975, pp. 41-48.
7. *Sāṃkhya Pravacana Sūtra*, I, 115-118, 121.  
*Sāṃkhya Kārikā*, IX Aniam Sen Gupta, "In Defence of the Sāṃkhya Kārikā, Definition of the Cause", *Proc. of the Aristotelian Society*, Vol. IX, July-Oct. 1974, Nos. 3, 4 pp. 120 ff.
8. C. Lloyd Morgan, *Gifford Lectures*, 1992, p. 16.
9. *Ibid.*, pp. 3, 65.  
Flora I. Mackinnon, "The Meaning of 'Emergent' in Lloyd C Morgan's Emergent Evolution", *Mind*, Vol. XXXIII, New Series, 1924, pp. 311-315.
10. C. Lloyd Morgan, *Gifford Lectures*, 1992, pp. 52, 59, 218, 227.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 71.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 66  
Arthur, O. Lovejoy, "The Meaning of 'Emergence' and its Modes", *Journal of Philosophical Studies (Philosophy)*, Vol. II, 1927, pp. 167-181.
13. C. Lloyd Morgan, *Gifford Lectures*, 1992, p3.
14. *Sāṃkhya Tattva Kaumudī*, IX.
15. W. Mc Dougal, *Modern Materialism and Emergent Evolution*, p. 115.

## ROLE OF PSYCHOSIS (VṚTTI) IN ADVAITA PSYCHOLOGY OF PERCEPTION

PRABHAT MISRA

### I

The Advaitins maintain that for the production of perceptual cognition, *antaḥkaraṇavṛtti* or psychosis plays the central role. In such cognition, what happens is that *antaḥkaraṇa* or the mind goes out to the object of cognition and assumes its form. The *Vedānta-Paribhāṣā* states with the help of a beautiful illustration : When the water of a tank (*taḍāga*) goes out through leakage and enters a tub (*kedāra*) through a channel in the form of that (channel), it assumes the form of that tub, a quadrangular or the like, in the same manner, the internal organ (*antaḥkaraṇa*), being the nature of light (*taijasa*) goes out through the sense of sight etc., and reaches the location of the contents like jar, and is modified in the form of those like jar. This modification of the internal organ is called *vṛtti*<sup>1</sup>. To explain. When the water remains in the tank, it remains there in the form of that (tank), when the water enters a tub through some channel, it assumes the form of that (tub). The water is modified into the form of the tub. In like manner, when the light-product *antaḥkaraṇa* remains in the body, it has the form of the (body), but when any part of the *antaḥkaraṇa* goes to the location of the contents, like jar, in the form of long rays through the sense-gates, then that part of the internal organ of the body gets the form of the contents, like jar, as some piece of the metal used to melt gets the shape of the pot for melting (*muṣā*). This transformation of the internal organ or *antaḥkaraṇa* into the shape of the object in concern is the *antaḥkaraṇa-vṛtti*.

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Now perceptual cognition, the immediate apprehension is of two types - external and internal. In the cases of internal perception like the cognition of pleasure, suffering etc. *antaḥkaraṇa* or the mind need not go out, but has to assume the form of the particular case of pleasure or pain. In the external perception, like the cognition of a jar, the mind must go out and assume the form of the object in concern. This is based on the Advaita principle of one undivided consciousness. Cognition, according to the Advaita, is nothing but the one and undivided pure consciousness. For the sake of cognition, the *pramāṇa-caitanya* (consciousness limited by the adjunct of *ṛtti*) and *viśaya-caitanya* (consciousness limited by the adjunct of object-content) must be localised in the *pramāṇī-caitanya* (consciousness limited by the adjunct of mind). In the case of internal cognition, this localisation (localisation in the same place) i.e., the localisation of both the *ṛtti-caitanya* and *viśaya-caitanya* in the *pramāṇī-caitanya*, is a simple and natural case. But in the case of external perception, this localisation is made possible through the mind's going out to the object and assuming its form. When there arises the relation between the *ṛtti-caitanya* and *viśaya-caitanya*, then both of them are found to be localised in the *pramāṇī-caitanya* or the *antaḥkaraṇa* that limits the Pure Consciousness to make possible the existence of individual self (*jīva*).

In the case of internal cognition, like 'I am happy' or 'I am unhappy', happiness or unhappiness, the limiting adjuncts of consciousness (*viśaya-caitanya*) and the mental modification of such happiness or unhappiness, which is also the limiting adjunct of the same (consciousness) occur simultaneously and remain always in the same *antaḥkaraṇa*. As the limiting adjuncts (*Upādhi*) are always in the same location, there would always arise the non-difference (*abheda*) of the consciousness limited by both the types of adjuncts. As the consciousness distinguished (*avacchinna*) by the *ṛtti* of the form of happiness and the consciousness distinguished by the happiness or unhappiness in concern, are always non-different, so one's own happiness or unhappiness, the internal objects and their cognitions will simply and always directly be cognised. These cognitions are designated as *sākṣibhāṣya* revealed by the eternal witnessing-self, not *jīvabhāṣya*, not revealed by the *jīva*, the consciousness limited either by the *antaḥkaraṇa* (view of the Bhāmātī School) or by the *avidyā* (view of

the Vivaraṇa School.) We cannot say, however, about the internal objects that they are sometimes cognised directly, sometimes indirectly, as we say about the external objects.

Thus we find that there does not arise any problem of the mind's outgoing to the object, although it does take the form of that in the case of internal cognition which is always immediate. In the case of mediate cognition, like inference also this problem does not arise. But in respect of the immediate cognition of the external objects, the mind (*antaḥkaraṇa*) must have to go out to the objects in concern and assume their shape. In such cases, the role of *antaḥkaraṇavṛtti* is centered in two specific points, viz., the mind's going out to the object and its assuming the form of the same.

In the Advaita texts, sometimes it is said that the *antaḥkaraṇa* or its part goes out to assume the form of the object of cognition and sometimes it is said that the *vṛtti* does so. This implies the question : Where does the *vṛtti* or modification of *antaḥkaraṇa* arise? Does it arise in the mind, or in the external world of objects? This question is not a problem to the Advaita, who is in favour of one undivided principle of Consciousness (*caitanya*). One principle of Consciousness reigns in the knowledge-situation consisting of the three factors- *pramāṇa-caitanya* (*vṛtavyavacchinna caitanya*), *pramāṇa-caitanya* (*antaḥkaraṇavacchinna caitanya*) and *viśaya-caitanya* (*viśayavacchinna caitanya*). Of the two types of perceptual cognition-*jñānagata pratyakṣa* (perceptuality as present in the cognition) and *viśayagata pratyakṣa* (perceptuality as present in the object-content), the first one is the non-difference between the *pramāṇa-caitanya* and *viśaya-caitanya*<sup>2</sup> and the second is the non-difference between the *pramāṇa-caitanya* and *viśaya-caitanya*<sup>3</sup>. One non-different consciousness is the substratum of *antaḥkaraṇa* (*pramāṇa*), *vṛtti* (*pramāṇa*) and the content (*viśaya*). This Consciousness becomes limited by the three substrata in their cases. The point is that these are metaphysically so close that whether the *antaḥkaraṇa* or the *vṛtti* does go out to assume the object-form and where does the modification arise - whether in the mind or in the locus of the object are no questions at all. For a pointed understanding, it may be thought that in the case of a perceptual cognition, the part of the *antaḥkaraṇa* is divided by the object of cognition, this part

is the state of mind, modified by the shape of the object. This modified state (*vṛtti*) removes the veil of ignorance from the object in concern. And in this way, the part of *antaḥkaraṇa*, not the whole, or the *vṛtti* comes out to be related with the object and becomes as it (the object) is.

Another type of question has been raised by some critic.<sup>4</sup> That the Vedantic doctrine of perception seems to fit in well only with the perception of a particular kind i.e., visual ones. In fact, in all the texts, it has been stated that *antaḥkaraṇa* goes out through the eye-channel only. But Madhusudana, the author of *Advaitasiddhi* strictly observes that 'there is no restriction that antahkarana should come out only through the eye and not through the other organs - *sarvatra tat-tad-indriyādīsthānasyaivadvārata-rata-sambhabāt* (*Advaitasiddhi*). In the case of pleasure, pain etc. there is no question of *antaḥkaraṇa* going out, because in their case there is no veil to be lifted and the locus is the same'.<sup>5</sup>

## II

Now let us try to explain the problem of mind's going out first and secondly, its assuming the form of the object of cognition.

Mind, the *antaḥkaraṇa*, according to the Advaita, has parts and is the product of matter. This does not imply the so-called materialism. Rather, it resembles to the view of some New Realists like Russell, according to whom, matter and mind are different arrangements of some same neutral stuff. Both matter and mind may be said to be produced out of the same neutral stuff, where the characteristics of both of these are not present - i.e, which is neither mind nor matter. Russell, in his '*Analysis of mind*' is not interested in enquiring any metaphysical reality as the material ground of the world of mind and matter, because to him, we cannot reach at the neutral stuff as existent. He has tried to explain this world from the point of view of this neutral stuff with the help of his epistemological theory of atomic facts. But in the Advaita, the source (*adhiṣṭhāna*) of both the mind (*antaḥkaraṇa*) and matter (*viśaya*) is Brahman- the principle of one non-different pure Consciousness. And in this sense, mind is the product of matter. This is the metaphysical standpoint of the Advaita. In its theory

# Role of Psychosis (Vṛtti) In Advaita Psychology of Perception 383

of creation, *antaḥkaraṇa* has been said to be produced out of the five material elements (*pancabhūta*) in all of which the *Sattva-guṇa* predominates.

However, there is really no difference between mind and matter in reality or as it is the product of matter, its movement or going out in space has been granted in the Advaita. Mind or *antaḥkaraṇa* goes out to the object, like a jar of the external world. In the *Vedānta-Paribhāṣā*, it is said that when the *antaḥkaraṇavṛtti* in the form of a content like the jar goes out to be related to the object, jar, then *pramāṭṛ-caitanya*, the *pramāṇa-caitanya* and the *viśaya-caitanya* become one and non-different. The difference of the consciousness is destroyed, because of the fact that the limiting adjuncts (*antaḥkaraṇa vṛtti* and object content) are placed in the same locus. In this way, when the *pramāṭṛ-caitanya*, and the *viśaya-caitanya* (consciousness limited by the object-content, jar) become one, then the *pramāṭṛ-caitanya* (*antaḥkaraṇa*) stands as the substratum of the object, jar, like the consciousness limited by the jar (*ghaṭadyavacchinnacaitanya*). At that time, there remains no other reality of the jar than the reality of the *pramātā* viz., the consciousness limited by the *antaḥkaraṇa* and the jar becomes an object of immediate cognition.<sup>6</sup>

Thinkers like T.M.P. Mahadevan, P. K. Sundaram and D.M. Datta opine that the outgoing of *antaḥkaraṇa* as the *vṛtti* is actual, not metaphorical. These thinkers, perhaps, have gained the support from the author of *Vedānta-Paribhāṣā*. The *Paribhāṣākāra* clearly states that '*tathā cayam ghata ityadi-pratyakṣasthale ghaṭādestadākāra-vṛtteśca vahirekatra deśe samā-vadhanat*' etc.<sup>7</sup> The word '*vahirekatra*' is to be noted here. But K. C. Bhattacharya says in his '*Studies in Vedantism*', "Ultimately no doubt, Vedānta will hold that the body is phenomenal, this space is also phenomenal, and this 'going out' of the mind is also only illusory"<sup>8</sup>

These two view-points in regard to the mind's going out, in fact, based on the Advaita distinction between the empirical reality (*vyāvahārika sattvā*) and the Absolute Reality (*pāramārthika sattā*). the *pāramārthika* point of view, all these viz., *antaḥkaraṇa*, *vṛtti* and object-content are illusory. So we may understand that the mind actually moves towards the object of cognition existing in the external world.

But, then, where does the *vytti* remain? In reply to the question, we may quote the words of D. M. Datta : "When we perceive an external object, our attention is directed not to the physiological changes caused by the object within the organism, but to the object itself, outside in space. And in fixing attention on an object mind comes into direct contact with it." Here we may emphasise on the word 'attention'. Attention, it may be thought, is what the Advaitin calls *antaḥkaraṇavytti*, function of the mind. This attention, in fact, goes out through the sense-organ to its object in the production of the cognition of that. This attention as the *antaḥkaraṇavytti* is nothing but a relation between the mind and the object - the relation, which is made possible through the one undivided principle of consciousness. This consciousness pervades the mind (*antaḥkaraṇa*), its modification (*vytti*) and the object-content (*viśaya*). So the question, in connection with the *vytti* remaining either in the locus of *antaḥkaraṇa* or in that of the object may be ignored.

The Advaita shows its peculiarity by declaring the activity of mind's going out. It does not hold the accepted view that the objects of external world, first, stimulate the senseorgans, then the mind receives the impression of the objects through these organs. The Advaitins grant the sense-object contact in perception, but according to them, neither the senses nor the objects have any distinguished role. The role completely belongs to the *antaḥkaraṇavytti*. This is taken as the general view of the Advaita system. But if we look into the view of Sureśvara, the direct disciple of Śaṅkara, in this connection, we find that the Advaita Vedānta seems not to disregard the accepted view of perception. To quote from an analysis of the theory of perception according to Sureśvara as made by V. P. Upadhyāya in his 'Lights on Vedānta' : "It is not certain whether the outgoing of the mind to the object (which is admitted by the Vivaraṇa School in clear words) is approved by Sureśvara as well. In accordance with his one verse (*Brhadaranyakopaniṣadbhāṣyavārttika*-Pune Publication, pp. 1827-28), if literally interpreted, it will have to be concluded that he is in favour of object transmitting its mould and it is this transmission of a distinct mould through the sense-organ by an object and consequent establishment of a direct contact between the mind and a particular object, which accounts for the immediacy of the perception as distinguishable from other kinds of

indirect cognitions".<sup>10</sup> Thus Sureśvara thinks that the object transmits its mould or form through the senses to the mind, and then the mind has a contact with the form of the object and as such becomes modified into the said form (*वृत्ति*).

In the light of the above exposition, we may understand the notion of 'the going out' of mind or its *वृत्ति* in this way. It is obviously said in the Advaita texts that the *वृत्ति*, a modified part of the *antaḥkaraṇa* goes out, not the whole of mind-apparatus. Then by 'the going out', it is better to understand, is the formation of a part of mind through modification in the shape of the object of cognition. Mind or the *antaḥkaraṇa* is *taijasa*, produced of lightmaterial also it is predominated by the *sattva-guṇa* and so transparent (*svaccha*). But this is not all of *वृत्ति* *jñāna*. Behind it there is *Sākṣī-caitanya* (*Jivasākṣī*) and behind this *Sākṣī-caitanya* there is the Cosmic Consciousness (*Īśvara-Sākṣī*). This Cosmic Consciousness is Brahman, the Absolute Reality-Consciousness and to the Advaita Vedānta School of thought, the energy-source of the *Jiva-Sākṣī*. "The *वृत्ति* *jñāna*.", as Prof. Hiriyanna puts, "draws its breath and substance from it, and the whole complex of empirical or finite knowledge would be no-where without the light of this Absolute or Infinite Consciousness".<sup>11</sup> The three entities (*Īśvara-sākṣī*), *Jiva-sākṣī* and *antaḥkaraṇa* are very close to each other. The *Jivasākṣī* may be compared with a tank of consciousness, by which, according to the Advaita, objects of the world as a whole, known or unknown, are manifested. In the case of the immediate cognition of an object, when the appearance of it creates attention, the *antaḥkaraṇa* is modified into the so-called *वृत्ति* by the Witnessing-self (*Sākṣī-caitanya*), which is the store of all objects - cognised or non-cognised and at that very moment, the arisen *वृत्ति* coincides with the approaching object through the respective sense-organ. This coincidence, though thought to be the result of the going out of mind, may itself be designated as the said 'going out'. It may so be designated only to make distinction of a particular *वृत्ति* of the *antaḥkaraṇa* and nothing more. And all this is happened instantly. So 'the going out' is just the coincidence between the *वृत्ति* and the object-content. As the sense-object contact is indispensable in the case of immediate cognition like perception, so the going out of the mental mode (*antaḥkaraṇa-वृत्ति*) has been recognised. In fact, whatever stimuli would come from the

object to the sense, without the attentive state of mind, the sense-object contact would not be possible. Again if there arises any sense-contact with the object without the participation of mind, the contact would certainly be fruitless. The active participation of mind, like its going out in perception, distinguishes it (perception) from the mediate cognitions, like inference, memory etc. and also from immediate internal cognitions. The sense-organs conjoined with the *antaḥkaraṇa* are in contact with the objects, so the *vṛtti* has to go out, or we may say, it thus coincides with the form of the object. In that case, the consciousness limited by the object (*viśayāvachinna caitanya*) becomes one and the same. And as all this consciousness is that one consciousness, by which energised the witnessing-self (Sākṣī) is existent in us, we have the immediate cognition of the something.

### III

Let us now come to the other issue. In the Advaita texts, it is said that the *antaḥkaraṇa* or its *vṛtti* not only goes out to the object, but also assumes its form. The Paribhāṣakāra has put, we may remember, as the water of a tank assumes the form a tub after passing through a channel, so also the *antaḥkaraṇa*, going out through the sense-channel, assumes the form of the object of cognition.

The form-assuming of *antaḥkaraṇa* is not a figment of imagination. It is capable of being recognised from our own experience. Suppose, I perceive a jar before me with the visual organ. In course of the perceiving, I may close up my eyes and so far my attention continues, I may have an image in the form of the jar in my mental world. Or if the object be left out of the scene any way at that time, still I may be possessed with an image of that object particularly in the mental state. This image may be regarded as the *antahkarana vṛtti* that possesses the form of the object in concern and this image is nothing but the impression left by the total form of the object. Here we are certainly reminded of the philosophical principle that *saṃskāra* (impression) produces *vṛtti* (mode) and vice versa. Now when either for the closure of eyes or for anyhow removal of the object from the vicinity of the sense, we have the image of the object, then that image is of the past object as it is no more in the sense-contact. The question is: How

can we possess the image of a past object?

There must be some inner principle to record the form of the object, when it was presented to the sense-organ. D.M. Datta observes, "*Antahkaraṇa* would then be identical with this principle. From all this it will appear that the Vedāntic theory that in the perception of an object the *antahkaraṇa* takes the form of the object, is not at all unreasonable."<sup>12</sup>

Secondly, according to the Advaita, the form of an object necessarily includes its primary qualities like size, shape etc. and also the secondary qualities like colour, taste, smell etc. There is no absolute difference of these qualities from the object - substance. The forms of the qualities are the forms of their substrata. So like the form of an object, the form of a quality or of an action may also arise in case of exclusively their (of quality or action) perception. The Advaita strictly upholds that the cognition of quality etc. (*dharma*) is not possible without the cognition of the substance (*dharmī*). To ascertain the immediacy in perceptuality the Advaitins do not recognise that the qualities are only sensed by the organs, not the substance, like some western realists; or they do not believe in the Humean conception that there is no substance over and above the qualities. According to the Advaita thinkers, the object as a total form is assumed by the mind through the sense-organ. It resembles to the view of common-sense realism of the West. Infact, the Advaita view of perception may be called to be solely based on the experience of common people. The point is that the form-assuming principle of the Advaita theory of cognition dissolves the complex problem of immediate cognition in regard to the question, whether the object of perception is immediately given, or given through the medium of its sensed qualities.

Thirdly, we may refer to the *Śāṅkarabhāṣya* of *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Sruti* in which it has been said that *antahkaraṇa* may assume the form of the object-substance and quality. The *bhāṣya* speaks of the form of quality assumed by the mind.<sup>13</sup> But it factually implies the form of substance also. It tells the fact of our images or impressions, in this connection, as we have explained. The portion in our concern may be stated from the translation by Svami Nikhilānanda : "The mind transformed into colour. The idea is that since one remembers colours which lie in the form of impression -

through the mind for their support.”<sup>14</sup>

Thus the mind's assuming the object-form is not at all baseless.

#### IV

Another important issue in connection with the role of *vṛtti* may be noted. When I have the perceptual cognition of a jar, I have it through a *vṛtti*. I have also such apprehension as ‘I perceive the jar? This is, of course, a latter cognition. The question is : is this latter cognition due to another *vṛtti*? The Naiyayikas speak of two cognitions - *Vyāvasāya* (primary cognition) and *anuvyavasaya* (after-cognition). But the Advaitins do not recognise a fresh *vṛtti* like this after-cognition. Because of the fact that if we admit a new *vṛtti* for the cognition of primary one, then for cognition of that new *vṛtti* (say, second *vṛtti*), another *vṛtti* (say, a third *vṛtti*) would be demanded, and this another *vṛtti* would require of another *vṛtti* (say, a fourth). Thus it would lead to infinite regress. So the *vṛtti* is not an object of another *vṛtti*. According to the Advaita, the *vṛtti*, as initially being a mode of the *antaḥkaraṇa* is itself all for its objecthood. It is by nature an object of itself.<sup>15</sup> Of course, the capacity of the self-uses (*svavyavahara-jñānāyogyatva*) of the *vṛtti* does not imply its objecthood (*karmatva*). Since in that case, the same *vṛtti* would both be the functioning (*kriyā*) and the object (*karma*) leading to contradiction. When there arises the *vṛtti* in the form of an object in the *antaḥkaraṇa*, then that *vṛtti* will have that for its object-content. In this way, the *pramāṭṛ-caitanya* would be limited by the *vṛtti* having itself for its content and when that limited consciousness (*vṛttyupahita-caitanya*) be the locus of the *vṛtti* then the reality of that *vṛtti* and that of the *pramāṭṛ-caitanya* would be non-different. Thus the *vṛtti* as cognition may have itself too for its content. There is no necessity of another new *vṛtti* after-cognition or *antaḥkaraṇa*. In fact, the *antaḥkaraṇa* of the Naiyayika also has itself for its object-content (*svaviśayaka*), it does not require of a latter cognition, although as S.S. Suryanarayana Śāstri points out, “When they (the Naiyayikas) infer that all cognition is a quality, that inferential cognition is taken to apply to itself (*anu-vyāvasaya*) as well.”<sup>15</sup> The point is : if *anuvyāvasaya* be a quality, it would also need a substratum of which it is the object. But the Naiyayikas stop at the *anu-vyāvasaya*. The Advaitin has not recognised the another

*vṛtti* like *anuvyāvasaya*, for the revelation of the initial *vṛtti* because it has explained its theory of cognition on the principle of non-difference (*abheda*) between the subject (*pramāṭṛcaitanya*) and the object (*viśaya-caitanya*).

## V

Philosophers like the Naiyāyika and others do not recognise the necessity of *antaḥkaraṇavṛtti* in knowledge situation. Only in the Sāṃkhya-Yoga and Advaita Vedānta, the necessity of *vṛtti* has been realised. Thinkers of these systems maintain that the sense-object contact is a necessary condition for direct cognition, but it is not all for this. Function of mind or the psychosis (*vṛtti*) is an essential factor not only in the case of direct cognition, but also in the case of indirect cognitions like *anumiti*, *upamiti* etc. In the direct cognition of external objects, the *vṛtti* goes forth to the object. In cognition of internal objects and in indirect cognitions it does not go out, because of the fact that there is no possibility of its outgoing in these cases. The outgoing of *vṛtti* the Advaitins hold, is necessary for the realisation of distinctness of perceptual objects, removal of the concealment of the objects, and finally for the manifestation of identity between the subject consciousness and the object-consciousness.

Although, like the Naiyāyikas, a section of the champions of extreme Advaitism contends that there is no necessity of *vṛtti* for the manifestation of identity between the subject and the object, since there is naturally a direct relation between them as both are consciousness,<sup>16</sup> the general view of the Advaita is in favour of accepting the necessity of *vṛtti* in the cognition of objects. Broadly speaking, there are found three views in connection with the necessity of *vṛtti*: (1) The *vṛtti* is necessary for the removal of the veil of ignorance (*āvaraṇābhavārthā*); (2) it is necessary for the establishment of relation between the subject-consciousness (*Jīva-caitanya*) and the object (*Sambadhārthā*); (3) it is necessary for the manifestation of identity (*abhedābhivyaktārthā*) between the two appearances of one Consciousness i.e. between the subject and the object.

The difference of the views is not so clear-cut as each may be ascribed to a particular school of Advaita Vedānta or to a particular Advaita thinker. In the Advaita works like *Vedānta-Paribhāṣā*, *Vedānta-Siddhāntasūktimañjarī* etc., none of the views has been stated as clearly

associated with any school of Vedānta or any Vedāntin. The author of the *Vedānta-Paribhāṣā* seems to hold that the first two views are of the Vivaraṇa school, since according to this school of thought, the Jīva is consciousness reflected through or limited by *avidyā* and the third one is of the Bhāmātī school, since according to this school, the Jīva is consciousness limited by *antaḥkaraṇa*.<sup>17</sup> The author of the *Vedānta-Siddhānta sūktimañjarī* has taken great pains to analyse each of the views from different points of view including those of the Vivaraṇa and the Bhāmātī.<sup>18</sup> V. P. Upadhyāya in his doctoral dissertation, '*Lights on Vedānta*' mentions that the first view is connected with the Bhāmātī School, the second, with the Vivaraṇa and the third, with the school of Śureśvara.<sup>19</sup> In spite of this controversy it appears from the different Advaita treatises that the function of *vṛtti* to remove the veil of ignorance has commonly been accepted by all the Advaitins. An attempt will be intended here to dive deep into and to appraise of these theories of the necessity of *vṛtti*.

## VI

The first theory is this : *Vṛtti* is necessary for the removal of veil (*āvaraṇābhāvāṛthā*); or it may be said that it is necessary for breaking the concealing power of *avidyā* (ignorance). But if it does mean the destruction of the concealing power (*āvaraṇa-śakti*) of ignorance, then in the case of cognition even of a pot the power would be destroyed and the cogniser in concern would be emancipated from the bondage of ignorance.

So according to some Advaitins, the *antaḥkaraṇavṛtti* destroys the ignorance spreading over the consciousness by part - it removes that part of ignorance which conceals only the object in relation to which some *vṛtti* has been formed. It is stated that as a part of darkness is removed by a glow-worm, or as a part of mat is seen to be rolled up, or as a cowardly soldier suddenly retreats, so a certain part of ignorance is destroyed by the *vṛtti* or cognition relating to an object. But such comparison is not sound. A part of darkness being removed may again come into existence, whereas ignorance, once destroyed completely cannot come back again. The object, then, once brought out of the veil would continue to be known for ever. It is not also something corporeal that may be rolled up; it is not a substance with moving power, so that it would retreat.

# Role of Psychosis (*Vṛtti*) In Advaita Psychology of Perception 391

To demolish this barrage, some Advaitins argue that the removal of the veil of ignorance is possible partially only with reference to some particular object-defined consciousness (*viśayā-vacchhinna caitanya*) which becomes connected with some particular *vṛtti*. Vimuktātman, the author of *Iṣṭasiddhi* opines that the primal ignorance (*mulāvidyā*) is not set aside by the *vṛtti* but its off-shoots—some homogeneous individual ignorances (*tulāvidyā*) about each object are removed by it. These individual ignorances envelope the common object-defined consciousness and they are individually destroyed by each of the different *vṛtti* in respect of that object each time. For this reason when the veil or obscurity of an individual ignorance is once removed by a *vṛtti* the object again would be enveloped by other homogeneous individual ignorance in respect of the same object. The difficulty of the objects' ever-cognising would not arise.

But is it possible that the first perception of the pot e.g., will destroy only a single individual ignorance without dispelling all the individual ignorances obscuring the consciousness in respect of the pot? *vṛtti* or cognition has no such a restrictive feature as it would dispel only one ignorance, not others. Moreover, how can we perceive the object, until and unless all the ignorances are totally destroyed?

In this position, some Advaitins think that one ignorance veils the object-defined consciousness, others are kept in abeyance. The *vṛtti* or psychosis is in a position to remove the veil of that only one ignorance. As soon as the *vṛtti* ceases to exist, another ignorance creeps in and encroaches the object defined consciousness.

Dissatisfied with this explanation some hold that ignorances cannot remain in abeyance, by nature each of them must be present in the location of the object. "So they maintain that only one is dispelled at a time and others are simply scared away for the time being. Just as in a place, where many people are assembled together, the thunder, perchance suddenly falling down on someone, scatters away the rest of them, or the medicine, specifically curative of the complex disease, called '*sannipāta*', while chiefly affecting and remedying only one prominent trouble or complaint (constituent of the disease) cures or drives away all other accompanying troubles or complaints as well, similarly the psychosis (or the so-called

cognition by virtue of being the reflections of consciousness) while casting off or dispelling once for ever only one ignorance, scares away and thus over-powers the remaining homogeneous individual ignorances also so long as it lingers. Thus when there is an absolute removal of one ignorance only through psychosis, there is dispersion and subjugation or neutralisation of other accompanying homogenous ignorance as well by the same."<sup>20</sup>

Now, although the advaitins do not recognise the difference of psychosis or cognition in a continuous stream of cognition of single object (*dhārāvāhika-jñāna*),<sup>21</sup> as there is neither cause, nor necessity, nor even cognition of the origin and cessation of different psychosis or cognitions in respect of a single object, yet they think that the cognition arising at each moment of the *dhārāvāhika-jñāna* is *pramā* or right cognition. So if the removal of only one ignorance and the neutralisation of other accompanying ignorances through the psychosis are held simultaneously, then as Dr. V.P. Upādhyāya observes in the case of *dhārāvāhika-jñāna* the second and other subsequent *vṛttis* or cognitions would stand futile, because the entire obscuration from the object-defined consciousness has been set aside. "So some Advaitins maintain that just as when one light goes out, the darkness subjugated by it, sets in again, similarly at the time of juncture, when the first psychosis will go out and the subsequent one will step in, the ignorance, only subjugated by the first psychosis and let loose by its obscuration upon the object-defines consciousness."<sup>22</sup>

In this connection, we may refer to the view of Ānandapūrṇa Vidyāsāgara, the author of the *Nyāyachandrikā*. He strictly maintains that the removal of a particular ignorance and neutralisation of other veiling ignorances do not occur simultaneously. When one psychosis arises, it removes the ignorance acting at that point of time and brings about the manifestation of the object. It does not neutralise other ignorances expected to appear and envelope the object at subsequent points of time.<sup>23</sup> Ignorances are the modes of the primary ignorance and so possessed of temporary or momentary obscuring capacities. This can explain that the *vṛttijñāna* of all the moments of a continuous stream of cognition of one and the same object is not futile.

According to some, the ignorance, destroyed by the first *vṛtti* merely

obscures the pure existence (*sattā*) of the object, say, pot, other ignorances which are removed by the second, third and the subsequent *vṛttis*, obscure the pot as conditioned by time, space etc.<sup>24</sup>

However, if the necessity of psychosis lies in the fact of dispelling the obscuration of ignorance, then one question may be raised : With which the ignorance (*avidyā*) is really connected? Is it connected with the object (*viṣaya*) or with the subject (*jīva*)? According to a section of the Vivaraṇa School, the ignorance with reference to the object is presented in two ways—one is connected with object, another is, with the subject. Ignorance lying in the object causes the projection of new external objects through psychosis, ignorance abiding in the subject is proved from our experience - "I do not know this". The followers of Bhāmatī hold that the ignorance does not exist in the object, it abides only in the subject and naturally obscures the object. It is associated with the subject like a veil. The psychosis removes the veil and makes the projection of external objects possible.

Some followers of the Vivaraṇa maintain that the ignorance does really be in the object - it, like a piece of cloth veils the object. While interpreting very intelligibly the necessity of dispelling obscuration of ignorance by *vṛtti* (*āvaraṇābhībhavārthā*), the author of the *Vedānta-Paribhāṣā* has favoured this view.<sup>25</sup> He asserts that the *jīva* is all pervading consciousness qualified per accidens by *avidyā*. According to this theory of self, both the *jīva* and *avidyā* are pervasive. So the *avidyā* or ignorance also lies in the objects, e.g., the jar etc. like the *jīva*-consciousness. As there is no locational difference between the consciousness defined by jar etc. and *avidyā* the qualifying adjunct of *jīva*-consciousness, so the consciousness defined by jar etc. and the *jīva*-consciousness have become one and identical. If both of the consciousness be thus one and non-different, then like the consciousness defined by jar etc. the *jīva*-consciousness would also be connected with the jar etc. And then these objects would be manifested constantly. But the jar etc. are not ever manifesting. So some recognise a conditional ignorance (*avasthā-ajñāna*) that obscures the consciousness as defined by jar etc. and is dependent on the primal ignorance (*mūlāvidyā*). This conditional ignorance is a dependent mode of the primal ignorance and is called *avasthā*.<sup>26</sup> On account of this, there would not be constant manifestation of the jar etc., since only the unveiled consciousness

makes such manifestation possible. And if the consciousness defined by jar etc. would be veiled by the primary ignorance, there would never be the manifestation of jar etc. in the worldly life of bondage. Again, if the obscuration made by the mode of ignorance were permanent, there would never be the manifestation of jar etc. possible, instead of the sense contact with them. So its removal is to be granted. The removal is not caused by the Witnessing Consciousness (*Sākṣī-caitanya*) since this consciousness manifests the modal ignorance (*avasthā-ajñāna*), product of the primal ignorance (*mūlāvidyā* or *mūlājñāna*) and so cannot remove it. The *Sākṣī-caitanya* cannot remove the obscuration, in as much as such a removal would happen even in a case of mediate cognition. This removal is actually caused by *vṛtti* or the psychosis. The author of the *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* has nicely established this Advaita position that the *vṛtti* removes the veil of modal ignorance lying in the object-defined consciousness.

## VII

The second theory is this : The *vṛtti* or psychosis is necessary for the establishment of relation between the subject consciousness and the object-consciousness (*sambandhārthā*). Those who maintain that the *jīva* is all-pervading consciousness reflected on or associated with *avidyā*, hold that this relation is a conjunction produced by another conjunction (*saṃyogaja-saṃyoga*). As the relation between a tree and river is established by the relation between the wave and the river, so the relation between the *jīva* (subject) and object requires of a relation between the object and the *vṛtti* and between the *vṛtti* and the *jīva*.<sup>27</sup>

A very comprehensive and argumentative explanation of this theory has been given in the *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*. Dharmarāja in his *Paribhāṣā* interpretes this theory on the line of those, according to whom *jīva* is conditioned by *avidyā* and all pervasive. Although this all-pervasive *jīva* is related to all the objects of cognition like jar etc. even in the absence of the *vṛtti* yet, the jar etc. are not always manifested. Since it is the *vṛtti* with the respective form that makes a relation between subject-consciousness and object-consciousness. And this particular type of relation is the relation of manifested and manifestor (*vyaṅgyavyaṅjakabhāva*); it is a temporary relation and is always conditioned by the *vṛtti* with the form of an object in

concern. The all-pervasive relation of *jñā* to the objects is not of the nature of manifested and manifest. As Pandit P. Bhattāchārya Śāstri has explained,<sup>28</sup> the all pervasive *jñā* has relation to the whole of a village, but the movement of the *jñā* in the village gives rise to a particular type of relation to the village, in like manner, the *jñā* comes to be related to the objects in the relation of manifested-manifester through *antaḥkaraṇavṛtti* the act of knowing.

*Antaḥkaraṇa* is the product of the five great elements (*pañcabhūta*) in which light is the pre-dominating factor. So it is called luminous (*aiśvarya-antaḥ-karaṇam*). It is a pure substance (*svaccha*) and by nature capable of manifesting the *jñā* consciousness. But the jar etc. are impure substances; they cannot manifest the consciousness underlying themselves. At the rise of the *vṛtti* with the forms of the respective objects like the jar etc., the inertness of these (jar etc.) are overpowered by them (the *vṛttis*) and the capacity to manifest consciousness is being generated in those contents of cognition. *Antaḥkaraṇa*, the internal organ, thus, manifests consciousness immediately after the rise of *vṛtti*.<sup>29</sup> Experience reveals that even an impure substance in conjunction with a pure substance acquires the capacity to take on a reflection. For example, the wall etc. obtain the capacity of taking on the reflection of face, when these are in conjunction with water etc.<sup>30</sup> That really is meant by the manifesting capacity of the impure substances, like jar etc. is the taking reflection of that consciousness (*pratibimbavān*). The *vṛtti* goes out in the case of immediate cognition of *antaḥkaraṇavṛtti* with the fire etc. in the case of mediate cognition (e.g. the reference of fire from the perception of smoke), there is no such manifestation of consciousness and there is never found the character of immediacy. The immediate cognition of objects is, thus, based on their manifesting capacity, and this capacity is generated by the *vṛtti* established relation between the subject and the object.

We may mention in this connection that some Advaita thinkers who explain *jñā* as consciousness limited by the internal organ, hold that "as the individual soul is not all pervading, the relation consists in the establishment of an identity between the *jñā* consciousness connected with the functions (*vṛtti*) and the Brahma-consciousness as the basis of

the objects".<sup>31</sup>

### VIII

The third theory of the necessity of *vṛtti* is that it makes the manifestation of nondifference (*abhedābhi vyaktyā*) between the consciousness and the Brahma consciousness conditioned in the *jñā* situation. The advocates of this theory hold that the *jñā* or mind-defined consciousness cannot cognise the jar etc. Without the proper manifestation of non-difference between the *jñā* consciousness and the consciousness defined by the jar etc., since no relation does either exist between the manifestable jar etc. and the *jñā* consciousness or between the *jñā* consciousness and the Brahma-consciousness, the substrate of jar etc. The point is that in the absence of an identity between the comprehender and the comprehensible the comprehension does not ensue. So the author of *Vedānta-Paribhāṣā* rightly points out that in order to give plain indication of the non-difference between the *jñā* and Brahma-consciousness, the substrate of jar etc., the theory of *antaḥkāraṇavṛtti* with the form of content of cognition has been introduced in the Advaita scheme of Śaṅkara.<sup>32</sup> Though the limiting adjuncts of the *pramāṇa-caitanya* (*jñā*-consciousness) and the *viśaya-caitanya* (consciousness defined by the objects like jar etc.) are different-the former has the internal organ and the latter, the jar, no difficulty does arise in establishing the non-difference between *pramāṇa-caitanya* and *viśaya-caitanya*, in as much as both the limiting adjuncts-the internal organ and the object in concern rest on the same locus.<sup>33</sup>

Sureśvara, a protagonist of this theory of the manifestation of non-difference makes an attempt to define *jñā* as an appearance of Pure Consciousness in buddhi (internal organ), the modification of avidyā. Following the foot-prints of the Great Sureśvara, Dr. V.P. Upādhyāya has given a precise expression of this view. "In any case," Dr. Upādhyāya writes, "the psychosis is held to be indispensably necessary for establishing and manifesting an identity between the *jñā* the Incidence or Appearance of Consciousness, cast and settled into the internal organ and the Incidence or Appearance of Consciousness, permeating the object as its inmost reality".<sup>34</sup>

Thus it appears from our rapid survey that the theories of the

necessity of *vṛtti* chiefly differ in regard to the treatment of the advaita concepts of the *jñā*. According to some, the *jñā* is all-pervasive and unveiled, they maintain that the *vṛtti* is necessary for the removal of obscuration of the object. To some, the *jñā* is all pervasive and veiled, for them the utility of *vṛtti* lies in the establishment of the relation between the subject and the object. Those, who think that the *jñā* is limited, hold that *vṛtti* brings about the manifestation of non-difference of the subject and the object. Keeping aside this subtle difference, we may unhesitatingly point out that in the case of immediate cognition, the *vṛtti* is essential in the Advaita Scheme for all the three purposes. It removes the obscuration of ignorance on the object-defined consciousness, links up the *jñā* with the object and consequently results the manifestation of non-difference of the object-defined consciousness and the *jñā* consciousness. Though Śaṅkara in his commentary to the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad<sup>35</sup> does not recognise the necessity of psychosis (*vṛtti*) in the case of direct cognition, subsequently, the exponents of Śaṅkara's School, however, have taken up the issue more seriously and expended substantial energy in introducing the concept of *vṛtti* in the process of all cognitions and placing thereby the Advaita psychology of cognition on a solid foundation.

### NOTES

1. tatra yatha tadāgodakam cchidrānirgatya kulyātmanā kedārān praviśya tadvadeva catuṣkoṇādyakaram bhavati. Tathā taijasamantahkaraṇamapi caksurādi dvārā nirgatya ghatadi viśaya-deśam gatva ghatadi-viśayakarena parinamated sa eva parināmo vṛttyuccate. - *Vedānta-Paribhāṣā*, ed. by Panchanana Bhattacharya, pp 30-31
2. Pramāṇa - caitanyasya viśayavacchinna-caitanyabheda- *ibid*. P. 28
3. ghatāder viśayasya pratyakṣam tu pramatrabhinnatvam *ibid*, p. 48
4. D. G. Londhe in Proceedings of the third Indian Philosophical Congress, 1927, P. 157 mentioned in the foot-notes, *Advaita Epistemology*, P. K. Sundaram, P. 33
5. *ibid*, pp 33-34
6. viśaya-caitanyanca purvokta-prakarena pramāṇa caitanyanameveti pramāṇa

- caitanyasyaiva ghatadya-dhisthanataya pramāṭr sattaiva ghatadi-satta nanyeti siddham ghatāderaparokṣatvam-*Vedānta-Paribhāṣā*, edited by Panchanan Bhattacharya, P. 50
7. *Vedānta-Paribhāṣā*, edited by Panchanan Bhattacharya, Pp. 32-33.
  8. K. C. Bhattacharya, *Studies in Philosophy*, Vol. I, P. 72
  9. D. M. Datta, *The Six Ways of Knowing*, P. 65.
  10. *Lights on Vedānta*, Pp. 166-167
  11. M. Hiriyanna, *Outlines of Indian Philosophy*, P. 360
  12. S. M. Sutta : *The Six Ways of Knowing*, P.71
  13. rupakaren hi hrdayani parinatam, Yasmat hrdayena hi rupāni sarvo loko janati, *Bṛhadaranyakopaniṣd- Śāṅkarabhāṣya* - 3, 9, 20
  14. *The Upaniṣads*, A Third Selection, P. 243
  15. anavasthabhiya vṛtti-gocara-vṛtṭyanangī-karcna tatra svākāra-vṛtṭyupahitātva-ghatitokta-lakṣaṇa bhāvabāditiced, na, anavasthābhiyā vṛtṭer-vṛtṭyantara-visayatveopisvarisayatvābhyupagamena svavisaya-vṛtṭyu-pahita-pramāṭrcaitanya-bhinna sattvakatvasya tatrāpi sambhavāt-*Vedānta Paribhāṣā*, edited by Panchanan Bhattacharya, Pp 55-56
  16. S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri, *Vedānta Paribhāṣā*, Notes, Pp. 178-179
  17. naiyāyikavatkecidviṣayatvaṃsvabhāvataḥ-*Vedānta-Siddhānta-sūktimañjarī*, by Gaṅgādharendra Sarasvatī-Verse 65
  18. I. avidyopahita caitanyasya jīvatvapakṣe-*Vedānta-Paribhāṣā*, P. 301  
I. tatrāpi avidyopadhikoaparichinno jīvaḥ-*ibid*, P. 303.  
III. antaḥkaraṇopādhika jīvaḥ-*ibid*, P 307
  19. See introduction to Gaṅgādharendra's *Vedānta-Siddhānta-sūktimañjarī*, by N. C. Vedāntatīrtha.
  20. *Lights on Vedānta* - P. 12
  21. *Lights on Vedānta* Pp. 151-152
  22. Kiṅca dhārāvāhjikabuddhisthale na jñānabhedah - *Vedānta Paribhāṣā*, edited by Pañcānana Bhattachārya, P. 12.
  23. *Lights on Vedānta* P.152
  24. Paryāyena vṛttirnyāyacandrikākṛd bhiriyitā/arthasya mohairbodhane

- svakālāvaranākṣathiḥ. *Vedānta-Siddhānta-sūktimañjarī*, verse 82
25. Kēcīdāhur ghatajñānam ādyajñānena hanyate/dvītiyadaistu kālādiviśīṣtajñānabodhanam. *ibid* verse 83
  26. tasyacāvaranasya sadātanatve kadācidapi ghatādibhānam nasāyd-  
*Vedānta-Paribhāṣā*, edited by Pañchānana Bhattācārya, P. 302
  27. ghatādyā vacchiṇṇa-cai tanyāvarakājñānam mulāvidyā-paratantrama  
vasthāvcyamabhyapagantavyam *ibid*. Pp. 301-302
  28. taraṅgatarusaṁsparaśān nadisparśam tarāviva / viṣaye vṛttisamsargāj-  
jivasāṅgam pare viduḥ- *Vedānta-Siddhānta-sūktimañjarī*, verse 66
  29. *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*, edited by Pañchānana Bhattācārya, Vivṛti, P. 304
  30. taduktamvivaraṇe "antaḥkaraṇam hi svasmīn niva  
svasamsarginyāpighatādaucitany ābhi-vyaktiyogyatamāpādayati"-  
*Vedānta-Paribhāṣā*, edited by Pañchānana Bhattācārya, P. 305
  31. dṛṣtamcāsvacchadravyasyāpīsvacchasambadha-daśāyām pratibimba-  
grāhitvam, yatha kuḍyader Jalādi saṁyoga-daśāyām mukhadi-  
pratibimbagrahita *ibid*. P. 305
  32. See introduction to *Vedānta-Siddhānta-sūktimañjarī*, edited by N. C.  
Vedāntatīrtha-explanation of verse 67
  33. tathāca jīvasya ghatādyadhi ṣṭhāna-brahmacaitanyā bhedaṁ antareṇa  
ghatādyā vabhāsāsambhave prāpte tade vabhāsa ya ghatādyadhi ṣṭhāna-  
brahmacaitanyā bheda- siddhyartham ghatādyākaraṁ vṛttir iṣyate -  
*Vedānta-Paribhāṣā*, edited by Pañchānana Bhattācārya, P. 307.
  34. vṛttir bahirdeś anirgamaṇāṅgī-kāreṇa vṛttyantaḥ - karaṇavi ṣayāṇām  
ekadeśas tha tvenopadheya - bhedaḥbhavasyo - ktatvāt-*ibid*, Pp. 307-308
  35. V. P. Upadyaya; *Lights on Vedānta*, P. 167

Also,.... "Simultaneously with the rise of a psychosis in respect of a particular object, there ensues through that psychosis, connected with the subject or the *jīva*, on the one hand and with the object, on the other and an identification of the two appearances of consciousness, pervading the subject and the object of knowledge. Thus all the three-subject-Appearance of Consciousness, the object-Appearance of Consciousness and the Appearance of Consciousness pervading the particular process-constitute one unit (ekalolobhāvāpanna) for the time being and the

cognition arising under these conditions is called perception." - *Lights on Vedānta*, P. 168

36. Vijñānasya vyatiriktagrāhyate karaṇāntarā-peksāyāmana-vastheti cenna. niyamabhāvāt... yatra vastvantareṇatṛhyate vastvantaram tatra grāhaka-vyatiriktaṁ karaṇāntaram syāditi naikāntena niyantum śakyate. - Śāṅkarabhāṣya on Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣad, 4.3.7

N. K. Devarāja exposes this position : "That the mediation of the *vṛtti* is essential for direct knowledge is not accepted by Śāṅkara. According to him, the *vṛtti* Jñana itself is illumined or apprehended by pure cit without the intervention of another *vṛtti* or some other instrumental cause". - *An Introduction to Śāṅkara's Theory of Knowledge*, Pp. 106-107.

## IS FARIS' DERIVATION OF 'IF P THEN Q' FROM 'P $\supset$ Q' TENABLE?

JAYDEB JENA

This paper refers to "If... then' and Horse Shoe (' $\supset$ ')- A Strawsonian Account" of Kantilal Das published in this Journal.<sup>1</sup> In this paper the author tries to show the interderivability of 'if... then' and ' $\supset$ '. There is no question of disagreement among logicians about the derivability of 'p $\supset$ q' from 'if p then q'; but all differences come off from the derivability of 'if p then q' from 'p $\supset$ q'. Before starting our argument for the derivability of 'if p then q', from 'p $\supset$ q', let us first reflect on the notion of 'if... then' (*ordinary implication*) and ' $\supset$ ' (*material implication*).

A statement composed of two constituent statements and the phrase 'if... then' is called a conditional. The component statement that precedes 'then' is called the *antecedent* (meaning 'that which precedes'), and the component following 'then' is termed the *consequent* ('that which follows'). The key to the meaning of a conditional is the relation of implication that is asserted to hold between its antecedent and consequent, in that order. In the conditional '*If all men are mortal and Plato is a man, then Plato is mortal*', the consequent logically follows from its antecedent, and hence the relation between the antecedent and the consequent is logical. In the conditional '*if the figure is a triangle, then the figure has three sides*', the consequent follows from the antecedent by the very definition of the word 'triangle', and hence the relation between them is a definitional one. In the conditional '*if blue litmus paper is placed in acid, then it will turn red*', the consequent neither follows logically from the antecedent nor does it follow from the very definition of any word contained in the antecedent, but the connection asserted here is causal, and hence it must

Indian Philosophical Quarterly XXX No. 3  
July 2003

be discovered empirically.

If we examine a number of different conditionals, then we can see that there are different kinds of implications that constitute different senses of the 'if... then' phrase used in ordinary language. Hence they are called *ordinary implications or relational implications*. In these conditionals the relation between the antecedent and the consequent is so intense that the truth or falsehood of the consequent cannot be determined without taking recourse to the truth or falsehood of the antecedent. For example, in the conditional "*If we take medicine, then our disease will be cured,*" if 'we take medicine' and 'our disease is cured' are true, then we will consider the conditional to be true. But if 'we take medicine' is false, that means, if we do not take medicine, then our disease may or may not be cured, and hence nothing can be said about the conditional. Sometimes it happens that if 'our disease is cured' is true, then 'our taking medicine' may be true or false, and hence nothing can be said about the conditional. Again if 'our disease is cured' is false, that means if our disease is not cured, then 'our taking medicine' may be true or false, and hence nothing can be said about the conditional. Supposing 'p' for the antecedent and 'q' for the consequent, we have the following results concerning *ordinary implication* :

- (I) If 'p' is true and 'q' is true, then the implication is true.
- (II) If 'p' is false, then 'q' may be true or false, and hence the implication remains undetermined.
- (III) If 'q' is true, then 'p' may be true or false, and hence the implication remains undetermined.
- (IV) If 'q' is false, then 'p' may be true or false, and hence the implication remains undetermined.

There is another type of conditional with no connection between its antecedent and consequent. It is special and non-relational in nature. In the conditional '*If  $2+2=2$ , then London is a small city*', there is no connection between its antecedent and consequent. This type of conditional is called material implication or Russellian implication. The notion of *material implication* occurs in *Principles of Mathematics*. It is truth functional in character. The truth value of this implication is determined by means of a

mechanical process. Any statement of the form ' $p \supset q$ ' ('p' materially implies 'q') is true if "it is not the case that the first of its constituent statements is true and the second false, and false if and only if the first of its constituent statements is true and the second false. That is to say, the falsity of the first constituent or the truth of the second is equally a sufficient condition of the truth of a statement of material implication and the combination of the truth in the first with the falsity in the second is the single necessary and sufficient condition of its falsity".<sup>2</sup> Thus we have the following results concerning *material implication* :

- I) If  $v(p) = T$  and  $v(q) = T$ , then  $v(p \supset q) = T$
- II) If  $v(p) = T$  and  $v(q) = F$ , then  $v(p \supset q) = F$
- III) If  $v(p) = F$  and  $v(q) = T$ , then  $v(p \supset q) = T$
- IV) If  $v(p) = F$  and  $v(q) = F$ , then  $v(p \supset q) = T$

J. A. Faris, in the last part of his monograph 'Truth Functional Logic'<sup>3</sup> claims that *ordinary implication* can be derived from *material implication*. That is to say, 'if p then q' can be derived from ' $p \supset q$ '. But my aim of writing this paper is to show whether or not his argument is sustainable. To derive 'if p then q' from ' $p \supset q$ ', Faris suggests an essential condition by means of which the necessary condition of the truth of 'if p then q' could be established. That condition is the condition-E, which runs as follows:

"There is a set S of true propositions such that 'q' is derivable from 'p' together with S".<sup>4</sup> This condition is a sufficient and a necessary condition of the truth of 'if p then q'. The derivability of 'if p then q' is possible with the aid of condition-E. According to Faris 'q' can certainly be inferred from 'p' and ' $p \supset q$ '. Accordingly if ' $p \supset q$ ' is true, then there is a set S of true propositions, namely the set consisting solely of the proposition ' $p \supset q$ ', such that 'q' is inferrible from 'p' together with S. It follows that if ' $p \supset q$ ' is true, then condition-E is satisfied. But if condition-E is satisfied, then 'if p then q' is true. Consequently if we are able to know that the proposition ' $p \supset q$ ' is true, then we are able to know that the proposition 'if p then q' is true, also whatever other truths or falsehood there may be. That is to say, 'if p then q' is derivable from ' $p \supset q$ '.<sup>5</sup>

Prof. Baker<sup>6</sup> criticises Faris' arguments in maintaining the view that 'if p then q' cannot be derived from ' $p \supset q$ ', because 'if p then q' is sometimes

consistent and inconsistent with 'if p then not-q', while ' $p \supset q$ ' is consistent with ' $p \supset \sim q$ '. If p then q' and 'if p then not-q' are consistent when they occur as premises of a *simple destructive dilemma*. By *simple destructive dilemma* we mean, a dilemma whose minor premise alternatively denies the consequents of the compound hypothetical major premise and the conclusion is a categorical proposition. Thus 'if p then q' and 'if p then not-q' are consistent as in such an argument as "if we are to escape, we must retreat (because the enemy is advancing), and if we are to escape we must not retreat (because there is a precipice behind us), therefore we shall not escape."<sup>7</sup> 'If p then q' and 'if p then not-q' are inconsistent in case of *ordinary hypothetical*, as "if the meeting is held at night, most members will attend and if the meeting is held at night most members will not attend."<sup>8</sup> It is plain that these two are inconsistent statements, only one of which can be true.

On the otherhand any two *material-implication-statements* of the form ' $p \supset q$ ' and ' $p \supset \sim q$ ' are consistent with one another. Because in *material implication* the falsity of the antecedent is a sufficient condition of its being true. For example, to say, 'it will not rain, the falsity of the antecedent of "it will rain  $\supset$  the match will be cancelled"', is to say that this condition is sufficient to establish the truth of this *material-implication-statement*. Thus when ' $p \supset q$ ' and ' $p \supset \sim q$ ' are both true (consistent), Faris' derivation of 'if p then q' from ' $p \supset q$ ' is not possible. Because according to condition-E, whenever ' $p \supset q$ ' is true, condition-E is satisfied. If condition-E is satisfied, then 'if p then q' is derivable from ' $p \supset q$ '. Similarly, whenever ' $p \supset \sim q$ ' is true, condition-E is also satisfied. If condition-E is satisfied, then 'if p then not-q' is derivable from ' $p \supset \sim q$ '. Thus according to condition-E, whenever ' $p \supset q$ ' and ' $p \supset \sim q$ ' are both true, we would be able to derive the corresponding hypotheticals, 'if p then q' and 'if p then not-q', and thus commit to the truth of both of inconsistent propositions. But to derive 'if p then q' from ' $p \supset q$ ' by means of condition-E, not only ' $p \supset q$ ' be true but also 'p' is true. In that case we would not be able to derive 'if p then not-q', which is inconsistent with 'if p then q', for, ' $p \supset \sim q$ ' would then be false.

Russell<sup>9</sup> does not accept Baker's argument, but suggests that 'if p then q' and 'if p then not-q' are *always* consistent, otherwise *reductio ad-absurdum* (R.A.A.) argument would not be possible. But 'if p then q'

and 'if p then not-q' might be inconsistent if and only if an additional assumption is made. that is to say, given the truth of 'p', 'if p then q' and 'if p then not-q' would be inconsistent. Thus it is to be noted that for R.A.A. to be possible 'if p then q' and 'if p then not-q' must be consistent. Because if 'if p then q' and if p then not-q' are both true, then the conclusion, ' $\neg p$ ' could validly be drawn. But this argument of Russell is not sustainable for the following reasons.

If 'if ... then' is understood in terms of *material implication*, then the possible falsity of the antecedent would be a decisive one. Thus the formula ' $p \supset q$ ' is consistent with ' $p \supset \neg q$ ' exactly because 'p' may be false, i.e.

1.	$p \supset q$	$p \supset \neg q$
	F T T	F T F T
2.	$p \supset q$	$p \supset \neg q$
	F T F	F T T F

But if 'if... then' is understood in terms of *ordinary implication*, then the possible falsity of the antecedent would not be a sufficient condition of its being true. For example, 'it will not rain' or 'it does not rain' is not considered as a sufficient condition of the truth of such an *ordinary implication* as 'if it rains, then the match will be cancelled'. The *ordinary implication* is taken to be true when both the antecedent and the consequent are found to be true. Thus "if it rains, the match will be cancelled" is taken to be inconsistent with 'if it rains, then the match will not be cancelled', and hence their joint assertion in the same context is self-contradictory. But the *material-implication*-sentence, "it will rain  $\supset$  the match will be cancelled" is surely taken to be consistent with the corresponding *material-implication* sentence, "it will rain  $\supset$  the match will not be cancelled". Thus the formulas ' $p \supset q$ ' and ' $p \supset \neg q$ ' are consistent with one another and their joint assertion is equivalent to ' $\neg q$ '. This could be demonstrated as :

{1}	(1) $(p \supset q). (p \supset \neg q)$	$\therefore \neg p$
{2}	(2) p	
{1}	(3) $p \supset q$	I, T

{1,2}	(4) $q$	2, 3, T
{1}	(5) $p \supset \neg q$	1 T
{1,2}	(6) $\neg q$	2, 5, T
{1,2}	(7) $q, \neg q$	4, 6, T
{1}	(8) $\neg p$	2, 7, R.A.A.

But if 'if... then' is understood in terms of *strict implication* (*strong implication*), then 'if  $p$  then  $q$ ' is true when ' $q$ ' is deducible from ' $p$ '. Again, If 'if... then' is understood in terms of *relevant implication* then the validity of an inference from ' $p$ ' to ' $q$ ' is that ' $p$ ' be relevant for ' $q$ '. Thus in the proposition 'if  $p$  then  $q$ ' the antecedent ' $p$ ' must be true, its actual truth value being disregarded as irrelevant to the truth value of the conditional. The truth of the antecedent may be relevant to the possibility of verifying or falsifying the conditional, but not to its truth value. Everywhere but in truth functional logic the validity of an inference is independent of the truth value of the antecedent or the premises. In truth functional logic, however, the truth value of ' $p \supset q$ ' depends on the truth value of ' $p$ ', if ' $q$ ' is false. But because we have to disregard as irrelevant the possible falsity of the antecedent, since it is supposed to be true, the propositions 'if  $p$  then  $q$ ' and 'if  $p$  then not- $q$ ' are inconsistent, whereas ' $p \supset q$ ' and ' $p \supset \neg q$ ' are not. Thus it is to be noted that the consistency / inconsistency between 'if  $p$  then  $q$ ' and 'if  $p$  then not- $q$ ' depends on the kind of logic we take for interpretation.

But ' $p \supset q$ ' and ' $p \supset \neg q$ ' could quite well be inconsistent if and only if a tautology is substituted for ' $p$ '. That is to say, ' $(p \supset q) \supset q$ ' and ' $(p \supset q) \supset \neg q$ ' are inconsistent, because they cannot both be true. This is proved by means of truth-table.

1.	$(p \supset p) \supset q$	(2)	$(p \supset p) \supset \neg q$
	T T T T T		T T T F F T
	T T T F F		T T T T T F
	F T F T T		F T F F F T
	F T F F F		F T F T T F

Thus Russell's thesis, "if  $p$  then  $q$ ' and 'if  $p$  then not- $q$ ' are always consistent"<sup>10</sup> is not tenable at all.

As Russell states, "for a *reductio-ad-absurdum* argument to be possible, 'if p then q' and 'if p then not-q' should be consistent".<sup>11</sup> By *reductio-ad-absurdum* we mean : "if a contradiction is derivable from a set of premises and the negation of the formula S, then S is derivable from the set of premises alone, i.e.  $P \cup \neg S \vdash (S \cdot \neg S) \supset P \vdash S$ ".<sup>12</sup> That means, if we derive a contradiction from a set of premises, then it is proved that at least one of the premises in that set is false. This follows from the fact that we cannot derive false sentences from true ones, plus the fact that contradictions are false sentences. Now, consider, say, a four premise argument, and assume that three of its four premises are true. Then, if we derive a contradiction from that set of four premises, then it is proved that the fourth premise in that set is false (since at least one member of the set is false, and we assume that the other three are true). But it follows then that we also have proved that the negation of the fourth premise is true (since the negation of a false sentence is true). We have here the main idea behind the *Indirect or reductio-ad-absurdum* (R.A.A.) proof. This could be demonstrated as :

{1}	(1) $p \supset (q.r)$	
{2}	(2) $(q \vee s) \supset t$	
{3}	(3) $(s \vee p)$	$\therefore t$
{4}	(4) $\neg t$	(1.p)
{2,4}	(5) $\neg (q \vee s)$	2, 4 T
{2,4}	(6) $\neg q. \neg s$	5 T
{2,4}	(7) $\neg q$	6 T
{2,4}	(8) $\neg s$	6 T
{2,3,4}	(9) p	3, 8 T
{1,2,3,4}	(10) $(q . r)$	1, 9 T
{1,2,3,4}	(11) q	10 T
{1,2,3,4}	(12) $q . \neg q$	7, 11, T
{1,2,3}	(13) t	4, 12. R. A. A.

But the argument of Russell, which really exemplifies the formula ' $((p \supset q). (p \supset \neg q)) \supset \neg p$ ', (where ' $\supset$ ' is equivalent to 'if... then'), also

fails. Because such an argument arises when ' $q \cdot \sim q$ ' is substituted for ' $p$ ', the result being ' $((q \cdot \sim q) \cdot ((q \cdot \sim q) \rightarrow \sim q)) \rightarrow \sim (q \cdot \sim q)$ '. It shows that " $\sim (q \cdot \sim q)$ " is derived from apparently avlid conditionals, ' $(q \cdot \sim q) \rightarrow q$ ' and ' $(q \cdot \sim q) \rightarrow \sim q$ ', not because they are consistent, but on the contrary, because they are inconsistent. From inconsistent propositions it may be inferred that their premises or antecedents can not all be true, and here the only antecedent in question is ' $q \cdot \sim q$ '. Thus it is precisely because ' $p \rightarrow q$ ' and ' $p \rightarrow \sim q$ ' (if  $p$  then  $q$  and 'if  $p$  then not- $q$ ') are inconsistent, that they imply  $\sim p$ '.<sup>13</sup>

Now we can paraphrase the argument as follows :

- (i) ' $p \supset q$ ' and ' $p \supset \sim q$ ' are consistent.
- (ii) 'If  $p$  then  $q$ ' and 'if  $p$  then not- $q$ ' are inconsistent.
- (iii) When ' $p \supset q$ ' and ' $p \supset \sim q$ ' are consistent, we would be able to derive their corresponding inconsistent hypotheticals, 'if  $p$  then  $q$ ' and 'if  $p$  then not- $q$ '
- (iv) When 'if  $p$  then  $q$ ' is derived from ' $p \supset q$ ', at that time not only ' $p \supset q$ ' be true, but also ' $p$ ' is true. In that case we would not be able to derive 'if  $p$  then not- $q$ '.

**Note** that Russell, in his paper "if and  $\supset$ ", *Mind*, 1970, V-LXXIX, p. 135, makes no distinction between 'if... then' and 'hook', and claims that the relation between ' $p \supset q$ ' and 'if  $p$  then  $q$ ' are not peculiar to the 'hook'. So 'if  $p$  then  $q$ ' is equivalent to ' $p \supset q$ '.

It is, therefore, concluded that Faris' derivation of 'if  $p$  then  $q$ ' from ' $p \supset q$ ' is not tenable.

## NOTES

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2. *Ibid.* p. 42
3. Faris, J. A : *Truth-Functional Logic*, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962, p. 109.'
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*Is Faris' Derivation of 'If P Then Q' From 'P $\supset$ Q' Tenable?*

409

5. *Ibid.* p. 118
6. Baker, A. J. 'If and ' $\supset$ ' *Mind*, 1967, V-LXXVI, N-303, p. 437
7. *Ibid.* p. 438
8. *Ibid*
9. Russell, L. J. : 'If and ' $\supset$ ' *Mind* 1970, V-LXXIV, N-313, pp. 135-36
10. *Ibid.* p. 136
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## ONTOLOGICAL NON-BEING (ABHĀVA) VS. PHILOSOPHICAL-BEING [ INDIAN CONTEXT ]

D. N. TIWARI

### I

Being (*Bhāva*) and non-being (*Abhāva*) as metaphysical concepts have been central issues widely discussed by the philosophical systems of the West and the East but very rare attempts are made there to view them independently of physiological, psychological and ontological pursuits. These concepts, in relation to the nature of language, are chiefly approached in two different ways-1: By taking language as referring tool that stand by proxy for the things-in-themselves as we find in the approaches made by most of the ontological philosophers of the East and the West and 2: By taking language as (*Vācaka*) by nature and being and non-being as expressed (*Vācya*) of it. *Pāṇinian* Grammarians, in general, and *Bhartṛhari* in particular approach these concepts, as they are revealed in the mind by language in usual communication. Here, in this paper, we propose to present a critique of negation (*abhāva*) in the light of *Bhartṛhari's* monumental work entitled *Vākyapadīya*. The novelty of this presentation lies in cognitive holistic approach to the concept of negation-an approach for which cognition, communication, philosophical reflections and investigations are not only based on but are confined to the language - the expresser and the meaning - the expressed revealed non-differently by it. Language reveals the meaning by itself and independently of ontological beings and our allegiances to them.<sup>1</sup> This approach is relevant in removing many of the philosophical controversies arising out of assuming or refuting being and non-being as metaphysically real or unreal.

*Indian Philosophical Quarterly* XXX No 3  
July 2003

## II

Language, for our philosophical concern, is a foundational being of awareness by nature. The term used by *Bhartṛhari*, for it, is 'sphoṭa': an indivisible, inner and ubiquitously given unit of awareness that reveals a complete meaning non-differently by itself. By the term 'complete meaning' we mean a unit that extincts further expectancy involved in the completion of cognition of a unit - meaning or the unit that satisfies further expectancy involved in the cognition of a complete meaning. Language is a being cognoscible and communicable by nature and communication, for us, is the cognition revealed by language in the mind. Thus, unlike Chomsky<sup>3</sup>, we give due importance to language comprising cognitive and social forms of behaviour as foundational being of communication. We do not overlook the significance of language-token because communication cannot ordinarily be accomplished without language - tokens, gestures and other marks learnt by us by the observation of their forms, tones, diction, their uses, etc. by the elders of the community in which we are born.

We simply make a difference between the real or meaning-revealing language (*sphoṭa*) and the language-token which helps manifestation of *sphoṭa* ubiquitously given in the mind of the speakers and hearers. We view that knowledge is not revealed by language token and that language is not confined to uttering and hearing of the utterances only. It is the revelation of cognition by the real language. As language token is learnt by the observation of its uses by the elders of the society in which we are born, it is a social phenomena and as the real language is a unit of awareness which reveals its meaning in the mind of the audience, it is inter-subjective being foundationally given to all rational animals. The tokens learnt, though, philosophically they are only instrumental in manifestation of the real language, are ordinarily taken as language only due to their instrumentality in the manifestation of the real language. How can instruments reveal cognition or do any thing by itself? Dr. John D. Kelly rightly remarks 'why should we imagine that signs have meaning? Do tools have gardening, fighting or cooking<sup>4</sup>? The real language i. e. *sphoṭa* is defined by *Bhartṛhari* as *grāhya-grāhaka* or *prakāśya* and *prakāśaka* by nature. It illuminates itself its own nature in the mind first and then its meaning as well. From the point of view of speakers, tokens are manifestations of it and from the

# Ontological Non-Being (Abhāva) Vs Philosophical-Being

point of view of cognition accomplished by the audience, it is manifested by the tokens and it is due to inter-subjective and inter-social specificities of language that our view is distinguished from that of mentalistic approach to it. As it, for us, is a foundational being of awareness in character i.e. it reveals awareness of objects and the self awareness as well, we differ from those inter-subjectivists who attach awareness and self-awareness with a subjective or trans-subjective consciousness.

*Bhartṛhari's* observations, on the nature of cognition as shot through and through by language and on the limit of cognition as confined to the language ubiquitously given in the mind as expressor and to what it expresses non-differently in the mind, provide a sufficient cognitive ground to accept that the being and non-being as things-in themselves are untouched by language. *Such an observation helps to find out that the main cause of the controversy and confusions, regarding the determination of being and non-being, lies in the nondiscrimination of the philosophical intelligible-being (Upacāra-sattā) which figures non-differently by language in the mind and that of the things-in-themselves which are untouched by the language.* What figure in the mind by language are beings, concepts or thought objects to which our philosophical reflection, investigation, cognition and communication are confined. In *Bhartṛhari's* terminology it is *upacāra-sattā* (intelligible being figured/revealed non-differently by language in the mind) which comprises the being of language (*sphoṭa*) and that of meaning non-differently revealed by it (*pratibhā* non-differently by language) *Bhartṛhari* apparently holds that the language, as such, does not illuminate or express things-in themselves and the experiences of them are only instrumental in manifestation of the language in the mind. What is revealed by language is not a metaphysical thing in its character, rather, it is the inner-being of awareness in character (*upacāra-sattā*). Even the mind-in itself is beyond the grasp of mind because it grasps only the meaning 'mind' non-differently revealed by language in the mind (consciousness in itself) which on the other hand is known by implication or by presumption, as the ontological substratum of the meaning 'mind' revealed non-differently by language 'mind'.

Cognitive-holistic interpretation of *Bhartṛhari* in the present paper,

accepts language as concept. All sentences and single word expressions for *Bhartṛhari* are concepts and all concepts are beings i.e., intelligible or philosophical beings. All sentences assertoric as well as negative are distinct beings because distinct and discriminate knowledge of them is revealed. He takes knowledge as infused with language<sup>8</sup>. The principle of the non-difference of the being of language and the meaning and that of the non-difference of language and cognition serves as the foundation of *Bhartṛhari*'s cognitive holistic philosophy for which sentence is not confined to the uttering and hearing only but is an indivisible and foundational being of awareness in character. So far this cognitive-holism is concerned, it takes sentence as inner, indivisible and given unit of cognition which reveals meaning non-differently when revealed by itself first. It considers all sentences as ubiquitously given, indivisible and distinct units conveying a complete meaning of their own and, thus, it does not hold proper to accept that assertoric sentences are original and that negative sentences are constituted out of them. In *Bhartṛhari*'s indivisibility theory of language<sup>9</sup> and of language infusing cognition there is no ground to hold that assertoric sentences form a constituent of another sentence by negating the original sentences as *Frege*<sup>10</sup> thinks because veridical-cognition, not only by assertoric sentences but by negative sentences also, is revealed and distinctly cognized and that is why communication by them is accomplished irrespectively of existence or non-existence of external referents.

Language is expressive or revealing force. It reveals meaning independently of things in themselves. We view that our cognition is confined to the units revealed by language in the mind and it is only this way that one can properly estimate the language as expressive being. We frequently use negative expressions, straightforwardly, for expressing negation. The sentence 'The tree does not exist' is an indivisible unit and is expressive of its meaning by itself independently of the assertoric sentence 'The tree exists' (which is another separate indivisible unit). As common parts of an indivisible unit or awareness do not occur, no two sentences are common and as the unit of communication is a unit, and, as all units are revealed indivisibles, there is no possibility of the common parts. The word 'Tree' in the expression 'The tree exists' and the word 'tree' in the expression 'The tree does not exist' are not common. They are expressive of their own

meanings respectively in those sentences. It is only for the sake of syntactical understanding of the indivisible sentences that we by ignoring the difference or their identity and unity of awareness as unit take them as common parts. But, from the point of views of cognition, distinctly expressed by the two separate indivisible sentences conveying distinct indivisible meanings, the idea of the common parts of the sentence does not stand significant. As no real division of awareness, which is a complete unit, is possible, the idea of common sentence or common parts of a sentence is baseless if the language as indivisible expressor of indivisible meaning is taken into account. The being of language and that of the meaning, non-differently figured in the mind by it, are the only objects of our cognition and cognition of the two as identical conception or as non-different is the foundational principle of *Bhartṛhari's* cognitive holism. As the language, for *Bhartṛhari*, is self-illuminated and illuminating being ubiquitously given in the mind as a principle of awareness of the identical conception, the relation between the language and meaning is taken by him as eternal fitness of the language i.e. *Yogyatā*<sup>11</sup> which is eternally dependent relation between the two-the illumined and the illuminated being to which our cognition, communication and philosophical reflections are confined. These beings are philosophical beings as they are the beings cognized and are communicable by nature.

In very brief, it appears clearly that *Bhartṛhari* and his commentators Helārāja and Puṇyarāja are of the opinion that *there is no possibility of philosophical solution to the problem of cognition of the being and of the non-being if the ontological being and non-being and those of the philosophical are not distinctly viewed and if the latter is not taken as the object proper of philosophical investigation*. not only that but if they in themselves are taken into account, the problem of relation between a linguistic unit i.e. expression and the non-linguistic unit i.e. things in themselves will be difficult to solve and ultimately the accomplishment of cognition and communication by language will be impossible if the two are taken as completely different in nature.

### III

Now, to begin with the *Vaiyākaraṇas* philosophy of abhāva cognition, as a cognitive problem par excellence, we are to explain that *Bhartṛhari*

following his great masters, has categorically mentioned two sorts of beings i.e. : 1. *Mukhya-sattā* or things in themselves which are beyond the grasp of language and of cognition as well and 2. *Upacāra-sattā* (intelligible being revealed by language in the mind) to which our cognition is confined. *Upacāra-sattā* figures equally as being and as non-being in the mind when presented so by language. It is the latter category of being with which we are primarily concerned, here in.

The words like Śaśaṅga (hare's horn), Vandhyāputra (barron's son). Khapuṣpa (sky-flowers) etc. having no referents in the empirical world, are used frequently in usual communication. Those who are habitual of seeking referents in the empirical world as the import of words may reject them as meaningless or as mere imagination of mind or as pseudo-words having no sense or as empty-concept. In fact, these consideration regarding words like hare's horn, etc. are non-philosophical. If by empty-concept one means the concept having no empirical content, it will be, philosophically, contradictory because it leads to the assertion that a linguistic unit possesses a non-linguistic empirical content and, hence, denied. If it means a content free awareness and if one by content means 'sense-data' or abstraction, it adds nothing of any philosophical signification because sense-data is abstracted by mind from perception and, overall, it is only instrumental in manifesting the real language (*sphoṭa*) by which concepts are revealed. The abstraction, if not restrained or revealed by language in the mind, may not be known as a being and if it is taken as revealed being then it is not abstraction but the being revealed by language which is the self-restrained being the form of which is the content of meaning. The cognition revealed by language is neither the sense data nor the abstraction made on their basis but the form of the meaning revealed non-differently by language in the mind and if it is taken as the content of the cognition then there is no cognition possible without contents. Even if there is some sense of the term 'empty-concept' apart from the form of its meaning, it would not be known so if not revealed by the term and in that case the expressive character of language will be put in question also. On the contrary, the words like hare's horn are empty concepts and are frequently used and communication is accomplished by them i.e. they are obviously expressive of their meanings. Do their meanings not figure positively in the

mind? Is communication not accomplished by them? If, it is yes, how can the object of cognition revealed by these words be denied? If it is not, how can they be known so? Do they not reveal their meanings as hare's horn or as empty-concept or as negation independently of referents? They do, and, therefore, communication is accomplished by them.

In order to clarify the issue, we may start our investigation with a counter question : does the cognition revealed by the word 'being' figure positively and that of the word 'non-beings' does not figure? *Bhartṛhari* holds the firm view that meaning positively figures in the mind non-differently by all words viz. being, non-being, empty-concept, etc.<sup>13</sup>. The words are words as they express their meaning and that is why communication by them is accomplished. Description of them as concepts with or without contents as referable entities can be made but it hardly adds any difference to the position of cognition which is revealed positively in the mind by those words independently of referents. Even the cognition by the terms with content, without content, meaninglessness etc. also figures positively as their expresseds (*vācya*). As we have already mentioned that what figures in the mind by language is taken by *Bhartṛhari* as a being (innerbeing) or a thought object i.e. expressed (*vācya*), there is no cognition free from awareness of object (thought-object) and in some cases, the word (revealed by utterances) itself may be the object as we find in cases of numinous recitation (*mantras*).

Just as illumination is the nature of light, just as the consciousness is the nature of mind, Flash of understanding or awareness, revealed and infused by language, is the nature of being and of non-being as well and that is the reason *Bhartṛhari* defines it as *pratibhā*. It is called *upacāra-sattā* as it is the being who figures in the mind by language and who, in contrast with the *mukhya-sattā* (things-in-themselves) for which the word *sattā* is popularly used, is called *upacāra-sattā* (intelligible being). Things-in-themselves (ontological or psychological) are not intelligible in character and the data acquired, on their basis, are only instrumental and, hence, are not beings. By being, we mean, here, the intelligible-being revealed, independently of things-in-themselves, by language in the mind i.e., *upacāra-sattā* which is the only being of our philosophical concern.

*Upacāra-sattā* is not mental construction as *Mādhyaṃika* Buddhists assume. It is not the modification of mind as *Yogācāra* idealists accept. It is not the abstraction of mind from the things-in-themselves. It is self-restrained being or idea revealed non-differently by language in the mind and that there is no philosophical need to accept any other content of cognition except the form of the beings figured in the mind by language. It is only for the sake of children and ignorant that the indivisible, inner and intelligible being is made understandable to them with reference to the things in themselves as the content of cognition.

All words, for *Bhartṛhari*, are concepts and, hence, *universals*. *Universals in the sense that identical cognition conception in all their occurrences and instances is revealed and not in the sense of them as abstraction from various occurrences and instances.* It is ubiquitously given as unit of awareness and is revealed by itself in communication when manifested by utterances. In case of *abhāva* (non-being) and hare's horn etc., as there is no individual for the inherence of universal of non-being, the question : how can it be justified to accept them as concepts if the concepts are taken as universal, may naturally be asked.

Solving the problem *Helārāja* writes, '*Abhāvasyāpi buddhyākāreṇa nirūpaṇāt*<sup>14</sup>. As per the statement '*Abhāva*' (non-being) also figures in the mind positively as being (of non-being) and as veridical and identical cognition by the world non-being, in its several occurrences and instances, is accomplished, it is universal. Not only that but as *abhāva* is presented in the mind differently by language and is, accordingly, classified in four of its kinds viz. 1. *Prāgabhāva* (non-existent of it in its cause prior to its production=pre-non-existence), 2. *Pradhvansābhāva* (non-existent of the effect after its destruction =post-non-existence), 3. *Anyonyābhāva* (*mutual non-existence of one in another*) and 4. *Atyantābhāva* (exclusively non-existent), it (non-being) as universal, inhering in all its categories, is admitted as the import of the word *abhāva*<sup>15</sup> (*abhāvaścātvarāḥ ityatrāpi nīrūpakhyātam sāmānyam kalpanīyam*). That which figures in the mind is also a being and thus non-being like being is also a being figured in the mind by language and it is this being (of non-being) on the basis of which communication regarding non-being by language is accomplished. In grammar, same rules are applied for the being

and for the non-being as well. For example, dative case for the being is used with the word 'dadāti' (*viprāya gām dadāti* - he gives a cow to a Brāhmin) and (*viprāya gām na dadāti* = he does not give a cow to a Brāhmin) also. Both of the being and non-being can neither be expressed nor be known simultaneously. 'The tree exists' and 'The tree does not exist' are different expressions distinctly expressing the being and non-being of a tree without a reference to its external-being and non-being respectively. Both of the being and non-being have their distinct cognitive or intelligible-beings. i.e. *upacāra-sattā* of which no expressive being is ever deprived of (*na sattām padārthavyabhicarati*)<sup>16</sup>. *Upacāra-sattā* of being and of non-being is not contradictory to each other. They are so known as they are distinctly revealed by the respective expressions. The possibility of their simultaneous cognition is not acceptable to *Bhartṛhari*.

What figures in the mind by language is a being i. e. *Upacāra-sattā*. It is the proper object of our cognition, for, what is revealed non-differently by language is the only object of our cognition. Thus, it is obviously proper to accept that philosophically non-being is also a being as it is revealed immediately by the language in the mind. It is the inner-being of 'non-being' on the basis of which expectancy for negative expressions is made possible and the cognition of it by those expressions is accomplished<sup>17</sup>. *Extremely non-existent or empty-concepts are also known thus as they are presented so by language in the mind.* It is this fact of cognition viewing which *Mahābhāṣyakāra* has given his verdict '*na sattāmpadārtho Vyabhicarati*' according to which no existence is ever deprived of its inner-being i.e. *upacāra-sattā*. *Bhartṛhari* has also come to the same conclusion regarding the inner-being of 'non-being'<sup>18</sup>. The relation between the language expressing 'non-being' and the expressed (non-being) is equally eternal as it is there with the being expressed by the language 'being'. Overall, being and non-being as things-in-themselves are beyond the touch of language and of cognition since our cognition is confined only to the beings expressed by the language.

According to the ontological perspective of *Bhartṛhari's* holism, being and non-being are not the realities separate from consciousness which is the ultimate principle of all of them. Even the consciousness-in-itself, philosophically, requires cognition of it, as revealed by the expression, as

its cognitive base. Cognitively, this cognitive base is foundation for their inference as the ontological apposition of the cognition. As philosophical being and non-being are known as are revealed by language, they are defined by *Bhartṛhari* as *upacāra-sattā*. *Bhartṛhari* is very bold in accepting that even consciousness is cognized as being or as non-being only when presented so by language<sup>19</sup>.

Being and non-being are not ontological transformations of consciousness<sup>20</sup> but are the flashes of consciousness figured differently, as being and non-being by the language, i.e. if communicated as a being existent in present it is known as *bhāva* (being) and if communicated as associated with past and future, it is revealed as *abhāva* (non-being). As the beings, communicated as associated with past and future, are not the object of sensory perception they are taken as non-being but, *cognitively, non-being is also a being given ubiquitously in the mind and is revealed by language as inner and intelligible being*. The memory of recognition of past and the implication (*utprekṣa*) of future are not possible if these inner-beings are not accepted as given. The pragmatic arguments may also be given for proving the pleasure and pain and, in such a situation, it is difficult to deny them only on the basis of their non-perceptibility. Philosophically, *bhāva* and *abhāva*, for *Bhartṛhari* are not ontological realities, but are cognitive beings or flashes of awareness (in character) as they are known as revealed in the mind by language.

Theory of ontological-commitment of language<sup>21</sup> and the theory of language as referring tool of concrete and abstract entities are based on opinion that language in a system is related to experience and from this relation meaning follows or that it presents even an entity non-linguistic in character and that the predicative use of language is governed by referents. It may be said that to use language is to respond the world in a certain way as *Quine* thinks but it is only a mistaken way to view meaning as identified with sense-experience. The language, for philosophy of language, must have the world of its own independently of the metaphysical world of our experiences. Philosophic world is confined only to the world of language i.e. the language and the meaning it reveals non-differently in the mind. It is a self-restrained world of awareness in character having its own law of awareness and autonomy of expressing itself and the meaning. It is

expressive by nature. The autonomy and the expressive character of language cannot properly be estimated if it is taken as committed to experiences of ontological beings, which for *Bhartṛhari* are beyond the touch of and against the autonomy of language. Language, the being expressive by nature, has its own freedom and autonomy in expressing beings independently of any commitment to ontological or psychological experiences. We can say that to accept the idea of ontological commitment of language is to deny the autonomy and freedom of the expressive character of language as a unit independently expressive of itself and its meaning as well. That is the reason communication, without a want of them or independently of their experiences, is accomplished by language itself. Ontological entities are beyond the touch of language and the experiences are only instrumental in manifesting inner-language which being manifested by them, expresses its ownself first and then its meaning independently of things-in themselves. Meaning could not be taken as something which follows from our experience of the metaphysical things because in that case there will be nothing to distinguish semantic units from the experiential or stimulus tools.

It is only by imposition of the cognition, revealed non-differently by language on our allegiances with the ontological things and theories, that the ontological commitment of language gets importance in a system. If *Bhartṛhari's* trend of philosophy is taken in view, it becomes difficult to think as to how language, having a non-ontological character and which, being expressive by nature, expresses the meaning independently of ontological entities, is committed to ontological real or unreal in a system. The theory of ontological-commitment of language leads to a very disputable contention that language and meaning, which for *Bhartṛhari* are awareness in character, are vitiated by the presence of the entities (metaphysical, psychological or physical) of a non-awareness character. Unlike, *Quine*, language for us, ceases to be language if it does not express meanings independently of empirical-real and meaning ceases to be so if identified with experience. Unlike what *Quine* thinks, meaning is not inter-subjective and real in the empirical sense. It, for us, is a self-restrained being of awareness in character and, thus, inter-subjective and real in the cognitive sense of the world of awareness revealed by language which is ubiquitously

given to all human beings. The autonomy and freedom of language in expressing cognition by itself, independently of ontological real or unreal, apparently, reject the idea of ontological commitment of language as futile. Against autonomy of language and meaning, language is not based on a theory as it is self-restrained being and the meaning does not follow from the connection of language to experiential contents which are physical facts but with the language which is a revealing unit.

#### IV

According to *Bhartṛhari's* analysis if the effects (pot, etc.) are taken real as things-in-themselves, there are two situations in which they may be taken so. They, prior to their birth, may either be real or unreal. (1) The systems of *Nyāya-vaiśeṣika* and *Mīmāṃsaka*s accept the effects, prior to their birth, as unreal while (2) the *satkāryavādin* system of *sāṃkhya* assumes them as real even prior to their birth. The effect may be taken differently as real or unreal, prior to its birth, but it is accepted by both of them as real. In order to analyse the issue, we are taking first the *Satkāryavādin's* arguments given in favour of non-being as a thing-in-itself. Objecting to *Satkāryavādin's* theory of 'manifestation of unmanifested effect', *Bhartṛhari* argues-if the effect prior to the acting on of the cause is existent, the acting on of the cause for producing that effect will be useless. Something may be achieved as produced by the causes, applied for the purpose, if there is an occasion for acting on of the causes but there is no possibility of such as occasion in the theory of *Satkārya* because the effect, for it, is already existent inherently there in the causes. If the effect is taken as real prior to its birth, the expression of birth of it or the expression of the achievement of something already produced will be impossible as there will not be any expectancy for the expression of the birth of a thing already existent<sup>22</sup>.

It may be assumed by *Satkāryavādins* that the effect, though it is real, is unmanifestedly inherent in its cause and is manifested by the acting on of the cause. Now the point for consideration is : whether the effect (inherent) is different or is non-different from that of the manifested effect (manifestation of the unmanifested effect)? If it is taken as different or separate from the latter then the question is: Is it real or is non-real in its cause prior to its manifestation? *Satkāryavādin* take it as real. Now if it is

real then there will not be any meaning of the expression regarding its manifestation by the causes. If it is taken as already manifested (effect) then there will be no expectancy for the expression of the manifestation of that which is already manifested and then expression of the manifestation of already manifested will just be a useless repetition. Nonetheless, nothing new is taken to be produced which can be called as effect and, thus, there will be a case of the uselessness of the acting on of the causes and the production of the effect as well<sup>23</sup>.

It is clear from the aforementioned arguments that the acting on of the causes according to *Satkāryavādins*, causes the manifestation of the effect (inherent previously as unmanifested in the cause). *Helārāja* refutes *Satkāryavādin's* assumption on the ground that the same argument may be applied for the manifestation of the latter also. Does that (the former) ontologically different from the latter or non-different? Any answer on this point may lead either to infinite regress or to a contradiction. It raises the question regarding the nature of difference and non-difference also. The issue of the nature of difference and non-difference will be discussed after few paragraphs. Presently, it is suffice to say that the manifestation of already manifested is a contradiction in term and since the manifestation, logically, cannot be taken as real before its birth, it may be taken as unreal. If it is unreal, the expression of the birth of the unreal is against their theory of *satkārya*. Not only that but there is no ground for the difference of predestined manifestation (effect inherent in its cause prior to birth) and of the consequent manifestation (latter) also. It is not justified to accept the previously inherent manifestation (effect in its inherent from) as unreal and the latter manifested manifestation (effect) as real. *Helārāja* comments that it is the pot, etc. (effects) and not their manifestation which is produced as effect of the causal function<sup>24</sup>. The effect cannot be taken identical (*ananya*) with the manifestation as, in that case, the effect will only be another term for the manifestation. If otherwise, the effect will be a new production out of causal functions and this will amount to *Asatkāryavāda*<sup>25</sup>.

Philosophers who assume the duality of *bhāva* (being) and *abhāva* (non-being) as ontological realities claim their reality on the basis of their separate causes i.e. the cause of *bhāva* is different from the cause of *abhāva*. It has already been mentioned that *satkāryavādins* accept the

effect as inherent in its cause, prior to its birth, and, hence, real while the *asatkāryavādins* assume an effect as a new production but both of them equally accept them as separate having different causes.

## V

*Asatkāryavādī Vaiśeṣikas* accept negation as an independent category to be known by inference. According to them, the effect prior to its birth is non-existent in its cause. It is a new production. The pot is absent in the clay before its formation. According to their *Ārambhavāda*, the effect is produced by the destruction of its non-existence (*prāgbhāva*). In this system, the effect is defined as counterpart of its *prāgbhāva* (*Kāryam*) *prāgbhāva pratiyogī*. That which has a birth can only have the end. The effect produced has to be destroyed and after destruction it is non-existent (*pradhvansābhāva*). The being and non-being are not only non-different but are mutually included in each other also but *vaiśeṣikas* take them as ontologically separate in character. It, as *Bhartṛhari* analyses, is not right to say that the non-being becomes being and the being again becomes non-being. Rather, the non-being, according to *vaiśeṣikas* can never be a being and the vice-versa because nature cannot change. If they are taken to change their nature, it will be difficult to define them either as having a character of being or of a non-being<sup>26</sup>. *Abhāva* as *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas* assume is a *padārtha* (category) and is separate from *bhāva*. *Abhāva* cannot be cognized without *bhāva* as its counterpart which is substratum of it. Similarly *bhāva* without *abhāva* as its counter part cannot be cognized. Now coming to an examination, it can be said-that, as the theorists accept the duality of *bhāva* and *abhāva*<sup>27</sup> their mutual dependency for their cognition cannot be accepted. According to *Helārāja*, the notion of duality of being and non-being as ontological entities is against the authority and that communication cannot be explained if they are taken as entities having separate ontic realities. Nonetheless, the mind does not know the thing-in-itself and what is known as being and non-being is revealed in character i.e. revealed by language in the mind.

*Abhāva*, for *Vaiyākaraṇas*, is a formless being. Now, if the effect prior to its birth is non-existent (*abhāva*) and if the '*abhāva*' is formless

as *Vaiyākaraṇas* assume, it cannot be produced as being even though there is a presence of a cause<sup>28</sup>.

Explaining *Bhartṛhari*'s view, *Helārāja* comments if the effect prior to its birth is extremely non-existent, there can be no incentive for producing the effect since the cause acts on according to the purpose involved in producing an effect. If the effect is non-existent, it cannot be the purpose to be achieved by cause and in the absence of the specific purpose, the incentive for producing an effect by a cause will not take place. To whom will the cause aim? Who causes incentive for production? If it is said that universal of the effect serves as the cause of incentive for producing the effect, it will not be conducive to *Vaiyākaraṇas* theory since transient individuals - pots, etc. can only be the effect and the universal, being eternal, cannot be taken by them as caused. What is caused is individual effect and not the universal. Logically, a non-existent cannot be taken as the effect desired to be caused<sup>29</sup>. If it is said by *asatkāryavādins* that though the effect, prior to its birth, is non-existent in its cause and it is the presence of that cause that acts on for the appearance of the effect, the effect will only be an appearance (and not the real) on the basis of which it can rightly be said that the explanation of cause-effect as a real relation between the two is not justified (A detailed account of the arguments given for the refutation of *asatkāryavāda* may be consulted from *sāṃkya kārīkā* of *Īśvarakṛṣṇa*).

Ontologically, the non-being cannot be real because a real can never be non-existent (*abhāva*). Being and non-being as ontological entities cannot mutually prove themselves (*vipratīdharma*). The nature of something which is not born cannot be related with something like being. Being and non-being in-themselves are opposite in character and, therefore, it is contradictory to accept non-being as a being or real. *Śrīdhara* in his *Nyāyakandalī* has mentioned *abhāva* as something having a form (*rūpavāna*) and, hence, real by nature. Contrary to it, *Bhartṛhari* accepts non-being-in-itself as *niḥsvarūpa*. For him, the mention of a formless as having a form is false.

*Abhāva* cannot be taken as unreal. The word '*Asan*' (the qualifier) is used with the being intended as qualified but it is not possible to use the qualifier '*Asan*' (existent) for the non-beings. The being may, ontologically,

be taken as opposite to or as counterpat (*pratiyogī*) of non-being but non-being, as it is formless, can be taken neither as *pratiyogī* nor as *Anuyogī* of the being. The word, 'non-real' as qualifier is used for non-existent but it as *Helārāja* says, does not amount to its being as ontological real.<sup>31</sup>

The sequence and simultaneity are possible only in the cases of the beings having form but how can these qualities be possible in a formless non-being? The sequence and simultaneity in a non-being are not possible either with the contrast of non-being itself or with a counter (contrast) of it by another non-being. Not only that but the destruction of a formless non-being by itself is also not possible. As there is no possibility of the perceptibility of sequence of a formless non-being either by itself or by another counter part of it, there is no occasion for any division in a formless non-being, even with the expectancy of another non-being because it is a discrete being<sup>32</sup>. By simultaneity *Bhartṛhari* means - 1. The cognition of the two events at the same part of time and 2. the presence of two events at same part of time with the expectancy to something other. Both of the aforesaid meanings of simultaneity are not applicable to a formless non-being. Over all, *Bhartṛhari* does not accept the simultaneous cognition either of beings or of non-beings or non-being and being both at a time. On the basis of the aforementioned arguments, *Bhartṛhari* contends that the existence of non-being as an entity separate from that of being as a counter entity cannot be proved by arguments and, hence, the theory of the difference of being and non-being as ontological reals is baseless.

Can *abhāva*, as having a form of its own, be proved by arguments? Are the arguments given by *Vaiśeṣikas* successful in settling *abhāva* as a thing-in-itself? These are the questions that invite focal attention presently for discussion. *Abhāva*, according to *Vaiśeṣikas*, is a separate *padārtha* (substance), a counter part of *bhāva*. Sky-flower, etc. are utter void of *bhāva* and are taken by them as *tuccha* (empty). *Vaiśeṣikas* take the negation of pot (*ghaṭābhāva*) as a counter part (*pratiyogī*) of the existence of pot (*ghaṭa*) and, thus, they consider that there is no question of the void of the existence of *abhāva*. *Abhāva*, for them, is not without a form or formless but as having a form like that of the being. The form of the non-being is known by the same sources by which the form of a *bhāva* is known (Ye nendriyen yadgṛhyate tenaiva tanniṣṭha

Ontological Non-Being (*Abhāva*) Vs Philosophical-Being

427

*jāistadābhavaścāpigrhyate*). There is sense-object contact in the comprehension of *abhāva* also.

Objecting to the arguments given by *vaiśeṣika*, *Bhartṛhari* says that their arguments, given against *abhāva* as formless, are themselves improper and are not sufficient even for proving their own theory of *abhāva* also. *Abhāva*, having a form of its own, can neither be negated nor be identified with *bhāva*, for they, themselves accept them as two different ontological entities (substances). According to *Bhartṛhari* their own arguments accept that a being is born when its *prāgabhāva* is destroyed. Now, if the being and non-being are two kinds of entities having different character, how can the being be taken as caused by the destruction of the *prāgabhāva* of the being? Similarly, how can being be destroyed after the birth of *pradhvansābhāva*? If they are mutually discrete two things then how can one be taken as that which negates the other and how can the birth of one is possible in the absence of other? *vaiśeṣikas* may accept the destruction of *bhāva* with the *sannidhi* of *bhāva* and the birth of *bhāva* after the destruction of *prāgabhāva*. According to *Bhartṛhari's* analysis, the notion of *abhāva* as of having a form and the idea of destruction and birth of *abhāva* by birth and destruction of *bhāva* are mutually contradictory. If *abhāva* is an entity with a form, it by its association, cannot be cause of birth and that of the destruction of *abhāva* by its dissociation as well and if it is taken as the cause of them it can, then, not be taken as entity with a form. If the two are identical then *abhāva* will not be a separate entity i.e. separate from *bhāva*. In such a circumstance, *Vaiśeṣikas* are bound to face a contradictory position if they follow their own arguments based on the theory of *asatkārya*. *Abhāva* if taken as formless, only then, the birth and destruction of being after the destruction and birth of a non-being can well be interpreted as a being (of non-being) figured by language in the mind.

As we have seen in the earlier pages, *Bhartṛhari* has refuted the being of non-being as a counter part of being as an ontological entity. The question arises : Is it real as a counterpart (*pratiyogī*) of non-being or as non-different from non-being? *Bhartṛhari* says that being, either as separate or as non-different from non-being as ontological entity is not known; they-in-themselves are trans-cognitive and the being and non-being which are

known to us are not things-in-themselves but are intelligible beings (*upacāra-sattā*) which are not destroyed as they are the objects of our cognition, memory and recognition. Their presence as *upacāra-sattā* cannot be denied in cases of past and future beings also as it flashes or figures in the mind as being or as non-being when presented so by language. The being and non-being, as intelligible-objects figured in the mind by language, are, by no means, known as counterpart of one another. The being, by definition, is that which is not destroyed and such a definition of being is applicable only to the context of intelligible being (*upacāra-sattā*) which is opposite neither to a being nor to a non-being and which is eternally given in the mind.

Being cannot be taken as real in the ontological sense of the term the criterion of which is its pragmatic function i.e. the real is that which is capable of producing effects. On the contrary, that which is not capable of producing effect is unreal. The 'pot' may be real if it is capable of containing water but may not be real if it is capable of other activities like concealing etc. excluding capability of containing water, It cannot be unreal in ontological sense as it is, for *Vaiśeṣikas* perceived by senses or as it appears to senses. As we have already seen in the previous, pages, sequence and simultaneity are also not possible if the being as trans-cognitive entity is taken into account. All communication regarding being and non-being as real unreal. With sequence-without sequence, simultaneity, discrete, opposite, etc. is concerned only with beings figured in the mind by language and not with a trans-communicative ontological entity.<sup>34</sup>

*Vaiśeṣikas* may again argue that there is difference of being and non-being based on the difference of time and that of awareness. They are known separately in different time. 'Difference of consciousness of being is different from that of non-being' is closely associated with the difference of time.

*Vaiśeṣikas* may say that something previously non-existent is born and later on comes into existence. Before coming into existence, it is something yet to be born (i.e. future in which there is *prāgabhāva* of the being). Extremely non-existence, when it comes into birth by acting on of the causes, is called *prāgabhāva*. Non-existence gives birth to existence (present). That which is born is destroyed and when destroyed it causes

*Ontological Non-Being (Abhāva) Vs Philosophical-Being*

429

non-being (*abhāva*) i.e. *pradhvansābhāva*). The being, in present when destroyed, gives birth to past (non-being) and, thus, the being and non-being, for *Vaiśeṣikas* are different as they are associated with different parts of time<sup>35</sup>. It can also be added that difference can never be absent because of the reason that it is always present and found all the time.

Considering the last of arguments that difference is never absent, supported by *Navya naiyāyikas* also, it can be said, from the side of *Bhartṛhari* that difference in that case will always be existent. In that circumstance both of the existence and non-existence will be present or existent which is not acceptable to them. Not only that but the birth of non-being out of the destruction of being and that of the being out of destruction of non-being will not logically be possible also. If both of them will be present, to accept non-being as present (i.e. existent) is a contradiction in terms. The two will be accepted as present only in the case of them as they figure in the mind by language and not in case of them as ontological beings.

Analyzing *Vaiśeṣikas* arguments regarding difference of them with the difference of parts of time, *Bhartṛhari* asserts if we accept that difference is ontologically real that can never be absent then association of non-being with all three division of time is not possible and similar is the case with the being also<sup>36</sup>. Association of being with time is expressed by *asatkāryavādins* in two ways-1. With a contrast of or with a reference to non-being (*prāgabhāva*) a state before birth of the being and a posterior to its destruction (*pradhvansābhāva*) and 2. with itself without any reference to a non-being. In the former case, as *Helārāja* comments, association of being with all the three parts of time is not possible because of the formlessness of non-being. That which is non-existent and formless cannot be associated with existent that is present. Now, as *abhāva* is not associated with present, it cannot be associated with past and future also because the difference of past and future is dependent upon present. Thus the division of past, present and future is not possible in connection to *abhāva*, which is formless and non-existent. As there is no division of time in regard with *abhāva* there is no division of it in *abhāva* also. If the two are taken mutually as counterpart, it has to be accepted that the time division of non-being is dependent upon the same of the being. The future *abhāva*

is dependent upon the future non-being of *abhāva* and similar is the case in regard with past and present also. Objecting to the aforementioned arguments of *Vaiśeṣikas*, Bhartṛhari says as there is no room for the division of a time in non-being, there is no possibility of the time division of *bhāva* also and thus, it needs hardly be mentioned that the division of present serving as the cause of *prāgabhāva*, *pradhvansaabhāva* etc. is also not possible because of the formlessness of *abhāva*. There is no possibility of the division of time in a being dependent upon non-being as its counterpart. As there is no possibility of divisions of ontological being of past and of future the question of their being (present) does not arise.

We have already mentioned in the previous paragraphs that neither the non-difference nor the difference of being and non-being in ontological sense of real is possible substantively, cognitively, as the being and the non-being-in-themselves are beyond the grasp of language and of cognition they cannot be known as non-different also. The non-being as *Vaiśeṣikas* conceive, is *pratisiddha rūpa* (having no form) while the being is positive in character. As they are taken as entities having opposite characters, the expression of them as unity or as difference may amount to contradiction in the nature. As they are quite opposite in character they cannot be mutually related and hence, they cannot be accepted as the cause of each other and thus communication on the basis of their mutual dependence, is not possible. On the basis of the same logic they cannot be taken as separate also and there is no possibility of a third alternative as the entities, according to *Vaiśeṣikas* may either be existent or be non-existent. Negation cannot be taken as non-apprehension of the being (*bhāva*) as this may be predicative to a being and not to a non-being. A being may be apprehended or non-apprehended but it cannot be denied that they, in such a context have being and not non-being as their concern. If non-apprehension is taken as cognition in view, it must be the apprehension of the non-apprehension and, thus, as the being of apprehension of non-apprehension the negation is known distinctly and independently of the apprehension of the being. Non-apprehension as apprehension of the non-apprehension is contradiction in terms if being and non-being are taken as external real but it is not so if they are taken as beings figured in the mind by language.

As transcendental entities are beyond the touch of language and as

their experiences are only instrumental in manifesting language, there is no possibility of expressions without the objects revealed non-differently by language. Being and non-being and their difference if taken as ontologically real, can neither be expressed nor be the object of cognition. Anything can be called different from some other thing only if it is known so. Things-in-themselves and their experiences are not the objects of cognition, and hence, the expressions of being and non-being as ontologically different from each other can also not be possible in the absence of objects of incentives to them and as incentive to expression is caused by the objects figured in the mind and not by the external existents there will be no cause of incentives of being and of non-being if they are taken as external existents<sup>37</sup>.

Cognitively, not only past (being which is destroyed) and future (being which is yet to be born) but the present being, which is externally existent, also requires to be revealed by language in the mind and it is the inner-being which when revealed in the mind of the speaker, serves as the cause of the incentive for these expressions. If the 'tree' in the expression 'The tree exists' is taken as external-being it will then be a being independently of language but as we have seen earlier, even the external-being in order to be known requires to be figured in the mind by language. If it does not figure in the mind, what will serve as the cause of expectancy for the expression: 'The tree exists'? Not only that but as external-being of 'tree' is given as already existent, the expression 'The tree exists' will amount to *petitio principii*. There will be no justification for the use of the word 'exists' with the word 'tree' which as external-being is already existent.

The relation of the accessory and action is also not possible if external-being is taken as the cause of the expectancy for expressions. The action to be denoted by *tin* (verb-termination) is of a non-finished character and so it cannot be taken as external-being which is of an accomplished character and, in the circumstance, the expressions, denoting action, will also not be possible if external-being is taken as the causes of the expectancy for expressions.<sup>38</sup>

The expression relating to qualifier-qualified beings will also not be possible if external-being is taken as the cause of their expectancy. For

example *nīla* (blue) and *utpalam* (lotus) in the expression '*nīlotpalam*' are expressed as qualifier-qualified but they are never preceived as separate things. What is *nīla* is *utpalam* also. It is the *upacāra-sattā* of *nīla* and *utpalam* on the basis of which they are distinctly known so by the expression without a want of them as separate entities - *nīla* and *utpalam*. Now, it is proper to conclude that all being are the object of cognition in their inner forms revealed by language in the mind and it is the inner-beings which serve as the cause of the expectancy for expressions<sup>39</sup>.

The possibility of the difference of being and non-being as ontological entities cannot be explained even on the basis of the use of the word '*bhāvan*' (beings) and '*Abhāvan*' (non-being) also. It may be argued by *Vaiśeṣikas* that it is the difference of being and non-being on account of which the words '*bhāvan*' and '*Abhāvan*' are used respectively. That which 'happens to exist' is '*bhāva*' and that which 'happens to non-exist' is '*Abhāva*'. According to *Bhartṛhari*, the difference based on the uses of '*bhavan*' and '*Abhavan*' is fit from the point of view of communication but not trans-communicatively. The idea 'that which does not exist is negation' does not touch the trans-communicative ontic form of non-being. Non-being means destruction which is not applicable to externally-existent transcendental entities. That which is utterly formless cannot be taken to be destroyed and that which exists cannot be said to be non-existent. Therefore, *abhāva* cannot be defined as an entity which does not exist<sup>42</sup>. It can be said, from the side of *Vaiśeṣikas* that *abhāva* as a being having a form of its own, cannot be denied. *Bhartṛhari* rejects the argument mentioned above by saying that logically, the form of the being like that of non-being is also not possible either by itself or by any other means<sup>40</sup>. That which already exists by itself cannot be said to exist by others. The expression of existence of an already existent does not add anything new and that there will be no cause of expectancy for such an expression also. Thus '*the notion that difference of being and non-being as ontologically 'real-difference' cannot be proved (HR on VP. 3 3 70) on the ground of the impossibility of the expectancy for expressions also.*

## VI

Conclusively, the casual relation between the being and non-being as

ontological real or unreal can be explained as real neither by the theory of *satkārya* nor by the theory of *asatkārya*. We have repeatedly said that being and non-being are not known as ontologically real (existents), and, thus, the question of the ontic reality of *prāgabdhāva* and *pradhvasābhāva*, as such, does not arise. As there is no birth, the question of its death (prior non-existence = *prāgabdhāva*) and its destruction (*pradhvasābhāva*) does not arise (*lītham ca kāryatā niṣedhāt prāgabdhāva pradhvasābhāvapi kṛtakavastu viṣyounastaḥ*)<sup>41</sup>. Cognitively, being and non-being in-themselves are known neither as real nor as unreal but are only presumptive. From this point of view, the whole ontological world defined by *Bhartṛhari* as 'Vivarta,' is presumption and is explained as inferred as creations of the *Śabda-Brhman* as the ultimate principle who, through the powers like prevention and permission of the time (which is an independent power of the *Śabda-Brhman*) manifests all the entities grouped into the categories of birth, existent, growth, increase, decrease, and destruction (non-existent). The *Śabda-Brhman* and its powers are eternally existent and it is through the functions of permission and prevention of the time power of *Śabda-Brhman* that the birth and destruction of things in the world are perceived and are wrongly conceived by ignorants and children respectively as separate beings and non-beings of ontological character. In this metaphysical explanation being and non-beings are taken as outcome of the constant operation of permission and prevention of the eternal *Śabda-Brhman*. Metaphysically, the *being*, eternally given, is taken as being when permission is in operation and is taken as non-being when prevention is in operation<sup>42</sup>. However, this description is concerned with the metaphysical speculations of the reality or entities in-themselves. Philosophically, being and non-being as things-in-themselves are not the object of cognition. They are not the objects revealed by language and that our cognition is confined to the beings the language reveals non-differently in the mind. From this point of view, being and non-being even '*Śabda-Brhman*-in-itself' is also trans-cognitive and is only presumed as the ontological substratum of the cognition and the objects of cognition revealed respectively in the mind by language. They are described as ontologically real or unreal, being or non-being only by implication or presumption and as philosophical reflections are concerned

only with knowledge revealed by language, things-in-themselves, being trans-cognitive, are not the objects of philosophical reflections but of religion or practice with which we are not particularly concerned here. On the contrary, the objects communicable and cognizable by nature can be said neither as ontologically real nor as non-real but always as cognitive-real. Cognitively, only the beings revealed in the mind by language are intelligible beings (*Samvṛta-upacāra-sattā*). As non-being also figures in the mind by language, it is very much a being cognizable and communicable by nature. If it is not so, it cannot be known, expressed and cognized thus (*Samvṛten turūpeṇa sarvaṁ Bhāvātmakam, avastunaḥ pratyaya yogāt*.<sup>43</sup>) and hence, a case of impossibility of accomplishment of communication may arise if the being or non-being as ontological real or unreal is taken in view.

Bhartṛhari philosophy of metaphysical non-dualism (*Śabdādvaitavāda*) accepts *Śabda-principle* as the ultimate, non-dual ontological reality who being consciousness by nature manifests all the diversities. The diversity is an outcome of analysis. Transcendently, there is no question of duality. *Śabda-Bṛhman* is an indivisible whole without a real part in it. It is for the sake of analysis and explanation on the ordinary plane that the whole without part is made understandable through parts. If otherwise, no explanation of the indivisible whole can be possible. *Helārāja*<sup>44</sup> remarks that without analytical device nothing can be said either about the things-in-themselves or about the indivisible cognition as well. The problem of ontological real and cognitive real as well can be reconciled and cognitively be justified only if his sentence-holism is given prominence in view. However, *the problem of duality from both of ontological and cognitive views does not arise in Bhartṛhari's holism for which ontological beings are all the same Śabda-Bṛhman and cognitively non-being is also known as being revealed non-differently in the mind by language.*

According to sentence-holism, the indivisible sentence, ubiquitously given in the mind as illumined and illuminating force (*spṛṣṭa*) is known as *vācaka* when it is revealed and the meaning is revealed non-differently by it as *vācya*. Our cognition is confined to the *vācaka* and the *vācaka* known non-differently as revealed in the mind by the *vācaka* itself. The *vācaka* and *vācya* as *upacāra-sattā* (intelligible-beings) are the only objects of

*Ontological Non-Being (Abhāva) Vs Philosophical-Being*

435

cognition and as the *vācaka* is non-different from the *vācya* it reveals, there is non-duality. The indivisible, inner sentence, for the sake of understanding and explanation, is divided artificially into piecemeal i.e. letters, words, roots/stems, suffixes etc. and their meaning are decided accordingly by grammar.

The cognition revealed by language in the mind is foundational even in the presumption of the ontological entities. As sentence reveals itself and the objects of cognition (i.e. ideas=meanings) which are only intelligible being and as the being and non-being are revealed by language in the mind, they are cognitively neither separate nor contradictory to each other. There is no question of contradiction of an awareness, unless and untill there is an awareness revealed by a sentence of contradiction. The thought revealed by a sentence and another thought (just contradictory to the former) revealed by an other sentences are two distinct being and so far cognition by the respective sentence is concerned, there is no contradiction. Even 'contradiction' is also known thus as it is revealed by language so in the mind. Various ideas are revealed in the mind and are known without contradicting themselves. As *Bhartṛhari* does not accept the simultaneous cognition there is no room for such a contradiction in a knowledge distinctly revealed by sentence. They are known as contradictory to one another only when contradiction of them is revealed by a separate sentence (the two are contradictory). They are two separate thought objects and the two separate ideas, revealed distinctly by respective sentences, from the point of view of logical consistency, are taken as contradictory if the two are not logically possible in a cohering context. It is only by inference that two cognitions are construed as contradictory but so far cognition is concerned, it is revealed distinctly by sentences (assertive or negative) and is a self-veridical.

Overall, there is no contradiction of awareness revealed immediately by the separate sentences and the 'awareness of contradiction' is also revealed uncontradicted and that is why the veridical-cognition by the word 'contradiction' is accomplished in communication. The veridical cognition by non-being like that of the being is revealed in the mind and that is why they are distinctly known so and communication is accomplished by them. Non-being like being also figures in the mind by language positively as a

being and the two beings are known distinctly. The being figured by the sentence 'non-being' is the intelligible-being of non-being and the being figured in the mind by the language 'being is the intelligible being of the being and it is due to this fact that all cognition by language are distinct. The idea revealed by the sentence, 'The tree exists' and the idea revealed by the sentence 'The tree does not exist' are two indivisible distinct ideas mutually uncontradicted. They, as such, are the flashes of the understanding revealed by language, and thus, it is improper to accept that one flash contradicts the other in the very moment of the cognition. Both of them are distinct and illuminative of their own selves. They are taken contradictory only by inference made on the basis of coherence, correspondence and other pragmatic situations.

The criterion of truth and falsity of sentence on the basis of corresponding referents is given importance by ontologists who think that the truth value of a sentence is based on its referent and that as the negative sentences are lacking them they are void of truth-value. They may think so but, philosophically, the idea of truth value of a sentence based on the availability of a referent is prerequisite based on the verity of cognition revealed by language first in the mind. How can non-linguistic referent be the basis of the truth condition of a linguistic unit? Overall, the cognition revealed by language is always a veridical-cognition and this verity for the sake of explanation, in terms of ontological view of availability of referents, is described by inference as truth or otherwise according to the verifying condition. *The truth condition of an assertion serves only as a line of demarcation of the sentences having referents and of those lacking referents.* But the meaning, the language reveals non-differently in the mind, is independent and autonomous of truth and falsity and, cognition, as such, needs interpretation in terms of truth-values only by proxy of referents. Is it proper to hold that a sentence having referent is true and others lacking referents are false? Communication by both sort of assertoric and negative sentence is accomplished. Conclusively, it is not philosophical to decide the truth-value of a linguistic unit (sentence-negative or assertoric) on the basis of availability of non-linguistic referents (things-in-themselves) which are beyond the touch of language. We are admitting the fact that the logic of referents for truth-value of sentences/propositions

*Ontological Non-Being (Abhāva) Vs Philosophical-Being*

437

is important for logical reasoning for which referential use of language is primary. However, it overlooks the philosophical value of the veridical-cognition revealed by a sentence (assertoric or negative).

We have already discussed in the previous pages that non-being like being is also a being revealed non-differently by negative expressions in the mind. It, as such, is a self-determined or self-restrained being as communication is accomplished on its own basis independently of corresponding referents in the external world of experience. The cognition, revealed by negative expression is also veridical. There is no question of it as an abstraction or as an imagination of mind. There is no room for the sense-perception of the formless non-being and that the sense-perception itself, in *Bhartṛhari's* philosophy, is accepted only as instrumental in the manifestation of foundational inner-sentence which when manifested by sentence-token reveals itself and its meaning independently of physical, psychological or transcendental entities. It can neither be taken as mental construction as it is a revealed being nor be taken as a counterpart of the being as ontological entity because it is a being awareness in nature.

It is obvious from the discussion made in the earlier pages that non-being as ontological entity cannot be proved as the object of cognition on the basis of reasoning and experience based on real, unreal, identity difference, sequence-sequencelessness. It can be said neither similar to nor dissimilar to the being for the reason that it has no concrete form. It is essentially formless and hence imperceptible. It is neither *anuyogī* as it is not similar to an other non-being nor *pratiyogī* (counterpart) of the being as ontological entity and, thus the controversy regarding the form of non-being, its perceptibility, its subjective or objective existence which are considered by ontological theories as significant philosophical problems, doesn't properly arise if we take non-being as a being figured non-differently by language in the mind.

Language infuses cognition and the beings revealed non-differently by language in the mind are the only beings to which our cognition is confined. Communication, by these beings, independently of referents in the empirical world, is accomplished and, hence, it seems, cognitively, justified to accept non-being as a being revealed non-differently by language. *It is*

the inner being of non-being which is the being of our philosophical concern<sup>46</sup> The view of philosophical being and non-being discussed in earlier pages, not only emphasizes the autonomy and freedom of language as expressive power that reveals cognition independently of ontological entities and our allegiances to them but also presents a purely philosophical account of them by considering language and what it reveals non-differently in the mind as the only concern of our philosophical reflections and investigations. Law of contradiction, verity of cognition, truth-value of negative sentences used independently of the assertive sentences can properly be explained only if the inner being of non-being non-differently revealed by the language is taken into consideration.

### NOTES

*I am, grateful to Professor Daya Krishna, Jaipur, for giving valuable suggestions and raising many queries regarding Negation in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system in a discussion with me at his residence in summer 1998 that prompted me to write this paper.*

1. In the book entitled '*Bhartrhari; Philosopher and Grammarian*' edited by *Saroja Bhate & J. Bronkhorst*, Motilal Banarasidass, 1992, *John D. Kelly*, in his paper entitled '*Meaning and the limits of analysis: Bhartrhari and the Buddhism and the post structuralism*', pp. 171-192, has looked upon *Vakyapadiya* as an argument about the limitation of a formal system of analysis to explain or even to describe linguistic phenomena. *Saroja Bhate*, in her paper, edited in the same book, entitled '*Bhartrhari on Language and Reality*', pp. 63-73, has observed it as the argument about the limitation of language to describe reality.

In this paper, I have observed it as an argument about the limitation of philosophical reflection to explain reality. As philosophical reflection, for our observation, is confined to the beings revealed by language in the mind and as philosophy is concerned with analysis of those cognitive-beings *Vakyapadiya* can be observed as an argument about the limitation of language to describe Reality and the argument about the limitation of a formal system of analysis to explain or even to describe linguistic phenomena as well.

2. The word *sphoṭ* derived by *sphuṭ-* added with suffix *ghañ* used in the sense of an accomplished character means flash. The flash of awareness in character which reveals itself and its meaning by itself, in the mind, is a cognitive being par excellence. See, also 'cognition, being and the possibility of expressions : A *Bhartṛhari* an Approach' by D. N. Tiwari JICPR Vol. XIV Number 1, 1996, p. 91. Notes no. 6.
3. For N. Chomsky's mentalistic account of language, see Reflection of Language, 1976, Language and Mind 1972, Syntactic Structure, 1957
4. John D. Kelly, 'Meaning and Limits of Analysis : *Bhartṛhari* and the Buddhists and post structuralism' *Bhartṛhari -Philosopher and Grammarian* p. 192, edited by Saroja Bhate and Johannes Bronkhorst, Motilal Banarasidass 1994.
5. The term *Upacāra-sattā* is used by grammarian in general and by *Bhartṛhari* in particular in a technical sense of the being revealed in the mind by language (*Buddhistha-sattā*) of which no meaning is ever deprived of. vp. 3/3/51 and Mahābhāṣya 5/2/94. As both of the language (*vācaka*) and the meaning (*Vācya*) are beings revealed by language they are known as *upacāra-sattā*. *Upacāra-sattā* is the only being to which our philosophical reflexions and investigations are confined. For a detailed description of *Upacāra-sattā* see, my paper entitled '*Bhartṛhari* on language being and cognition' pp. 46-49, Published in the *Visva-Bharati* journal of philosophy, Vol. XXXVII number 1, August 1995-Feb 1996., Santiniketan-Calcutta, and also 'cognition, being and possibility of expressions. PP. 74-85 JICPR Vol. no. XIV November 1-- 1996 edited by Dayakrishna, New Delhi.
6. *Pratibhā*, for *Bhartṛhari* is the meaning, a determinate and distinct meaning revealed non-differently in the mind by *sphoṭa* for a very clear and brief account of *Pratibhā* see, my review article of '*Śabda*'. A study of *Bhartṛhari's* Philosophy of language' by Tandra patnaik, published in JICPR Vol. XII number 3, 1995 pp. 173-174 New Delhi.
7. *Tathā hi buddhyānirūpitavastuviśayāḥ śabhāḥ. Buddhisca bahirasatyapyarthe Svabhāvāsanāparipākavaśāvagraharupopajāyate Vaikalpiki.*  
*Śabdaparāmarśamantareṇaiśūpasansparśyābhāvāt. Helārāja on vp. 3/3/39* edited by Bhagiratha Prasad Triphathi Śāstri', Varanaseya Sanskrit

Viśvavidyalaya 1974.

8. *Na so sti pratyayo loke yah śabdānugamādṛte anuviddhamiva Jñānam sarvam Śabden bhāṣate vp. 1/123* edited by Bhagirath Prasad Tripathi Varanaseya Sanskrit Viśva vidyalayaya, Varanasi 1976.
9. See, Bhartṛhari on the indivisibility of single word expression and subordinate sentences, D. N. Tiwari, *Indian Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. XXIV April 1997, University of Poona, PP. 197-216 Pune.
10. See, *Frege : Philosophy of Language* -- M. Dummett pp 420-423 second edition, Gerald Duckworth & Company Limited, New Delhi 1973
11. Vp. 3/3/4 & 29-39 see, also, *Bhartṛhari Philosophy of Relation Between Word and Meaning*, D. N. Tiwari JICPR. Vol. XI Number, 1994, pp. 43-54 New Delhi- 2
12. Kaiyaṭa, *Mahābhāṣyapradīpa* 5/2/94 edited by Guru Parasad Sastri, Varanasi, 1939 & *Pravṛttilhetum sarveśām śabdānāmaupacārikām*, vp. 3/3/50 and *Etām sattām padārtho hi na Kaścidativartate. sā ca Samprati Sattāyah pṛthagbhāṣye nidarśitā*. Helārāja's commentary on vp 3/3/51
13. VP. 3/3/40-42
14. Helārāja on VP. 3/1/34
15. *Abhāvascatvāraḥ ityatrāpi nirūpakhyātām Sāmānyam Kalpanīyam, Mahābhāṣyadīpikā*, 1/2/46
16. *Mahābhāṣya*, 5/2/94
17. For a detailed account of the possibility of expressions see, "Cognition, being and possibility of expressions : A Bhartṛharian approach" by D. N. Tiwari, *JICPR* Vol. XIV number-1, pp 77-85, 1996.
18. *Etām Sattām Padārtho hi na kaścidativartate. VP. 3/3/51.*
19. *Ekasmādātmano nanyaubhāvābhāvau vikalpitaū. VP. 3/3/61*
20. Helārāja on VP. 3/2/15.
21. For a detailed description of Quine's theory of ontological commitment of language, see, *Ontological Relation and Other Essays*, Columbia University Press, Newyork, 1969, see also *Theones and Things* by W. V. Quine, Harward University Press, Cambridge, Mass 1981.
22. Helārāja on VP. 3/3/62.

23. *Ibid*, 3/3/62.
24. *Abhivyaktauca kārāṇavyāpārāt kāryasya kāryatā na syāt*, *ibid* 3/3/62.
25. *Koyam Janyajanakayoḥ Sambandhaḥ? Tattvépyabhi Vyaktau rajjanyāyām tadviśayaḥ Kārāṇavyāpāro na syāt. Kāryeṇaiva tasyā jananāt, tathā kāryasya janane tadviśayo pikārāṇavyāpāronasyāt... Tathā ca tasy āsato janane satkāryaprasangaḥ-- Helārāja on VP. 3/3/62.*
26. *Nābhāvojāyate bhāvo naiti bhāvo nupākhyatām. VP. 3/3/61.*
27. *Nyāyabhāṣya 1/1/1.*
28. *Ananyatve bhivyakteḥ kāryāt.... Sankaṭo yam Panthāḥ. Helārāja on VP. 3/3/62.*
29. *Abhivyaktauca kārāṇavyāpārāt kāryasya kāryatā na syāt* *ibid* 3/3/62.
30. *Ibid* 3/3/62.
31. *Asattvamapyasya tadrūpatvādeva vyatiriktam bhāvavannopapadyate. Evam hi bhāvatāprasangaḥ, Helārāja on VP. 3/3/67.*
32. *Ibid*, 3/3/67.
33. *Yato 'bhāvasyetathamānupadhyamānatā, ten bhāvo' pyevam paramārthato nopapadyate. Ibid. 3/3/68.*
34. *Ittham sarvavyavahārāvikalpapparighatitā evetibhāvābhāvāvpi tathā vijñeyau... Sā ca tattvānyattvābhyāmanirvācyeti. Helārāja on VP. 3/3/68.*
35. See, *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra* 2/2/9.
36. *Abhāve triṣu kāleṣu na bhedasyāsti sambhavaḥ, tasminnasati bhāve pi traikālyam nāvatisthate. VP. 3/3/69.*
37. *Pravṛttihetum sarveṣām śabdānāmaupacārikīm. VP. 3/3/50.*
38. "Cognition, being and possibility of expression : A Bhartṛhariian approach" by D. N. Tiwari, *JICPR Vol. XIV number - 1*, pp 77-85, 1996
39. *Helārāja on VP. 3/3/50.*
40. *Ātmatattvam tu parataḥsvato vā nokalpate, VP. 3/3/70*
41. *Helārāja on VP. 3/3/63.*
42. See, *Concept of Time in the Philosophy of Bhartṛhari* by D. N. Tiwari, *JICPR Vol. XIV number - 1*, pp 25-37, 1988.
43. *Helārāja on VP. 3/3/63.*

44. *Vyavahāraśca lokasya padārthaiḥ parikalpitaiḥ. Śāstre padārathaḥ kāryarthā laukikaḥ pravibhajyate, VP. 3/3/88 Helārāja comments "idam ca laukikānāmeva śabdānāmanuśāsanam śāstram, Tadaira lokaprasiddhaivapadārthaprakriyāsamāśrayaṇīyetyakhaṇḍād vākyaarthāt kriyāvacano dhātuḥ sattvapradhānāni nāmāni, pratyāyakaḥ pratyaya ityādi sastrīyakāryaprasiddh yārtham laukika eva kriyādravyaguṇādilakṣaṇo poddhārapadārthaḥ pravibhajyata iti HR on VP. 3/3/88.*
45. *VP. 3/1/104 and Helārāja's commentary on it.*
46. *HR on VP 3/3/59.*

## STERBA ON RECONCILING ANTHROPOCENTRIC WITH NON-ANTHROPOCENTRIC ETHICS

JAGAT PAL

There is a controversy in contemporary environmental ethics between anthropocentric and non-anthropocentric ethicists. Anthropocentric ethicists hold the view that the members of all species are not equal. Human beings are superior to the members of all other species. Non-anthropocentric ethicists do not subscribe to this view. According to them, the members of all species are equal. Human beings are not superior to the members of all other species. Sterba James P. has tried to reconcile both the anthropocentric and non-anthropocentric views of environmental ethics in his essay entitled "Reconciling Anthropocentric and Non-anthropocentric Environmental Ethics"<sup>1</sup> by formulating three basic principles which he calls the principles of environmental justice. He claims that all his three principles taken together strike the right balance between concerns of human welfare and the welfare of non-human nature. His three formulated principles are

(1) *A Principle of Human Defense* : Actions that defend oneself and other human beings against harmful aggression are permissible even when they necessitate killing or harming individual animals or plants or even destroying whole species or ecosystems.

(2) *A Principle of Human Preservation*: Actions that are necessary for meeting one's basic needs or the basic needs of other human beings are permissible even when they require aggressing against the basic needs of individual animals and plants or even of whole species or ecosystems.

(3) *A Principle of Disproportionality* : Actions that meet non-basic or luxury needs of humans are prohibited when they aggress against

*Indian Philosophical Quarterly* XXX No 3  
July 2003

the basic needs of individual animals and plants or of whole species or ecosystems.

The purpose of this paper is to show through analysis that Sterba has not succeeded in reconciling of both the anthropocentric and non-anthropocentric views of environmental ethics because his all three principles do not strike the right balance even when we take them together between concerns of human welfare and the welfare of non-human nature as he claims because of the following reasons.

The first two principles, namely, the Principle of Human Defense and the Principle of Human Preservation hold good only when it is logically assumed that the defense and preservation of human lives are morally more valuable than the defense and preservation of non-human lives regardless of their differences. The reason is simple because once we logically assume that the defense and preservation of human live are morally more valuable than the defense and preservation of non-human lives regardless of their differences, it automatically follows from this that whenever there is a conflict between them, the defense and preservation of human lives always logically supersede or outweigh the defense and preservation of non-human lives. And this Sterba cannot logically assume because assuming this would amount to mean denying that all species are equal. And to say this amounts to mean saying that human beings are superior to the members of all other species. But since the very fact that Sterba assumes that all lives are equal<sup>2</sup>, he cannot logically say that the defense and preservation of human lives always supersede or outweigh the defense and preservation of non-human lives when there is a conflict between them without weighing their relative moral values. But since he says it, therefore his both the principles, that is, the Principle of Human Defense and the Principle of Human Preservation cannot be said to be logically consistent with the general moral principle of species equality.

Sterba claims that the principle of species equality does not invalidate the Principle of Human Defense and the Principle of Human Preservation because the principle of species equality does allow for human preference in the same way as the principle of human equality allows for self preference<sup>3</sup>. But his this line of argument, I think, does not hold much water simply because it always begs the question : what are those

characteristics which make human defense and preservation of lives morally more valuable than the defense and preservation of non-human lives? This question Sterba cannot brush aside just by saying that the defense and preservation of human lives are morally more valuable simply because they are the lives of human beings. If he says so, it would amount to saying that he does not accept that all species are equal which he assumes. Not only this, it would also amount to assuming that human lives by virtue of being lives of human beings always morally supersede non-human lives in all circumstances whenever there is a conflict between them regardless of their basic needs. And this Sterba cannot logically assume even if he wishes because assuming this would amount to rejecting the Principle of Disproportionality which he advocates in order to reconcile both the anthropocentric and non-anthropocentric views of environmental ethics.

In fact, when Sterba says that all species are equal, he does not say on the ground of this because they have same traits of character. He rather says that all species do not have same traits of character. They have distinctive traits of character which the members of other species lack<sup>4</sup>. Since he says that all species do not have same traits of character, therefore the distinctive traits of human character such as rationality and moral agency cannot be used as a logical ground to justify that human lives are morally more valuable than the lives of non-human nature. The reason is simple because if we accept that the defense and preservation of human lives are morally more valuable than the defense and preservation of non-human lives on the ground of this because human lives have distinctive traits of character which non-human lives essentially lack, then we also will have to admit on the same ground that non-human lives are morally more valuable than human lives because they also do possess the distinctive traits of character of their own which human beings essentially lack. We cannot say that the defense and preservation of human lives are morally more valuable than the defense and preservation of non-human lives because they have the distinctive traits of character but the defense and preservation of non-human lives are not morally more valuable than the defense and preservation of human lives even though they have the distinctive traits of character of their own because to say this amounts to making a self-contradictory statement. The reason is that because what

constitutes a good ground in one case to say that the defense and preservation of human lives are morally more valuable than the defense and preservation of non-human lives also constitutes at the same time a good ground in another case to say that the defense and preservation of non-human lives are morally more valuable than the defense and preservation of human lives unless we logically assume that the distinctive traits of human beings are morally more valuable than the distinctive traits of non-human beings on an a priori ground which Sterba cannot assume even if he wishes. Because assuming this amounts to denying the principle of species equality. And if he denies the principle of species equality, he cannot claim that the principle of species equality does allow for human preference in the same way as the principle of human equality allows for self preference as he does. He cannot logically accept both the theses in the same breath because acceptance of one logically prevents him from accepting of another. So if he says that the distinctive traits of human beings make human lives morally more valuable than the distinctive traits of non-human lives, then he will have to admit that all species are not morally equal. And if he admits that all species are not morally equal, then the quest of his reconciling of both the anthropocentric and non-anthropocentric views of environmental ethics simply does not arise at all. His whole effort is futile. Not only this, if all species is not equal and human beings are superior to the members of other species, then treating of them equally would also amount to doing some injustice against human beings. And to do so is not only irrational but also is highly immoral because the principle of moral equality demands that equals must be treated equally and unequal differently.

Furthermore, if all species have life and life as such is considered to be something intrinsically valuable, then all lives must get same treatment no matter what they are simply because they have intrinsic value of life. If this be so, then to give preferential treatment to the defense and preservation of human lives over the lives of non-humans would amount to favoring them over non-humans even though they have the same intrinsic moral value of life which human beings have. And to do this is to do injustice against the members of non-human species which any consistent theory of morality cannot logically allow. But to say all this, however, does not

amount to saying that the members of all species cannot be treated differently even when they have morally relevant differences between them. If there are morally relevant differences between them, surely they cannot be treated in the same way. We have to treat them differently. If someone does not do it, he or she is moral fanatic and moral fanaticism is not praiseworthy. The reason is simple because morally relevant differences do constitute good ground to say that they do not belong to the same logical type. If this be the case, then the principle of species equality does not logically rule out preferential treatment when there are morally relevant differences between them. So if human beings are given preferential treatment over non-human beings, it must be done on a morally justified ground. It should not be done on an arbitrary ground. And this is possible only when the defense and preservation of human lives possess relatively moral overriding features and not otherwise. If this be the case, then whenever there is a conflict between the defense and preservation of human lives and non-human lives, we must defend and preserve only those lives which have moral overriding features no matter whose lives they are for to be a consistent moralist. The reason is that because moral overriding features logically restrict the permissibility of doing certain action to the members of those who belong to the category of overridden.

If it is said that all lives although are intrinsically valuable but are not equally valuable, then there has to be some criterion (or criteria) by means of which one can distinguish and decide which life is to be preferred to which when there is a conflict between the two lives. In other words, we always need some criterion (or criteria) to account for the preferential treatment to the members of one category over the members of another category. The criterion of gradation of value surely cannot be traced in the notion of intrinsic value itself because there is nothing in the notion of intrinsic value on the basis of which one can do moral gradation between two different kinds of life when all lives are considered to be intrinsically valuable regardless of their specific distinctive traits of character. Even if we admit for the sake of argument that the notion of intrinsic value does admit the gradation of value, still we need some criterion to assess and evaluate their degrees of intrinsic value. And whatever the criterion we may choose to assess and justify their different degrees of intrinsic value,

we must apply it consistently to all cases which fall under the domain of its jurisdiction. If their degree of difference of value does not consist in the notion of intrinsic value of life itself but consists in their basic needs of life, even then we need some criterion to assess and justify the degrees of value of their basic needs of life. In fact, we cannot say it that the criterion of gradation of value of life consists in the notion of basic needs of life itself because there is nothing in the notion of basic needs of life on the basis of which we can claim that human basic needs of life always morally supersede the basic needs of non-human life whenever there is a conflict between them. For example, if the preservation of life is considered to be one of the basic needs of all species, then it is a basic need of all species no matter whether they are human species or non-human species. If this line of my argument is valid, then surely we cannot do any moral gradation of the values of their lives just by referring to the notion of the basic needs of life. We will have to find out the criterion of moral gradation of the values of their lives out side the very notion of the basic needs of their lives. Unfortunately, Sterba nowhere in his whole article mentions any criterion of moral gradation by which we can judge and decide whose basic needs are to be preferred to who when there is a conflict between human and non-human basic needs of life.

No doubt, Sterba is right when he says that all species are equal does allow to treat them differently in the same way as all humans are equal allows to treat them differently<sup>5</sup>. But he forgets that it does allow only when there are morally relevant differences between them and not otherwise. The reason is that because morally relevant differences do constitute good ground to treat them differently. That is why in such cases moral agents cannot be held to be guilty of doing something against the spirit of the principle of moral equality because whenever they do it, they always do it on some moral good grounds which justify their actions. It goes against the spirit of the general principle of moral equality only when there are no morally relevant differences between them and not otherwise. So if the basic needs of all species are equally significant from the moral point of view because of being life-preserving basic needs, then their basic needs affected by an action are to be taken into account and given the same weightage without any prejudice irrespective of whose needs they

are. We cannot say that the basic needs of human beings are morally more important than the basic needs of non-human beings on the ground of this because they are the basic needs of human beings unless we further assume that human basic needs themselves possess relatively more moral values than the basic needs of non-human beings. In other words, unless we logically assume that human basic needs themselves possess moral overriding features, we cannot say that they have more moral values than the basic needs of non-human beings and moral overriding features cannot be determined in advance independent of the particular environmental conditions of species in which they live. The reason is that because moral overriding features are relative features of morality. What constitutes moral overriding feature in one particular condition of environment may or may not constitute moral overriding feature in another particular condition of environment. If this is true, then self-regarding basic needs may or may not morally override the basic needs of others. This argument holds good not only in the domain of human beings but also in the domain of whole biotic communities. If whatever I have said so far is correct, then from this it is quite evident that the Principle of Human Defense and the Principle of Human Preservation cannot be said to be valid Principles of environmental justice at all as Sterba says because they fail to strike the right balance between concerns of human welfare and the welfare of non-human nature.

Sterba cannot say to avoid the problem that although all species are equal but humans are more equal than non-humans. If he says so, it would amount to making a self-contradictory statement because the notions of equality and more equality are not mutually compatible notions. In fact, his both the principles, that are, the Principle of Human Defense and the Principle of Human Preservation involve human bias. If human beings consume oxygen and release carbondioxide which plants consume and plants release oxygen which human beings consume without which they cannot survive at all, then to say that actions that are necessary for meeting the basic needs of human beings are permissible even when they require aggressing against the whole species of plant is not a logically viable principle at all because it is self-defeating. It defeats the fulfillment of even the basic needs of human beings. In other words, it is logically impossible to act on both the principles, that is, the Principle of Human Defense and the

Principle of Human Preservation without violating anyone of them. The Principle of Disproportionality, no doubt, can be said to be a valid principle of environmental justice simply because the basic needs of life always morally override the non-basic needs of life when there is a conflict between the two irrespective of whose needs they are. But when we take this principle along with other two principles which Sterba advocates to reconcile both the anthropocentric and non-anthropocentric views of environmental ethics, we find that they fail to strike the right balance between concerns of human welfare and the welfare of non-human nature as he claims. Even if we assume for the sake of argument that the members of all biotic communities do not have lives of equal value, still from this it does not follow that the defense and preservation of human lives are always morally more valuable than the defense and preservation of non-human lives. The reason is that because some human lives do have less value than non-human lives. For example, an infant born baby without a brain surely cannot be said to have the same value of life which a well trained and healthy adult tiger does have. If this be the case, then surely the lives of some animals have a greater value than the lives of some human beings. If this line of argument of mine is valid, then to say that all the three principles taken together strike the right balance between concerns of human welfare and the welfare of non-human nature is absolutely wrong. The reason is that because what justifies to say that the life of an infant born baby without brain falls drastically below the quality of life of normal (adult) human life also justifies to say that some human lives fall drastically below the quality of life of normal (adult) animal life. We cannot say that it justifies in one case but does not justify in another case unless we commit the fallacy of inconsistency because what constitutes a good reason in one case also constitutes a good reason in another case since the cases are exactly alike.

In fact, Sterba's both the principles, the Principle of Human Defense and the Principle of Human Preservation, it can be said very well that they are human-centric principles. They are not eco-centric principles at all because they favor the defense and preservation of human lives over the lives of non-human species. This Sterba himself admits because he says that "if we were to prefer consistently the basic needs of the members of other species whenever those needs conflicted with our own (or even if

*Sterba on Reconciling Anthropocentric*

we do so half the time), given the characteristic behavior of the members of other species, we would soon be facing extinction, and fortunately, we have no reason to think that we are morally required to bring about our own extinction. For these reasons, the degree of preference for our own species found in the above Principle of Human Preservation is justified even if we were to adopt a non-anthropocentric perspective"<sup>6</sup>. So if the Principle of Human Defense and the Principle of Human Preservation are formulated keeping in view the interest of one's own species, that is, human species at the cost of the interest of non-human species or ecosystems, then how can Sterba say that they strike the right balance between concerns of human welfare and the welfare of non-human nature? But since the very fact that he says it, therefore his account of environmental ethics cannot be said to be a rational account at all. Because any rational account of environmental ethics always demands that all species must be treated in the same way unless they are relevantly different, that is, different in ways that morally justify treating them differently. And this demand Sterba's account of environmental ethics does not fulfill because he has failed to maintain consistency by not following the same criterion in reconciling of both the anthropocentric and non-anthropocentric views of environmental ethics. His whole analysis, therefore, could be said very well to be motivated by human biases.

In view of the above mentioned arguments we can, thus, say that Sterba has failed to reconcile both the anthropocentric and non-anthropocentric views of environmental ethics. His all three formulated principles are not the principles of environmental justice at all. They are human-interest preserving principles.

## NOTES

1. *Ethics In Practice : An Anthology* Edited by Hugh LaFollette, Blackwell Publishers Limited, 1997, p. 64.
2. *Ibid.* P. 648.
3. *Ibid.* P. 646.

4. *Ibid.* P. 644.
5. *Ibid.* P. 648.
6. *Ibid.* P. 647.

## A NOTE ON SAÑJAYA'S AMARĀVIKṢEPAVĀDA

DILIPKUMAR MOHANTA

The earliest available account of philosophical scepticism may be traced to Sañjaya, the son of Bairatti and an older contemporary of Lord Buddha. Sañjaya is said to have propounded a unique method of philosophizing of his own and this method in later philosophical discourses is popularly known as the method of '*amarāvikṣepa*' the tortuous method of eel-fish. It is not inconceivable that there were many other critical philosophers during the life period of Goutama Buddha and Mahāvira. There are evidences to consider Sañjaya as the precursor of sceptical arguments in Indian philosophy as in later days, such thought has been represented by 'Nāgārjuna - Jayaraśi - Śrīharsa' tradition.<sup>1</sup> The exposition of Sañjaya's philosophical method in modern philosophic terms is a long felt desideration for an understanding of the sceptical tradition of later days from historical perspective. Chisholm feels a similar necessity when he argues about the relevance of Sextus Empiricus' 'Pyrrhonism' towards the understanding of present century's 'empiricism' and 'phenomenalism'.<sup>2</sup> Burnet refers to a strange fact of history that the philosophical insight of Pyrrho was influenced by Indian dialectical thinking. He goes a step forward to state with all probability that Pyrrho visited India and supposed to have been trained under the Buddhist dialectician.<sup>3</sup> Oldenburg also describes dialectical approach of the Greeks 'as a species of Indian sophistic' philosophy.<sup>4</sup> Jayatilke has, however, expressed doubt about the influence of Buddhism on Pyrrho.<sup>5</sup> He has contended, on the other hand, that Pyrrho was influenced by the sceptical method of Sañjaya in philosophising. But in the absence of sufficient historical evidences, we do not like to enter into the subtle polemics

*Indian Philosophical Quarterly* XXX No 3  
July 2003

about the extent of influence. All that we can say is that some early Greek thinkers (i.e. Gunmophists) who raised doubt or question against the existing ethical and metaphysical claims in ancient Greek society seem to be similar as done by Sañjaya against the metaphysical 'theory-builders' in ancient India. Matilal comes in support of Jayatilke when he says that "Pyrrho was most probably under the influence of Indian scepticism as propounded by Sañjaya and not really under the direct influence of Buddhism".<sup>6</sup>

However, it is indeed true that metaphysical and moral claims made by both brahmanas and śramaṇas were questioned by Sañjaya. What Sañjaya propounded seems to be that, the metaphysical and ethical queries can not be categorically answered with truth and certitude, the two indispensable marks of assertion and therefore all claims made about the possibility of knowledge regarding these matters are unwarranted and should be discarded. There were followers of his view in ancient India. Dīghanikāya tells us that Sāriputra and Moggallāna, the first two disciples of Lord Buddha were, in fact, the disciples of Sañjaya and later on they being attracted by the Buddha's teaching as explained to them by Aśvajit, embraced Buddhism. This event as it is said that, led more than two hundred and fifty other disciples of Sañjaya to abandon his disciple-ship and to come to the Buddhist fold. We do not have sufficient historical evidences to question the narration of the Buddhist Nikāya. But it is clear even the Buddhist canons that Sañjaya was one of the dominant philosophers of Buddha's life time and participation in debate in philosophic or religious matters was almost an unavoidable order in the society for the learned. It is a peculiar aspect of the Buddhist scriptures that they "describe Sañjaya and his followers on the one hand as *dull* and *stupid* and on the other hand, recognise them as well-known and famous *recluses* having a number of followers."<sup>27</sup> Popularity of Sañjaya's method of philosophising probably lies in its unique character of not only avoiding 'defeat' in debate but also in not 'asserting any position' while showing the limitations of opponents' arguments. It is interesting for any researcher in Indian epistemology to take note of Sañjaya's sceptical method of philosophizing. In the following paragraphs I have ventured to present an expository survey of Sañjaya's philosophical method as it could be gathered from the literary canons of

Buddhism.

A careful study of the buddhist canons may show evidence of dialectical approach to philosophical problems. It has its preśramanic origination and one such fulleged method of philosophy has received mature-shape in Sañjaya's '*amarāvikṣepa*' method. *Amarā* or eel-fish has a very slippery body and goes tortuously and thus it becomes almost impossible to catch it. Likewise, when Sañjaya had been asked any philosophical question, he used to avoid answering it in either categorization of affirmation or negation by using four types of dilemma. He was utterly indifferent to making any assertion regarding metaphysical questions about the final cause of the world, the existence of life after death and the implication of the law of karma. Here little reflection about the development of critical philosophy may allow us to say that Sañjaya's being not in favour of giving any categorical answer might have been inspired by his awareness about the limitation of human knowability. Perhaps his intention was to show that human knowledge can not go beyond the phenomenal world to investigate into the ultimate cause of this world. The *Dīghanikāya* elucidates how according to Sañjaya four alternative replies are possible to any metaphysical question or problem. The *Dīghanikāya* depicts a story where Lord Buddha explains to his disciples how the '*amarāvikṣepi*' Sañjaya uses tortuous philosophical technique in order to avoid any kind of cognitive assertions about metaphysical questions. The *amarāvikṣepi* avoids cognitive assertions in the following way :

i) This is not my view (*evam pi me no*), ii) that is not my view (*tathā ti pi me no*), iii) another third different view is also not of mine (*aññathā ti pi me no*); iv) 'neither this nor that' - I am not saying this (*no ti pi me no, no no ti pi me no ti*).<sup>8</sup> The first step is the denial of any affirmation about the aforesaid questions, the second is the denial of any negative description or assertion, in the third having the form of a conjunction of both the first two alternatives is denied. But the extreme form of non-committal refutation is expressed in the fourth alternative. It is a form of denial of a thesis not being assenting to a counter-thesis. It may be called a 'commitment - less denial.'

Let us now investigate what could be the plausible explanation of the causes and ways of treatment of any philosophical problem by Sañjaya

the '*amarāvīkṣepi*'. '*Amarāvīkṣepavāda*' seems to be important as a method of philosophising for more than one reason. Firstly, as recorded in the Buddhist scriptures, there were ascetics who used to follow this tortuous way of logical dilemma, because, they neither, did know what the 'being is' nor what the 'non-being' stands for. Being unaware about the nature of reality, it is unworthy to make an assertion about what really exists. If reality were described as what it is not, the description would be erroneous (*duṣṭa*) and if it were erroneous, it would become self-destroying and therefore, irrelevant. On account of this, most probably Sañjaya tried to avoid any assertion either about 'being' or about 'non-being'. This, as depicted in the *Dīghanikāya*, could be the first ground for which some ascetics (*śramaṇas*) and brahmins following the tortuous way of argument prefer not to make any assertions about reality.

But what is depicted in the Buddhist canons as limitation of Sañjaya's method seems to us a great merit of his philosophical method. A person who is not adequately sure about the answer of a question about reality better not to indulge in any kind of assertion either in affirmative or in negative way and this logical attitude is to be morally more appreciable. Any way, the second reason for relying on this tortuous '*amarāvīkṣepi*' technique might be the awareness about the incompatibility of our ordinary linguistic discourse to characterise properly what is real. Thus it is preferable not to say anything categorically as 'It is real' or 'It is not real'. What could be the third cause for which some ascetics and brahmins would have been tempted to follow this tortuous technique of *eel-fish* (*amarā*)? Sañjaya would have replied this question by saying that an user of the method of *amarāvīkṣepa* is aware of the limitations of human knowability either in terms of affirmative or negative categorisation. But the limit of my knowledge does not mean the limit of reality 'in-itself'. Whenever I know, I know with certain conditions and therefore, I can not claim with adequate warrant that what I say about reality is exactly the nature of reality 'in-itself'. What I claim to know as true may be proved wrong subsequently by a stronger argument. The best way, thus considered Sañjaya, is to avoid the metaphysical question following this tortuous way of argumentation. The last step of using this tortuous way although discouraged in the Buddhist literature from the ethical consideration seems

to be very important. It must have also been considered as the germination point of philosophical scepticism in Indian tradition. Lord Buddha's main concern was the moral uplift of the common masses in society and perhaps that is why he discouraged the tortuous logical polemics for them. But this art is specially meant for a very few people with philosophic insight. This contention may be supported with reference to the later development of philosophic thought in Buddhism itself. It has direct bearing upon Nāgārjuna's '*catuṣkoti-vinirmukta*' position of philosophising.<sup>9</sup>

From what has been discussed above it is clear that Sañjaya's position in methodological approach is very much like the Greek sceptic Pyrrho. Pyrrho suspends judgement in order to attain 'the state of unperturbedness' (*ataraxia*). Sañjaya might have thought that mental perturbation that arises due to the unwarranted cognitive claim could be avoided by using '*amarāvikṣepa*' method of not committing to any 'theory-making'. It is possible to argue, as Matilal contends that scepticism as a philosophical method 'might have been started in India by Sañjaya'.<sup>10</sup> Had Sañjaya been acquainted with the linguistic phraseology of Sextus Empiricus, he might probably have expressed himself in the same vein, that is to say, "the man who determines nothing as to what is naturally good or bad, neither shuns nor pursues anything eagerly and in consequence, he is unperturbed".<sup>11</sup> For Sañjaya, if I make a claim that I have known answers to the questions when in fact, I did not, my claim would be false and this is morally wrong. This brings 'perturbation' and disturbs mental peace. Sañjaya would have suggested that the tortuous technique would enable a philosopher not making any false claim regarding the possibility of knowing answers to metaphysical questions and to save him from doing moral wrong - the root cause of all 'perturbance' and hindrance to mental peace.

#### NOTES

1. B. K. Matilal : *Logical and Ethical Issues of Religious Belief*, University of Calcutta, 1982, p. 62.
2. For details see : R. Chisholm : 'Sextus Empiricus and Modern Empiricism', *Philosophy of Science*, Vol. 8, 1941.

3. J. Burnet : *Early Greek Philosophy*, London, A and C, Blact, 1892, Reprint 1958, p. 68.
4. H. Oldenburg : *The Buddha*, Tr. W. Hoey, Edinburgh, 1982.
5. K. N. Jayatilleka : *Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge*, Allen and Unwin, London, 1963, p. 82.
6. B. K. Matilal : *Op. Cit.* p. 61.
7. *Ibid.* p. 54.
8. *Dīghanikāya* (ed. T. Rhys Davids and E. J. Carpenter) I, ii, 24, Vol. I, London, 1890, p. 25.

## BOOK REVIEW : I

R.C. Pradhan, *Recent Developments in Analytic Philosophy*, Indian Council of Philosophical Research, New Delhi, 2001. pp. vii-516, Rs. 650

Philosophical enterprise in the new millennium as a search for a new metaphysics is the central idea of R. C. Pradhan's book *Recent Developments in Analytic Philosophy*. Professor Pradhan's endeavour is the reassuring of a new outlook after discussing the major developments of analytic philosophy in recent time. A metaphysical order that he proposes in his entire discussion of the history of analytic philosophy draws a middle path in understanding the deterministic and indeterministic worldviews together and simultaneously rejecting both deductive-model of metaphysics as well as descriptive metaphysics. Moreover, the significance of the work lies in showing the relevance of metaphysics once again as one of the core areas of philosophical explanation of reality since times immemorial. Over and above it reflects upon the triangular facets of reality *per se*, i.e., the logical bond between mind, language and the world. The tripartite relationship gives a holistic conception of reality by seeing its significance through the value of *holy* life of the *being in the world*. As a result, it stands up to transcend all conflicting frameworks of the discourse of reality to provide a solid foundation to both epistemological and moral order to the universe. Thus 'language centric philosophy is not tied down by any conceptual framework or the paradigm but evolves its own approach to address the problem of life - sought the liberating character of philosophy as domain of free thought.'

Since the author belongs to the analytic school of thought, he upholds the consequences of linguistic analysis in the discourses of philosophical thinking. Language centric philosophy has been quite successful in not only resolving the pertinent problems of philosophy but also the whole enterprise has been a critique of language. It mainly suffices for his argument that *linguistic turn* is a second Copernican revolution in philosophy. The critique of language reflects upon the conceptual construction of the root of the philosophical problems, further "It makes us look for the roots of our conceptual constructions themselves, i.e., into the language that lies at the foundation of the conceptual edifice. ...The analytic critique of language,

therefore, is a logical consequence of thought and reason." (P.8) Thus analytic philosophy shows a big shift in the very practice of philosophy distinguishing itself from the classical method of philosophical practices as well as the Kantian approaches.

The book has eleven chapters excluding introduction, an extensive version of selected bibliography and index. These chapters are classified in four parts. And each chapter contains at least eight to ten subsections provides a coherent and comprehensive discussion of the concerned problem. The first part "Linguistic Revolution" includes chapters such as (I) Philosophical Analysis and the Nature of Linguistic Revolution, (II) Logic and Metaphysics : Breaking Away from the Past. Part two is about "Logic of Language" has chapters such as (III) Logic and Language : The Rise and Fall of Formal Language philosophy; (IV) The Logic of Natural Language : Facing Ordinary Language. Part three is about "The Primacy of the Semantical" includes chapters such as (V) The Semantic Models: Foundation of a Theory of Truth, (VI) Meaning, Truth and Verification: Parameters of Theory of Meaning; (VII) Reference and Predication : The Structure of a Theory of Reference. Part fourth "Language, Mind and Metaphysics," includes the chapters such as (VIII) Language, Thought and Reality, (IX) Mind, Language and Subjectivity; (X) Realism and Anti-realism: Towards Reconstruction of Metaphysics; (XI) Knowledge, Value and the Metaphysics of Freedom.

Semantics has been a primary concern of analytic philosophers. It involves three important notions such as meaning, reference and truth. The book fairly brings out the intricacies involved in the analysis of these notions. The pioneers who belong to this camp and their theories are the central focus of discussion in this book. They are Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein, Ryle, Carnap, Quine, Ayer, Putnam, Strawson, Austin, Kripke, Searle, Dummett, Davidson, Rorty and many of their critics who equally share the thoughts towards the development of analytic philosophy. Pradhan begins with the developments of *formal semantics*, by Frege and Carnap who demand the **logical** analysis of language for explaining logical truth. Language per se, in **fact** defined exclusively through syntax would involve *formation rules* as well as *transformation rules*. Logical truth and logical necessity becomes a **part of the** syntactical analysis of language. Such a

## Book Review : I

notion of logical necessity brings a 'decisive place' for 'grammar in logic'. Pradhan finds that 'grammar combines the possibility of its semantic sufficiency and syntactic completeness.' (P.91) As a result of which the linguistic analysis, on the one hand, results in dualism within the linguistic discourse showing the 'division between object language and meta-language,' and on the other hand fails to give a broader view of concept of necessity. In this connection, he brings out the notion of *necessity* which is central to the theses of Quine, Putnam and Kripke. Carnap's harmonious definition of extensional logic and intentional semantics 'gives the impression of a two way traffic between meaning and truth' that Quine finds will lead to 'methodological solipsism.' (P.165) In order to avoid the circularity of defining analytic truth, Quine has argued in favour of 'conceptual holism' which could replace the metaphysical atomism of Russell. The holistic character of the conceptual system could 'dismantle the distinction between science and philosophy.' And that is shown in Quine's rejection of analytic synthetic distinction and 'consequently the rejection of two ideas of truth, i.e., truth of language and truth of experience.' (p.96) Further Putnam makes a serious attempt to define truth in terms of identity relationship between 'normativity and rationality'. The latter allows Kripke to suggest a combining thesis for analyticity and a priority which 'takes a shift from logical necessity to metaphysical necessity.' Moreover, for Pradhan, "Formal language philosophy came to lose the grip over philosophical imagination because of the fact that its faith in that language and its rules can secure every necessary truth became weak. It was realized that formal language is not taken into account the contextual and the modal features of language. Therefore, it failed to give a broader view of the concept of necessity." (P.105) Such dissatisfaction over the notion of 'ideal language' semantics for defining meaning and truth consequently leads to a change in the discourse of analytic philosophy by few eminent Oxford philosophers such as Ryle, Austin and Strawson. Their arguments in favour of 'ordinary language discourse changed the method of philosophizing using the larger context of human life and action. (P.109) Over and above, the author clearly notes that formal language semantics does not entirely rule out the scope of metaphysics, he writes, "But Carnap brings out the 'unsayable' into the heart of the meta-language and thus keeps the door open to metaphysics

even if metaphysics concern the world of empirical objects. Transcendental metaphysics is in a way ruled out even without the object language and meta-language distinction." (P. 105) Thus the shift from formal language and semantics to the natural language semantics sprouts in Oxford philosophers. His attempt also has been to show the over all continuity in Wittgenstein's approach in dealing with semantics discussing *Tractatus* and *Philosophical Investigations*.

The author finds a similar type of turn in the rejection of Frege's meta-linguistic notion of sense. Referring to Dummett, he writes, "Linguistic turn in the theory of sense may appear to be alien to Frege's semantic theory but it cannot be denied that it has its roots in Frege's theory as claimed by Dummett". (P.204) The meta-linguistic notion of sense provides a prelinguistic interpretation to it which either makes sense living in a Platonic world or a Chomskyeen prelinguistic structure of thought. He also points out Dummett's worry about gap between thought and language. He neither subscribes fully to Dummett's intuitionist semantics, nor defines truth in terms of interpretations. Interpretations are mental constructions that could replace truth in terms of justification. consequently the concept of justifiability is explained in linguistic practices, which would further reveal the semantic structure of sentence. (P. 190) Pradhan denies both stating that 'a purely articulated thought expresses its semantic content', hence, sense is embedded in the very structure of thought as well as its expression of it. That is shown in both early and later philosophy of Wittgenstein. Sense is defined in terms of the pictoriality of a proposition. Pictorial form shows the relationship between language and the world. As he puts it, "Sense cannot accidentally acquire language it must show the logical structure of the latter." (P. 210) And verification of *sense* is not further necessary because it already determines the 'structure of experience'. The author suggests that the verificationist method does show a linguistic turn in analytic philosophy but "the verifiability criterion of meaning has the chief merit in showing that meaning is not a non-cognitive metaphysical notion and it must be related to the over all epistemological framework in which we have a scientific experience and the scientific hypothesis which we constantly test against experience. (p.214) The merit of linguistic turn in positivism involves two parts, firstly positivists undertake statements that

are 'units of meaning and only carry the semantic weight' and, secondly it is about reductionism that is involved in positivists' analysis of language meaning as a piecemeal analysis, interpreted by Quine. Quine's naturalistic semantics on the other hand gives *holistic* interpretation to meaning. The indeterminacy thesis does give a broad outline to naturalistic semantics. Pradhan says, "Quine's above conclusion on the nature of meaning has serious repercussions on the nature of translation which is the most ancient art of inter-linguistic communications." (P.220) However, naturalistic semantics has its limitations in 'denying the speaker's access to the transcendent notion of meaning'. (P. 225) The author then brings Davidson and Dummett to discuss meaning and truth going little beyond the strictness of naturalistic semantics. Davidson's idea of *interpretation* 'retains both Tarskian and Quinean insights' in explaining meaning and truth within a conceptual framework, whereas Dummett maintains that *justification* condition can unfold the manifoldness of meaning in the actual practice of language. Pradhan rightly points out that "Dummett is anxious to make meaning and truth available in language itself and so to do away with cognition-transcendent notion of truth meaning." (P. 233) Moreover, Dummett separates truth from meaning, 'truth is driven away by justification whereas meaning lies in the use of language.' Thus the author takes up the issue of *speech acts semantics* advocated by Austin and latter by Searle, which gives a viable challenge to *truth conditional semantics*. If semantics as a whole is necessarily bound by truth and falsity conditions and ignores its other applicability then it would show its 'limited availability'. 'Meaning is also a joint product of convention and the force of utterances.' (P. 235) By stating that he goes back to the root of speech act semantics in Wittgenstein's notion *language use* to strengthen his thesis of autonomy of meaning. Autonomy of meaning follows from autonomy of language use, that is, where 'language speaks for itself.' In his words, "Meaning is neither a mental reality nor it is an entity in the abstract Platonic sense. It is ultimately a reality in language. It is internal to the language system so is autonomous." (P.240)

In the following chapter "Reference and Predication", the author takes up the problem of reference *vis a vis* sense - meaning which defines truth in terms of predication. Interestingly, he associates the predicational

structure of sentences i.e., the *syntactical well formed sentence* with over all logico-grammatical structure of sentences, i.e., *semantically well formed sentences*. As he suggests, "The real grammatical form of a sentence in which the descriptive phase is no more in the subject-predicate form but it is the character of an existential sentences in which the descriptive phrase is no more in the subject-predicate at all." (P.254) And it is in this context the author feels that Russell presses the notion of meaning towards the domain of semantics where truth and falsity conditions are also taken care of. Strawson's critique of Russell's "Theory of Description" brings back to the demand for natural language semantics. However, Pradhan says, "Strawson unlike Russell, recognizes that sentences as such cannot be taken for the truth value assessment and that they must always be related to the context and the speaker for such assessment." (P.258). He further gives a proper attention to the interpretation raised on Russell's theory of description by Searle, Kripke and Donnellan. Strawson and Searle challenge in converting proper names to descriptions for the stronger version of *translatability*. Kripke's cluster theory of description' again is clue for Pradhan to relate Wittgenstein's notion of crisscrossing feature of language games which gives a proper description of meaning. Moreover, he differentiates and maintains that *descriptive content* of sentence is not identical with the sense of a sentence. 'The former is a linguistic entity and proved by virtue of linguistic convention, but sense is pre-linguistic therefore pre-conventional. Thus Frege's theory of sense differs from Russell's theory of description.' (P. 265) He too is not happy with the causal theory of names insisted by many like Donnellan, Putnam, Evans apart from Kripke. Though Putnam rejects the 'theory of description' by analyzing in terms of *rigidity* and *Indexicality*, still Putnam 'endorses the causal relationship as an underlying mechanism of reference.' He appreciates Putnam in rejecting psychologism, denying that meanings are not in the head and along with Kripke he overcomes the referential opacity precisely on the ground that necessity is dependent on reference across possible worlds.

Pradhan conclusively returns to the main theme of the book in part-IV, that is 'Language, Thought and metaphysics'. The linguistic analysis of these chapters focuses on the metaphysical foundations of the structure of

thought and reality. Linguistic analysis is responsible in bringing about change in the theoretical positions. A change in the way of looking at the metaphysics or the metaphysical issues inevitably follows from the linguistic analysis. However this conceptual change is a part of the 'intellectual history of mankind' but they are neither *frequent* nor *radical* as interpreted by Kuhn and Feyerabend. Referring to Wittgenstein and Strawson, he writes, "There is a natural limit to the change in the concepts themselves and for that reason there is an internal link between what concepts we have and what the world actually is." (P. 311) For him, Strawsonian descriptive metaphysics has its limitations. It neither revises the concepts nor is it constructive or speculative, yet it preserves the concepts. Concepts are evolutionary phenomenon and their development is a matter of *necessity*. They are not imposed, as Kant believes rather they are 'the inner structure of the language and reality'. He discusses both Davidson's and Putnam's adherence to the idea of *conceptual scheme*. Moreover, he is critical of the very idea of conceptual scheme, and writes, "relativity of reality to conceptual scheme is vulnerable to the criticism - reality is relative to the language, is illogical, in the sense that it is itself not a criterion of language." (P.320) He contrasts Putnam's theory of internal realism, i.e., defining truth from *internal point of view* with externalism, i.e., *God's eye point of view*. Representation of reality through concepts is one of the classical notions of philosophical discourses, emphasizes the author while highlighting Rorty's anti-representational attitude. Rorty fairly undertakes language as an activity and undermines its representational characteristics. In this context he finds Russell's and Wittgenstein's approaches are quite metaphysical and artificial. However, Pradhan's approach towards representational theory of meaning and truth is substantiated by the thesis of both Putnam and Dummett. His conclusive remark of this chapter is noteworthy, "The representational theory of language brings in it train the concept of truth as it is wedded to the fact that language speaks about the world irrespective of how we construe the relationship between language and the world. The relation between language, thought and reality is not a pseudo-problem as Rorty thinks, and besides this problem is not a source of relativist's menace which Rorty wants to encounter by dissolving the problem. In fact the best way of facing relativism is to take our language

and conceptual scheme as they work and to see that language is firmly related to the world. Both skepticism and relativism arise when we do not see the definite language world relationship." (P.333) In the following chapter, "Mind, Language, Subjectivity", the author makes a shift in his discourse from linguistic representation to mental representation. Representationality remains common to both language and mental phenomena. The dual forms of representation are bridged by the subjectivity of human mental experience. Subjectivity is the route of first person accessibility to the mental experiences as well as the feature of establishing the autonomy of the mind. The *first person point of view* of studying the mental introduces the concept of self. Searle's biological naturalism is one of the central theses of discussion in this chapter which has been effective in refuting the functionalism and identity theory of mind. The analysis of concepts of intentionality and subjectivity simultaneously gives a *turn* to the Cartesian dualism. Nagelean dual positions of explaining the mental seem to be not appealing to the author and he also denounces Searle's naturalism too. Searle's notion of intentionality of mental experience ultimately gives a causal account of consciousness. Mind is neither considered as part of the world nor the self. He advocates a transcendental notion of self in a *Tractarian* sense, i.e., self is the limit of the world. As he puts it "The conflict between the biological point of view of consciousness and the transcendental notion of self is more apparent than real because there is no reason why transcendental notion of self cannot accommodate empirical feature of consciousness." (P.354) The consciousness without *creativity* leads to nothingness in the sense that the mental loses its unique feature. This chapter also focuses on Ryle's *analytic behavioursim* in refuting the Cartesian myth and Davidson's *anomalous monism* seeing a parallel explanation between psychology and philosophy of mind. Rejection of dualism can lead to the presupposition of the self and he is very logical in advocating, "Self is the metaphysical background of the philosophical understanding of body and the mind. It is the basic ontological category that is presupposed by mind, language and the world. ... The self is the person that is engaged in the act of self-knowledge and self-understanding in the first person sense, such that by knowledge what the self can remember and anticipate we can contribute freedom and responsibility to

it." (P.391) Moreover, the metaphysics of the notion of self goes hand in hand with the metaphysics of truth and reality. And that he discusses in the chapter "Realism and Anti-Realism: Towards the reconstruction of metaphysics". The realists and anti-realists positions regarding the nature of truth and reality unfold the controversy between the 'God's eye point of view' and the 'human eye point of view', Further it replaces classical metaphysical realism with transcendental metaphysics which asserts reality is rationally intelligible. His Wittgensteinian approach is not only to reject metaphysical realism and transcendental metaphysics but also to see a 'harmony among thought, language and the world.' He writes, "This cosmic point of view that takes the objects in the world as fixed entities given in a timeless framework. The world is taken as independent of human standpoint (P.403) The human point of view holds a corresponding relationship between language and reality. Linguistic representation goes perfectly well in tracking reference and truth. That is because 'language and the world share a common logical form'. Austin's analysis of truth from *descriptive convention* as well as *demonstrative convention* does strengthen the foundation of realist semantics. Moreover, it also focuses on the viable challenges against the metaphysical realism of Kant and latter advocated by Putnam in his famous essay 'Brain in a Vat'. Putnam advocates a causal relationship between language and the world and tries to point out the follies in McGinn's notion of mental content. Putnam's theory of 'internal realism' becomes the core of the discussion in this chapter and shows how truth 'loses its transcendent metaphysical character once it is placed within the frameworks of linguistic practice and cognition.' (P.427) The cognitive framework as a perspective advocates the involvement of normative order and the role of rational community in justifying beliefs. Justification then remains central to language use and relative to the conceptual scheme. Realist semantics not only insists on truth independent of knower but also determinate factors between language and reality. Pradhan is certainly critical of Putnam's *internal realism*, however, he synthesizes both the realists and anti-realists stand points, "The metaphysical picture of the world of the internalists as well as of the anti-realists are the same : that is, both take the world to be an emerging universe of diverse and plural entities that do not pre-exist in human mind but are constructed in the conceptual

scheme of mankind. It is not a fixed universe consisting of self-identifying substances. Metaphysical realists wrongly conceive the world to be independent of human minds and languages. The anti-realists correct this picture by bringing in human language and mind to the centre. Thus it brings out a second Copernican Revolution in philosophy by making world dependent on mind and language." (P.437) In the conclusive chapter of the book "Knowledge, Value and Metaphysics of Freedom" the author explains the necessity of understanding the value of person that lies in the rational exploration of his existence. Such cognitive endeavour discloses the exercises of free will and reason in understanding that the nature of self and its relationship with the world. The synthesis is certainly a creative endeavour towards redefining a new worldview in which the value of human life will have manifold descriptions. The cognitive bond between the self and the world will disclose the limitation of reason. Moreover, the critical analysis of epistemology will not only reject skeptical attitudes but will also succeed in showing the shift of the epistemological discourse from individualism to the community towards construing knowledge.

Thus analytic philosophy which is man-centric philosophy must examine different facets of man and the constituting factors of such epistemology lies in human wishes, motives, intentions. More importantly, "In actions alone the whole man is revealed". Pradhan is disappointed about the hiding nature of the rational self, rather he says, "....for the whole understanding of the nature of man we have to look into his behaviour, his character above all his *inner will*." (P. 467) The significance of his argument is deeply touched by the sense of morality and the virtues of the human life. They need to be guided by the reason. He does not disregard reason at all. On the other hand, brings a synthesis in understanding the value of life within the self-referential structure of the causal order of the world and the free will of the consciousness. Hence, determinism and indeterminism are inadequate to resolve the issue of understanding the nature of man. "The actual man is both causally conditioned as well as free in proper context. We are free when we exercise our will, but also we are under causal law when we are executing our actions in the world. Thus man has a dual nature, both as a free and as a causally determined entity. There is no contradiction between these two faces of human action."

(P.479) However, it would be a mistake to conclude him a dualist in this sense. Rather his seriousness about emphasizing a harmony between reason and freedom to give a comprehensive ground for understanding the nature of human life and the values ascribed to it. It is because the values of life are safeguarded by rationality in man. And such a discourse of 'knowledge to value' is a "continuous thread binding mankind into one cognitive and moral community of free individuals." (P. 484)

Thus Pradhan does succeed in showing the analytic philosophers endeavour to provide a sustainable thesis in *reconstructing metaphysics*. His enriching arguments do carry readers to the *sea* of linguistic analysis. The author's attempt has been to bring clarity to most of the issues in analytic philosophy. The work not only brings clarity to readers but also establishes a milestone in unfolding a new facet of analytic philosophy. In this regard, *Recent Development in Analytic Philosophy* is certainly an asset for further research.

RANJAN K. PANDA

## BOOK REVIEW : II

**Bijayananda Kar : *Value Perspectives in Indian Philosophy*. New Delhi. Mittal Publications, 2000.**

This book is a collection of philosophical essays. Some of these were read to seminars national and international, some published in India and abroad and some appearing for the first time in the collection.

Whatever the provenance of the essays, a 'common point of valuational importance', as the author rightly claims, 'runs through most of the essays'.

To the present reviewer, the book is topical. It presents a perspective on an issue which has clouded the proper understanding of Indian philosophy as *philosophy*. It is the issue of philosophy *vis-a-vis* religion. The author, rightly according to me, seeks to disabuse one's mind of the notion that philosophy in India has been oriented to religion. To the author, what can legitimately be said is that Indian philosophy has been oriented to *dharma* which is *not* religion in the accepted sense of the word. The author goes on to show, in the various papers, that *dharma* which is a value-*purusārtha*- is essentially related to the mundane concerns of men and has nothing supra mundane or transcendent to which religion is oriented. The book is indeed topical at this junction of our national life when religious bigotries have struck at the root (s) of Indian unity. A wholesome understanding of *dharma*, such as is presented in the book, can extricate our people from religious conflicts and generate a 'liberal outlook' comprehending both one and many and be at once 'holistic' and 'pluralistic'. (p.98) Philosophy, by clarifying our conceptual confusions in life-situations, can generate insight or clarity of vision -*darsana*- and helps in the right conduct of life. Kar is not all apologetic in drawing sustenance from his tradition : he is a philosopher who revitalises and recreates his tradition, not a chronicler of his tradition. Kar particularly draws sustenance from that liberal outpouring of the Indian psyche, viz., '*ekam sat viprā bahudhā vadanti*'.

On two other counts, the book is striking. *First*, it retains its philosophical tenor to the end of the chapter. *Secondly*, never once does it, in its philosophic enterprise, become 'opaque to the cultural heritage' of India : on the contrary, it boldly asserts that 'there is some sort of Indian

approach to philosophising' (p.4). According to Kar, it is precisely by taking stock of its cultural roots that philosophy fulfils its obligation to society. Philosophy is indeed a rational, logical, analytical enterprise, and such enterprise, inspite of its variety, has its distinctive methodology and distinctive consideration (s) in virtue of which it can be identified as philosophical. Yet, it appears that Kar, honest both to his cultural tradition and to his calling as a philosopher, hints that philosophy, at least in the Indian understanding of it, *must generate some soteriology*. What is more important, Kar-as a philosopher again-explicates the cultural situation that he cogitates on, envisions in his mind's eye the conceptual components of the situation, and seeks to generate an insight into the situation that would be closed to the non-philosopher.

In this connection, Kar discounts the attitude 'in certain quarters' (p.8) to 'look down' upon the task of re-interpreting Indian philosophy on the ground (if, of course, 'looking down upon' something has a *ground*!) that such re-interpretation would be 'hooked' to 'old antiquated ideas' (p.8). Reacting to such derisive attitude to the task of re-interpretation of Indian philosophy, Kar asks 'If Plato could be reviewed by Ryle, St. Anselm's ontological argument can be revitalised as claimed by Malcolm,... why should be there reluctance for reinterpreting Śankara's Advaita from fresh angle? (p.9).

It appears that Kar marks off history of philosophy - to write which is a philosophical task - from history. The latter presents the temporal succession of some events (whose history is to be written), the former the logical development of ideas. It was Hegel who accorded philosophical importance to history of philosophy. Wrote Erdmann in his *History of Philosophy* 'The history of philosophy can be represented ... only with the help of philosophy'. Erdmann of course wrote with a Hegelian preconception of philosophy. But, on our part too, we can say that a critical review of a tradition of thought may amount to philosophy in its own right. And this is how we may view Kar's cogitations on his cultural tradition. Well might Kar claim to have written a *new hermeneutics of his tradition* in the first essay on the present collection on 'A Look on Indian Philosophy - Past and Present'? It is really a *relook* on Indian philosophy through which the past gnaws into the present and the present re-lives in the past.

Essay (2) on 'National integration, Secularism and Advaita philosophy' addresses itself, initially, to the concern to which essay (1) too addresses itself (partly though). Once again, Kar confronts himself with the various divides in Indian life, the religious one being the principal among them. Indeed, religion today perils our integration. Now, emphasising as he does the importance of the valuational perspective of *dharma* not merely in the context of academic philosophy, i.e., not merely to obtain the right theoretical concept for philosophy but also for correcting our lives, he insists on recognising that *dharma* in Hindu thought primarily stands for the translation of the moral virtues of honesty, integrity and truthfulness in society so that society is preserved and the claims of the individual and the society are balanced (p.24). I should add: Kar here frees the concept of 'dharma' from any doctrinaire or theological trappings. Freed from its theological trappings, *dharma* can weld together people of India. As Kar points out, 'national integration' is a 'political concern', and because-as the philosopher in Kar acutely observes - 'political' and 'religious' are different categories, faith in a balanced rational outlook, in '*samabuddhi*' (p.27) can bring about 'oneness, universality etc. amidst multiplicity' (p.27). And such faith is no psychological state, it has an extra-psychological component in that it is *commitment*, on the part of society, to the *rational order* in which and in which only its individuals can thrive.

It appears that Kar reads into the *Vedānta* - so far as it is understood in the essay under reference - a *theory of reason*. This is indeed a *new theory of reason and a new interpretation of Vedānta*. It is not abstract reason that Kar has in mind but reason that actualises itself in different ways in different contexts of the life of society, rational outlook to which the members of the society are committed to. Man forsakes his right to exist if he abandons reason. Shall we not pay heed to the *sanity of the philosopher who envisions a rational Indian society based on the dharma-principle and marked by equanimity and tolerance?*

Though finally essay (3) on 'Śankara's Advaita on Truth, Reality and Value' leads to valuational perspectives on life, yet initially it deals with some conceptual questions. Brahman in the Advaita system is regarded as '*sattā*', i.e., 'being' and again as '*Satyam*', i.e., 'truth'. Kar asks how the *epistemic concept* of 'truth' can be combined with the *ontological*

concept of 'being'.

Actually, in the Advaita - Vedānta context, 'truth' is *indifferently* an epistemic concept *and* an ontological concept. Kar here rightly points to the Advaita doctrine of *Sattātraividhya* according to which *all* our experiences - illusory or waking or of Brahman - have the mark of 'being' i.e., '*Satta*' (pp.32-33). As Radharishnan wrote (in, the chapter on 'The Advaita of Śāṅkara' in *Indian Philosophy*, Vol II.) If there were not a Brahman, there would have been, no empirical being nor empirical falsity'. Indeed, one of the chief points of disagreement between the *asatkhyātivādin* and *anirvcaniya khyātivādin* (i.e., *advaitin*) is that according to the former the illusory content is *nirālambapratiti* whereas according to the Advaita even illusion is located on *sattā* or being (*Brahman*). The *asatkhyātivādin* compares the illusory content with unreal entities like *vandhyāputra* (son of a barren woman) or *khapuṣpa* (sky-flower). The Advaitin replies that unreal entities cannot be presented in experience whereas the illusory content *is presented*. It is not just a no fact but as K.C. Bhattacharya (to whom Kar refers) points out, a '*presented no-fact*' (emphasis added). So too is the content of waking experience. What the Advaitin wants to convey is that *sattā* (*Brahman*) is presented in all experience, and as Kar rightly observes, 'something that is true cannot be unreal' (p.36), *sat* may be understood in its contrast with *asat* (p.36). But more importantly, from the Advaita point of view, *sat* is *satyam*, the truth, the value, *śreya* (p.36). One achieves this value through the clarification of one's conceptual confusion as Kar repeatedly points out [Essays (3), 94) and (5)] and as he interprets *adhyasa* to be.

The basic confusion is of 'I' with 'this' ('*adam idam*' '*mama idam*' - cp. Śāṅkaras *adhyāśabhāṣya*). Kar accordingly understands Advaita as *proposing a revision of our ordinary whys of looking at the world. Such revision is at once epistemic and valuational and ontological.*

Essay (5) on 'Mokṣa as Value and jñāna as method in Śāṅkara Vedāntā' continues the same thought with particular reference to Kar's teacher, the late Professor G. Misra who was the first to interpret Śāṅkara as *advocating linguistic clarification*. Following Misra, Kar comes to the conclusion that 'clarification of obscurities does play a significant part in formulating a new view of life', that is, it generates an attitude of balance

or *samabuddhi* (p.53). Lest Kar should not be understood as proposing sterile conceptual analysis, one should note what he writes in this connection viz., that the conceptual analysis 'is no doubt ontological in character... But ...this ontologism is the outcome of linguistic or conceptual analysis already undertaken...' (p.51).

The present reviewer is inclined to Kar's attitude towards linguistic analysis. Philosophy has always been linguistic analysis, i.e., analysis of the different ways of talking about whatever concerns man. And whatever may be the nature of concern theoretical, practical, valuational, scientific, societal, philosophical *et al.* (These again may get interweaved). Analytical activity may generate a clarity of vision in terms of which the philosopher *stations himself* in the situation he reflects on. So analytical activity in the philosophic context is an in-depth reflective enterprise. Philosophers in India took philosophy within the life-spectrum which was analytically or conceptually explored and life's different situations came to be understood, i.e., enlightenment came to be derived by the philosopher. It is to the credit of the late Professor G. Misra to have revived the Indian tradition of 'analysis' in the philosophic context, and again, it is to the credit of Kar to have continued the tradition set up by his teacher.

Essay (6) on 'Karma-yoga in Gita-its Valuational Framework' seeks to understand (i) what makes a proper *karmayogi* and (ii) what is the end of his *karma*. To be a proper *karmayogi* one has to 'purify one's self' (p.57). And one can purify one's self only if one does 'motiveless action' (*niṣkāmakarma*) (p.56). Kar, then, understands ego-less action as motiveless action, and then he gives *content* to motiveless action in terms of 'social obligations' (p.57) (of one who is motiveless in his actions). It appears that 'sociality' not only gives content to motiveless or ego-less actions but also *frees* actions from their psychological pressures. Free actions then transcend natural or psychological causality, and it is this transcendence that orients the *karmayogi* to work for *others*. Social obligations-to the extent they are *obligations* are regarded in India as fulfilment of '*dharma*'. So freedom understood in the Indian context is not negative withdrawal from one's naturalistic or psychological pressures but the *positive freedom* to realise '*dharma*', i.e., to participate in the giving away of one's ego to others. The merit of Kar's study of *karmayoga* in

the Gītā lies precisely here : 'pure' actions or motiveless actions are for him egoless *and* social, and sociality, again, for Kar is not just performing certain functions in the context of pooling the resources of different ego-s but *freely giving oneself away to the yajña for mankind*. Kar's humanistic interpretation of the Gītā aligns him with the interpretation advocated long ago by Kar's compatriot viz., the late Pandit Nilakantha Dasa.

The humanistic and social point of view is continued in essay (7) on 'The Dharma in Jainism' where it is maintained that (i) *dharma* is primarily a social principle for cohesion, integration etc for 'balance' (Kar's word), (ii) one becomes *arhat* or enlightened when one not only does not do violence to others but preserves the balance in respect of everything. Kar here seeks to situate the Jaina teaching on *ahimsā* in the context of current discussions on ecological balance.

Essay (8) on 'Karma in Bauddha Darśana' is Kar's critical essay on 'critical' philosophy of Buddhism. As every student of Indian Philosophy knows, the Buddhists advocate the view that non-substantive momentary reals are the only reals. If things are non-substantive, how then can *Karmavada* be advocated? This is Kar's question. But Buddhism is *not inconsistent* here. Kar comes to the conclusion that Buddhism 'critically views' Pp.81) the karma-theory : even the desire to reap the consequences of karma would imply craving for something permanent.

It is by now evident that Kar as a philosopher turns his back at any speculative method of philosophising. Instead, he would analyse the distinctive nuances of a situation (may be political, national, social, religious or whatever) reflect on and explicate, *from within the situation*, the structural concepts or categories which would help understand the situation better. It appears that for Kar philosophical reflection is always context-relative and not speculative. That is to say, Kar would not propose model (s) of interpretation from above (so to say) but would make search for philosophical concepts *in* the different situations the philosopher reflects (or may reflect) on.

For example, reflecting on Gandhi's approach to Individuality and Social change, Kar maintains that the concept of 'Democracy' as formulated

in the West cannot do justice to the individual. If the individual is thought to be *sacred*, then *Sarvodaya* is the concept within which the individual is to be viewed. This substantiates our point that Kar's philosophical procedure is not 'revisionary' but 'descriptive', if these Strawsonian expressions are of any help in the present context.

*Dharma*, as we have seen, occupies the centre-stage of Kar's attention. But then, Kar throughout gives a human orientation to the content. The point of saying this is that *dharma* for Kar may be understood, not in any theological or doctrinaire sense, but just as a 'balancing principle'. From this viewpoint, Kar tries to understand Swami Vivekananda's advocacy of Universal Religion which may be, indifferently, a religion for *all* or many religions for many persons. Lurking in Kar's thought, it appears to me, is this *concept of conjunctive alternatives of religions*. But given the concept, how would one reckon with institutional and definitional religions i.e., religions that, according to *their* definitions, distinguish between the heretic and the religious? Do not such religions frustrate the human interface of religions? But then, signs are already there of the emergence of a 'Fellowship of Faiths' *a la* Radhakrishnan. If so, Kar may well make the claim to have provided a humanistic foundation to such fellowship. *And talk of such fellowship cannot consistently be made by conceiving Indian unity in religious terms. Kar's consistency in thinking in this context stands out sharply against Radhakrishnan's inconsistency.*

In the essay on 'Radhakrishnan on Intuition' Kar's aim is to be as faithful as possible to Radhakrishnan's intention to bring intuition close to knowledge. Kar rightly notes that Radhakrishnan does not understand intuition as non knowledge. But the 'part - whole distinction' in terms of which Radhakrishnan distinguishes 'intuition' and 'knowledge' is distressing to Kar. Part- whole distinction can be maintained between things belonging to the same discourse type. But Kar finds Radhakrishnan maintaining that intuition is self-knowledge, whereas for Kar knowledge is necessarily object-ward. So part - whole distinction cannot be made between 'intuition' and 'intellect', Nevertheless, it is to the credit of Kar that he accords recognition to Radhakrishnan where it is due. Radhakrishnan makes an attempt to bring 'intuition' close to 'knowledge' as we understand it in ordinary parlance. One must appreciate Kar's temperament which is as

good a thing, if not more than, his analytic acumen.

Once again, the humanistic strain in Kar's thinking becomes explicit when he accords approval to the spirit behind 'commonism' of Professor G.C. Nayak. In agreement with Nayak, Kar maintains that the 'dawn of religious consciousness can be traced anywhere, irrespective of caste, creed or social or economic status'. (p.120)

This essay, apart from its emphasis on the humanistic aspect of religion, has *one particular merit viz., it opposes any hierarchical view in respect of religion. It may provide a good Indian counter to the Hegelian attempt at grading religions.* And this counter is in harmony with the ancient and time-honoured Indian idea of toleration to which we do appeal in spite of all the travails we have been passing through.

To sum up. Here is a book (i) which helps us clear our minds of the misconception that philosophy in India is religious, (ii) which brings out the important and almost central role that *dharma* plays in Indian mind, (iii) which brings out the social implications of *dharma*, (iv) which brings out the idea of justice inherent in *dharma* in virtue of which *dharma* can unite the different faiths which, while retaining their doctrinal differences, may yet put on a *non-denominational face* so that this land of many religions becomes one day the 'ocean of humanity' which the national poet once dreamt of.

K. BAGCHI

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## CULTURAL INTEGRITY AND LIBERTY RIGHTS<sup>1</sup>

WILLIAM SWEET

In the last half century, the concept of human rights, and the discourse that has been developed out of it, have obviously had important roles, not only in political philosophy, but in virtually all matters involving political and social life. Given the frequent appeals for the respect of rights made by ethnic and cultural minorities and disadvantaged groups throughout the world—by those who agitated for democratic institutions in South Africa, in the countries of the former Soviet bloc, and throughout Asia (e.g., in mainland China, in Myanmar, and in Vietnam), and given the number of international agreements and charters spelling out the rights and principles of conduct that must be respected within nation states, the importance and the universality of human rights might seem to be beyond dispute.

Yet the notion of universal rights has long been the object of criticism. Within the western philosophical tradition, authors as diverse as Karl Marx, Edmund Burke, and Jeremy Bentham,<sup>2</sup> have challenged the claim that there are universal human rights. Moreover, the awareness of different cultures and different cultural practices has long ago raised the question of whether there are any transcultural norms or standards. And more recently, a number of critics have gone further, and have called the notion of the universality of human rights into question for other reasons still. The insistence on human rights, they say, is used primarily as a political tool by western nations in obtaining concessions from developing countries. Using this discourse as a substantive moral standard is also illegitimate because it rests on a number of concepts that are peculiar to the west, reflect questionable assumptions, and have no basis—and hence no proper moral

*Indian Philosophical Quarterly* XXX No 4

Oct. 2003

weight—in many parts of the world<sup>3</sup>. And, finally, it is argued that the introduction of the discourse of human rights into non-occidental cultures can lead (or has already led) to a breakdown in the 'cultural identity' and autonomy of those cultures.

Is it useful, then, to continue to employ concepts like 'human rights,' and to insist that such rights have a universal character? Is the call for 'human rights' consistent with the respect of cultures—particularly in those cultures where the term 'rights' does not have a place? Is the notion of 'human rights' comparable with that of a collective, social good? Is it possible to prove that there are such rights—such as the rights to freedom of conscience, freedom of expression, freedom of association, and so on—and, if so, can such a proof work in different cultures?

## I

I want to address these questions and concerns by approaching the issue of the nature, source, and limits of human rights in an indirect way and by using an analogy. (Though the discussion may seem at times a bit removed from the central topic, it will give us the background for some important distinctions to be made later.) Specifically, I want to start with an analysis of two familiar concepts, and then extend the results of this analysis to two related terms that bear on the idea of culture. This will enable me to draw some conclusions, not only about the relation of the idea of culture to human rights, but also about the nature of these rights, and whether one can have any reason to believe that there are universal human rights.

The first concept I want to discuss is that of 'identity,' in the sense of 'personal identity.' 'Personal identity' is a notoriously vague notion—for to speak of the identity of a person may be to refer to what that person 'is' at some particular moment or 'slice of time,' or it may refer to that person over a period of time. It is also a philosophically very puzzling notion; recall the example of 'The Ship of Theseus,' and the question of whether an object, all of whose parts have been gradually replaced over time, can still properly be called the same object. Or again, can we speak of people remaining 'the same' people, despite growing older, learning and changing their beliefs and values, maturing and, of course, gradually forgetting the past or becoming senile? This is not just a metaphysical problem, but a

legal, an ethical, and a political problem.

Still, I think that most of us would agree that personal identity involves *continuity and stability of consciousness* over time and *coherence in one's ideas and beliefs*. The person who is pulled left and right by her desires and whims, without any systematic way of organizing or addressing these desires and whims, and without having a consistent will at all, is not much of a person and, so, has no obvious identity. (Events that 'interrupt' or radically change our consciousness, 'end' our identity. Physical death interrupts both physical and conscious continuity; brain injury or senility do as well.) To have personal identity, then, requires having a will and a continuous and coherent history—a past, and the promise or expectation of a future (e.g., expressed through goals and aspirations)—and perhaps the possibility of articulating a personal narrative. While such an account is not without its problems, it seems to be where many people's intuitions on the matter lie.

Of course, personal identity is more than this; it is not just continuity, coherence, and stability. Most of us would insist that it requires a *sameness*. We often think of personal identity as involving at least a genetic sameness (e.g., for me to be the same person as I was 20 years ago, I would have to have the same DNA) and having at least some of the 'same' or similar sense of self, memories, tastes, inclinations, values, and so on. (In fact, if my values, tastes, inclinations, and memories were all significantly different, someone who knew me might reasonably say "He is not the same person I knew.")

Now, when we speak of personal identity, we often want to identify what it is that *distinguishes* one person from another. But to do this, we must also acknowledge that they have a good deal in common, and that that person has many of the same characteristics that other persons have. Identity involves not just what makes one distinct, but what makes one like others—of the same kind or species.

But we should also note what personal identity does *not* imply.

When we talk about someone's 'identity,' we are not necessarily talking about something that that person has any control over; I may make my ideas, beliefs, values, and so on, more coherent or consistent, but in doing so I don't obviously make myself a different kind of being than I was

before. So the characteristics of being an agent and of being free are not relevant to the issue of identity. (They may, of course, bear on the issue of what kind of being I am—e.g., whether I am a person.)

Further, when we speak of 'identity,' it does not automatically follow that it is a value; it just says that something is as it was in the past. Beings who have 'personal identity' have a value, but it is as a person that we are valuable, not just in being the same or similar to what we were in the past.

To sum up, when we speak of personal identity, we have in mind such things as:

1. the stability of consciousness and the coherence of one's ideas and beliefs,
2. the presence of a systematic way of organizing or addressing one's desires and wishes—i.e., one's will
3. having a history—a past, and the promise or expectation of a future
4. a sameness that is more than a continuity

But, to have an identity is not something that that being need have any control over. One need not even be free, and being the same as one was before is not, in itself, valuable.

## II

The second concept that I want to discuss is that of (personal) *integrity*. Now, while personal identity and integrity are clearly distinct, there is no contradiction between them.

To begin with, integrity suggests a 'wholeness' and consistency, and is opposed to incoherence and inconsistency. When we speak of someone as having integrity, we speak of that person's basic beliefs and values, recognize that these beliefs and values form a 'whole,' and acknowledge that he acts in a way is consistent or coherent with those beliefs and values, and does so in a way that others can count on. Integrity is a *disposition*—i.e., a way of looking at and approaching the world, and a habitual intention to act in a certain way. Integrity is, of course, also a moral quality, and so it not only describes the characteristic of 'wholeness' and consistency, but implies a value. (And because integrity is a moral notion, it is not purely subjective, and depends on the existence of a moral framework that has its

origin outside of that person. One can be 'called' to act in a way that exhibits integrity.) The term implies, as well, awareness of oneself as a being that can develop such a disposition, and an explicit wish to bring his beliefs and values and so on, into coherence or wholeness.

But while a person of integrity holds to certain basic beliefs and values, it doesn't mean that she or he always holds *all the same* beliefs and values.

For example, we are often confronted with novelty—things that are new or are significantly different from our past experience. A person of integrity responds to novel situations in a way that is generally consistent with the past; at the very least, he seeks to act to bring the present novel situation into coherence with his past experience. But it is clear that, in doing so, *how* the person of integrity should act is not completely determined in advance. To act in a way consistent with one's past is not just a matter of repetition of past actions or acting out of rote habit. Nor could it be. One is often not able to deal with these novel situations entirely on one's own terms; life rarely permits us to control our situation entirely. But even if we could, we should not seek to respond just on our own terms, for to do so is to deny the reality and significance of the situation.

So the mere fact that something happens that is new or different or unforeseen does not mean that it will threaten our integrity. Rather new experience *calls us out of ourselves* to act with integrity. (Of course, where something would undermine *all or most* of our values, then there might be a threat to integrity, but this is something that cannot be determined *a priori*.)

And so, the quality of integrity is not only consistent with, but entails, that a person should act in a way that shows an openness and a willingness to learn. Even if one thinks one has the truth, it does not follow that one has the whole truth and nothing except the truth. Integrity requires humility. And realism reminds us that sometimes we have to deal with rather uncomfortable facts—and so we cannot be blind to them, or ignore them,

Consequently, integrity requires not just being true to one's past principles, beliefs, and values, but also being true to the reality of the situation. A person who blindly ignores the features of the situation he finds himself in does not act with integrity. But, likely, no one is entirely without integrity;

some degree of integrity seems to be a property of almost all human beings in the maturity of their faculties.

Finally, because integrity is a disposition, it logically requires freedom. One must [logically] be free in order to act with integrity. (As noted above, identity, by itself, does not require freedom.) The exercise of this freedom, however, must be consistent with 'who' one is—with one's basic principles and values—and with the reality of the situations one is confronted with.

In other words, for people to have integrity, they must be free to seek, pursue, and preserve wholeness in their beliefs. And although one's freedom is not absolute (because it must be consistent with who or what one is), one must [again, logically] be free enough so that the development of individual responsibility and the growth of moral character are possible. You cannot be restricted or treated as a child and still have integrity. If you don't have freedom, then integrity is impossible.

In short, for integrity, one needs freedom or rights—rights of life, of various kinds of liberty, of security; rights to be free from *arbitrary* discrimination, arrest, interference<sup>4</sup>; rights to be recognized as a person. There is, of course, a certain logical priority in these rights—you cannot have a right to security if you do not already have a right to life—but this does not mean that rights are discrete and separable from one another, and serially ordered. Rights come in 'packages'; they are largely inseparable from one another (as seen above, in discussing rights to security). Moreover, it is not obvious or required that everyone must have exactly the same 'package' of rights in order to act with integrity. And finally, unlike identity as such, integrity is a value, and so one can appeal to other values in order to preserve or promote it.

I would add that it is entirely beside the point to ask who or what 'confers' these rights or freedoms; the reference to rights here is not a matter of them having been ascribed by the state or having been seen as inherent in or inferred from the dignity of the human person. The issue is, rather, a logical one. To have integrity, and to be a person of integrity, one must be free and have certain civil and political freedoms or rights. This is not to say that integrity is *the* foundation of human rights, though I will argue in a moment that it can serve as *a* basis of an argument for them.

In short, a person who acts with integrity is acting in a way that shows

1. a 'wholeness' or consistency in his or her beliefs and values,
2. awareness of oneself as a self or as a moral agent, and consciously seeking to make her or his beliefs and values consistent
3. a disposition—i.e., a way of looking at and approaching the world, and a habitual intention to act so that one will respond to novel situations in a way that is consistent with the past, and that attempts to bring one's beliefs and values, and so on, into coherence or wholeness.
4. a recognition that one is often not able to deal these novel situations entirely on one's own terms
5. that, while consistent, how one should act in a way is not completely determined in advance.
6. that one requires freedom, but a freedom that must nevertheless be consistent with 'who' one is, and
7. that one must, therefore, have a set of human rights

### III

At this point, I want to extend these reflections on identity and integrity to the cultural sphere. I do not want to go into a lengthy discussion of 'culture' here; for simplicity of presentation, let me just offer the following description of how I understand 'culture.'

The word 'culture,' in a broad sense, refers to "the whole way of life, material, intellectual, and spiritual, of a given society"<sup>5</sup>—and it is important to see this not as simply what exists in a society at a particular moment, but as something dynamic and growing. (This reflects the etymological relation of the term to the Latin word *cultura*—the practice of cultivating land.) Moreover, when speaking of culture, we need to refer to more than artistic and intellectual work. A discussion of the 'whole way of life' of a society must mention its customs, its mores and moral principles, its laws, its manner of educating its citizens, and its understanding of the nature of the spiritual life. Culture, then, exists in *consciousnesses*; it is present in institutions, practices, and so on, so far as they reflect consciousnesses. And because

'cultura' is a practice—usually a practice involving some 'care'—we can say that to engage in cultural activities takes time, takes imaginativeness, takes conscious knowledge and action, takes seeing how things work together, and takes freedom.

Now the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 (UNDHR) and, I would dare to say, all cultures themselves agree on at least one thing, and that is the importance of human flourishing—and perhaps even "the free and full development of the human personality"<sup>6</sup> In fact, even many of the *critics* of the discourse of human rights have objected to it because it is inconsistent with the 'cultural identity' and the flourishing of at least some societies.

When people speak of 'cultural identity,' I take this to be closely analogous to 'personal identity.'

By 'cultural identity,' then, I mean the 'unity' of ideas and beliefs, present in institutions and practices, that constitute a system and a coherent 'way of life,' that reflects the 'mind,' goals and aspirations of a group of persons, but also its history, experience and environment. This will have not only a continuity with the past and the prospect of a future, but a 'sameness' over time, and this 'sameness' serves to distinguish that one group from other groups. But cultural identity is not just 'cultural difference' or what is unique to such a group; it unifies that group and it also includes what may be shared with others (e.g., our humanity).

Cultural identity is a fact—it is the description of a 'way of life.' But although that way of life 'unites,' enables life to be lived, and provides a basis for individual identity, this says nothing positive or negative about that way of life as a whole.

Does a culture have value? I would say that, so far as it reflects the consciousness and will of those who constitute it, and so far as it permits human flourishing—the growth and development of those who are members of it, it does. But if that 'culture' is static and nothing more than the 'status quo' for many or for all, then it isn't obvious that it has value. So in answer to the question of whether a culture should be preserved just because it exists, the answer is, I think, no. Cultures should be preserved presumably

because they permit human flourishing or because they reflect or contain the kind of values referred to above. But they need not be preserved *just because they exist*—and certainly not preserved at all costs.

All existing cultures that we know of today have had contact with other cultures, and rarely has it been on equal terms. What at least one culture is confronted with, when it has contact with another culture, is *novelty*. And it is rare that any culture can control this experience of novelty. For example, novelty can be the result of the invasion of one nation (with its own culture) by another, or the result of other kinds of force—although the power of this novelty is also largely due to the fact that there are elements within the 'recipient' culture that, in some way or another, embrace it or hope to use it to further their own personal ends. (At best, a culture can attempt to control the way in which it deals with the novelty. But this presupposes that cultural leaders know exactly what their culture is and involves, and what it needs or can use in order to grow and flourish.)

Novelty has often been seen as a problem or threat. It may raise questions about the status quo, about what people can have or do, it may suggest alternatives to what exists and, in a more thorough way, it may even suggest changes in how to understand oneself and about which questions one might ask. Novelty, in short, disturbs what is customary and, therefore, it can disrupt or threaten a culture. It challenges the 'sameness' that is a feature of cultural identity.

Thus, the spread of capitalism and secularism has consistently influenced and challenged values and practices in the non-western world, but also in various places in North America (e.g., in non-urban areas, and areas with strong religious traditions)—and it continues to do so. But there are all manner of other influences that have influenced these various cultures as well.

What we find in many cultures today, then, is the presence of one set of ideas—cultural identity—confronted with another set of ideas—those that are novel or new. And while the traditional ideas that exist—and in part define a culture—have a value so far as they provide a framework in which life can be led, and in which flourishing is possible, a culture cannot ignore the new ideas altogether, for, as I have suggested, the preservation of cultural sameness or identity itself is not obviously a value.

So the question is, *how* should we respond to novelty?

Here, I want to offer a solution and propose that, in the place of 'cultural identity,' we employ a concept that I call 'cultural integrity.'

#### IV

When I discussed the notion of 'personal integrity' above, I noted that integrity does not mean that one always holds all the same views. It suggests that there is a 'wholeness' or consistency in the subject's beliefs and values as well as an awareness of oneself as a self. But it also implies that that subject has a disposition—i.e., a way of looking at and approaching the world, and a habitual intention to act in a way that shows one's effort to bring these beliefs and values directly to bear on future experience. Thus, when persons of integrity encounter novelty, they recognize that they are often not able to deal with these novel situations entirely on their own terms, and so they will try to find a way of responding to these situations that is generally consistent with the past, but that also respects the reality of the new situation. Persons of integrity should act in a way that is consistent with their past, but this is not a way that is completely determined in advance.

We can, I would argue, extend the notion of integrity to cultures. Admittedly, in certain respects, the analogy between 'cultural integrity' and 'personal integrity' is not exact. Still, there are many important parallels. For example, given that cultures have an identity that reflects a way of life, one can find within them basic principles or values or beliefs that are more or less coherent with one another and exhibit a 'wholeness' and consistency.

Now, since 'integrity' indicates a disposition, when we speak of 'cultural integrity,' I am claiming that that culture (or its agents and leaders) have a disposition to act. And to have integrity, that culture (or its agents and leaders) must act in a way that is consistent with (though it is not simply dictated by) its cultural identity and its dominant ideas. When a culture that exhibits cultural integrity encounters novel situations, it must respond—and it must respond in a way that takes account of that novelty seriously.

In taking account of this novelty, a culture having integrity will seek coherence with this novelty—and so it must respond with creativity.

Obviously, this response will often lead to some change in the culture—but change is a property of anything that lives and grows

So, if we examine a culture that exhibits integrity, we will find that that culture does not always hold all the same views. Just as we can speak of an individual's integrity or wholeness even as the individual changes (i.e., matures), so we can speak of a culture having a similar integrity even as it changes. Cultural integrity involves being conscious of the importance of, and being true to, one's cultural identity, but also being capable of going beyond it. And it is so far as a culture exhibits not only the possibility of a coherent life in common, but a life with integrity, that we can speak that culture as having a value and as deserving to be preserved.

## V

Now, what is necessary for a culture to exhibit or possess cultural integrity?

First, I would argue that, just as personal integrity requires freedom and rights, so cultural integrity also requires freedom and rights. But freedom and rights must exist at both the 'macro' and the 'micro' levels in a culture. To begin with, the culture as a whole must be free—i.e., that cultural community must have the freedom to respond to novelty with integrity and in a way consistent with its identity. (I would, of course, distinguish this from the 'freedom' of state authorities to do whatever they see fit to guarantee or preserve the existing political institutions, and at all costs.) Moreover, since cultures are 'ways of living' for those within them, there must also be freedoms and rights for individuals within those cultures, that allow them to act with integrity. For cultural integrity as a whole to be possible, there must be a freedom for individuals to participate in the construction of their culture.<sup>7</sup> This implies, in turn, a robust theory of rights—that is, 'freedoms from' certain restrictions, but also positive 'freedoms to' the means to engage in "participative construction" in a meaningful way.

In short, human rights serve as necessary preconditions for the existence of freedom and for cultural integrity. And, in this sense, cultural integrity serves as a foundation and justification of human rights. Thus, those who

recognize the value of cultural integrity, and who are concerned about preserving a culture that exhibits integrity, must be committed to a discourse of human rights.

Second, cultural integrity requires openness to dialogue and exchange. This does not mean that one needs to 'suspend' or 'bracket' one's own beliefs and values, but it does require at least a willingness to listen to other beliefs. It also requires one to be humble, in the sense that one must acknowledge that one does not know the *whole* truth, and that there is the possibility of learning something about oneself through the dialogue and exchange. (e.g., We see this feature in religious movements such as ecumenism and in inter-faith dialogue). Action and interaction with other cultures *are not* necessarily threats to one's 'cultural integrity.' They may contribute to it. In fact, the categorical or complete refusal to enter into dialogue or exchange is quite inconsistent with acting with integrity.

This model of cultural integrity does not mean, of course, that a culture has the luxury of deciding for itself how and when to engage in dialogue and exchange. History is full of examples where one sees the action and influence of very powerful 'external' cultural forces—e.g., Christianity, Islam, capitalism, and secularism—leading to radical changes in cultures and societies. But what is interesting, is that although such forces have led to significant changes in those cultures and societies that they have come into contact with—in the Americas, central and southern Africa, Australia, and Asia—it is *not* obvious that they have violated the cultural integrity of those cultures. For, as argued above, change is quite consistent with cultural integrity, and it is worth noting that these forces have rarely, if ever, led to the homogeneity of, or the disappearance of substantial diversity among, cultures.

What we should be concerned about, is not the existence or occurrence of change, but rather the mechanisms by which that change is brought about. The key is that both cultural communities and individuals must be free to seek, pursue, and preserve a wholeness and consistency in their beliefs and values. And although this freedom is not absolute (because it must be consistent with who or what one is), individuals and collectivities must [again, logically] be free enough so that the development of

responsibility and integrity is possible. Just as an individual cannot be limited, or treated, as a child and still have integrity, neither can a cultural community. If freedom does not exist, then integrity is impossible.

So, again, we are led to the notion of human rights

## VI

The notion of cultural integrity, then, entails the notion of human rights.

Now, some have argued that concepts such as 'human rights' are 'alien' to countries outside of what we call 'the west,' and that, because they are not part of the traditions of these countries and entail different social relations, they therefore have no place in these countries.

But the fact that something is new or different or not explicit in tradition—that it may destabilize the status quo and is the occasion of evolution in cultural identity—does not entail that it is wrong or threatens cultural integrity. Moreover, it is clear that the discourse of human rights has been embraced by those groups and individuals in non western countries who have been oppressed, and that this discourse is an appropriate means of expressing what they need in order to pursue 'integrity.' Nor is this just a tendency characteristic of oppressed groups. In Japan, for example, the word for the English notion of 'liberty' is 'ji-yu'; it is a combination of two originally Chinese characters that has, as some scholars point out, "never occupied a central position in traditional literature" and that has a slightly negative connotation. What is interesting is that, in contemporary conversation in Japan, when the word 'ji-yu' is used, the 'traditional' negative connotations associated with the word have diminished, and the more positive, 'western' notion of liberty is meant. Thus, Japanese speak of 'ji-yu' of speech and association as constitutional rights.

Furthermore, it has been argued that such concepts as 'human rights' are not inherently opposed to the culture of those societies in which they have not had an obvious place. For in the articulation of the UN Declaration of Rights itself, we can count among those who drafted it, Americans (including former U.S. First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt), Canadians, French, but also the Lebanese scholar Charles Malik, and the Chinese diplomat

and scholar, P.C. Chang.)

Consequently, even if the term or the concept of human rights is alien to certain cultures, and even if they are part of a 'novelty' and a reality that non-western cultures have been confronted with, it is not obvious that the term threatens the cultural integrity of a particular group. From what I have suggested, they may even be necessary or required for that group to flourish.

It does not follow, of course, that every *culture* must have exactly the same 'package' of rights in order to act with integrity, any more than every *individual* must have the same package of rights. Even if rights are seen as fundamental to the growth and development of a culture with integrity, there is room for a good deal of cultural diversity and difference. Not only should there be such room but (at the very least, for contingent reasons) there inevitably will be such room. Nevertheless, certain basic rights to life and liberty and security, and a number of corollaries or implications of those rights, are necessary for individuals and cultures to flourish and thrive.

And this is, after all and as noted above, something on which cultures and recent human rights declarations agree—that human flourishing is important.

## VII

To conclude, let me briefly summarize some of the advantages of the preceding approach to human rights.

In the contemporary world, there is an increasingly strong interest in the preservation of local culture and—at the same time—a powerful appeal, by those who are oppressed, to a discourse of universal human rights. I have suggested that, while cultural identity is important, the *value* of a culture is to be found not so much in its identity as in its integrity. The model of cultural integrity is one that claims that, for a culture to develop and grow, and for human flourishing to be promoted, that culture must be open to influence from the outside. But it should be open in a way where it seeks to achieve a unity or consistency between the past and what this

new influence offers it.

Thus, first, I claim that such an approach to culture provides a means of avoiding or regulating cultural conflict and, second, I argue that this approach allows for cultural difference. For cultural integrity to be possible, however, we need a robust theory of human rights. And so, in the third place, I have suggested that a discourse of human rights can be a realistic response to a culturally diverse world, without its existence threatening cultural integrity.

If the proposals in this paper are plausible, there are three corollaries that are particularly significant to the issue of universal human rights, and that bear on the questions raised at the beginning of this paper. First, a model of cultural integrity provides a kind of philosophical foundation (though in a non-traditional way) for a discourse of rights. Second, since human rights are a necessary part of cultural identity, it follows that a discourse of human rights is not inherently or distinctively occidental. And, finally, if the model of cultural integrity is a desirable one, it follows that the promotion of a discourse of human rights does not necessarily violate the cultural integrity of non-European/non-American societies.

## NOTES

- 1 This paper was initially presented at the University of Pune, while I was a Visiting Professorial Fellow in the Department of Philosophy. An earlier version was read at the International Conference on Ethnicity, Cultural Identity and Freedom (Afro-Asian Philosophy Association), in New Delhi. I am grateful to Professors Sharad Deshpande and R. Balasubramanian and their colleagues in Pune and New Delhi for their comments and suggestions. I am also grateful for the support of the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, under Grant 410-00-0056.
- 2 See Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *Marx/Engels Selected Works in One Volume*; London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1973, pp. 320-321; Edmund Burke, *Reflections on the Revolution in France*, ed C.C. O'Brien, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1969, pp. 149-151, 153, 194-195, and Jeremy Bentham, *Anarchical Fallacies*, in his *Works*, ed. J. Bowring, London, 1838-1843, Vol. II, pp. 489-534, and, generally, Jeremy Waldron, *Nonsense upon Stilts*:

*Bentham, Burke and Marx on the Rights of Man*, London: Methuen, 1987. More recent challenges have come particularly from 'communitarians,' such as Michael Walzer (who argues that as the notion of rights is extended, the more 'democratic space' is narrowed; see his "Liberalism and the Art of Separation," *Political Theory*, 12 (1984): 315-330) and Alasdair MacIntyre (*After Virtue*, 2nd ed., Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984).

- 3 This was the view expressed by delegates from China and Indonesia at the June 1993 World Conference on Human Rights, held in Vienna.
- 4 *These are, of course, rights recognized in the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, under articles 3, 4, 9, and 12. Other rights could be similarly shown to be involved in personal integrity.*
- 5 Raymond Williams, "Culture and Civilization," in *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. Paul Edwards, New York: Macmillan and Free Press, 1967, Vol. 2, pp. 273-276, at p. 273.
- 6 UNDHR, article 29.
- 7 This is specifically recognized in the UNDHR, under articles 21 and 27.

## GADAMER'S CRITIQUE OF HEIDEGGER'S HERMENEUTICS OF FACTICITY<sup>1</sup>

S. PANNEERASELVAM

The primary aim of the paper is to present Gadamer's critical approach to hermeneutics of facticity of Heidegger. Existentiality, facticity and being-fallen are the three aspects of Dasein according to Heidegger. His work, *Being and Time* starts with the examination of the analysis of Dasein and ends with the examination of temporality as the source of the ordinary conception of time. The other important issues like, Being in the world as the basic state of Dasein, the worldhood of the world, Being in the world as being with and being one's self, Being in as such and care as the being of Dasein, the relation between Dasein and temporality, temporality and everydayness, are also discussed by Heidegger. For him, Dasein exists factically. What is the nature of human existence? This is an important question for Heidegger. According to him, the important characteristic of human existence comes from expressions like "I am here" or "I am in this world". In other words, my existence is my own existence. My facticity is a part of the disclosure of ontological anxiety, which presents Dasein to itself as an isolated possibility thrown into the world. Thus facticity is characterized by individuality. Gadamer questions the hermeneutics of facticity of Heidegger by saying that it is paradoxical in nature. This is discussed in this paper. Also the paper examines the criticisms against Gadamer's understanding of the problem.

### I

In *Being and Time*, Heidegger's talks of three structural elements that make up human existence. They are : (1) Dasein always finds itself

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Oct. 2003

"thrown" into a concrete situation and attuned to a cultural and historical context where things already count in determinate ways. This thrownness makes up Dasein's facticity. (2) Agency is "discursive" *i.e.*, our entire activities take place in language and (3) Dasein is "understanding". Heidegger's fundamental ontology emphasizes our facticity, thrownness and embeddness in a concrete world. Facticity of human experience in its condition of being is closely bound up with *a priori* givenness of disclosure. Facticity is the human fate of being "thrown" into endless, finite mediation necessitated by difference, without being able to know why this endless mediation is necessary. The tripartite definition which Heidegger gives for Dasein is that it has existentiality, facticity and fallenness. These are the three aspects of Dasein. (1) ahead-of-itself (understanding), (2) already-in (disposition), and (3) alongside. Heidegger gives a temporal interpretation of these three aspects of Dasein. "The primordial unity of the structure of care lies in temporality."<sup>2</sup> The three aspects of care correspond to the three dimensions of time: the future (ahead of itself), the past (facticity), and the present (fallenness). Care is the basic state of Dasein. If death belongs in a distinctive sense to the Being of Dasein, then death must be defined in terms of these characteristics according to Heidegger.

From Husserl's phenomenology, Heidegger has shifted to "hermeneutics of facticity". The transcendental phenomenology, which was developed by Dilthey and Husserl mainly, attempts to elucidate the essential meaning of objects of experience through an investigation of the mode of their appearance. This investigation was to be conducted in a manner free from all presuppositions including presuppositions concerning the existence of material objects. But the epistemological problems, which preoccupy Dilthey and Husserls, were replaced by Heidegger's hermeneutic phenomenology. This is because of the main reason that though both of them attacked the positivism, they have accepted the Kantian epistemology. But Heidegger transcends this by saying that before any object is posited for a subject, the subject and object terms are bound together by a fundamental relation of belonging to a world. Thus for Heidegger, what is more important is the ontological inquiry into the nature of that being which is capable of such activities, *i.e.*, into the nature of "Dasein". He says that Dasein is an entity, which does not just occur among other entities. It is peculiar to this entity that with and through its

Being, this Being is disclosed to it. Understanding of Being is itself a definite characteristic of Dasein's Being. Heidegger tries to formulate a "hermeneutics of facticity" or what is known as "existential analytics."<sup>3</sup> He draws a distinction between "factuality" and "facticity". Factuality is that which concerns non-human things. The distinction between these two is explained in this way. Dasein is not its factuality, and hence it is not what it is factually. But it should be known that Dasein is understanding and understanding involves projection into concrete "current world".

According to Heidegger, Dasein's being is care. He brings in the concept of care only at the end of Division I of *Being and Time*. The question here is this: "Why did Heidegger first define Dasein's being as existence, only to show in the end that it really is care? For Heidegger, it is a purely ontological-temporal concept. He avoids the concept of care in the beginning of his inquiry of Dasein because of the main reason that Dasein's being is a complex one. The Dasein which is a difficult concept is introduced by him stage by stage. But Heidegger says that the being of Dasein is to be interpreted as care. It is name for how the whole Dasein is. Dasein is so complex that it can be articulated into three main structures: existence (self), thrownness (facticity) and fallenness (of falling prey or entanglement). He explains the first one, namely, existence in a detailed way in his discussion of "existence". Dasein is constantly beyond itself. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger talks about the existence of Dasein. He says: "Dasein exists". Dasein not only cares, but Dasein's being is care. In the Division I of chapter six of *Being and Time*, Heidegger undertakes a study of the notion of care. He defines Dasein as care. He also deals with the care-structure to show that Dasein has to be interpreted as care. In existence, Dasein is constantly out beyond itself. In this context, Heidegger talks about the disowned existence. It is a movement, he says, "away from...", which actually makes a threat from which Dasein flees. Dasein flees from himself into his occupations with things within the world. The flight of disowned existence is not an occasional, isolated act, but a basic way in which Dasein is in the world. By saying Dasein is care, Heidegger means that being can only be there as care; only as a factually existing being-in-the world, does the illumination of being happened. If care is the name for the "actual" thereness of being, it must be the origination source, the gathering place, of any understanding whatever of being. In the concept

of care, we are considering, the being-together-with means the fundamentally falling way in which Dasein loses himself in his occupations with things. In this mode of existing, Dasein's being-with others like himself has a predominately worldish character.

The notion of care is difficult to grasp. This can be seen in the Greek ontology. All disclosure of reality and world is grounded in and made possible by Dasein's being as care. It is anxiety, the basic state of mind which discloses the primordial totality of Dasein's being. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger says: "The Being of Dasein means ahead-of-itself-Being-already-in as Being-alongside".<sup>4</sup> Care stands for the existential totality of Dasein's ontological structural whole. It is because Dasein's being is "care", it can relate itself to the equipmental world by concern and to the communal world by solicitude. In the phenomenon of care, we arrive at the point of existential analysis of Dasein in its everydayness.

Heidegger's usage of the term "care" is to designate the basic feature in us that constitutes all our involvement in the world.<sup>5</sup> It is the analysis of the structure of care that allows him to claim that our being is at the same time "being-in-the world" as an organised whole. This conception of care must be taken into account in an overall sense we give to our existence as being-in-the-world by virtue of which it is an integrated whole. According to him, we cannot make projections without an existing understanding of the world and ourselves in it. In all our activities, we are tied to the present, because we are in and with the world that absorbs us and ties us down to our everyday activities. This is the structure of our "temporality." Of course, by temporality, he does not mean that we are confined to time. It is being ahead of ourselves in the future, drawing on our past, while being concerned with the present that constitutes our being.

Dasein, according to Heidegger, is concerned primarily with an explication of what it means to be in the world, of how, we find ourselves in relation to things in the world in average everydayness. This "being in relation" is our worldliness. It has two principal structures, namely, understanding and state of mind. We understand ourselves and our world in terms of our practical involvement and projects. Both are nothing but aspects of care, which captures not just one aspect of Dasein but Dasein in its entirety. Thus he defines care as "ahead-of-itself-Being-already-in (the world) as Being-alongside".<sup>6</sup>

Heidegger explains that the practical dimension of human existence by defining the very being of Dasein as care. To be human, means to be concerned about things and to be in relation with other people. According to Heidegger, Dasein exists factically. He examines whether existentiality and facticity have an ontological unity, or whether facticity belongs essentially to existential. He defines Dasein's average everydayness as "Being in the world which if falling and disclosed, thrown and projecting, and for which its ownmost potentially-for-being is an issue, both in its Being alongside the "world" and in its Being-with Others".<sup>7</sup> Dasein's Being reveals itself as care. Here we must see the basic existential phenomenon. This must be distinguished from phenomena, which might be identified with care, such as will, wish, addiction and urge. But care cannot be derived from these, says Heidegger.<sup>8</sup> Dasein's Being as care is very much essential in order to understand the totality of the structural whole ontologically. For this, the first step is to see whether the phenomenon of anxiety, which is disclosed in it, can give us the whole of Dasein in a way which is phenomenally equiprimordial, and whether they can do so. The entire phenomenon of anxiety clearly shows that Dasein is factically existing Being-in-the world.

Since Being-in-the-world is essentially care, Being-alongside can be taken as concern. Heidegger says that Being-alongside something is concern, because it is defined as a way of being-in by its basic structure-care. Care does not characterize just existentially, says Heidegger.<sup>9</sup> It embraces the unity of these ways in which Being may be characterized. This means that care cannot stand for some special attitude towards the Self, for the Self has been characterized ontologically by "Being-ahead-of-itself", a characteristic in which the other two items in the structure of care—Being-already-in and Being-alongside have been jointly posited. Care, is always concern and solicitude. Care according to Heidegger, is not yet become free though it first makes it ontologically possible for Dasein to be urged on by itself. The urge to live is not to be annihilated. But while explicating care, Heidegger is not forcing it under an idea of our own contriving, but is conceptualizing existentially what has been disclosed in an ontic-existential manner. Thus by saying that care is to be understood just ontically as worry or grief, Heidegger explains that it is preontological in character.<sup>10</sup>

Interpretation is grounded in understanding. Understanding is an

existential and expressive of Dasein's existence, of its being ahead of itself, project. But Dasein is a thrown project. This according to Heidegger is the "existential state" or "state of mind" or "condition."<sup>11</sup> This ontologico-existential structure is expressed in "mood." "A mood, Heidegger contends, makes manifest how one is, and how one is faring"<sup>12</sup> State of mind and mood are expressive of Dasein's facticity. Heidegger's following remarks are important: "Facticity is not the factuality of the factum brutum of something present-at-hand, but a characteristic of Dasein's Being -- one which has been taken up into existence, even if proximity it has been thrust aside."<sup>13</sup>

In our analysis so far, we have shown that Dasein is something neutral or even explicitly as inauthentic Dread or anxiety provides the access to the authentic self. Because dread alone fetch man back from the falling down upon the world. The unity of existential structures is care. This is present in the formal determination of man as a being who is for the sake of himself, i.e., man's for-the-sake-of or relationship to his own being. Thus Dasein always appears as an absolutely individualized creature, concerned about its own Being and threatened from two sides, from within by the deep stratum of fundamental moods, and from without by the mass which swallows up the individual.

## II

Hans-Georg Gadamer, the exponent of philosophical hermeneutics, has offered new modes of interpretation. He gave a twist to Heidegger's hermeneutics of facticity by reinterpreting it. Born in Marburg, Germany, in 1900, he studied philosophy, and classical philology in 1920s' at Marburg and Freiburg, under teachers like Paul Natorp, Heidegger and Paul Friedlander. He completed his doctorate on Plato in 1922 and served in Marburg from 1927 to 1937, Leipzig from 1938 to 1937, Frankfurt from 1947-1949 and later at Heidelberg from 1949 to 1968, i.e., till his retirement. He delivered lectures as a guest professor in American, Canadian and German Universities after his retirement. He died in 2002. When Heidegger was given rectorship of Freiburg University in 1933 and became the supporter of National Socialism, Gadamer broke off his relation with Heidegger.<sup>14</sup> He renewed his relation with Heidegger in the late 1930's, after Heidegger had given up the rectorship and political life. This relation

continued until Heidegger's death in 1976. Heidegger invited Gadamer to write an introduction for the publication of the second edition of the essay, "Origin of the work of Art" in 1960. Till then, Gadamer did not write anything on Heidegger directly. The book *Truth and Method* was published in 1960, but in 1950 itself Heidegger requested him to write a substantial book. But Gadamer says that he always felt that Heidegger was "looking over his shoulder". *Truth and Method* was written when Gadamer was at the age of sixty. Gadamer in his lifetime, has written only three books. (1) *Plato's Dialectical Ethics*. This book is on Gadamer's habilitation in 1931 on Plato's *Philebus*. (2) *Truth and Method* and (3) *The Idea of Good in Platonic-Aristotelian Philosophy*. All other writings of Gadamer are the collection of essays by him on various occasions. Some of his other important works include: *Philosophical Hermeneutics*, (1976) *Dialogue and Dialectic: Eight Hermeneutical Studies on Plato*, (1980) *Reason in the Age of Science*, (1981) *Hegel's Dialectic: Five Hermeneutical Studies*, (1982) *Philosophical Apprenticeship*, (1985) *The Relevance of the Beautiful and Other Essays*, (1986) *Heidegger's Ways*, (1994) and *Literature and Philosophy in Dialogue* (1984).

Gadamer's teacher Paul Natorp gave him a manuscript from Heidegger to read. It was about an introduction to Aristotle from the phenomenological side. Gadamer read Heidegger's essay on Aristotle, which hit him like "a charge of electricity."<sup>15</sup> This essay made Gadamer to join under Heidegger. In Freiburg, he attended lectures by Heidegger on Aristotle, Husserl's *Logical Investigations* and Lectures on "The Hermeneutics of Facticity", which is a lecture on ontology. Both for Heidegger and Gadamer, understanding is the origian form of the realization of our existence. Every interpretation presupposes understanding because every interpretation is guided by anticipations. For Heidegger, the understanding is mainly to know one's way around, to be up to a task, whereas for Gadamer it is to agree on the thing itself. Moreover, for Heidegger, the prestructure of understanding consists of an anticipation of existence in fore-sight, preacquisition and pre-conceptuality, whereas for Gadamer, it is prejudice. The perspective of *Truth and Method* is the perspective of philosophical hermeneutics. Gadamer says how his "revival" of hermeneutics is different from the earlier hermeneutics. "If there is any practical consequence of the present investigation, it certainly has nothing

to do with an unscientific 'commitment': instead, it is concerned with the 'scientific' integrity of acknowledging the commitment involved in all understanding. My real concern was and is philosophic: not what we do or what we ought to do, but what happens to us over and over our wanting and doing."<sup>16</sup>

Gadamer asks the question namely, "Is Heidegger's 'hermeneutic of facticity' really only an answer to a transcendental limiting problematic?"<sup>17</sup> Gadamer feels that Heidegger's project in *Being and Time* does not completely overcome the sphere of the problematic of transcendental reflection. He believes that under the name of a "hermeneutic facticity" Heidegger confronted Husserl's eidetic phenomenology, together with the distinction between a fact and essence on which it depended, with a paradoxical demand. Gadamer explains the difficulties with regard to facticity in the following way: "The facticity of there-being, existence, which cannot be based on or derived from anything else and not the pure cogito as the essential constitution of typical universality, should represent the ontological basis of the phenomenological position—a bold idea, but difficult to carry through," says Gadamer.<sup>18</sup>

In his essay, "The Phenomenological Movement",<sup>19</sup> Gadamer examines the role played by Husserl and Heidegger on the movement. Here, Gadamer explains the errors in Heidegger's hermeneutics of facticity as conceived by Husserl. Also Gadamer explains how these errors are rectified by Husserl. He says as follows: "...it seems to me, those in Husserl's eyes it is a question of the difficulties he had perceived long ago in the selfreferential character of phenomenology, namely that the phenomenological basis of all philosophy in apodictic certainty must itself have application on this basis too. And it is his conviction that these difficulties had led to fateful errors in Heidegger's 'hermeneutic of facticity.'"<sup>20</sup> Gadamer says the *Crisis* makes an attempt to remove such errors by giving an answer to *Being and Time*. No doubt, *Being and Time* had influenced Gadamer in his theory of interpretation. But in *Truth and Method*, Gadamer clearly says that though there are inadequacies of Heidegger's language, he accepts the development throughout Heidegger's thinking. But he explains how he differs from him. He says: "Our thoughts on the significance of tradition in historical consciousness took off from Heidegger's analysis of the hermeneutics of facticity and sought to apply

it to a hermeneutics of the human sciences."<sup>21</sup> In the hermeneutical theory, the role of ontological significance is something very important. The uniqueness of Gadamer is that he had worked out the implications, which Heidegger had provided as the starting point. For example, it can be said that Heidegger talks about Dasein as thrown projection. This is the starting point for Gadamer. Understanding is always related to the future into which Dasein continually projects itself. "Understanding is thrown, that is, situated by the past as a heritage of funded meanings that Dasein takes over from its community."<sup>22</sup> This definitely implies that Heidegger's understanding of facticity had influenced Gadamer to a great extent in the theory of interpretation.

In Part II, of *Philosophical Hermeneutics*, Gadamer takes up three important themes for discussion, namely, Phenomenology, Existential Philosophy and Philosophical Hermeneutics. He wrote these essays between 1960 and 1969. He explains how Dasein comes upon itself as radically finite and temporal "being-in-the-world." Thus the effect of "Heidegger's analytic of Dasein was to render unsuspendable precisely the life-world Husserl intended to reduce and to replace the transcendental ego with the being whose facticity reflection could not set aside."<sup>23</sup> Gadamer argues that Husserl acknowledges being-in-the world as a problem of horizon intentionality of transcendental and the absolute historicity of transcendental subjectivity had to be able to demonstrate the meaning of facticity. Further he says that Husserl's understanding goes against the Heidegger's meaning of facticity is itself an *eidotes*, that it belongs essentially to the eidetic sphere of universal essences.<sup>24</sup>

Gadamer feels that although *Being and Time* criticised the lack of ontological definition of Husserl's concept of transcendental subjectivity, it still formulated its own account of the question of being in terms of transcendental philosophy. Gadamer says: "In his (Heidegger) grounding of the hermeneutics of 'facticity' he went beyond both the concept of spirit developed by classical idealism and the thematic of transcendental consciousness, purified by phenomenological reduction."<sup>25</sup> Heidegger examines the question whether existentiality and facticity have an ontological unity or whether facticity belongs essentially to existentiality.<sup>26</sup> He says that his thrownness belongs together with that which is projected.

The main point of the hermeneutics of facticity is that no freely chosen relation towards one's own being can go back beyond the facticity of this being. Gadamer supports Heidegger by saying that the hermeneutical situation explains that the human beings are thrown into a history. In his famous essay on "Text and Interpretation"<sup>27</sup> Gadamer says that the Being that can be understood is language. Based on Heidegger's facticity, Gadamer also argues that Being is that which is questionable. Heidegger's break with Husserl led to beginning of the hermeneutics of facticity. Even before the publication of *Being and Time*, Heidegger was interested in the notion of facticity. It is something that points to everything about our experience that resists understanding and is a clear and precise conception. Facticity highlights Dasein's existence as interplay between motivation and anticipation. Gadamer no doubt made use of Heidegger's hermeneutics of facticity to overcome aesthetic, romantic, and historical consciousness. Heidegger's study of facticity developed in *Being and Time*, severely attacks Husserl and also the Idealist transcendental subjectivity. Gadamer's *Truth and Method* tries to answer this.

Gadamer says that Heidegger pursued the inner inextricability of authenticity and inauthenticity, of truth and error, and the concealment that necessarily accompanies all disclosure and shows the internal contradiction in the idea of total objectifiability. According to Gadamer the notion of hermeneutics of facticity of Heidegger is paradoxical. He says as follows: "The slogan that the young Heidegger proclaimed was itself paradoxical enough, and it was critical of all factions."<sup>28</sup> To speak of a hermeneutics of facticity is to speak of something like "wooden iron".<sup>29</sup> "Facticity", contends Gadamer, "means precisely the unshakable resistance that the factual puts up against all grasping and understanding, and in the special phrasing in which Heidegger couched the concept of facticity, it meant the fundamental determination of human Dasein".<sup>30</sup> Is it consciousness or self-consciousness by nature? Gadamer says that this is certainly not merely consciousness or self-consciousness. "The understanding of Being, which distinguishes the human Dasein by compelling it to question the meaning of Being, is itself in the highest degree of paradox."<sup>31</sup> It is mainly because of the reason that the meaning of Being is not like any other question concerning meaning.

## III

Habermas in his *Knowledge and Human Interests*, calls Gadamer's method "hermeneutic-historical science." Habermas says that in the hermeneutic-historical science, there is a pre-understanding of tradition. It cannot do a complete justice to the study of social phenomena because of their claim to self-sufficiency and universality. Habermas is of the view that in Gadamer, the growing of all knowledge in tradition cut him off from appreciating the system of social labour and power potentially distort consciousness. Habermas criticizes Gadamer for his dependence on tradition.<sup>32</sup> Similarly in the *Consequences of Pragmatism*, Rorty charges Gadamer as a "weak textualist."<sup>33</sup> Gadamer's reply to Habermas is that he has misunderstood and distorted the fundamental character and the aim of philosophical hermeneutics. It must be remembered that the project in *Truth and Method* is ontological. Habermas shows the limitations of the philosophical hermeneutics. Gadamer derives his philosophy of hermeneutics mainly from Heidegger's hermeneutics of facticity discussed by him in part I of *Being and Time*. The philosophical hermeneutics of Gadamer is transcendental and phenomenological like the fundamental ontology of Heidegger in *Being and Time*. Gadamer says: "I received impetuses for thinking from Heidegger very early on, ... However, as is always the case when one is attempting to find one's own position, some distance was needed before I was able to present Heidegger's ways of thinking as his; I first had to distinguish my own search for my ways and paths from my companionship with Heidegger and his ways."<sup>34</sup> It is said that a fundamental empathy with Heidegger prevails in all Gadamer's writings.<sup>35</sup> Gadamer's hermeneutics of facticity is that which he had derived largely from Heidegger. But there is a distance and the distance is to be understood as the "creative distance."<sup>36</sup>

Caputo in his *Radical Hermeneutics : Repetition, Deconstruction and the Hermeneutic Project* argues that the "hermeneutics of facticity" of Heidegger was betrayed by Gadamer. Caputo says that Gadamer's thinking is "historical" but not "epochal". But Caputo fails to note that by being historical rather than epochal, Gadamer's approach acts as a check on the Heidegger's narrative of the relation between philosophy and the destiny of the west. Caputo attacks Gadamer for breaking away from

Heidegger's hermeneutics. But it must be kept in mind that in some respects Gadamer goes beyond Heidegger. Our participation in the tradition is not eminently epochal, as it is for Heidegger. We participate in the tradition which carries the values when we read particular texts. Thus it is not epochal, but historical according to Gadamer. There is also another place where Gadamer goes beyond Heidegger. Tradition, for Heidegger is a fixed canon of names or a stabilized cast of characters. But for Gadamer, tradition is the play of conversation with others. This generates meanings, and it is how tradition becomes an ongoing process. By virtue of the openness and inclusion of conversation, all those who appreciate it retain tradition. For Gadamer, hermeneutics is centered on a theory of interpretation, of the transmission of the stored up riches of the tradition, of the dynamics of that transmission. Tradition is the finite unfolding of an infinite content, a history of finite actualization of an essentially inexhaustible, or infinite, truth. Gadamer does not see the tradition as a given and an "inescapable facticity". He puts the history of philosophy by means of "tradition" back on a more modest, human limit, built up out of meetings between the text and the reader.

Caputo also claims that in the philosophical hermeneutics of Gadamer, radical elements are absent. By radical what he means is not to lay any philosophical problems to rest.<sup>37</sup> "If there is anything that we learn in radical hermeneutics, it is that we never get the better of the flux", says Caputo.<sup>38</sup> But it should be understood that Gadamer is more radical than others hermeneuticians. His explication of the historicity of human understanding and his effort to show the historical conditions under which the understanding operates, proves that Gadamer is more radical than others are. Another criticism of Caputo is that in the Gadamerian analytic of finitude, there is a shift from Heidegger to Hegel and a radical Heideggerian facticity has been subverted from within by a creeping Hegelianism. This in short, means that Gadamer reinterprets hermeneutics in a more Hegelian way that undermined the radicality of facticity of Heidegger. But this criticism of Caputo is not valid at all for the main reason that a close study of Heidegger would reveal that the later Heidegger himself, who replaces it with Being, betrayed the hermeneutics of facticity than Gadamer.

## NOTES

1. This paper is dedicated in memory of Hans-Georg Gadamer who passed away recently.
2. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson (tr.) Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1978, p.375.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 490, n.l.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 237.
5. *Ibid.*, Division I, Chapter Six.
6. *Ibid.*, p.237.
7. *Ibid.*, p.225.
8. *Ibid.*, p.227.
9. *Ibid.*, p.237.
10. Heidegger's expalins Dasein's intrerpretation of itself as care in an ancient fable as follows:  
 " 'Care' was once crossing a river, she saw some clay. She took up a piece and began to shape it. Jupiter comes that way. Now Care asks him to give it spirit and he did it. They were quarreling over the name to be given to it. Then, Earth desired that her own name be conferred on the creature, because she had furnished it with part of her body. They went to Saturn for justice. he said as follows: "Since you, Jupiter, have given its spirit, you shall receive that spirit at its death; and since you, Earth, have given its body, you shall receive its body. But since "care" first shaped this creature, she shall possess it as long as it lives. And because there is now a dispute among you as its name, let it be called "*homo*", for it is made out of *humus* (earth)".  
 This very clearly shows that care should be seen as that to which human Dasein belongs for its lifetime. The priority of care emerges in connection with the familiar way of taking man as compounded of body and spirit. See *Being and Time*, p.242.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 172,n.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 173.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 174.
14. Heidegger's support to Nazis is Gadamer's first disappointment with Heidegger. There was also second disappointment when Heidegger failed to recognize the *Truth and Method*. It seems that Gadamer sent a copy of his book when it first came out and waited for a response from Heidegger and it did not come at all. The book, *Truth and Method* Gadamer says, is an attempt, among other things to open the way for readers to the work of the

later Heidegger.

15. Gadamer, *Heidegger's Ways*, John W. Stanley (tr.) Introduction by Dennis J. Schmidt, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994, p. 113.
16. Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, William Glen-Doepel, (tr.) London: Sheed and Ward, Gadamer's Foreword to the Second Edition, 1979, p. xvi
17. Gadamer, *Philosophical Hermeneutics*, David E. Linge, (tr.) London: University of California Press, 1977, p. 169.
18. *Truth and Method*, p. 225.
19. *Philosophical Hermeneutics*, Chapter ix.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 161.
21. *Truth and Method*, p. 276.
22. *Philosophical Hermeneutics*, p. xlvii.
23. *Ibid.*, p. xlvi.
24. *Truth and Method*, p. 226.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 229.
26. *Being and Time*, p. 225.
27. Gadamer, "Text and Interpretation" in *Dialogue and Deconstruction: The Gadamer-Derrida Encounter*, Diane P. Michelfelder and Richard E. Palmer (ed. & tr.) Albany: SUNY Press, 1989.
28. *Heidegger's Ways*, p. 55.
29. *Ibid.*
30. *Ibid.*
31. *Ibid.*
32. Harbermas, *Knowledge and Human Interests*, Jeremy J. Shapiro, (tr.) London: Heinmann, 1972, p. 309.
33. Rotry, *Consequences of Pragmatism*, Great Britain: The Harvester Press Ltd., 1982, p. 153.
34. *Heidegger's Ways*, p. vii.
35. *Ibid.*, p. xvii.
36. *Ibid.*, p. xviii.
37. John D. Caputo, *Radical Hermeneutics: Repetition, Deconstruction and the Hermeneutic Project*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987, p. 2.
38. *Ibid.* p. 258.

## CIVIL SOCIETY : A TRANSPOSITIONAL UNDERSTANDING

ASHA MUKHERJEE

### Introduction

After the end of Cold War in 1989 the world scenario has changed suddenly. We are no more concerned with the tense relations of the super powers but such as family, women, rights of the persons, environment, peace and the standards of living etc. We seem to be more concerned with the quality of human life. Which life is a good life? What are the ways to achieve good life? Can we ever achieve good life? Is it not just an ideal? These questions and answers of such questions lead us to the concept of Civil Society. It is generally accepted that civil society is a social phenomena. As individual cannot be regarded as a separate entity--it has to be understood in its connectedness. Human rights cannot be taken in terms of a simple individual, unrelated to family or community. If taken, will lead to chaos and conflicts. "In contrast, solidarity is basic and indispensable social dimension of human life: people need people and thrive when they are together in communities--from family to neighborhood, to nation, religion and globe."<sup>1</sup> In this paper I try to draw attention to a very different way of looking at civil society than the one usually suggested by most of Euro-Americans. The Upanishads, the Hindu scriptures as interpreted by Gandhi and Tagore play an important role in Civil society in India. Their transpositional view enables us to transcend all differences and enables us to drive towards a universal goal - the goal of Humanity, the goal of civil society. The paper consists of five sections. The first section discusses the concern of civil society which is mainly - What is good life? The second section presents the concept of positional objectivity leading towards

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transpositional objectivity. Marx and Rousseau's concept of 'good life' present us the positional objectivity but not transpositional. I try to look back to our traditions so as to look for models for Civil Society and I find, in recent times, Gandhi and Tagore who tried to reformulate the tradition, have tried hard, in their life time, to give a new shape to the society.

Their model may not be the only model, but the point I try to make is that they serve as the sincere guidelines towards which we should proceed- the unifying force for cosmic civil society. In the last section it is suggested that the idea of civil society is different from its practice. It may be the case that in reality there is no society which is 'civil' in the sense one would like to have- the transpositional but we can still sincerely hope and try towards approaching 'civility' by becoming 'civil society' conscious'.

## I

### Civil Society : Its Concern

The answer of the question 'What is good life?' would lead to concept of 'civil society'. But answering this question satisfactorily needs that we first agree with as to what would be counted as good life. We find that 'good life' has inbuilt two dimensions-- the individualistic as well as social. 'Good life' issues settle in monolithic way--in favor of individual human value, or in terms of transcendental, would lead us to solidarity but that does not deny their 'differenthood'. The different approaches still remain different. This is subsidiarity. For example, knowledge, love and shared life were the main concern of Catholic thought which lead to solidarity but the pattern of subsidiarity 'the ultimate concern for the weak and the oppressed' is in - built in it. The 'weak and 'oppressed' has a special place and it has to be recognized.

Civil society may also be understood as an organization. The words "Civil Society" name the space of uncoerced human associations and also the set of relational networks--formed for the sake of family, faith, interest and ideology--that fills his place. Central and East European dissidence flourished within a highly restricted version of civil society and the first task of the new democracies by dissidents, so we are told, is to rebuild the networks: unions, churches, political parties and movements, cooperatives, neighborhoods, schools of thought, societies for promoting or preventing this or that."<sup>2</sup> At the same time, The civil society, ideally speaking would

not like to see the 'people as tools of industry but as persons informed and responsible, uniting freely in human solidarities to act responsibly and creatively each in their own field.'<sup>3</sup>

Civil society can not be understood in only anthropocentric terms but as an organization also related with the responsible citizens--responsibility towards oneself, towards other human beings and towards community of all life forms. It means that my personal freedom of willing and deciding is restricted by other human beings and other human being's by mine. The technical power of man is effectively extended in the recent times and it becomes dangerous for the world as such which extends man's responsibility for the future life on earth. Thus man's responsibility becomes for the first time cosmic. Following Hans Jonas<sup>4</sup> we can talk of technological civil society and the need to discover or rediscover our solidarity with the whole world.

Man not only is considered responsible for the welfare of other human beings but it is man's peculiar distinction, his dignity that he can hold himself responsible for the welfare of all other life forms, i.e. to safeguard their being treated as ends in themselves and not as means for man's personal satisfaction and his dealing with and handling of nature. Man has the moral obligation--the duty to act as an agent for those beings who are not endowed with such a moral capacity and hence unable advocate their own cases. To put it more clearly, civil society is not merely social phenomena between interhuman behaviour but must consider the wider context of man's being a substantial part of nature: and as the destruction of nature by man is irresponsible and violent use or misuses of the discoveries would be disadvantageous to the human beings and might lead of disastrous consequences, is also the concern of civil society--the well being of man. I am in agreement with Jonas on the need of a change of consciousness and the outlook of life. We need to change our thinking from a property-oriented outlook on life and world to a value-oriented one; for it is by changing our way of thought only that living conditions would be better and not by only social or economic conditions as Marx suggested. The capitalistic welfare states of the West have proved that we really need basic change in our outlook. We cannot afford to look for the success and failure of power in terms of economic gains and technological developments. The success and failure should be judged only in terms of the human values in

civil society. Duties and responsibilities would be acceptable to all-irrespective to caste, culture, religion, creed and state. These differences would be there but they are not primary; the primary basis would be the universal principles which are underlying all the principles and values. The only basic metaphysical imperative in Kantian sense-There should be civil society on earth : this can only give us moral binding not for some particular purpose but for the sake of humanity as such.

It is Rousseau, I suppose, in neoclassical version, who emphasized good life in terms of a political community, the democratic state, in which we can be citizens. He points out to the understanding of citizenship as moral agency which is the key of democratic idealism. A large part of society consisting of women, workers, blacks and new immigrants started claiming their capacity as agents in recent times. This new idea of agent as citizen took a new turn in recent times. At times we look back to the early democratic, republic Rousseauian idealism and call for a renewal of civil culture by fragmented view--only the political view. But in my view, to revive or reconstruct the civil society, in view of the developments of the technological age we need to construct a wholistic view of civil society which would include on the one hand, politics, economics, all sections of society, human values and freedom of the agents. As, Michael Walzer argues that all answers of the question 'what is a good life?' are "wrong-headed because of their singularity. They miss the complexity of human society, the inevitable conflicts of commitment and loyalty."<sup>5</sup> On the other, the spiritual upwardness- may be called transcendence towards Truth and Love.

What is this wholistic view of civil society? Is it just an Utopia? Or a social reality? An utopia, as long as it is only an utopia may not help us much. 'A good life must be lived through--we must know how to live a good life. Even if it is an Utopia, an idea or a concept, it must be grounded in reality. We need ideologies and structures but we also need to look at the people in their national communities as persons, as free, responsible, creative and dignified agents. We need to suggest a mechanism, or a methodology to convert civil society into a social reality. Rousseau suggested one way--the democratic way with political emphasis, Marx suggested another way--the economic emphasis. These are independently 'a way of good life' but 'the good life' consists in transcending these ways of good

life. In this connection Amartya Sen's idea of positional objectivity may help us in understanding the social reality and consequently lead to a universal nation of civil society which is though suggested in Indian context, has a much wider application--society as a whole.

## II

### Positional Objectivity

The positional objectivity is an interpersonally sharable understanding--a sharing that objectivity in any form must minimally demand. But that shared understanding is specifically in terms of the view from some identified positions. But these positionally objective observations cannot be taken to be position-invariant objective truth. Moon and sun viewed from the earth as same size does not entail that they are of the same size in terms of all criteria of measurement. The objectivity of a particular perspective does not establish its epistemic status beyond that position. It is argued by Amartya Sen that objectivity of an observation of analysis can be judged from the uncompromisingly universal terms as well as with reference to identified 'positional' perspectives.<sup>6</sup> He explains further that these positional features are not 'subjective' as they may not be 'having its source in the mind' and they may not 'pertain to an individual subject or his mental operations'. They are positional in the sense that they are based on actual observations and the objective interpretation of those observations. To take his example of sun and moon from the earth, the similarity of the observed sizes of sun and the moon from the earth does not originate in our mind. Nor are they peculiar to individual subjects since a normal person placed in the same position, with a standard eyesight, should be able to replicate similar observations. One may ask, is there any 'trans-positional' exercise? If there is any, what is its nature? It is defined in terms of coherence in different positional views. We can also think of evaluating or assessing the positional views in terms of the practical consequences.

Now, I think, by using the notion of positional objectivity and transpositional exercise, we may come back to understand the notion of civil society. Marx and Rousseau's answers of good life--economic and political are answers from the positional objectivity and they cannot be

taken to be position invariant objective truth. The objectivity of Marxist perspective does not establish its epistemic status beyond Marxist position. The same is true about Rousseau's position. But to have a trans-positional exercise is to have a coherence in different positional views and to evaluate or assess the positional views in terms of the practical consequences. Two very good examples could be as Gandhi's concept of civil society and Tagore's concept of civil society which are not basically different.

It is worth noting here that classical Indian formulation of nationalism which we find in Gandhi and Tagore often did emphasize the importance of broader concern that go beyond national limits. In one form or the another, references to such constraints can be clearly seen in the writings of Gandhi, Tagore, Nehru and others. The anti colonial nationalists often had strong global commitments, while invoking the unity of the nation in pursuit of demand for 'self-determination'.<sup>7</sup> Thus Gandhi's and Tagore's views may also be considered as positional but their concern was the whole of humanity in trans-national, trans positional sense.

The question of our national identity is influenced by the positionally objective observation of our history and culture but we cannot stop with this positional understanding of our history and culture we have to take a transpositional view of reasoned choice by looking at the implications on society. Not in terms of economic gains or techno-developments but in terms of civil society we would like to have we look forward. The developments of the West have proved that no civil society can develop by having only techno-politico-eco developments.

### III

#### **The Unison attempt, Gandhi and Tagore : Towards Civil Society**

The two India's greatest minds- Gandhi and Tagore- expressed themselves in their thoughts and actions that ran parallel and often supplemented each other by strong affinities and contrasts. They had the passion for social reform, for India's independence and growth. But more than that, their concern was much wider. They both looked for an inclusive view of civilization--they both knew the transcending values--Man's humanity. They both had concern for the dignity of the individual, for

economic and educational justice, for disciplined freedom in the enterprises of personal and social change. Both of them stood up against violence and war. They both spoke as one among countless many--everyone knew them as men, they were members of the big family and never as 'great leaders'. Yet, the gifted personality was there. They both believed in divine guidance in the pursuit and fulfillment of human service; both of them denounced violence and discrimination; they committed themselves to spreading education and enlightenment, particularly in view of the needful understanding and interdependence in the emerging world order. The decisions were made from different background; *Viśva* (the world) and *Bhāratī* (India) had to meet anew in creative community (emphasis by Tagore); *Satya* (truth) and *Āgraha* (the urge, the cohesive force) belonged together in a technique--a way of living (emphasized by Gandhi) which would replace the ruinous and ineffective methods of violence in a world that seeks radical changes. Tagore tried to explore the unfolding richness of humanity and nature. Their efforts are now seen as correlated and supplemental.

Gandhi realized as early as in the beginning of twentieth century, the need to reconstruct a civil society--"The machineries of government stood in between and hide the hearts of one people from those of another. Yet, we could see how the world is moving steadily to realize that between nation and nation as between man and man force has failed to solve problems"--the universal civil problems. Tagore too was aware of these problems which were across the state territory. The unison view of Tagore and Gandhi may be called as trans-positional view--mainly the humanist approach, would help us in solving the civil problems. Though it is true that all religions have 'humanism' built in their structure it is normally not practised. This kind of humanism may be called 'operational' or 'activistic humanism'. In this sense, a step forward towards civil society. Tagore worked for a rural reconstruction--e.g. at Sriniketan to give shape to his ideas and at his school in Shantiniketan (the place I come from). It is just a co-incidence that Gandhi and Tagore both shared a number of convictions about the nature of man and civil society. There were differences between the opinions as how this can be executed. Both represent humanism by having faith in man, in his dignity and a 'free' individual. Gandhi's ideas we

get from his speeches, letters in 'Young India' and 'Harijan' and Tagore's in *Religion of Man*, *Sadhana* and other writings.

Gandhi believed in mysterious power pervading everything, call it love, truth, low or inner voice or anything. Gandhi's concept of man and the dignity of man is rooted in a *priori* faith in God. It is this faith which creates a kind of optimism--a humanism which may be called an activist or operational humanism--man has to be understood in terms of acts or actions. He talks of 'renunciation', which I suppose, is a traditional value in Bhagvat Gita. This is a very complex term--which includes--to reject, to give up, to sacrifice, to surrender and to serve and to transcend. It has positive aspect and negative aspect. Rejection of untruth is an essential activity on the part of the individual man. Gandhi writes: "In my humble opinion, rejection is as much an ideal as the acceptance of a thing".<sup>8</sup> 'Untruth' implies everything British, individual interests and selfish desires and the body--its limitations (not literally).<sup>9</sup> Man according to Gandhi is essentially a spiritual being, the body is to him a form of untruth. Sacrificing the body connotes self-restraints--the fast. At the same time, body is a gift of God and has to be used accordingly, i.e. sacramentally: "all of us are bound to place our resources at the disposal of humanity."<sup>10</sup> This is the positive aspect of renunciation. One form of service is 'bread labour'--the shrama. Gandhi takes this notion from Tolstoy and Ruskin which is traced back in the teachings of Gita called as 'yajna'; the third chapter of Gita that "he who eats without sacrifice eats stolen food. Sacrifice here can only mean bread labour."<sup>11</sup>

What is to renounce? One's own lethargy or inertia. This would lead to struggle for mutual service. The Law of the brute will be replaced by the Law of man.<sup>12</sup> To renounce fruits of action--it is freeing oneself from the bounds of egoism-desireless action. But it is not indifference to results, which is again taken from the the teachings of Gita the *Karma-sannyāsa*. The *sannyāsa* of the Gita is all work and yet no work. In this sense renunciation means 'to transcend' and therefore, transpositional. This, Gandhi was aware, is a formidable task, often impossible of complete realization. But then 'a constant striving after' ought to be there, for in that way alone the human beings could be viewed as a distinct mode of being--from animals. By transcending the narrow self one can realize the infinite-

in-me, the authentic existence which is 'self-realization'--the inner possibilities present in the individual. In this sense renunciation though not directed towards any purpose is found to be purposive in nature. Renunciation takes an individual ahead and still ahead towards realizing one's inner possibilities.

The other principle is *Ahimsā*--non-violence, which is not seen as distinct but a constitutive of renunciation. It is "the law of our species". The dignity of man requires obedience to a higher law (than of the law of the physical might, characterizing the beasts)--the strength of the spirit. The strength of the spirit is *Ahimsa* and as the law of our species it has universal significance and applicability: "I am not a visionary, I claim to be a practical idealist. The religion of violence is not meant for Rishis and Saints. It is meant for the common people as well."<sup>13</sup> It has no spirit of withdrawal or resignation, just like renunciation. He says "My creed of non-violence is an extremely active force".<sup>14</sup> *Ahimsā* is normally taken as non-killing or refraining from taking vengeance etc. But Gandhi is using it in much wider sense: "The principle of *Ahimsā* is hurt by every evil thought, by undue haste, by lying, by hatred, by wishing ill to anybody".<sup>15</sup> Thus, the positive meaning of *Ahimsā*, consists in the cultivation of good will and love towards all life. *Ahimsā*--as love expressed through, forgiveness, fearlessness, the feeling of sympathy, mutuality, unity - it leads to complete sacrifice and humility. I feel, this may be the influence of Christianity and Buddhism (Mahayana). This is the basis of social solidarity--non--violence as Love turns into a social virtue and necessary social activity and helps one to realize the possible unity of oneself with the Supreme One-Truth or God. Gandhi says "... truth and non-violence (*ahimsā*) are, to me, faces of the same coin."

*Ahimsā*, renunciation are also functions of man as opposed to walking, breathing and sleeping which brings out the possible meaning of being of the man. These functions are potential ones. Gandhi's ideas are the outcome of his firm faith in man, in his dignity and his capability to realize his own intrinsic nature--self realization is the result of the realization of one's potentialities. It is a kind of directedness to realize certain potentialities. They may be called "*Sāttvika* qualities". Gandhi will agree that *rajas* and *tamas* are also qualities of man but *sāttva* is the true potentiality--if properly

cultivated it would transcend the qualities all together (guna-atita). Sattva-goodness, raja-passion, and tamas-ignorance. To be free means (i) not to be bound to the work (ii) to see, recognize, realize and live up to the essential unity lying at the roots of things--man is free since he is the ground of meaning conferring activity. His humanism is an emanation from his faith in man's potentialities. If we agree with his assertion that man is to strive forward to realize his potentialities we may justifiably call Gandhian humanism a kind of activist or operational humanism which is required to convert civil society in to a reality.

It is true, Gandhi is an idealist in some sense, but his idealism is grounded in practice. At the same time he is optimist too. "Why can we not see that if the sum total of the world's activities was destructive, it would have come to an end long ago? Love, otherwise, *Ahiṃsā*, sustains this planet of ours."<sup>16</sup> Further, he says "Whether mankind will consciously follow the law of love, I do not know. But that need not perturb us. The law will work, just as the law of gravitation will work whether we accept it or not."<sup>17</sup> So, should we do nothing? That would be *Himṣā*.

### Tagore: Dharma--the source of civil society :

Civil society cannot be understood in terms of totality of happenings around us, by chance. It must be the expression of some guiding moral force which we have evolved as human beings and is the object of attaining by a method agreed upon by the humanity as a whole. What could be the guiding moral force? Since man is a complex being and always at the path of transforming and transcending himself, the guiding moral force cannot be crystallized by one answer. But whatever the particular form it has--it has to be something which holds us firm together and something following which would lead us to our best welfare--a *dharma*--a quality of life. A civil society as an ideal should be an expression of 'man's *dharma* in his corporate life'. The simplicity of life, which is the product of centuries of culture should be the source of civil society, which cannot be imitated, it takes no account of its own value and does not claim any wages but it is highest product of any civil society. Development cannot be measured by the speed with which materials are multiplying. The 'horse-power' though drives does not sustain--only the spirit power sustains--the one which sustains is called '*dharma*'--the source which would lead to civil society.

A society would be healthy and strong; civil, if it centers on some ideal that binds its members in a relationship. It is the relationship which is beautiful and not merely utilitarian. The immense value this relationship has with the other and the inner ideal; the spirit of the unit, leading to co-operation and to a common sharing of life. Tagore talks of our living society which should follow its natural rhythm the grace of self-control--without being extravagance.

For civil society giving a shape, he started a school in Shantiniketan where the children from any background would come and see themselves as a part of the unit in sharing the common life (seeking to realize the spiritual meaning of their life). Yet, to find their freedom in Nature by being able to love it. For Tagore, "Love is freedom.; it gives us that fullness of existence which saves us from paying with our soul for objects that are immensely cheap."<sup>18</sup> The children enjoy the freshness of their feeling for Nature, a sensitiveness of soul in their relationship with their human surroundings with the help of literature, festivals, ceremonies and also religious teachings. It is a real 'homecoming' for the children. They learn in the open air under the shade of trees, they have their music and picture making, drama performances and other activities which are the expressions of life. Tagore, along with this also realizes the need to give the education which would give them the ability to clear the path towards a definite end or practical good. He emphasizes that for children the atmosphere is more important than the rules and methods, buildings, appliances, class teachings and text books. The education system should be like a 'tiller of the soil, whose work is in perfect collaboration with the nature' ....For atmosphere there must be for developing the sensitiveness of soul, for affording mind its true freedom of sympathy. Apathy and ignorance are the worst forms of bondage for man; they are the invisible walls of confinements that we carry around us when we are in their grip. "In educational organizations our reasoning faculties have to be nourished in order to allow our mind its freedom in the world of truth, our imagination for the world which belongs to art, and our sympathy for the world of human relationship. This last is even more important than learning the geography of foreign lands."<sup>19</sup> The mind of children is full of natural human love and its only by preserving this natural human love and sympathetic understanding, we may reach civil society.

Tagore talks of universal love, universal man, universal person and universal vision for the world consciousness. He talks of the process in which an individual can become universal person. Its only through the creativity in language. The transcendent beauty cannot be expressed in language. He says : 'Where my language cannot take me, my songs can take me'. He talks of love and devotion. The love relation is between the individual and the universal. Without the individual the universal is not complete. Universal remains essentially incomplete without the individual. The divine love would remain unfulfilled if it is not for individual. So, there is no contradiction in solidarity and subsidiarity. These are two sides of the same coin. The main idea is to find universal principles to understand the universe. The reality is an abstract reality--an unified reality. But there is also difference. Just as in science there is a difference in individual and universal and to get universal principles one has to eliminate individual. Individual is not important but from the other level without individuals no universal can be formed. Tagore asks Einstein "Do you believe in divine as isolated from the universe? Unity deeper than humanity? Einstein answers, "I can not prove but I believe--that truth is independent of human beings."<sup>20</sup> It is *avidiyā*, the ignorance, which causes our disunion with our surroundings. It is *Vidyā*, the knowledge of the *Brahma* manifested in the material universe that makes us realize *advaitam*, the spirit of unity in the world of matter. Those who have been brought in a misunderstanding of the world's process, not knowing that it is his, by his right of intelligence, are trained as cowards by hopeless faith in the ordinance of a destiny, offering no room for appeal. They submit without struggle when human rights are denied to them.

In social and political field the lack of freedom is based upon the spirit of alienation on the imperfect realization of *advaitam*. One may imagine that an individual who succeeds in dissociating himself from his fellows attain real freedom in as much as all ties of relationship imply obligation to others. But we know, though it may sound paradoxical, it is true that in the human world only perfect arrangement of inter-dependence gives rise to freedom. The most individualistic of human beings, who own no responsibility, are the savages who fail to attain their fullness of manifestation. They live immersed in obscurity, like an ill-lighted fire that

cannot liberate itself from its envelope of smoke. Only those may attain their freedom from the segregation of an eclipsed life, who have the power to cultivate mutual understanding and co-operation. The history of the growth of freedom is the history of the perfection of human relationship.

#### IV

#### **Democracy as Practice**

As being concerned with the welfare of the human beings as well as with the equal rights and justice to all human beings, civil society may have a democracy which would make the qualitative development of the citizens and this would be the central concern, which would lead us to a 'socialist' society. In this sense, socialism would mean two things: first, a system of economic relation which would stop the exploitation of one section of the people by another and second, the gross inequalities among person would be absent, as regards their necessities of life and material comforts. A perfect democracy should be able to provide equal opportunity for self-development and progress to every citizen. Though, it seems difficult to see how provisions for such equality can be made unless there is a democratic control at the state level, over the material resources, employment, education etc.

In a society, where material goods are considered to be source for pleasure, such goods come in a competitive spirit. This accounts for the fact that even in such a rich country as United States most people are not happy, as the spirit of competition keeps them perpetually worried. Thus, in my view, socialist, humanist outlook along with democracy could be a solution to many national and international problems of the modern man. But they only supply an external framework, wherein the spirit of man has a chance of being regenerated. The regeneration itself, however is a different process, an inner discipline; the adjustment of the external environment, may assist man in discipline, but one can never substitute the other. The necessary outer conditions for the spiritual development of modern man are not part of the development itself. We may be interested in politics but there is something higher than the politics. Politics is not a substitute for philosophy. In present times, man must reassert that man is exclusively a social animal and that an ideal man is identical with ideal

citizen. Modern man cannot solve his problems unless he learns to appreciate the significance of the emphasis on self knowledge and self-transformation laid by Buddha, Socrates, Christ, The Upanishads and in modern times by Gnadhi and Tagore. They appear to be far superior than any wealthiest of modern west. The essence of man as a man consists in his creativity, and as a creative being he must constantly transcend the limits set by his bio-social-economic needs. A person guided by a creative companionship finds other person interesting, not because they are potential source of material gain to him or his nation but because they are potential centers of creative awareness and potential sharers in his or his nation's spiritual life. This creative companionship can enrich and contribute to the cultural unity of mankind and share and enrich the spiritual heritage of one another.

Man's real potentiality is his creativity. He creates not only for himself but also for sharing his feelings with others. No poet writes only for himself, no philosopher writes only for his pleasure. In this sharing and in being spiritually creative one person can sacrifice for other person. The person who constantly sacrifices his own comfort for the sake of others is a virtuous person. For him there is no suffering in service--it is not a 'sacrifice' in the sense of 'sacrifice', it is a joy. True virtue is an attribute of a morally creative individual. He feels creative joy in promotion of other person's and other living being's good.

## V

### Civil Society : An Idea and/or reality?

The concept of unity in diversity which is inbuilt in Indian structure is the best example of exercising universality or approaching solidarity. Many religions, many cultures many languages, many casts etc. form the subsidiarities. To come back to our discussion of transpositional objectivity which is the essence of civil society. Hinduism from the beginning is based on some overreaching values which transcends sectarianism and which provides a cultural basis for tolerance. Mahatma Gandhi thought that truth might be this uniting factor. "The essential spirit seems to be : live and let live. Mahatma Gandhi has attempted to define it: 'If I were asked to define the Hindu creed, I should simply say: search after truth through non-violent

means....Hinduism is the religion of truth. Truth is God. Denial of God we have known. Denial of truth we have not known."<sup>21</sup>

There has been a unitary impulse prevalent in Indian culture. Was this really special feature of India, which is not present elsewhere? It is hard to answer here. But it is true that despite all diversities, invasions there has been a tolerant culture and it has successfully given rise to a new synthesis by way of absorption.

It is often suggested that inspite of this absorption there has been a national perspective prevalent, internal diversities-divisiveness was always present which later on led to divided India. This was largely the imperial view. "The very fact that India chose to have a secular constitution and inspite of the fact that Pakistan chose to have an Islamic Republic shows that indeed there was much unity in India inspite of the undoubted presence of many religions, diverse languages and other differences on which the imperial theory is based. This unity lived in India over the millennia."<sup>22</sup> The ideal universality would be ideal without diversity and thus void of any unity, as unity by definition has to unite something. On the other hand, if there is only diversity without unity then too diversities would not be 'diversities' as, it has to 'diversify' something. Thus to make sense of 'unity' and 'diversity' we need to have both as real entities.

By way of concluding, we look forward to a civil society, where we have all democratic rights protected and practised, providing justice to every individual all persons are responsible citizens implying the moral and legal duties with economic freedom and political freedom and development. This may be an over all development of all. But whether this is achieved or can ever be achieved in reality is another question. The circle of violence must be broken somewhere, and it can only be broken by non-violence. To quote Tagore about Gandhi, "Perhaps he will not succeed. Perhaps he will fail as Buddha failed and as Christ failed to wean man from their inequalities, but he will always be remembered as one who made his life lesson for all ages to come."<sup>23</sup>

## NOTES

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## THE CONDITIONED AND THE UNCONDITIONED MIND - J. KRISHNAMURTI'S PERSPECTIVE

G. VEDAPARAYANA

Mind or consciousness is one of the dominant issues of philosophical inquiry. Thinkers of the East as well as of the West have given consciousness tremendous importance in their understanding of the life-world. A plethora of knowledge about mind has been accumulationg in biology, psychology and philosophy. But the problem of mind is still an enigma ; a clear and complete picture of mind has yet to emerge despite constant debates about and researches into mind. J. Krishnamurti is one of the contemporary thinkers who has offered incisive and instructive insights into mind. His account of mind may be said to be comprehensive and complete. His discoveries in the field of consciousness are more profound than those of the physicist in the field of matter. This paper is an attempt at presenting a detailed exposition of Krishnamurti's analysis and understanding of mind or consciousness. The paper comprises four parts. Part one presents in brief some of the influential conceptions of consciousness in the field of philosophy, viz., the Advaitic, the Yogacara-Vijnanvada, the phenomenological and the Marxian. Part two embodies Krishnamurti's analysis and understanding of the conditioned consciousness. Part three deals with Krishnamurti's radical transformation of the conditioned consciousness; it also gives in brief the essential features of the unconditioned mind, according to Krishnamurti. And in the fourth and concluding part an attempt is made to compare Krishnamurti with Advaita, Yogacara-Vijñānavada, Phenomenology and Marxism.

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## I

According to Advaita there are four states of consciousness - the waking (*jāgrat*), the dream (*svapna*), the sleep (*suṣupti*) and the metaphysical awakening. (*Turiya*) The first three are the conditioned states (*avasthatraya*) while the fourth (*caturtha*) is the absolutely unconditioned. In the waking state, consciousness is associated with the mind and the senses ; it is intentional, directed outside (*bahīḥprajñāḥ*) and cognises the external, gross object of forms, sounds, etc. ; the objective world of duality and multiplicity is its field of activity and the out turned sense organs are the channels of its experience and knowledge. In the state of dream, the intentional consciousness in association with the mind or the intellect is internalised (*antaḥprajñāḥ*) and is aware of the subtle objects (*praviviktabhuj*) which are the impressions of the waking experience. Consciousness here creates its own world of diversity without the help of the body and the senses which are gone to sleep; its projects from itself, without the external aid, all kinds of wierd objects like chariots, roads, tanks, streams, lotus pools, pleasures, pains etc. In sleep where the mind is absent and the senses inactive consciousness is non-intentional, without content and alone; it knows neither the objects nor distinctions, nor relations whatsoever. Consciousness in this state is pure awareness (*prajñā*) which is neither the knowing subject nor the object known but the witness self (*sakṣin*) to which the world of objects, gross as well as subtle, are totally absent. And in the fourth state, namely, *Turiya*, consciousness is neither external awareness (*ñā' bahīḥprajñā*) as in the waking state nor internal awareness (*ñā'ntaḥprajñā*) as in dream ; nor is it awareness in between the both (*no'bhayataḥprajñā*); it is not even a substantial mass (*na' prajñānaghana*) as in sleep ; it is neither the cogniser of all things at the same time (*na prajñā*) nor non-cognitive as what is inert (*na' prajñā*). Consciousness here is unseen (*a dṛṣṭa*) beyond empirical usages (*avyavahārya*), ungraspable (*agrāhya*), without any distinctive mark (*alakṣan*) and beyond the reach of thought (*acintya*) and word (*avyapadeśya*). It is the unchanging essence of knowledge (*ēkāmapratyayasāram*) and the cessation of the pluralistic universe (*prapañcopaśanam*). It is peace (*sāntam*), auspicious (*śivam*) and non-

dual (*advaita*).<sup>1</sup> It is totally different from the preceding three states of consciousness covered (*āvarana*) by nescience (*avidyā*). It is regarded as the supreme Consciousness the attainment of which marks the ultimate liberation (*mokṣa*) from the cycle of birth and death (*saṃsāra*). "It is the end which is final and complete. It is transcendence of all finitude ; hence it is designated as *turiyan* or *brāhmaṇyam padam* (the fourth or the Brahman state)".<sup>2</sup>

Refuting the Sarvastivadin's realist position that there are discrete and momentary things - in themselves, namely, the ultimately real elements of existence (*dharmas*), the Yogacara-Vijñānavadins hold that the belief in the objects existing externally and independent of consciousness is false. They maintain that the objects are unreal like dreams, mirages or sky-lotuses and exist only as subjective facts, as ideas in the mind. Vasubandhu contends that "all existence has its centre and being in mind"<sup>3</sup> and the apprehension of objects such as trees, houses, mountains etc., are only the projections (*parikalpita*) of consciousness. Consciousness is the implicate of the unreal (*śūnya*) objective knowledge, like the space is of the spatial distinctions. The apprehension of the unreal objects as real is due to the reality of consciousness. "The object may well be unreal, but for the appearance of the unreal, for something to be mistaken for the real consciousness must be real".<sup>4</sup> All objectivity and the distinctions thereof are 'within' consciousness only. They are only a *vāṣana*, an impression or an illusion created by consciousness. The objects as substances and attributes are a mere superimposition on the states of consciousness. Consciousness is the 'unity' of which the subject and the object are its abstractions. Indeed there can be no relation between the subject and the objects, the inner and the outer in case they are really distinct. The subject - object distinctions and relations are purely mental and therefore unreal. "The external appearance of the object is transcendental illusion because of which consciousness is bifurcated into subject - object duality".<sup>5</sup> The Yogacara-Vijñānavadins also hold that the ultimate consciousness manifests itself in three stratifications which form the basis for the illusion of objectivity. The three strata are : the store - house consciousness (*ālayavijñāna*), the thought consciousness (*manovijñāna*), and the

consciousness of things (*viṣayavijñāna* or *pravṛthivijñāna*). The store-house consciousness is the repository, the potential state of the phenomena, both subjective and objective ; it is rather a stream of things in their seed (*bija*) form or in the form of impressions (*vāsanās*) ; the *ālaya* is a realm of possibilities and "co-terminus with the phenomenal existence".<sup>6</sup> The *manovijñāna* is the process of intellection (*manaṇa*) which categorises or synthesizes the indeterminate realm of possibilities of the *ālaya*; it is the mental activity of nourishing on the false notion of the 'I' and the 'mine.' And the *viṣayavijñāna* is the fully actualised state of the contents of the *ālaya*. It gives us the kinds of objectivity corresponding to the six types of consciousness, viz, the form (*rūpa*) of the eye-consciousness, the sound of the ear-consciousness, etc.<sup>7</sup>

Phenomenologically, Edmund Husserl and Jean-Paul Sartre have extensively dealt with consciousness. According to Husserl consciousness is both transcendental and intentional in character. Transcendentally, consciousness is a pure Ego from which the whole 'factual' world-natural as well as psychological - is "disconnected" or "bracketed" through the method of phenomenological reduction. As a phenomenological residuum, consciousness is a new region of Being which "in itself has a being of its own which in its absolute uniqueness of nature remains unaffected by the phenomenological disconnection".<sup>8</sup> Consciousness is a radically modified and livingly active subjectivity which is never reduced to objectivity; it is a definite and unique form of reflexion which is never reflected upon. Intentionally, consciousness is "consciousness of something",<sup>9</sup> turned towards an 'object' of 'experience' ; it is an act of relation oriented with meaning.

According to Sartre, consciousness is a non-substantial absolute, which is totally 'empty' within itself ; consciousness is lucid and translucent within itself. "Consciousness has no content"<sup>10</sup>, physical or psychic ; the entire natural and psychological world is outside it ; nothing is given or hidden in it, either the ego or the unconscious. Consciousness is what it appears to be ; it is a phenomenon without a noumenon ; it is a single and 'unitary' being without depth or inner core, the 'I' or the "me" ; its existence is no more than its apperance and it "exists only to the degree to which it

appears".<sup>11</sup> At the same time, consciousness, according to Sartre, is not an independently existing being like the Husserlian consciousness as the transcendental Ego. To Sartre consciousness cannot exist except as an intentional being ; in its immediacy consciousness is "consciousness of something".<sup>12</sup> Consciousness of nothing ceases to be consciousness. Consciousness is a revealing intuition of something other than itself, it is "born supported" by a being which is not it".<sup>13</sup>

The distinctive quality of the Sartrian consciousness is that it is a being of 'absolute' freedom ; consciousness is freedom in the sense that it is a plenum of nothingness as against the plenum of being, the world of objects. Consciousness, which is the same as human existence, is a being of autonomous choice and self-determination; "determination of itself by itself is its essential character."<sup>14</sup> On ultimate analysis, Sartre depicts consciousness as unhappy consciousness since it is a useless passion to be god. Consciousness can never attain the status of god since god implies the impossible union of the two self-contradictory beings - the being of consciousness and the being of objects, the for-itself and the in-itself - in one and the same beings. Thus Sartre condemns consciousness to sorrow without remedy. He says, "Human reality by nature is an unhappy consciousness with no possibility of surpassing its unhappy state".<sup>15</sup>

According to the materialism of Marx and Engels, consciousness is "a property of the brain to reflect the objective material world".<sup>16</sup> Consciousness is man's reflection on the inner side of the material object in the light of the laws relating to the object. Consciousness is man's "ability of abstract thinking which is reflection of the inner essential properties of the natural objects".<sup>17</sup> In other words, consciousness is the product of human labour and the means of production ; it arises in our attempt to modify the natural object into a tool and adapt it to a specific purpose.

So consciousness is not something independent of or opposed to matter but belongs to and predetermined by the material world. Consciousness is not an abstract idea or an *apriori* reason but concrete knowledge which is a historical product evolved by the people's materialist intercourse. Consciousness is not a transcendental, pure substance but the knowledge that man has developed in the realm of science, philosophy, politics, law,

religion and morality. Consciousness is linguistic in character and evolved along with language. Thus consciousness, according to Marx and Engels, is human through and through ; it is as old as the human race itself and would take on ever new forms depending upon the progress in thinking and ever changing human relations. "Consciousness (*das Bewusstsein*) can never be anything else than conscious being (*das bewusste sein*) and the being of man in their actual life-process".<sup>18</sup> Consciousness is not individualistic but social in character ; from its sensuous level as the contact of the brain and the senses with immediate environment to its reflective level of formulation of a theory, consciousness is conditioned by the material and social life. "Consciousness is therefore from the very beginning a social product and remains so as long as man exists at all".<sup>19</sup>

## II

Jiddu Krishnamurti (K. henceforth) distinguishes between two radically different kinds of mind - the totally conditioned and the absolutely free. He calls the former consciousness and the latter Intelligence. To him consciousness is the reality which is put together by thought ; he equates consciousness with reality since reality is "anything that thought operates on, or fabricates, or reflects about";<sup>20</sup> The term "reality" comes from "res" which means thing ; and the root meaning of the term "thing" is "to condition, to set the conditions or determine".<sup>21</sup> Accordingly, consciousness as reality is anything that thought thinks about, reasonably or unreasonably, factually or fictitiously ; consciousness is 'thing' in the sense that it is conditioned or determined by thought which is itself conditioned.

To K, Intelligence, unlike consciousness, is Truth which transcends thought. Intelligence as Truth is neither dependent upon nor conditioned by thought. Thought can never touch Truth since thought is 'thing' ; the term "true" comes from the Latin "versus" which means "that which is" and "cannot be conditioned or dependent on things".<sup>22</sup> K calls the free mind not only Intelligence or Truth but also Consciousness. But this consciousness has a dimension altogether different from that of the conditioned mind or the consciousness as the reality.

Basically, consciousness, according to K, is the brain which has evolved physically and psychologically through time. Time implies the past.

So the brain has evolved by accumulating the past physically and psychologically. It has grown by gathering the past for security at the physical and psychological levels. And the gathering of the past takes place through the brain's perceptual activity, the activity of challenge and response. So the brain is the product of its own sensory process through which it accumulates the past. And consciousness is precisely the brain evolved through the perceptual process of gathering the past. K says, "My consciousness is my mind, is my brain cells, is the result of my sensory perceptions".<sup>23</sup>

Consciousness is not only the brain which is the product of the perceptual activity of gathering the past ; consciousness is also the perceptual activity of the brain conditioned by the past. The activity of the brain is not only to gather the past but also to respond to the challenge on the background of the past. So, as a product, consciousness is precisely the brain conditioned by the past or memory ; and as an activity, consciousness is the response <sup>24</sup> of the brain conditioned by the past. Consciousness thus has the brain, the biological organism and its memory as its foundation. There can be no consciousness which is not of the activity of the brain filled with memory.

Although K equates consciousness with the brain, he at the same time, holds that consciousness is not whole of the brain ; he observes that consciousness is confined to a part of the brain ; only a little portion of the brain functions as consciousness ; only that part of the brain through which the past or the thought operates is consciousness ; the remaining part of the brain is dormant or 'unconscious' and inactive ; consciousness is the movement of the past, the activity of thought through a little part of the brain.

To K consciousness is the same as experience. Consciousness is experience since the brain is the result of the past which is experience. The past is experience gathered by the brain through time. So consciousness is experience which is in relation with the challenge. K says, "My consciousness is the sum total of human experience, plus my particular contact with the present"<sup>25</sup> Consciousness is not only the totality of human experience but also the process or the activity of experience ; consciousness

is the activity of the challenge and response on the background of the past. "This response to challenge is experience".<sup>26</sup> So to be conscious is to experience and to experience is to be consciousness. Both as a product and as a process, consciousness is not different from experience.

To K consciousness is the same as knowledge ; consciousness is knowledge since knowledge, like consciousness, is (the product of) the past ; knowledge is (the result of) experience ; it is memory accumulated through time, through the process of stimulus and response. K says, "Knowledge is the residue of experience, the gathering of the past. Knowledge, consciousness is always the past".<sup>27</sup> Consciousness is not only the product of knowledge but also the process of knowing ; to be conscious is to know and to know is to be conscious. Consciousness is confined to the realm of knowledge, the known ; it is always a movement from the known to the known. "The mind is the warehouse of the known, the residue of the known".<sup>28</sup> The moment the mind or consciousness experiences anything it translates that experience in terms of the known and reduces it to the past by naming and recording it. Knowledge or the known is never complete. So consciousness is always limited or incomplete. The unknown or the unlimited is totally outside the field of the known ; the process of knowing and not-knowing are entirely different from each other.

To K, consciousness is not different from thought ; consciousness is not only (the product) the thought but also the activity of thought. Just as consciousness, thought is not different from experience or the past ; thought is the same as knowledge or memory gathered by the brain through time. Thought, like consciousness, is the memory stored up in the brain cells. Both consciousness and thought are (the product of) the past. And as an activity, thought is nothing but the response of the brain from the background or the memory. Thought is the reaction of past to the present ; thought, like consciousness, is the movement of the past which is the same as experience or knowledge. Both as a product and as a process, consciousness is the same as thought. To be conscious is to think and to think is to be conscious. As K puts it, "So long as the mind is not thinking consciously or unconsciously, there is no consciousness".<sup>29</sup>

Thus K treats consciousness the same as the brain, experience, knowledge and thought ; he uses the terms "brain", "experience" and so

on synonymously ; to him, all of them mean one and the same thing, namely, the mind conditioned by the past ; they indicate the mind which is not only the product of memory but also the mind which operates on the background of memory. But at the same time, besides equating consciousness with the brain, experience and so on, K also speaks about consciousness as the brain which is programmed to operate in the circle of experience, knowledge, memory, thought and action. He says, "First experience ; that experience may have been from the beginning of man, which we have inherited, that experience gives knowledge which is stored up in the brain ; from knowledge there is memory and from that memory thought. From thought you act. From that action you learn more. So you repeat the cycle".<sup>30</sup>

The fact that consciousness is the brain filled with the memory implies that consciousness is not without the content. The past, the experience, the knowledge or the thought which the brain has gathered through time constitutes the content of consciousness. Consciousness as we know it to be is not independent of its content. Consciousness and its content are not different ; consciousness is not a container of its content ; the content itself is consciousness. Just as there is no valley without the hills, the trees, the birds and so on, there is no consciousness without its content. Bereft of the content, consciousness as we know ceases to be consciousness.<sup>31</sup> Consciousness 'is' its content. K says "The content of consciousness is consciousness. Without the content, there is no consciousness. Content is consciousness. The two are not separate".<sup>32</sup>

The content of consciousness, namely, the past, is of two kinds - factual and psychological. The factual content comprises the academic, the scientific and technological knowledge of the world of objects ; it includes the knowledge essential for our biological survival and well-being. Whereas the psychological content comprises the whole network of "innumerable thoughts and feeling, influences and responses."<sup>33</sup> K calls it inward knowledge which includes our accumulated beliefs, aspirations, desires, attachments, ambitions, fears, anxiety, uncertainty, depression, pleasure, pain and sorrow. As against the factual knowledge which is well-reasoned, objective and sane, the psychological knowledge is irrational, twisted and a muddle of confusion and contradiction. So K says that the content of consciousness is "a messy conglomeration of irrational knowledge and

some which is correct".<sup>34</sup>

According to K, the psychological content constitutes the self or the psyche of the individual. The individual "ego" or the "I" is the same as the psychological content of consciousness. I am my consciousness and my consciousness is "me". "That whole content of that consciousness is the 'me'. That 'me' is not different from my consciousness",<sup>35</sup> says K. At the same time K, holds that consciousness is not individualistic but common to human race as a whole. My consciousness is not mine but what I have inherited from humankind. Consciousness is shared by all human beings. Besides the superficial - the biological, the intellectual, the professional differences, the psychological human beings are the same all over the world ; the psychological content of humanity has been the same all through the ages - self-centred, divisive, conflicting, lonely, confused, envious, violent, unhappy and so on. Psychologically, consciousness is the story of humankind. K says, "My brain is the brain of time. The brain is not my brain. It is the brain of humanity in which the hereditary principle is involved"<sup>36</sup> ; it is consciousness of humanity, because man suffers, he is proud, cruel, anxious, unkind. This is the common ground of the man. There is no individual at all for me".<sup>37</sup>

According to K, consciousness is not what it appears to be but has, as it were, "an enormous length, depth and volume".<sup>38</sup> Having a heritage of its own and evolved through millennia consciousness has many layers and operates at different levels. But basically the state of consciousness may be likened to that of an iceberg; a major part of consciousness is 'concealed' as the unconscious and only a little part of it appears to be conscious and active. But the parts of consciousness are interconnected ; they are mutually dependent and interacting. The so-called unconscious remains inactive so long as the conscious part is busy ; but it becomes active and props up the moment the conscious part remains inactive ; it sends its intimations to the conscious part when the latter is silent or goes to sleep. So the parts of consciousness are not watertight compartments without communication. The division between them is illusory. So K says that consciousness is "one whole"<sup>39</sup> and a unitary process constituting "the totality of our being".<sup>40</sup> Moreover, there can be no two different states of consciousness, since the content of consciousness, whether conscious

or unconscious, is the same, namely, the past. Consciousness at both the levels is the recording or the projection of something that is past. Consciousness essentially is a process of the known ; there is nothing really unknown, unrecorded or unprojected in it. K says, "There is in fact only one state, not two states such as the conscious and the unconscious, though you may divide it as the conscious and the unconscious. But that consciousness is always of the past never of the present. You are conscious only of the things that are over".<sup>41</sup>

Consciousness, according to K, is a material process, which is 'abstract' in character. Consciousness is abstract since we cannot perceive it through our sense organs. So consciousness is matter which is subtle in nature. Consciousness is matter since consciousness is the brain which is matter; the brain is made up of hydrogen, carbon and other molecules ; it operates as electrical circuits through chemical reactions. Consciousness is a material process also because consciousness is the same as the brain which has physically and psychologically evolved in time. All that has evolved through time is matter. Consciousness is a material process for yet another reason, namely, it has evolved by accumulating memory which is also matter ; memory is matter since, like the brain, it evolves in time and gets stored up in the brain cells. K says, "Memory is matter, otherwise it cannot hold and leave a mark on the brain-cells which are also matter".<sup>42</sup>

The psychological content, namely, the memory is a muddle since it is made up of several irreconcilable, opposing and fragmentary desires, aspirations and intentions. The memory generates energy out of its own muddle ; the division, contradiction and conflict creates the energy and consciousness is precisely this energy ; consciousness sustains by generating its energy out of itself, out of its content, and continues itself endlessly. K says, "Actually, the content is creating its own energy. Look, I am in contradiction and that contradiction gives me vitality".<sup>43</sup> Being a material process consciousness is a process of energy ; but the energy is dissipating and destructive since it is in contradiction and conflict within itself.

K compares consciousness to the computer which is also a material process and operates on mechanical energy. The computer is made of silicon molecules and works on the electrical circuits of chips. Like

consciousness, the computer works according to its accumulated memory; its responses, however quick or spectacular they may be, are determined by its content, namely, the memory; they are the reactions, the effects of its programme, namely, the memory. Like the computer consciousness is programmed in different ways. Just as different computers are programmed differently to produce different results human being has been programmed according to a particular religion, nation, race and so on. "For centuries he has been programmed - to believe, to have faith, to follow certain rituals, certain dogmas; programmed to be nationalistic and to go to war".<sup>44</sup>

Although consciousness is the product of the past consciousness is not a permanent or substantial entity ; consciousness is an impermanent process ; there is nothing abiding and lasting in it. Consciousness or thought is in a state of perpetual flux ; its content is transient and ever changing depending upon its environment. But, unable to bear its own impermanency, consciousness invents a 'permanent entity' called the 'thinker' ; thought divides itself as the thinker and the thought ; the thinker operates at different levels, in different forms like the observer, the censor or the supreme self (*Ātman*). But the thinker in all its garbs is the same as the thought ; the thinker is not a separate entity but only a projection, an extension of thought. "Thought has created the thinker. If thought did not exist there would be no thinker".<sup>45</sup> The thinker is the refuge of thought ; the thinker is only a modified continuity of thought. The content of the thinker is not different from thought, namely, the past ; it is made up of experience, knowledge, or memory which is in movement. The thinker is as much conditioned as thought is. There is nothing sacred about the thinker. Even the Super Consciousness is (a fabrication of) the thinker, a part of thought. "The *ātman* is the aeroplane invented by thought"<sup>46</sup>, says K. Thought plays all kinds of tricks upon itself in order to continue itself endlessly ; it disguises itself as the thinker and place at different levels of permanency. "But this permanency is born of impermanency and so there is within it the seeds of impermanency. There is only one fact : impermanency",<sup>47</sup> observes K.

As it has been mentioned at the very outset, consciousness, according to K, is temporal in character ; consciousness is the same as the brain put together through time which is the past. Consciousness is the brain which is old or traditional in character ; it is the memory accumulated in the brain

- cells ; it has evolved through millions of years of human experience, knowledge or thought. K says, "That consciousness is the result of time, evolution, growth. It is expandable and contractable".<sup>48</sup> Consciousness is temporal also because it is a 'manifested' energy which is the same as matter, and all manifested energy or matter is time. K says, "Time is matter. Time is manifested energy. The very manifestation is a process of time".<sup>49</sup>

Being (the product of) time, consciousness is a process, an activity in time. It always operates within the field of time - the past, the present and the future. Consciousness is what *has been* ; to it 'to be' is to 'have been' ; it is a continuity from the past to the future in contact with the present ; it is a movement of the past towards the future through the present ; in the present consciousness is swinging like a pendulum from the past to the future ; its present is what is hedged about by the past and the future ; consciousness uses the present, the 'what is' only as a lever to pass over to the future. Being a swift momentum of the past consciousness slurs over the actual 'present', the timeless 'now' which is outside its field. "Our minds are the product of many yesterdays and the present is merely the passage of the past to the future".<sup>50</sup> Similarly the future is only the extension of the past ; it is a modified continuity of the past only.

Consciousness is a process of desire ; it is, as K puts it, "an agglomeration of desire";<sup>51</sup> being the products of the past, the responses of consciousness are inadequate and these inadequate responses are the process of desire. K says, "Desire is the inadequate response to challenge".<sup>52</sup> Being inadequate, the responses are the sources of disturbance or conflict. "Conflict arises when the response is not adequate to the challenge".<sup>53</sup> Inadequate response gives rise to conflict since there is in it the meeting of the opposites, namely, the past, the ever old and the challenge, the ever new ; inadequate response meets the challenge, the unnamable, by naming it and the very terming gives rise to conflict. This conflict in consciousness is precisely desire. Desire is the movement of consciousness in conflict. To put it in other words, consciousness is the conflict caused by the inadequate response. K observes, "This disturbance is the consciousness of desire ; the focusing of disturbance, caused by pain or pleasure, is self-consciousness. Self-consciousness is desire. We are conscious when there is the disturbance of inadequate response to challenge".<sup>54</sup>

Consciousness is of the nature of fear since it is confined to the realm of the known ; fear is the fear of the known ; fear is not in abstraction and isolation but in relationship to something known. Even the fear of the so-called unknown. like death, is in fact, the fear of losing what we have known - people, ideas or things. There is no such thing as the fear of the unknown, the unrelated. K says, "My fear is not of death but of losing my association with things belonging to me. My fear is always in relation to the known, not to the unknown".<sup>55</sup> Consciousness is a process of fear also because it is insecure within itself ; consciousness is insecure since it is neither independent, permanent nor complete within itself. On the contrary, consciousness is conditioned by its content, namely, the past which is incomplete and impermanent ; it is limited and transient since it is put together by thought which is finite and ever changing. And anything that is not independent, stable and complete should be a cause of insecurity. The dependency, impermanency and incompleteness of consciousness are the source of its insecurity which is the same as fear. So fear is inherent in consciousness. Fear may be hidden so long as consciousness is busy with its routine. But fear props up the moment consciousness encounters a challenge. K says, "You may not be afraid of anything now, sitting here. But obviously in your consciousness there is fear. In the unconscious, or in the conscious, there is this terrible thing called anxiety, pain, grief, suffering and fear".<sup>56</sup>

Fear is intrinsic to consciousness also because it is a process of avoiding the true nature, the essence of our being, namely 'nothingness' or inner solitude. Nothingness means not a thing. Nothingness 'is' in the negation of consciousness, everything that thought has conceived. "To be absolutely nothing means a total contradiction of everything you have learnt, everything that thought has put together. To be not a thing".<sup>57</sup> There is absolute security and fearlessness only in being absolutely 'nothing'. But consciousness can never comprehend the nothing. The nothingness is the 'unknown' whereas thought is the known. The two can never meet. Yet thought desires to know the unknown. In the process, thought merely verbalises the unknown and accumulates ideas, knowledge or belief about the unknown. Unable to actually realise the unknown, and being afraid of being nothing, thought accumulates 'things' of all kinds as a source of

security. But being transitory, the things of thought, including knowledge, belief, god, etc. are the source of insecurity. Security through something is the greatest insecurity and hence fear. "Fear exists as long as there is accumulation of the known which creates the fear of losing".<sup>58</sup>

Being the process of knowing, consciousness can know the unknown, the nothingness only by terming it; but knowing the unknown by giving it a name is only a verbal recognition and not its actual realization; in verbalisation the word takes the place of direct perception; the word covers up the unknown and renders it the source of fear; the very naming of the unnamable generates fear. So more the thought tries to capture the nothing, the further it moves away from the nothing; in its effort to know the unknown consciousness merely strengthens itself; it only gathers more and more content, more and more words which perpetuate fear. As K puts it, "As thought cannot know the unknown, it is afraid of it. There will be fear as long as thought desires to experience, to understand the unknown... Whatever thought does with regard to inner solitude is an escape, an avoidance of what is. In avoiding what is, thought creates its own conditioning which prevents the experiencing of the new, the unknown. Fear is the only response of thought to the unknown; thought may call it by different terms, but is still fear".<sup>59</sup>

Thus, consciousness, according to K, is a part of the brain which is the product of time and evolution. Consciousness is its content, namely, the past or memory; it is put together by thought and the result of experience, the process of challenge and response. Like the computer, consciousness is the process of the known, programmed by memory; it operates in the cycle of knowledge, memory, thought and action. Consciousness is a material energy which has its own momentum. Besides the factual content which is sane and utilitarian, the psychological content of consciousness, namely, the self or the psyche is irrational and insane; it is limited and incomplete within itself; it is full of division, fragmentation and conflict; it comprises desire, disturbance, fear, anxiety, confusion and so on. Consciousness is in great turmoil and fast deteriorating. Constitutive of the individual self and being common to humankind as a whole, consciousness is at the root of all human problems and misery. Consciousness, as K puts it, is "creating great damage in the world because it is separative and

therefore it is constantly in conflict not only within itself but within the society, within the family and so on."<sup>60</sup> K also holds that consciousness is responsible for the human problems like hunger, poverty, division, disintegration, conflict, violence and war. The crises of all kinds in the world are due to the consciousness in crisis. Therefore there is an urgent need to deeply change the consciousness. K says, "Unless human beings radically transform this consciousness, we are going to end up in bloody wars".<sup>61</sup>

### III

K does not condemn the human being to the conditioned consciousness. Nor does he confine the human brain or the mind to the consciousness as we know it to be. He holds that the conditioned consciousness belongs only to the superficial layers, a limited part of the brain. He revolts against the whole idea that there is nothing beyond the inherited consciousness, the consciousness in crisis. He contends that there is an unconditionally and absolutely free mind which happens to be in the total ending or the radical transformation of the limited consciousness. K says, "I realise that thought and thinker are very limited and I do not stop there. To do so would be a purely materialistic philosophy".<sup>62</sup>

Ending of consciousness is possible when consciousness is aware of itself without choice. Awareness is to be devoid of choice, for choice arises out of consciousness; choice is the movement of thought; there is no choice without the past. Awareness is observation in which consciousness observes its nature and structure without the observer. Awareness is to be without the observer since the observer is the residue, the refuge of consciousness only; the observer is the thinker 'who' is thought itself; the thinker is only a modified continuity of thought or consciousness. Awareness is alert passivity wherein consciousness 'holds' the totality of content without any remnant. In awareness consciousness perceives the actuality, the 'what is' of itself and realizes its truth. "Awareness is a state of being in which truth can come into being, the truth of 'what is'".<sup>63</sup>

Radical transformation of consciousness happens to be only when consciousness directly faces the fact of its being totally conditioned; it takes place when consciousness comprehends the fact of its being totally

limited ; an unequivocal and absolute observation of the fact of its nature and structure brings about a radical transformation in consciousness. K says, "Facts, if one observes carefully, in themselves bring about a change".<sup>64</sup> But consciousness always avoids the 'understanding' the fact of itself by verbalising, justifying or condemning it ; it prevaricates the fact through the process of agreeing or disagreeing, affirming or denying ; it deviates itself from the 'what is' of itself by interpreting, comparing or concluding it ; it distorts the fact by suppressing, modifying or resisting it ; consciousness does not realise but only moulds the fact by identifying or recognising it according to its own conditioning. All these activities - verbalising, justifying, condemning and so on - are only the movements of consciousness in a modified form. Instead of bringing about a real change in consciousness they merely manifest it in several different ways. They are the subtle means through which consciousness chooses to continue itself endlessly. So transformation takes place only when consciousness 'sees' the fact of its being as a whole and remains there without any movement. K asks, "The question is : can the conditioned brain awaken to its own conditioning and so perceive its own limitation and stay there for a moment".<sup>65</sup>

As it has already been mentioned, consciousness is a divisive process ; it divides itself as the thinker and thought, the observer and observed, or the experience and experienced ; the divisive process is a process of becoming ; consciousness continues and sustains itself by dividing itself as the observer and observed ; it functions in the same pattern of division even in its effort to transform itself ; it deludes itself into the division of itself as the one who changes and as something to be changed ; it tries to change itself by operating upon itself ; but any attempt on its part to change itself divides itself and creates the thinker and results in its becoming or continuity. The duality is a barrier to the wholistic perception ; it generates conflict which fritters away the wholistic energy required for the undivided attention of consciousness by itself ; conflict is the noise, the friction which precludes the quiescence of consciousness ; it is only in the absolute quietitude of consciousness that the fact of consciousness can fully flower and reveal its truth, namely, Nothing.<sup>66</sup> The quietitude or the silence brings about a highly creative action in which the observer 'is' the observed. The action releases immense, creative energy which shatters the whole nature and structure of consciousness. K says, "Then the observer is the observed.

Then a totally different action takes place, a totally different chemical action takes place."<sup>67</sup>

Awareness or observation is not a technique, a method or a system, either spiritual or psychoanalytic; a method implies a path, a pattern or a formula which consciousness mechanically follows in order to transform itself; but a method cannot bring about a radical transformation in consciousness, since the method is the product of thought only; method merely moulds consciousness according to some knowledge or some pre-conceived idea which is part of consciousness itself. Moreover, a method or a path implies practice which involves time; time implies gradual change; gradual change means not the ending of consciousness but its continuity in a modified form. Therefore method is a barrier to the awareness in which consciousness radically transforms itself by observing, perceiving the fact of itself without any knowledge, an idea or an experience which is the continuity of consciousness. So adopting a method, however noble, ancient or latest it may be, as a means of transforming consciousness, results in the perpetuation of consciousness; it merely breeds the illusion of bringing about a deep change in consciousness; indeed, the method is a creation of consciousness for its own continuity; it is an outcome of the desire of consciousness to become further and not to end itself here and now without any time; it is only a means of achieving the self-projected goal through which consciousness continues itself by distracting itself from the fact of itself; a method never allows consciousness to inquire into the nature of itself; it does not allow consciousness to remain 'with (the fact of) itself in which alone there is a radical transformation. K says, "To practice a method is to cultivate another set of time binding memories; but realisation is possible only when the mind is no longer in bondage, in time".<sup>68</sup>

Awareness therefore is entirely different from method; awareness is instantaneous understanding of the 'what is' without knowledge, time, choice, motive, resistance, an idea or an end in view; it is an intense feeling in which consciousness is one with itself without any division. Awareness is attention wherein consciousness remains 'with' itself, without escaping from the fact of itself. Awareness, as K puts it, is the absolute rationality, intelligence, insight or perception which brings about a mutation in the brain itself. K says, "There is this perception of insight and the brain

*The Conditioned and the Unconditioned Mind*

cells themselves change".<sup>69</sup>

The ending of the conditioned consciousness marks the emergence of the Mind which of "free of all dependence and limitation";<sup>70</sup> the free mind is absolutely unconditioned and devoid of all the content, namely, the psychological past, memory, knowledge, experience or thought. The free mind is acausal, beyond all causal determination - physical or psychological; it is therefore a timeless or an eternal mind which is without beginning and end. K calls the free mind Intelligence. The intelligent mind, unlike the conditioned consciousness, is 'anonymous' and beyond all identification and recognition. K says, "Intelligence has no heritage. Consciousness has heritage"<sup>71</sup>. The intelligent mind is 'alone' which means all one; it is one with 'everything' without attachment or detachment. K calls the intelligent mind the unknown; it is beyond all knowledge - conceptualisation and verbalisation. K calls the free mind also Emptiness or Nothingness; the Emptiness is not void, a vacuum but a wholistic energy which is boundless and immeasurable; the Nothingness is Truth which is not an abstraction, but the mind 'that which is'. Truth consists in being true to 'that which is'.

The conditioned mind is completely secure within itself; it does not seek security in possessions - things, ideas or people; its security is not in anything objective or outward but is in itself, in being Nothing. Nothingness means absolute security; security through something is the greatest insecurity, for it involves time, the source of impermanence and sorrow; time is a limitation and all limitation leads to insecurity. In Eternity alone is true security. Eternity is Emptiness which is beyond consciousness with all its accretions, namely, memories.

The free mind is an orderly mind. Its order is not of the order of thought which is limited and therefore the source of conflict and confusion. The order of the free mind is infinite and unlimited; it is of the absolute order of the Cosmos. Its order is intrinsic and not invented and imposed by thought; it is totally devoid of division, friction or disharmony. Being orderly, the free mind is a stable mind; its stability is not static or rigid but "the movement of stillness"<sup>72</sup> which consists in its being one with the Cosmos - the timeless movement of the supreme order.

The intelligent mind is a perceptive mind; it does not experience but

perceives the 'what is' ; consciousness experiences the 'what is' through knowledge, thought and time. Whereas, the perceptive mind 'sees' the 'what is' from moment to moment without knowledge, thought and time. Perception is not experience. Experienced is continuous whereas perception is momentary, without beginning and end. The first perception is the last perception; there is a total gap between two moments of perception; the one is not the continuity of the other. "Perception", as K puts it, "is like the light of a candle which has been put out and relit. The new light is not the old, though the candle is the same".<sup>73</sup> The perceptive mind 'sees' clearly the truth or the falsity of the 'what is' and dies to it completely; it does not reduce the moment of perception to memory by verbalising it ; it does not translate it in terms of thought and form the continuity, the causal chain of the moments.

To K, intelligence is the same as love ; the intelligent mind is a compassionate mind. Compassion or love is neither sensual nor reomantic, neither attachment nor detachment but "transformation from moment to moment".<sup>74</sup> Love is not circumstantial but absolute ; to it far is a near. Love is not an abstraction but action in the flowering of goodness in relationship ; it is an unconditional care and concern for everything, for the whole world without expecting anything in return. The goodness is absolute and not relative to the emotions like hatred, envy, and jealousy. The goodness in love is virtue which knows no evil. K declares, "When there is love you can do what you will. Then there is no sin, then there is no conflict"<sup>75</sup>. K contends that intelligent love is the only panacea for humanity. Life-world is full of crises- hunger, poverty, injustice, ecological degradation, conflict, violence and war. The crises are due to the consciousness in crisis. Love is the absence of consciousness in crisis which means the absence of all human problems. "If these is love there are no social problems,"<sup>76</sup> observes K.

Awareness demolishes thought at the psychological level but leaves the factual thought or knowledge in tact. For the free mind only two things are significant - intelligence and biological survival. Intelligence uses the factual thought strictly for biological survival. It guides the latter in a proper direction and confines it to the physical realm ; it does not allow thought to enter the 'psychological' world of emptiness, the only foundation for

harmonious human relations and peaceful co-existence of humanity. In freedom thought works 'through' intelligence, just as the sound of the drum is produced out of emptiness. In freedom thought functions in the world with sanity, without going berserk. It promotes a sustainable development of our civilisation. Intelligence is the only way of living a meaningful life. Bereft of intelligence life is absurd, full of problems. Intelligence is bliss or joy which knows no sorrow ; it is not touched by any of the human emotions or qualities which the conditioned consciousness is heir to. K says, "Therefore there are only two things left : the highest form of intelligence and survival which is entirely different from animal survival. Man is not merely the animal because he is able to think, design and construct".<sup>77</sup>

#### IV

In conclusion it may be held that Krishnamurti's exposition of the conditioned and the unconditioned mind is similar to as well as different from the conceptions of consciousness presented in the first part of this paper.

Firstly, Krishnamurti's conception of the conditioned consciousness may be said to be analogous to the Advaitic conception of consciousness in the state of waking and dream. To both K and Advaita, the conditioned consciousness is intentional and sensual ; it is in association with thought, senses and the objects thereof. But the difference between K and Advaita is that K takes the brain filled with memory as the basis of the conditioned consciousness. Whereas Advaita does not take the physical organisms into account in dealing with the nature of the empirical consciousness.

It may also be held that K's notion of the unconditioned Mind or Intelligence is the same as the Advaitic supreme Consciousness. Both are absolutely free and mark the cessation of suffering ; they imply a mind which is undivided, beyond experience, thought and word. But the difference between K and Advaita in this regard is that the Advaitic supreme Consciousness is most often depicted as the product of the intellect, thought and knowledge by the Advaitins. K says that the *Ātman* is aeroplane invented by thought. Unlike the Advaitins, K deals with Intelligence as its actual realisation. His understanding of the nature and limitations of the intellect, thought and knowledge are quite clear. To him, knowledge, however sacred

or ancient it may be, is antithetical to Intelligence. Knowledge conditions the mind or consciousness. It is in the total ending of knowledge that there is Intelligence. Intellect and Intelligence do not go together. Truth is when thought is not.

Secondly, the Krishnamurtian conditioned mind may appear to be similar to the Yogacara-vijnanavadin's conception of the three strata of Intelligence- the ālayavijñāna, manovijñāna and viśayavijñāna. And K's notion of Intelligence may converge with the latter's notion of pure consciousness (pariniṣpanna). But again the difference between K and the yogācāra-Vijñānavādins is that the latter do not take the brain, the neurological basis into consideration in their dealings with the mind or consciousness at various levels; they are more doctrinal and speculative than actual and realistic.

Thirdly, Husserl's conception of consciousness as that which includes everything we experience, as inner perception and as an intentional act appears to resemble K's conception of the conditioned consciousness. But it may be said that Husserl's account of consciousness is not as incisive as that of K's in unravelling the depth of human personality. Also Husserl's conception of consciousness as the pure, transcendental Ego might be compared with K's notion of Intelligent. But the difference is that the Husserlian pure consciousness is more epistemological than 'spiritual'; whereas K's Intelligence is deeply 'religious' and morally perfect. To Husserl, the Ego is the residuum of phenomenological reduction of "bracketing" the world. But Husserl is not at all clear as to how the reduction takes place. Whereas K is extremely clear in his account of choiceless awareness as a 'process' of radically transforming the conditioned consciousness. And to him, Intelligence is not egotistic in any sense of the term.

Fourthly, K's exposition of the conditioned and the unconditioned mind seems to have much in common with Sartre's phenomenological ontology of consciousness and freedom. But there are fundamental differences between the two. To Sartre consciousness *per se* is empty, non-substantial and without content ; consciousness is the same as nothingness and freedom. There is no consciousness which is unfree or conditioned. Whereas

K distinguishes between the conditioned and the free mind. The latter takes place in the ending of the former ; and the ending happens to be in the observation of the former without choice, the inalienable essence of the Sartrean consciousness. Sartre presumes consciousness to be free and unconditioned; freedom is the ontological stuff consciousness. Whereas K holds that consciousness as we know it to be is conditioned for millennia. Freedom happens to be in the radical transformation of the conditioned consciousness. And the Sartrean consciousness as freedom is condemned to be anguishing, sorrowful and unhappy. Whereas K's notion of freedom implies a mind which is devoid of all the emotions like fear, anxiety, violence, conflict and sorrow. Unlike the Sartrean freedom, K's free mind cannot even choose to manifest itself through these destructive thoughts and feelings, since it is totally cleansed of their network. Unlike the Sartrean freedom which is morally ambiguous and often relapses into bad faith, K's free mind is morally perfect since it is full of pure compassion or love devoid of the self, the ego, even in its objective sense as being in the world, to put it in Sartre's own terms.

And fifthly, K's description of the conditioned consciousness is very much akin to the Marxian conception of consciousness. To both Marx and K, consciousness is a material process having the brain as its neuro-physiological basis; both admit that consciousness is a social product, a product of time and environment; consciousness evolves through language, knowledge and ideas. Both subscribe to the view that everything we experience goes into the making up of our consciousness. But the radical difference between K and Marx is that to the latter there is no consciousness other than the phenomenon of matter. Whereas K holds that there is an unconditionally and absolutely free consciousness of mind which 'transcends' the material realm of time, environment, thought and knowledge. While Marx holds that consciousness can be changed only by changing the social structure, K maintains that the world can be changed only by radically changing consciousness. K contends that the inner determines the outer while Marx believes in the opposite. Both are seriously concerned about the radical transformation of the world but their approaches to the transformation are quite opposed to each other.

Above all, the uniqueness of K lies in his direct perception of the life-

world; his insights into the mind are not only incisive but original to the core. They are not the outcome of the study of the systems of philosophy. On the contrary, they are the offspring of his study of the book of life and the observation of the functioning of the mind. K examines the mind and life, not as a professional philosopher or as a psychologist or as a neurologist but as a common man who is seriously concerned about the crises in the mind and the world. His discoveries in the field of mind have profound implications for living a meaningful life and for the establishment of sane society.

## NOTES

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13. -----, *Ibid.*, p. 23.
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15. -----, *Ibid.*, p. 140.
16. A Team of Editors, *Fundamentals of Marxist and Leninist Philosophy*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1985, p. 115.
17. -----, *Ibid.*, p. 117.
18. Marx & Engels, *German Ideology*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1976, p. 42.
19. -----, *Ibid.*, pp. 49-50.
20. Krishnamurti, J., *Truth and Actuality*, Krishnamurti Foundation India (KFI), Chennai, p. 15.
21. -----, *Ibid.*, p. 18.
22. -----, *Ibid.*, pp. 19, 21.
23. -----, *Commentaries on Living*. Third Series, B.I. Publications, Bombay, 1960, p. 334.
24. The responses of the brain are of two kinds : 1) the natural responses which are not of the past and 2) the responses conditioned by the past at the physical and the psychological levels. The former are purely neurological and protective chemical reactions which are in-built in the brain itself. The responses of the brain to the stimulus like shock, pain etc., belong to this category. Whereas the latter kind of responses are based on memory ; the responses of the brain at the physical level are conditioned by the factual memory which is sane and utilitarian ; and the responses at the psychological level are conditioned by the speculative memory which is irrational and harmful.
25. Krishnamurti, J., *The First and Last Freedom*, Krishnamurti Foundation India (KFI), Chennai, 1954, p. 138.
26. -----, *Commentaries on Living*, First Series, B.I. Publications, Bombay, 1972, pp. 224-5.
27. -----, *Ibid.*, p. 223.

28. \_\_\_\_\_, *The First and Last Freedom*, p. 153.
29. \_\_\_\_\_, *Ibid.*, p. 115.
30. \_\_\_\_\_, *The Network of Thought*, Krishnamurti Foundation India (KFI), Chennai, 1985, p. 15.
31. Even the brain as we know, like the consciousness as we know, is its past; it cannot function without the past ; that portion of the brain which is conditioned by the past is not different from the past ; it is never independent of its content, namely, the past ; it is dormant or inactive without the past; it function by operating outwardly and inwardly, during waking and sleep, through the past only; and the brain as we know is its functioning only.
32. Krishnamurti, J., *Truth and Actuality*, p. 101.
33. \_\_\_\_\_, *The First and Last Freedom*, p. 238.
34. \_\_\_\_\_, *Truth and Actuality*, p. 22.
35. Krishnamurti, J., *The Future of Humanity*, (A Conversation), Krishnamurti Foundation India, Chennai, p. 1993, pp. 11.
36. K also holds that consciousness is global in the sense that it belongs not only to the human beings but encompasses the whole of life ; all living organisms - the trees, the birds, the animals and the insects - are the beings of consciousness. They do have the same feelings as we have. The basic content of consciousness, namely, the trouble or the travail is common to all the living beings and pervades the totality of life. K also says that consciousness is limited although globe. see, Pupul Jayakar, *Fire in the Mind*, p. 23.
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38. \_\_\_\_\_, *Ibid.*, p. 18.
39. \_\_\_\_\_, *The Network of Thought*, p.10.
40. \_\_\_\_\_, *The Way of Intelligence*, p. 166.
41. \_\_\_\_\_, *The First and Last Freedom*, p. 223.
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43. -----, *Ibid.*, p. 24.
44. -----, *The Network of Thought*, p.8-9.
45. -----, *Tradition and Revolution*, Krishnamurti Foundation India, Chennai, p. 1974, p.246
46. -----, *Ibid.*, p. 157.
47. -----, *Commentaries on Living*, Third Series, p. 253.
48. -----, *Commentaries on Living*, Second Series B.I. Publications, 1972, p. 334.
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50. Krishnamurti, J., *The First and Last Freedom*, p. 131.
51. -----, *Commentaries on Living*, Second Series, p. 119.
52. -----, *Commentaries on Living*, First Series, p. 173.
53. -----, *Ibid.*
54. -----, *Ibid.*
55. -----, *The First and Last Freedom*, p. 89.
56. -----, *Meeting Life*, Krishnamurti Foundation India, Chennai, p. 1991, p.185
57. -----, *Ibid.*, p. 188.
58. -----, *The First and Last Freedom*, p. 84.
59. -----, *Commentaries on Living*, Second Series, p. 10.
60. -----, *The Future of Humanity*, p. 55.
61. -----, *The Way of Intelligence*, p. 69.
62. -----, *Tradition and Revolution*, p. 249.
63. -----, *Reflections on the Self* (Ed.) Raymond Martin, Bluejay Books, New Delhi, 1997, p. 171.

64. Jayakar, Pupul, *Fire in the Mind*, p. 221.
65. -----, *Ibid.*, p. 219.
66. K observes that Nothing remains when a fact is observed unconditionally and in its totality, see, *Fire in the Mind*, p. 225.
67. Krishnamurti, J., *Reflections on the Self*, p. 37.
68. -----, *Commentaries on Living Third Series*, p. 285.
69. Jayakar, Pupul, *Fire in the Mind*, p. 350.
70. Krishnamurti, J., *The Ending of Time*, Krishnamurti & Bohm, David, Foundation India, Chennai, p. 1992, p. 243.
71. Jayakar, Pupul, *Fire in the Mind*, p. 324.
72. Krishnamurti, J., *The Ending of Time*, p. 241.
73. -----, *The Penguin Krishnamurti Reader*, ed., Mary Lutyens, Penguin Books, London, 1930, p. 115.
74. -----, *The First and Last Freedom*, p. 288.
75. -----, *On Freedom*, Victor Gollanez, London, 1992, p. 112.
76. -----, *The First and Last Freedom*, p. 284.
77. Jayakar, Pupul, *Fire in the Mind*, p. 324.

## THE ĀVIRBHĀVA AND TIROBHĀVA THEORY IN VALLABHA VEDĀNTA : SOME PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS

RAGHUNATH GHOSH

The present paper deals with the theory of appearance (*āvirbhāva*) and disappearance (*tirobhāva*) according to the Vallabha Vedantins with special reference to Acharya Purushottama. An effort has been made to consider some philosophical problems, which may generally arise in one's mind in following the Vallabha's doctrines and their probable solutions within the framework of Vallabha Vedānta. In this connection an effort will be made to consider how Purushottamaji has encountered the opponents, which remains in the philosophical discussions in Indian tradition.

### I

An uncommon cause, which is in operation, is called *kāraṇa* or instrument. *Kāraṇa* or cause is the locus of the power embedded in appearance or manifestation or revelation (*Kāraṇatvaṇa āvirbhāvaśaktyādhāratvaṁ*). Let us see what the power to manifest (*āvirbhāvaśakti*) is. The power, which makes effects existing in the material elements, fit for behaviour is called revealing power or manifesting power (*āvirbhāvaśakti*). The term 'appearance' means 'being fit for an object of usage or behaviour' and 'disappearance' means 'not being fit for an object of usage or behaviour'<sup>1</sup>. That both types of power belong to Divinity is proved from the Sruti texts- 'the powers behind appearance and disappearance belong to Lord Krishna (*āvirbhāva-tirobhāva-śakti*

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Oct. 2003

*vai mukhavirīṇaḥ*’) and ‘who pained the peacocks’ (*mayūrāściritā yenā*’). The Phenomenon of making something appeared is called *āvirbhāva* (*āvirbhāvayatiti avirbhāvaḥ*). Though the Divine power is stated to be two yet the Lord has manifested Himself by dividing or scattering His power here and there. Each and every factor giving rise to a particular manifestation is called the power of the Lord. That is, the seeds of the Divine power are scattered by Him in all places. These seeds gradually give rise to the manifestation of something from which the Divine power is inferred. It is also supported by the Śruti text which runs as follows:— ‘The Divided power of the Divine appears in various ways in different places, as the seeds are found in the place from which all things originate (*viśiṣṭaśaktirbahudheva bhāti bījāni yoniṁ pratipādyā yadeva*). In the same way, the power behind the appearance of something in our daily behaviour is the cause of such appearance.

That which is fit for use from something is called an effect of that. From this discussion it follows that the potter’s father cannot be the cause of the pot produced by his son.<sup>2</sup>

In this connection a problem may be raised in the following manner. It is very difficult to determine the appearance and disappearance of an effect if the origination and destruction of an effect are not accepted. Because both appearance and disappearance are in the forms of the capability of cognizing and non-cognizing respectively. Without accepting the fact of origination the existence of an effect cannot be asserted. If an object is stated to exist even it is not originated, there would arise the possibility of perceiving the same even in the case of its prior absence (*prāgabhāva*). It cannot be said that the prior absence is an obstacle to its manifestation. Because ‘prior absence’ of something is taken as a vital factor of its coming into being (*kāryam prāgabhāvapratiyogī*) as accepted by the Naiyāyikas also<sup>3</sup>.

It may be said that if an object exists in a cause, it is established as being existent and hence, it is described as merely capable of being raised but it is not a case of origination. If it is so, there cannot remain power in the potential cause to produce effect due to the absence of the instrumentality of producing an effect. In other words, a cause is potentially capable to originate an effect if it is used as an instrument for the same. Otherwise a

cause may remain as non-functional. If an effect is taken to be originated in the cause then the cause, though potential, will have no function due to the absence of instrumentality. In other words, a potential cause is kept as inoperative, as there is no scope for its application due to the existence of an effect in a cause. Due to the nonorigination of the effect there would prevail accidentalism (*ākasmikatāvāda*), which entails that anything can be originated from anything.<sup>4</sup>

Considering the above-mentioned problems in view it may be contended that the meaning of the term *utpatti* or origination may be taken in a different sense. The origination of something does not always signify 'remaining in an exposed way' (*bahirbhāva*). It may be taken as an adoption of a particular situation (*avasthāviśeṣa*) as we find in the following examples. A particular situation of a clay (*mṛdavasthā*) turns into another situation of a piece of lump of clay (*pinḍavasthā*), which may again transform into the form of a jar. This position is also not satisfactory. Because, even a particular situation (*avasthāviśeṣa*), being accidental, may be taken as originated<sup>5</sup>. The view that the change of situation is an effect is also not proper. If it is so, a son may be taken as a change of situation of a father. From this it would follow that there would be the destruction of the father as that of the lump. If it were said that there would be no destruction of a cause just as thread is not destroyed in a cloth, it (thread) would have covered all. In such cases a son may be taken as a part of father. In the same way the sprout etc. are the parts of the seed, but not the change of situation or status (*avasthāntara*). If it is said that the causeness lies in the seed etc. by virtue of its part, it cannot be accepted, because the origination in the form of bifurcation is already shown as vitiated. Hence, it is better to accept *utpattivāda* as per the *Vaiśeṣikas*<sup>6</sup>.

Even if it is accepted that there is an origination, the appearance and disappearance as accepted by the Vallabha Vedāntins are very difficult to establish. It may be asked whether these appearance and disappearance are eternal or non-eternal. The former is not correct, because the objects like jar etc. are sometimes cognized and sometimes not. Even the cognizance and non-cognizance of them cannot remain together due to their opposite character. Moreover, had these appearance and disappearance been eternal, a volition to produce or to destroy a jar would be useless, as it will go

against the perceptual fact. If an object having diverse characteristics becomes fictitious, the appearance and disappearance of an object would also be taken as fictitious leading to nihilism<sup>7</sup>.

The second alternative that the appearance and disappearance are non-eternal is also not tenable. Just like other effects they are to be taken as manifested from their cause in the case of *āvirbhāva* and so disappeared in their cause in the case of *tirobhāva*. The origination itself has to be originated or brought into being by another origination before it can properly function leading to Infinite Regress (*anavasthā*)<sup>8</sup>.

From the above discussion it can be concluded that the theories of *āvirbhāva* and *tirobhāva* rooted in the theory of *Satkāryavāda* are not to be supported easily. In reply, Purushottamaji has proposed the following suggestion. These *āvirbhāva* and *tirobhāva* are the results of the eternal power of the Lord operating out of His will (*ucyate tau hareḥ śaktiniyatāvicchāya tataḥ*)<sup>9</sup>. These two powers are the causes of the *āvirbhāva* (appearance) and *tirobhāva* (disappearance). It is not true that there is no necessity to assume such additional power due to not having any proof. For, as a cloth and a jar is produced from the thread etc. and clay etc. respectively we can ascertain the generating powers in these cases. The power is neither the nature nor the essential character of the cause. If it were so, the power would have been present everywhere giving rise to the origination of a cloth etc. from less thick threads and also to the origination of the sprout from the fried seeds. In the same way fire could burn the grass etc. even when there is the impediment of the moonstone. Due to these impediments these activities are not found. Hence it can be concluded that certain additional power different from its nature or essential character has to be admitted in the cause.<sup>10</sup>

If it is argued that an object is originated due to the desire of the Lord, it is also not true. It will go in favour of *asatkāryavāda*. Now a few questions have been raised in connection with the meaning of the term 'utpatti' i.e., origination. Is it prior absence (*prāgabhāva*) or transformation (*dharmāntara*)? It is not to be taken as a prior absence, because if it is not originated, it would be contradicted to the usage- 'A jar will be originated now' before its origination. It is also not to be taken as a transformation. Because it may remain in the cause as an effect is not at all originated. If

it is so, it can be understood as originated.<sup>11</sup> Hence the theory that something is originated from the non-existent object does not stand in the eye of logic (*tasmādata utpattirna yuktimadhirohati*). On account of this it follows that an object bearing properties (*dharmī*) always exists before (*dharmī purvasiddhaḥ sarvathaivādhyupeyām*)<sup>12</sup> and hence it is eternal (*sanātanaḥ*). If an object bearing properties (*dharmī*) is taken as eternal, it becomes identical with Brahman, which is evidenced from the Śruti text—“This world is that *Puruṣa*’ (*Puruṣa evedaṁ*), ‘He is the whole world’ (*‘sa vai sarvamidam jagat’*)”<sup>13</sup>. As the power of the Lord is already existent beforehand, the cause associated with power becomes manifested. From this the appearance and disappearance come into being.

It is said in the Śruti—‘May Lord Viṣṇu who has painted peacock, made the parrots green and made the ducks white be pleased on me’ (*Mayūrāściritrītā yena śukāśca haritīkṛtāḥ/Hamsāśca svetagurutāḥ sa me viṣṇuḥ prasīdatviti*). From this statement it is known that the powers as shown in these are from the Divine. The Lord divides Himself and wants to create. Keeping this volition in view the Lord manifolds His power in those forms.<sup>14</sup> In the same manner, the appearance and disappearance also are due to His powers. The two terms—*āvirbhāva* and *tirobhāva* may be interpreted in two ways. The term ‘*āvirbhāva*’ means ‘external manifestation’ of the effect remaining in the inner part of the material elements (*upādānantahsthaṁ kāryaṁ vahiḥ prakāṣaṁ karoti*) through the power pertaining to auxiliary and material cause. In the same way, the power, which puts the externally manifested effect in the inner part of the elements by way of veiling the manifestation, is called *tirobhāva*.<sup>15</sup>

If a *dharmī* possessing appearance etc. originates from something where there is a property in the form of the power of *āvirbhāva*, the latter is cause of the former. The factors, which cause the disappearance, are called the causes of *tirobhāva*. It can be said that the effects are destructible. In the same way the origination and destruction in the forms of manifestation and non-manifestation of a non-eternal object can be explained. In this context it is not at all essential to depend on the other causes due to having the Divine desire as the regulator<sup>16</sup>.

As the powers of *āvirbhāva* and *tirobhāva* are from the Divinity,

these are to be taken as eternal forms of the Divine. Hence every creation of Him is beautiful. As the main creation is taken as a Divine sport (*līlāsṛṣṭi*), which is eternal, the transnatural and natural events are to be taken as the part of the Divine sport.<sup>17</sup>

## II

It has been said that if a dharmī possessing appearance etc. originates from something where there is a property (*dharma*) in the form of the power of *āvirbhāva*, the latter is the cause of the former. The factors, which cause disappearance, are called the causes of *tirobhāva* (*evaṁ ca yanniṣṭhāvirbhāvaśaktirūpāddharmādyasyāvirbhavanarūpadharmisiddhistasya tatkarāṇamityucyate*). In this context the power embedded in appearance is called *dharma* and the phenomenon of appearance is called *dharmī*. In the case of disappearance (*tirobhāva*) the power in it is called *dharma* and the fact of disappearance is also called *dharma*. In the latter case why both are described as *dharma*. If the power embedded in appearance is called *dharma*, the fact of appearance (*āvirbhāvanām*) is a *dharmī* no doubt due to its function as the bearer of power. In the same way, the power embedded in disappearance is *dharma* from which a *dharmī* in the form of disappearance (*tirobhāvanām*) comes into being, but not as *dharma* as mentioned by Purushottamacharana.

To the Vallabha *Vedāntins* God is omnipresent and hence the theory called *Asatkāryavāda* cannot find its room. In each and every form of effect there is the power of the Divine and hence all appearances and disappearances are taken to be eternal forms of the Divine. Hence it has been shown earlier that these appearances etc. are not at all new origination, as they implicitly exist in the cause in the form of Divine power. To them effectuation is the transformation or change of form and no new beginning. For example, the physical energy may be transformed into chemical energy, which again transforms into energy of life or vital energy leading transformation of the energy of life and mind. In all these there is no real creation anywhere but only the appearance of new forms in the self-same original material through redistribution and rearrangement of its constituents. Causation is *abhivyakti* or manifestation as distinguished from *utpatti* or origination. An effect e.g., a jar is consubstantial with the cause

and is non-different from it so that as the cause is existent the effect must also be existent. In order to prove that an effect is non-different from the cause we may undertake the following considerations. A cloth is non-different from the threads of yarn, for it is perceived as contained in other thing as its substrate. If a thing is different from another thing, it is not perceived as contained in other thing as its substrate. For example, a cow, which is different from a horse is never perceived as contained in horse as its substrate. Besides, between the thread of yarn and the cloth there holds the relation of a material cause and its effect. Therefore, they are not different objects. This thesis may again be justified from the standpoint of the Divinity.

The above-mentioned theory may be substantiated in the following manner. Due to certain arrangements the effect becomes tirohita or non-manifest while in other arrangements it comes to manifestation. When the tortoise withdraws its head into its shell, we do not say that the head has ceased to be but only that it has ceased to be manifest and when it protrudes its head out of its shell, we do not say that its head comes into being but only that it comes into view. There is no beginning of all effects including liberation in the forms of the attainment of bliss and the cessation of sufferings. Although such liberation is identical with Divinity, it is already achieved. The cessation of suffering is already achieved due to its identity with the Lord. In the world also the attainment of what is already attained and the avoidance of what is already avoided are patent aims. For instance with regard to gold that is in one's hand but has been forgotten, the instruction of a reliable person saying- 'The gold is in your hand' makes one attain it as if it were not already attained. Or when one has mistaken a garland for a snake, the words of a reliable person saying- 'This is not a snake' make one get rid of the snake that was already got rid of. Hence there is nothing in this world, which is really a new.

If the manifestation and non-manifestation are taken as Divine sports (*līlā*), some problems may crop up in respect of law of Karma. A question may be raised whether these *āvirbhāva* and *tirobhāva* that are nothing but *līlā* are arbitrary or systematic. If this is arbitrary, the law of karma will collapse. If this is systematic, i.e., *līlās* are in keeping with the result of karma done by an individual being, they are not to be taken as *līlā* in the

true sense of the term. To the Naiyāyikas God creates the world after keeping the result of *karma* of an individual in view. If God's *līlā* in the form of *āvirbhāva* etc. were irrespective of an individual's action, there would arise the defects like *kṛatapraṇāśa* (non-attainment of the result of *karma* done by an individual being) and *akṛtābhyugama* (attainment of the result of *karma* not performed by an individual). If every action is dependent on God's desire, it may be asked whether this desire depends on *karma* of an individual or not. If God or His desire is bound by the *karma* of a *jīva*, He will have no autonomy, which is not desirable. If God's desire is taken as superior, *karma* may seem to be impotent having no power of its own. If *karma* is taken as superior, one could ask what function God serves. If God has no function, it will lose its godliness. If God and *Karma* both are accepted as superior, God has to depend on *karma*. Hence He will be no longer a powerful being or omnipotent due to the loss of autonomy.

Lastly, these *āvirbhāva* and *tirobhāva* theories can be interpreted from the metaphysical point of view. If an individual takes refuge to Lord, the Divine bliss is realized everywhere, which is called *āvirbhava* and at the same time the suffering is ceased, which is called *tirobhāva*. Just like a material object there is the appearance of the Divine bliss and the disappearance of the sufferings when an individual surrenders to Lord ('*yadāvirbhāva ānanda āvirbhavati sarvataḥ tirobhavanti santāpastam śraye gokuleśvarin*')

### NOTES

- 1 'Tatra tāvad vyāpāravadasādhāraṇaṁ kāraṇaṁ. Kāraṇvañca āvirbhāvaśaktyādhāratvaṁ. Upādānasthaṁ kāryaṁ ya vyavāharagocaraṁ karoti sa śaktiḥ āvirbhāvikā. Āvirbhāvaśca vyavahārayogyatvaṁ, tirobhāvaśca tadayogyatvaṁ.' *Prasthānaratnākara*, p.39, 3rd Ed. Edt. by Goswami Shyam Manohar, Maharashtra
- 2 'Te dve yadyapi bhagavataḥ śaktiḥ āvirbhāva-tirobhāvau śakti vaimukhairinah' iti 'mayūrāścitrītā yena' iti ca vākyād āvirbhāvayatīti āvirbhāvah iti arthāt, tathāpi bhagavita vibhajya tatra tatra sthāpitā iti tasya

tattadāvirbhāvakatvāt at tattacchaktitvaṁ'. Ucyate-tathātvāñce 'viśiṣṭaśaktirbahudheva bhāti bijāni yonirṁ pratipādyā yadvad' iti kathanāt. Evañca vyavahāre yatra yadāvirbhāvika śakith tat tasya kāraṇaṁ, yasya ca yato vyavahārayogyatvaṁ tat tasya kāryaṁ. Itthañca yathā tathā āvirbhāva-tirobhāva-vāde prapañcitaṁ asmābhih, etenaival etenaiva kulālapiturapi na kāraṇatā iti siddhaṁ phalopadhānābhāvāt.'

*Ibid*

- 3 Nanvidamanupapannam. Kāryotpattināśāvanupagacchataṁ kāryāvirbhāvatirobhāvayorapi durnirūpitatvāt. Tayoranubhavayogyatātadyogyatātadyogyataftmaktvāt. Utpattimañtarena kāryavartamānatāyāścāśākyavacanatvāt. Anyathā prāgabdhāvādaśāyāmapī tatpratyakṣaprasangāt. Na ca prāgabdhāve eva pratibandhaka iti vācyam, tasya karaṇatvāt.' Avirbhāvatirobhāvavāda, from *Avatāravādavalī* by Puurstrottamje.
- 4 'Kiñca kāraṇe kāryasattāyāṁ tatpaścādhāvitvenābhimatasyāpi kāryasya kāraṇāt purvaṁ sttvena siddhatvāddarśanayogyatvamātraṁ vācyam, natu tajjananaṁ. Tathā sati śaktasya śakyakāraṇābhāvādasaktiprasakteḥ. Tataśca kāryānutpādasyākasmikavādasya vā prasangaḥ.' *Ibid*
- 5 Athotpattirna vahirbhāvah. Kintu mṛdavasthā gatā pinḍavasthā jātā, sa gatā ghaṭāvasthā jātetyādipratitistantvavasthā anupamaṛdena paṭāvasthādarśanaccāvasthāviśesa eva seti vidhāvyate. Tadapyavasthāveseṣasya kādācitkatvājanyatvam vācyameva.' *Ibid*
- 6 'Tat sutarāmeva durvacam. Utpatteraniruktatvāt. Avasthāntaraṁ kāryamityapyasangataṁ. Tathā sati putro'pi pitravasthāntaraṁ syāt. Thathā ca pinḍāvasthāvatpiturnāśaḥ syāt. Tantuvadanāśāngikāre'pi sarvo vyāpriyeta. Ato'mśa eva putrah. Evamankurādirapi bijāmśa eva. Na tvavasthāntaraṁ. Samānanyāyāt... vahirbhāvarupāyā utpatteḥ pūrvameva duṣṭitatvāt. Ato vaiśeṣikapratipanna utpattivāda eva sādhiyān.'
- 7 Tau nityāvanityau va. Nādyah. Ghaṭādivastūpalambhānupalambhayoh sātayatyaprasangāt. Na ceṣṭāpattih. Tayorviruddhatvena sahāvasthānāyogāt... ghaṭādyāvirbhāvanāya tirobhāvanāya ca sādhanē pravrttidarśanena pratyakṣavirodhāt. Tādr̥gavivruddhadharmāśrayabhūtasya dharmino' siddhau tayorapyasākyatvena śūnyavādāpatteḥ ca.' *Ibid*
- 8 'Na dvitīyah kāryāntaravattayorapi svakāraṇādvahirbhāvस्या svakāraṇē' ntarbhāvasyāvāsyāvācyatvena puṇastadiyayorapi tayostathātenānavasthāpātāt.' *Ibid*

9 Kārikā No.2, *Ibid*

10 Tathāhi-kāraṇagatau śaktiviśeṣavatau. Na cātiriktaśaktikalpane mānādyabhāvah śankyā. Tantuturibemādibhyaḥ paṭotpattidarśanāttatra tatra tajjananaśakterniścayāt. Sā ca na svabhāva nāpi svarūpaṁ. Tatha sati tasya sarvādikatvācchirnebhyo'pi tantvādibhyo ghatādyutpattiprasaṅgāt. Bharjitabijebhyo'pyankurotpattiprasaṅgācca.

Maṇisamavadhāne'pi vahnestrnādidāhaprasaṅgācca. Atah kālena bharjanena ca nāśyā manisamavdhāno pratibaddhyā ca kācit svabhāvāt svarūpāccātiriktaiva sāṅgikārya.' *Ibid*.

11 'Nanvevaṁ satīśvareccayā vastūtpattirevāṅgīkriyatāmiti cet. Maivaṁ. Asatkāryavāda utpatteraśakyavacanatvāt. Tathāhi-utpattiranāma prāgabhāvo dharmāntaraṁ vā. Nādyah. Tasyājanyasya kāryaprākṛkālavartivenedānīm ghaṭotpattirbhaviṣyati iti pratityābhilāpayorbādhaprasaṅgāt. Nāntyah. Tasyaikaniṣṭhatve kāryānutpadadaśāyām kāryasyāsattvātkāraṇādiniṣṭhatvameva tasya vacyaṁ, tathā sati tadviśayinyutpadyata iti pratitih syāt.' *Ibid*

12 Kārikā no. 1, p.190

13 Kārikā no. 3, *Ibid*.

14 "Pūrvokta api śaktayo bhagavata eva. Bhagavataiva ca vibhajya prajāyeyetiṣṭhayā tatra tatra rūpe sthāpitāḥ.' *Ibid*

15 "Kiñca āvirbhāvatirobhāvāvapi bhagavataḥ śkti... āvirbhāvātirobhāvaśabdau ca kāraṇavyutpannau, bhāvavyutpannau ca. Tatrādyapakse-āviḥ prakataṁ bh-āvayati, upādānānantahsthaṁ kāryaṁ vahih prakataṁ karoti yā nimittagata upadānagatā ca śaktiḥ sā āvirbhāvaśhdavācyā. Dvitiyapakse-āvirbhavanamāvirbhāvastirobhavanam tirobhavaḥ. *Ibid*.

16 'Evaṁ ca yanniṣṭhāvirbhāvaśaktirūpāddharmādyasyāvirbhavanarūpadharmisiddhiḥ tasya tatkāraṇamityucyate. Yannisthatirobhāvaśaktirūpadharmādyasya tirobhavanarūpadharmasiddhiḥ tasya tannāśakamityucyate... Anenaiva nyāyenāvirbhāva-tirobhāvayormityatvaṁ sadātanatvaṁ bhagavadrūpatvāṁ cāvaseyam. Icchāyāśca niyāmakatvānna taylorutpattyadyarthaṁ kāraṇāntarāpekṣā'. *Ibid*

17 'Brahmopadanasrtistvavastha. Mukhyāyā līlāsṛṣṭestu nityatvenābhinnatvāt prakṛtāprakṛtābhyam līlāsampattiḥ.' *Ibid*.

## ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT

A.D. NAIK

In 'A' I give an original proof of St. Anselm's argument for the existence of God based on a new law of deduction.<sup>1</sup> In 'B' I give an explanation for premiss 7 of the proof, and in 'C' I give an explanation for premiss 8. In 'D' I show the validity of the new law of deduction on which the final conclusion is based (A9). (Key: \* = necessarily, # = possibly, ~ = negation, v = disjunction, & = conjunction, > = conditional) In 'E' I answer some objections that have been levelled against the proof in the past.

A :

1. The perfect being cannot have a begining or ending in time for then it would not determine what comes before it in time and what comes after it in time. (Ontological truth)
2. Since the perfect being would then exist eternally (be an eternal substance) it would neither ever come into being nor ever cease to be. (1)
3. The contradictory of the contingently existent ( $\sim^*p$  or  $\#p$ ) is the contingently non-existent ( $\sim^*\sim p$  or  $\#\sim p$ ), while the contradictory of the necessarily existent ( $*p$ ) is the necessarily non-existent ( $*\sim p$ ). (Onto-logical truth)
4. Therefore neither its existence is contingent nor is its non-existence contingent. (2,3)
5. Therefore necessarily (if the perfect being exists then necessarily it exists) or necessarily (if the perfect being does not exist the necessarily

*Indian Philosophical Quarterly* XXX No 4  
Oct. 2003

it does not exist). (4) (The conditional 'If-then' refers to the possibility of the argument not the contingency of its being or not being)

6. Necessarily the perfect being exists or necessarily the perfect being does not exist.  $(*p \vee * \sim p)(5)$
7. The idea of a perfect being is self-consistent. (B)
8. Therefore necessarily it is the case that necessarily it is not the case that necessarily there isn't the perfect being.  $([* \sim * \sim p])(7),(C)$
9. Therefore necessarily the perfect being exists.  $(*p)(6,8)$

**B :**

Only an omnipotent power can necessarily exist. For only an omnipotent power cannot lack any logically possible power, i.e. that which is not self-contradictory, including that of self-existence. (To be unable to perform the self-contradictory is no lack of power).

Now the idea of more than one omnipotent power is self-contradictory. For suppose there are two such powers. In that case since for either to be omnipotent the other must be within its power, either is subject to the power of the other and so neither is omnipotent. Therefore the idea of one omnipotent power is self consistent (not self-contradictory)<sup>2</sup>

The very impossibility of more than one omnipotent power proves the self-consistency of the perfect being. For it is the only one that has the power to order itself in a wholly self-consistent manner because it has the greatest powers of reasoning and of ordering attributes.

An omnipotent power is one which has the power to realize all that is logically possible i.e. that which is not self-contradictory. But possessing every logically possible power or being all-powerful means that the power to know all that it is logically possible to know (omniscience or all-knowing) and the power to love all that it is logically possible to love (omnilove or all-loving) would be two of the powers it possesses. For they are simply two out of all the powers it possesses. The latter two powers are logically derivable from the power or omnipotence. Omnipotence, omniscience and omnilove are then three necessarily individuating attributes, among possibly an infinite number, which are consistent with each other. Consequently the

idea of a perfect being is self-consistent.

Since logically there can be only one omnipotent power possessing all powers the power of greatest good and greatest evil belong to the same omnipotent power. Both are held consistently by the same power in a perfect unit since being omnipotent it has the power to unify all things in the highest degree. Consequently logically there is no problem of evil.

Note for the proof all that is required is that of all the possible conceptions of God one is self-consistent.

C :

It should also be noted that everything self-contradictory is necessarily non-existent. (Ontological truth) But idea of a perfect being being self-consistent is not self-contradictory, and so the perfect being is not necessarily non-existent.

Since either necessarily it exists or necessarily it does not exist and since the idea is not self-contradictory and this implies that it does not necessarily not exist, it necessarily exists. But then since the idea that it is not self-contradictory implies that the only alternative is that it necessarily exists, its very possibility implies its existence. The very idea of God then implies its existence. For God existence is a perfection. To conceive of God and to conceive of it as not existing, seems self-contradictory.

It should be noted that all necessary truths are not logical truths. That everything that is material has spatio-temporal properties is a necessary truth but not a logical truth. It is then not necessary to conceive of God's necessary existence as a logical truth.

D :

1. The above proof is based on the modal version of the following new law of deduction, based on the law of excluded middle, which consists in the elimination of one of the disjuncts :

$$\{(p \vee \neg p) \ \& \ \neg \neg P\} > P$$

$$\{(* p \vee * \neg p) \ \& \ [*(\neg \neg p)]\} > *p$$

2. The truth table validity is as follows :

p $\neg$ p		$\{(p \vee \neg p) \& (\neg \neg p)\} > p$			
T	F	T	T	T	T
F	T	T	F	F	T

3. It should be noted that  $*\neg p$  and  $\neg *p$  are not identical modal logical operators. The latter implies  $\#p$  while the former does not, the former implies  $\neg \#p$ . So  $\neg *p$  implies  $\#p$  not  $*p$  while  $*\neg p$  implies  $p$  whereas  $*(\neg *p)$  implies  $*p$ .  $\neg \#p$  implies  $\#p$ , not  $*p$

E :

1. The idea that a proposition is self-referringly true, confirmed when its very denial presupposes its truth by being used in the very denial, implies that its very idea implies its necessary truth. This is the ontological argument for necessary truths.

It may be applicable to the argument for the necessary existence of God. If its very idea implies its existence, its very denial may be self-refuting.

2. Kant's two famous objections can be answered.

One is that while it is not possible to think away the idea of the necessary properties of a conceived object it is possible to think away the object itself. The necessary properties of God may not be thought away in the conception of God but the object God can be thought away. First of all this ignores the distinction between universal and particular. A particular triangle may be thought away, rubbed off the blackboard as it wear, but the universal triangle which is one and not many cannot be thought away. Similarly particular gods may be thought away but the universal God cannot be thought away. Finite existents may be thought away but the universal Being of which all finite existents are instances cannot be thought away. And Kant's objection assumes that necessity cannot reign over particulars.

The other is that existence is not an attribute. But consider the following. A possible individual can be conceived in this manner. A

particular sperm and a particular ovum can be imagined to be fertilizable and the possible embryological process develop into an individual. Such an individual remains a possibility. When fertilized and developed it acquires existence. Existence then is an attribute which something may possess or not possess. The difference is that with the perfect being it is an inseparable attribute since such a being necessarily exists and can never lack the attribute, unlike contingent beings.

### NOTES

1. For the Indian version of the ontological argument see S.Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, vol. II, London, George, Allen and Unwin, 1940, p. 369.
2. The formulation here differs from that of A. Plantinga and R. Swinburne in that it neither argues for the self-consistency of God from the reduction ad absurdum, that more than one omnipotent power is self-contradictory. Nor do they utilize the law of deduction that I do, Infact none of the premisses formulated here are to be found in them.

I have not used quantifiers since firstly they gloss over the distinction between the indefinite and definite article; secondly, they gloss over the distinction between properties held universally but contingently on the one hand and properties held universally and necessarily on the other, and thirdly, the point is glossed over that necessity may reign over either universals or particulars.

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## INFERENCE : DHARMAKIRTI AND HEMPEL

AMIT KUMAR SEN

### I

In Indian logic inference is based on two factors - (1) invariable concomitance (vyāpti) between hetu and sādhyā, and (2) Pakṣadharmatā, i.e. the presence of hetu in the pakṣa. An inference is sound when a hetu is pervaded by the sādhyā, and when such a hetu characterizes the pakṣa. When these two conditions are satisfied, we are justified in claiming that the sādhyā is present in the pakṣa. Vyāpti or pervasion may be expressed in two ways namely (i) Anvaya and (ii) Vyatireka. The former takes the positive form "Where ever there is hetu, there is also sādhyā" and the second is expressed in the negative form "Whatever is characterized by the absence of the sādhyā is also characterized by the absence of the hetu."

For Dharmakīrti, the Buddhist logician, given the anvaya form of a vyāpti, one can construct the corresponding vyatireka form or vice versa. He also maintains that the universal generalization involved in the formulation of vyāpti cannot be justified merely by repeated experience or repeated observation of the agreement in presence and agreement in absence between the hetu and the sādhyā-while they are necessary conditions for grasping vyapti, they are not sufficient conditions for the same. Dharmakīrti points out that experience of mere agreement in presence and agreement in absence does not enable us to claim beyond reasonable doubt that there is an invariable concomitance between the hetu and the sādhyā, because under such circumstances, we are not in a position to rule

*Indian Philosophical Quarterly* XXX No 4  
Oct. 2003

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For Dharmakīrti, the Buddhist logician, given the anvaya form of a vyāpti, one can construct the corresponding vyatireka form or vice versa. He also maintains that the universal generalization involved in the formulation of vyāpti cannot be justified merely by repeated experience or repeated observation of the agreement in presence and agreement in absence between the hetu and the sādhyā-while they are necessary conditions for grasping vyapti, they are not sufficient conditions for the same. Dharmakīrti points out that experience of mere agreement in presence and agreement in absence does not enable us to claim beyond reasonable doubt that there is an invariable concomitance between the hetu and the sādhyā, because under such circumstances, we are not in a position to rule

*Indian Philosophical Quarterly* XXX No 4  
Oct. 2003

out any exception to the universal concomitance between *hetu* and *sādhya*. The claim that whatever is characterized by *hetu* is also characterized by *sādhya* can be justified if it can be shown that it is impossible for the *hetu* to be present along with the absence of the *sādhya*. This can be shown if it can be shown that the *hetu* constitutes the very nature of the *sādhya*-that there is some essential identity between the *hetu* and the *sādhya*. The essential identity is called *tādātmya*, and in such cases the *hetu* is called *svabhāva* *hetu*. *Vyāpti* can also be established beyond doubt if the *hetu* concerned is the effect of *sādhya* and this *vyāpti* relation is called *tadutpatti*. In such cases the *hetu* is called *kārya* *hetu*. In both these cases, denial of *vyāpti* leads to contradiction in some form or other. In both *tādātmya* and *tadutpatti* *vyāpti* Dharmakīrti wanted to obtain a sort of necessary relation between the *hetu* and the *sādhya*, obviously in order to avoid the contingent character of an inductive generalization based on observation. The purpose of this paper is to compare Dharmakīrti's theory of inference with the notion of scientific inference found in C.G. Hempel, an eminent philosopher of science.

## II


According to Dharmakīrti from these two types of *vyāpti* we may have three kinds of inference. One is based upon the identity between the *hetu* and *sādhya*, viz, 'it is a plant, because it is an ivy'. The inference is based here upon the fact that property of being an ivy can't characterize an object unless that object is also characterized by the property of being a plant. In other words, whatever is identical with an ivy is necessarily identical with a plant. An ivy can't be but a plant at the same time. The second type of inferences is based upon the causal relation between the *hetu* and the *sādhya*, viz, 'there is fire here because there is smoke here'. It is the nature of smoke that it can't but be caused by fire. So smoke can't be there without fire being there. These two types of inference are affirmative in nature. But in the case of previous one the two properties are in some sense identical, for whatever is an ivy is also a plant and in the case of latter, the two properties, smoke and fire, are non-identical but causally related. The third is the inference where that *sādhya* is absence of something

and this takes on a negative form. Viz, there is no pot on the floor, because had the pot been present there it would have been apprehended, and yet, it is not being apprehended'. Here the hetu is known as anupalabdhihetu. Dharmakīrti enumerated several varieties of this type of inference. We shall not go in detail of this. Our concern here is to highlight Dharmakīrti's contribution to the development of the theory of inference by comparing it with the notion of scientific inference by C.G. Hempel.

Hempel in his '*Aspects of Scientific Explanation*' illustrates his notion of scientific inference, the model of which could be written as:

Q because P

This should be read as an assertion that 'P' is the case, and that there are laws, not explicitly specified, such that 'Q' follows logically from these laws in conjunction with the statement that 'P'. To take an example from Hempel: There is Rainbow because there are raindrops in the air and sunlight fall on these drops. Here, Hempel argues, the occurrence of the rainbow can be deductively explained by reference to certain particular determining conditions, such as the presence of raindrops in the air, falling of sunlight on these drops etc. along with certain general laws optical reflection, refraction and dispersion which are not explicitly specified in the inference. He explains his theory of scientific inference in deductive nomological model in the following schema:



Dharmakīrti's type of inference may be written in similar fashion as:  
F because S

Here 'S' stands for hetu and must fulfill the following conditions.

- (i) All known S are known to be F and
- (ii) All known non-F are known to be non-S

The above shows that the condition is that S and F are known to be nomologically related. Similarly, Hempel's scientific inference answers the why-question, "why-E?" (E for explanandum which is a sentence that describes a known particular event of facta) by showing that E is nomologically expectable on the basis of general laws and antecedent conditions.

Again, Hempel denied any role whatsoever of induction in his scientific inference. According to him no rule can even guarantee that a generalization inferred from true observation however often repeated, is true. In the scientific inference he admits, the relation between the explanans and explanandum is a causal relation which holds necessarily but is knowable a-posteriori. Dharmakīrti was a naturalist in his approach to the solution of the problem of induction and argued that purely observation-based induction can never generate an inferential knowledge. To answer the problem of induction Dharmakīrti depends upon some natural relation between properties and such natural relation would make one, the hetu, concomitant with the other, the sādhyā or the property to be inferred. The relation between such properties are either essential identity or causal dependence (*Pramāṇavārttika*, svārthānumāṇa pariccheda, 34). Dharmakīrti, like Hempel, thinks that these two relations between properties hold necessarily but are knowable ā-posteriori.

Again, Dharmakīrti's type of inference seems to be predictive rather than explanatory. It does not explain why must it be the case that F rather than not in the inference: 'F because S'. It only states why it is the case that F given that it is the case that S. Hempel's scientific inference also, because of its insistence on general laws, appears to have a close affinity to scientific prediction.

Thus we see that the line of thinking of Dharmakīrti and C.G. Hempel, is very close.

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## A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF SARTRE'S EXISTENTIAL HUMANISM

SANTOSH KUMAR PAL

Humanism is not a well-defined doctrine, and as a result, there have been different versions of humanism. In spite of this, there is a central core of humanistic thought, and this is the recognition that *savar upre manus satya, tahar upre nai* (above all, man is real; nothing is above him). Jean-Paul Sartre, the principal exponent of French Existentialism, accords complete autonomy to human beings, thereby suggesting that there is no reality higher than human individuals. Sartre does not believe in any super human reality, like God. Atheistic existentialism, to which Sartre is one of the most important subscribers, declares that God does not exist, and as such, there is at least one being whose existence comes before his essence, a being which exists before it can be defined at all. This means, in the language of Sartre, that '....man, first of all, exists, encounters himself, surges up in the world--and defines himself afterwards.'<sup>1</sup> This philosophy of existentialism upholds: Man is nothing else but that which he makes of himself.<sup>2</sup>

In what follows we want to analyse Sartre's philosophy of humanism in a critical manner.

### I

Before entering straightaway into Sartre's own view on humanism, it would be better to take note of, at least, two influential versions of the same, as Sartre takes on them as the rival views. These are Christian Humanism and Positivist Humanism.

*Indian Philosophical Quarterly* XXX No 3  
October 2003

The starting-point of Christian understanding of man is the knowledge that man has been created in the image of God. Accordingly, the incomprehensible, immaterial, almighty God, who transcends all existence, all power, all knowledge, wanted to become copies of himself. This, of course, does not mean that He simply impressed His image like a seal on some plastic material, but that He raised man to a creature in which He recognised His own image and came to the consciousness of Himself and that man, then, in a completely decisive way, belongs to the self manifestation of God., that the history of mankind is theology.

There are mainly two types of interpretation of this theological humanism. First, it is held that man like other creatures of the universe is, in essence, a creature; he is nothing by himself, but owes everything, even his existence, to the will of his divine creator. As we are all his creatures, we feel solidarity of universal brotherhood with all fellow-beings. Secondly, the fact God created man after his image determined man's special status before all other creatures. In the fact that one sees the image of God-in-man, which is merely suggested in other creatures, is founded the unity of humanity. The image of God in man is the true sign of his divine destiny and calling, and the ground of the future integration of the humanity. For the sake of his destiny and calling, all men should maintain with each other the greatest possible unity and peace.

Although this Christian humanism made a considerable influence in binding human groups, it fails to accord full dignity and sovereignty to human beings. It is based on charity and love and as such, it could not rise above humanitarianism. Besides, disintegration and conflicts among different religious sects within Christianity have added misery to mankind. The religious conflicts are sometimes engineered for political purposes; economic factors add fuel to them. Even admitting these, it can be said that these are fought in the name of religion, and there is hardly found any effective resistance from the believers quarter. Reason, the most important guide to the path of humanity, is not always accorded by the Church. Only the Renaissance movement raised its voice against dogmatic worldviews, thereby paving the way for true humanism.

At the end of 19<sup>th</sup> century the French intellectuals came out to formulate a secular humanism based mainly on reason. The principal trend

has been the Positivist humanistic thought. Positivism sees man as an end in itself and as a supreme value. August Comte, the main proponent of positivism, along with his followers preached that God is a useless and costly hypothesis, and we could do without it. Positivism offers an alternative system of values to regulate the whole course of our private and public life, by bringing noble feelings, reason and human actions into a unity. Actually, positivism regards life as continuous and earnest act of worship--worship to elevate and purify our feeling, enlarge and enlighten our thought, ennoble and invigorate our actions. In the words of Comte, it is 'Religion of Humanity' that could replace all imperfect dogmatic systems based on theology.

According to this positivist philosophy, if we are to have a morality, a society and a law-abiding world, it is essential that certain secular value should be taken seriously. These values are seen to have an *a priori* existence ascribed to them. That is, it must be obligatory *a priori* to be honest, not to lie, not to beat one's wife, to bring up children and so forth. These values are, however, thought to be inscribed in an intelligible heaven, although of course, there is no God.

## II

Sartre vehemently opposes these two versions of humanism. Against Christian humanism he upholds the view that 'If God exists, man is nothing....'<sup>3</sup> Human being is the supreme and sovereign reality. Man has no pre-determined essence, rather he makes of himself only through his free activities. Sartre's view will be gradually clear as we go on analysing his existential world-view.

Sartre rejects, at the same time, the positivist version of humanism. Comtean humanism sees man as directed to a pre-determined, fixed end in itself, whereas man according to Sartre, is by nature free, and still to be determined. Sartre thinks<sup>4</sup> that humanism in this sense appears, e.g., in Cocteau's story *Round the World in 80 Hours* in which one of the characters says, while flying over mountains in an aeroplane, 'Man is magnificent!' This signifies that, although I personally have not built aeroplanes, I have the benefit of those particular inventions, and that I personally, being a man, can consider myself responsible for, and honoured

by, the achievements that are peculiar to some other expert personalities. This means that we can ascribe value to men at large, while only some other individuals are responsible for something.

According to Sartre, this kind of humanism is absurd, for someday some non-human being might come to pronounce a general judgement upon man and declare that man is magnificent. Nor is it admissible that a man should pronounce judgement upon man. Existentialism dispenses with any judgement of this sort: an existentialist would never take man as the end, since man is still to be determined<sup>5</sup>. And as such, we do not have any right to believe that humanity is something to which we could set up a cult after the manner of Auguste Comte. This cult of Religion of Humanity is shut-up upon itself, and, ironically, this might end in Fascism.

### III

Sartre endeavours, through his literary and philosophical writings, to erect a new kind of humanism, which he characterised as 'Existential Humanism'<sup>6</sup>. According to him, to be human is to be free. Man is always outside of himself. It is in his projecting and losing himself beyond that he makes man to exist; and on the other hand, it is by pursuing transcendent aims that he himself is able to exist. Since man is thus self-surpassing and can grasp objects only in relation to his self-surpassing, he is himself the heart and centre of his transcendence. There is thus no other universe except the human universe, the universe of human subjectivity. The relation of transcendence as constitutive of man, in the sense of self-surpassing subjectivity in a sense that man is not shut up in himself for ever-presents a human universe.

As already indicated, Sartre elucidated his notion of humanism through a lecture which was later published as *Existentialism and Humanism*. Yet in order to understand the full import of his humanistic philosophy we have to take note, at least, of his two monumental volumes, viz., *Being and Nothingness* and *Critique of Dialectical Reason*, along with the play *Lucifer and the Lord*.

Sartre's *Being and Nothingness* is an analysis of ontology of human reality. Sartre begins his ontological analysis with a discussion of consciousness as nothingness. Man is by nature incomplete, at every moment

he experiences that he is not what he has to be. This primordial experience of nothingness occurs within the limits of human expectation. It is because I expect to find fifteen hundred rupees in my purse that I find only thirteen hundred. This world discloses nonbeing to someone who has first posited certain possibility. Nothingness is an irreducible experience, which cannot result from prior affirmation. He holds that the necessary condition of our saying 'no' is that non-being is a perpetual presence to us and outside of us, as nothingness haunts being.

Sartre distinguishes between being-in-itself and being for itself in connection with his analysis of human reality. Being-in-itself is the full, self identical being, which has no lack, no incompleteness. It is what it is, being of full positivity. For example, a chair is always a chair. Being-for-itself is, on the other hand, human being as conscious reality, never identifiable with itself. For it, the being-in-itself is a goal towards which consciousness moves, but which it never achieves. That is why consciousness is defined as perpetual negation.

Being-for-itself, i.e., human consciousness has a basic structure which can be stated thus: Consciousness is impersonal, non-substantial being infected with internal negation, which is temporal and the source of values. The nature of consciousness is such that it goes beyond itself, to be what it is not, not to be what it is. In this sense, consciousness is possible, because consciousness is free. That consciousness exists in the ekstastic unity of past, present and future is possible, as consciousness is freedom. This is made clear by Sartre when he says that man does not exist first in order to be free subsequently; there is no difference between the being of man and his being free. Not only that '.....human reality does not exist first in order to act later; but for human reality, to be is to act and to cease to act is to cease to be.'<sup>7</sup> Freedom, being and action are thus the same thing.

Sartre reiterates that it is only by pure wrenching from himself and the world, that the worker, e.g., can understand the suffering as unendurable and as a result can make of it the motive of a revolutionary action. Sartre does not think that there is any action without cause; rather his idea is that every action must have an end, and in the light of this end, the cause functions as cause.

Obviously Sartre does not believe in the so-called objectivity of values. Human individual is the being that gives rise to values. Man wants to proceed to a form of existence from the present position, as past does not satisfy him. He has a goal, a purpose, and he thinks that realization of that goal will satisfy him. Sartre would call this process of realization surpassing. Due to this act of realizing a purpose, an object receives significance, becomes endowed with value. This paper which I write now, for example, comes to have a meaning only when it is related to some purpose.

Sartre connects man's movement of surpassing the present with his desire to reach the future. Just as a crescent moon can be understood with reference to the full moon, so also an individual being is to be understood with reference to the complete to be realised. And value there becomes an extended nothingness that always haunts us. This emptiness is ingrained in his nature in such a manner that it can never get rid of it, That is why his consciousness is always fragmented, he is in anxiety. To get beyond this anxiety he takes refuge in bad-faith, which is nothing but a lying to oneself.

Thus we find that, according to Sartre in *Being and Nothingness*, freedom is the only foundation of values. Man, who is thrown into this alien world, is denied any external value to support him. Man is alone, unjustified, and irreducibly free. He uses his freedom by constantly interpreting and signifying the world around him, by making fresh judgements in every new situation, and above all, by an ever renewed effort of self-justification.

In his play '*Lucifer and the Lord*' (*Le Diable et le bon Dieu*) Sartre throws all burden on the individual's shoulders. His existential atheism is expressed in clear language through the mouth of the hero, Goetz: "I tried to make myself a pillar and carry the weight of celestial vault. I'll tell you a secret; heaven is an empty hole"<sup>8</sup> He says: "God is loneliness of man. There was no one but myself: I alone decided on evil and I alone invented God. It was I who cheated I who worked miracles. I who accuse myself today, I alone who can absolve myself, I, the man. If God exists, man is nothing; if man exists..."<sup>9</sup> He goes on to declare: "There was no trial; I tell you God is dead ... we have no witness now, I lone can see your hair and your brow. How REAL you have become since He no longer

exists."<sup>10</sup>

Thus we find in Sartre the clear picture of a solely human universe, which results from man's self-transcending and constitutive subjectivity, his freedom of choice. Man is with total freedom, along with inevitable responsibility of the whole world. Sartre's existential humanism '... puts every man in possession of himself as he is and place the entire responsibility for his existence squarely upon his own shoulders.'<sup>11</sup> An individual is responsible for war which he has not started, not even fought. This is because he lets the war to be fought!

#### IV

The above discussion gives the impression that Sartre is advocating absolute individualism that hardly leaves room for social and collective construction. But a true humanism has to accommodate both the individual and the social aspects. The individual must be harmonized with the society. Though Sartre is not very positive on this issue in his *Being and Nothingness*, he is aware of this problem of individual subjectivism. To overcome this narrow world-view he endeavours to relate the autonomous individual with the social being, first in his *Existentialism and Humanism*, then in *Critique of Dialectical Reason*. Instead of the previous stress on the basic and deadly conflict of freedoms in the field, he now tells us that in choosing our freedom we also choose freedom for other fellow-beings. He comes to declare: "When we say that man chooses himself, we do mean that everyone of us must choose himself; but by that we also mean that in choosing for himself, he choose for all men."<sup>12</sup> Sartre explains, in effect, of all the actions a man may take in order to create himself as he wishes to be, there is not one which is not creative, at the same time, of an image of man such as he believes he ought to be. Furthermore, what a man chooses is always the better, and nothing can be better for him unless it is better for all. If we admit that existence precedes essence and wish to exist at the same time as we fashion our image, that image is valid for all and for the entire epoch in which we find ourselves. Our responsibility is thus much greater than it is generally supposed, for it concerns mankind as a whole. To be specific, when a man commits himself to anything fully realising that he is not only choosing for himself but also comes out as a

legislator deciding on behalf of the whole of mankind-in such a moment a man cannot escape from the sense of complete and profound responsibility.<sup>13</sup>

Sartre means to say that man in discovering himself discovers also the others. I do not get a true picture of my existence unless there is intervention of the other. So others are necessary for my own existence and self-knowledge. This fact of knowing others through one's own existence is called by Sartre inter-subjectivity. In addition, he speaks of a human universality, and it is the condition of man's actions. These conditions are objective, as these exist at all places. An individual has to lead his life according to these conditions. This universality is not, of course, completely pre-given, it is being built up; all the time. I go on constructing this universality by my choice. This same idea is expressed in an interview with R.C. Solomon.<sup>14</sup>

## V

As is evident from the above, Sartre speaks of an ontological harmony between the individual and the social. But he did not fully explain the matter till the publication of *Critique of Dialectical Reason*. He came to the realisation that a complete account of the problem is required, as he gradually engaged himself in political action, and when existentialism is seen as the philosophy of political commitment. In the beginning of 1948 he founded a political group known as 'Ressemblent Democratique Revolutionaire'. He felt that he has found a political platform which could resolve the contradictory positions of Existentialism and Marxism. It was practically an attempt to discover a non-communist left group that would give rise to an 'existential subject of history'. However, this attempt did not succeed. Another occasion for a new turn was the experience of the Resistance movement in which Sartre had taken an active part, followed by the era of liberation and painful reconstruction. In this new situation Sartre's liberation of human existence, instead of taking the form of escape into world of beauty and artistic creations, finds its prime expression in the social struggle moer and more, specifically in the commitment to the cause of social revolution in the interest of the least free members of the society, viz., the proletariat. But while he accepts the Marxist diagnosis of the class-struggle,

he rejects all the more strongly the metaphysics of the dialectical materialism that underlies it. Sartre points out that both Marxism and Existentialism are philosophies of freedom, as well as theories of a project and commitment. According to him, existentialism is a humanistic philosophy of action, of effort, of combat, of solidarity, in other words, a supplement to Marxism. Sartre puts emphasis on individual decision which bourgeois determinism and vulgar Marxism habitually undermines.

If we look at his career, we would find that Sartre sought to uphold absolute autonomy of individuals up to 1957. He wrote in a private note, 'All my political efforts are directed toward finding a group that will give a meaning to my transcendence, that will prove by its existence,....that my contradictory position was to true one.'<sup>15</sup> In 1960 he came to develop his philosophy of social and historical ideas in a systematic way. In the *Critique of Dialectical Reason* he comes to explore the possibility of a social and historical anthropology and to determine the limits of Marxism as a dialectical mode of thought and free it from dogma. In the first part of the introductory section (which is separately published also as *Search for a Method*) Sartre shows the importance of Marxism in our times, though he thinks that it has been reduced to a dogma. Sartre writes "Far from being exhausted, Marxism is still very young, almost in its infancy; it has scarcely begun to develop. It remains, therefore, the philosophy of our time ... Existentialism, like Marxism, addresses itself to experience in order to discover their concrete synthesis..."<sup>16</sup> He thinks that Marxism has to take in consideration the existential mediations which correct the economic base with concrete action. He opines that Marxism is inadequate, as it fails to accommodate the concept of a project to reveal the subjective level of social experience.

It is indeed inside the movement of Marxism that we discover a flaw that is to be plugged namely, that the free individual is to be rehabilitated. The very notions, such as exploitation, alienation, reification, etc. which the Marxist employs have to be clarified with reference to existential structure.

Sartre thinks that the most important philosophical question is the status of dialectic. He regards it as both the method of thought and the structure of reality, while reason and the object of knowledge which are

both in motion are mutually dependent on each other. Dialectic may be located in the world but it is constituted through man in the process of totalizing his experience.<sup>17</sup> It is true that man is within nature and the process of nature is the foundation of human life. But it is not true that human knowledge reduces itself to the model of nature. Human reality differs from the physico-chemical processes. To say the truth, the dialectic of nature is paradoxical as at first human ideas are imposed upon human reality and then our knowledge is re-imposed upon human reality with the belief that it originated in nature. The Marxists who call themselves materialists are in fact idealists who regard their ideas about nature as existing superhumanly. But he is always ready to accept the dialectic in explaining the possibility of comprehension of history.

Human relations, according to Sartre, are governed by a dialectical principle that man is mediated by the things to the extent that things are mediated by man. Each man begins his work upon nature as a solitary individual, but two solitary workers may be unified by a third person who brings both of them into a single totalization.<sup>18</sup> The concept of this third party stresses the collective background of individual actions implying their social mediation. Similarly, the dialectic of dyad individual nature leads to the unavoidable fact of scarcity, for there is not enough for everyone. Like need, scarcity also unifies the practical field of multiplicity of men. The scarcity would be eliminated only when goods are shared equitably and when labour is reduced to a marginal fact of life through automation.

Anyhow, man experiences alienation, which he wants to overcome by his free choice and there is a dialectic of freedom and alienation. But a solitary individual does not have the freedom of choice to alter the situation in order to abolish alienation. This can come about only through grouping. For this, formation of groups is a very important factor in social dialectics. In the *Critique of Dialectical Reason* Sartre discusses how the individual moves through the 'series' to the 'group-in-fusion'.<sup>19</sup> He refers to a number of men standing in a line at the bus stop. They have a common purpose, i.e., getting into the bus, through which they are united. But among themselves they are in condition of solitude. The object (here, the bus) for which they are waiting defines a relation of the individuals as interchangeable and external. In such a situation the relation of one man to another is

togetherness. It seems to have an inertness of matter, but the group possesses a vitality of free projects. To explain the formation of group he cites an example<sup>20</sup>: In July 1789 the people of France found themselves in a dangerous situation and saw their own selves in the other persons as possible victims. As a result, series was abolished in an explosion of fraternal reciprocity and each person then began to see himself in the other, as he saw himself there as himself. There emerged an absolute reciprocity of praxis in which each person saw in the other the same project as his own. Each individual reaches, in a new fashion, not as mere individual, but as a singular interaction of the common person. Impersonality, isolation, automation etc., which define the series, are thrown away in the intensely personal relations of the group-in-fusion. This group is, according to Sartre, the 'beginning of humanity' where men recover their lost being, their supposed freedom.

## VI

From the above analysis it is evident that Sartre, the champion of individual freedom, endeavoured through the later part of his career to establish his existentialism as a true humanism. But in spite of his earnest effort, he could not convince the intellectuals. His excessive love for individual autonomy, his overemphasis of the cartesian cogito stand against his socialist intentions. He felt that the individual could not carry on his progress and welfare without the other, without the society. Yet he could not sufficiently explain how the individual is to be reconciled with collective constructions. He has made an honest attempt in *Critique of Dialectical Reason*, but it has remained incomplete. His analysis of collective actions, objective conditions, etc. is insufficient. But still, it may safely be said that he was able to provide us with a new, existential dimension vis-a-vis the so-called positivist, mechanical approach, to humanism.

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## ETHICAL RESPONSIBILITY TOWARDS ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION

ARPANA DHAR DAS

### Introduction

Degradation of the environment has assumed a global dimension in the present scenario and at the threshold of the twenty first century man has learnt to realise the ill consequences of his conscious and unconscious activities for the fulfillment of his never ending desires possessing instrumental value. The one time cordial man-environmental relationship has been marred due to increased human greed, prominence of materialism, individualism and egoism, ruthless use and misuse of nature, irresponsible attitude of technologically innovative and economic man towards the same. The defilement of the friendly man-environment relationship commenced with the era of enlightenment of renaissance in Europe. It was virtually the beginning of the era of darkness when the concept of 'conquest of nature' encompassed human mind. With the onset of this concept the balance of the ecosystem and therefore the environment was shaken which ultimately led to environment degradation and degradation of environment quality.

Environmental degradation has reached its peak and obviously there is a need of a philosophy of life based on symbiosis i.e. cordiality between man and nature, instead of the Darwinian survival of the fittest. The ultimate solution of all environmental problems is embedded in the conversion of materialistic human society into a humanistic one full of natural and human diversity.

The main objective of this paper is to examine the ethical responsibility

*Indian Philosophical Quarterly* XXX No 4  
Oct. 2003

of human being in general and technologically oriented man in particular towards the protection of his environment. In my opinion, ethical response towards environmental degradation in terms of value is ultimate means of bringing down its rapid rate, as neither economic stability, political will or policy, nor judicial law provides an amicable solution to this vital global problem. Before delving into this key issue I would like to analyse the major causes leading to environmental degradation and its disastrous consequences which has transformed the world into a suicidal living system.

## I

Before discussing the issue of environmental degradation the term 'environment' needs to be defined. The word 'environment' is an all-embracing term, which usually refers to a system of physical and biotic elements with a dynamic interaction between them. As C.C. Park remarks: "Environment refers to the sum total of conditions which surround man at a given point in space and time"<sup>1</sup> The 'environment' in fact is composed of all physical, biological and cultural elements, which are constantly and systematically interacting with each other. The physical elements including space, landforms, water bodies, climate, soil, minerals, rock etc. determine the complex character of human habitat, whereas the biosphere is constituted of plants, animals, micro-organisms and man. Barring these, the cultural elements (economic, social and political) are essentially man-made features constituting the cultural environment.

We now come to the key question--- "What is environment degradation or environmental crisis? In a single sentence environmental degradation means lowering of environmental quality on local, regional and global scales by both natural processes and the activities of the species, particularly man, occupying the habitat. Degradation of the environment is initiated due to destabilization of the ecosystem brought about by the natural hazards like earth quakes, volcanic eruption, faulting, cyclonic storm, landslides, avalanches etc. and harmful anthropogenic (man oriented) activities.

It may be pointed out that any change in the environment brought about by physical and biological processes is adequately compensated by

a negative feed back mechanism or a self-regulating system known as 'Homeostatic Mechanism'. Such a mechanism is highly effective in correcting and absorbing the slight changes and disbalances in the environment before they attain a severe proportion. This assimilative capacity of the environment to absorb slight change mainly by natural processes has its limitations. Beyond a specific limit, the aforesaid negative feed back mechanism fails to function which bring about a break down of the life supporting system leading to environmental degradation. It is important to note that this limitation is crossed by modern man himself through his activities.

With the onset of industrial revolution since 1860, modern intelligent man spearheaded by scientific innovative technologies has become the most powerful environmental process capable of transforming and modifying the environment to an extent detrimental not only to all biota but also to his own existence. With the phenomenal increase of human population the finite resources of the world are becoming more and more scarce due to abuse and over exploitation, ultimately bringing about environmental degradation. The quality of the environment is a product of man-environment process and the weakening of this relationship brings about a drastic change in the quality of environment where in the 'natural environment' is substituted by a 'man-made' one.

The present century is marked by economic, scientific, technological and social development of man on one hand, whereas it is plagued by serious environmental problems on the other. The basic reason behind this environmental crisis is the rapid increase in world population which has led to rapacious exploitation of the earth's natural resources and speedy rate of industrialization and urbanization. Estimating the rapid rate of environmental degradation R.F. Dasmann said, "the human race is like an ape with a hand grenade. Nobody can say when he will pull the pin of the grenade and the whole world will be destroyed".<sup>2</sup>

In the following paragraphs I would like to discuss in brief the causes and harmful consequences of the above mentioned environmental crisis.

### **Population Explosion And Environmental Crisis**

Industrial expansion, modernization of agriculture, urban growth,

expansion of transportation network, scientific and technological development consequent upon alarming rate of population growth through decades is the major cause of environmental degradation. As long as the number of human beings interacting with nature remain within specific limits the ecology is balanced and every thing works well. But when the number increases by geometric proportion and the man-land ratio becomes adverse, as much in the developing countries today, ecological and environmental problems crop up. The global environmental crisis confronted today is partly rooted in rapid population growth in the south and partly in the consumerist culture in the north.

High rate of population growth in the developing countries since 1930 and its resultant pressure on the earth's finite resources has led to over-exploitation of exhaustible resources. Moreover, acceptance of the western mode of advancement with major insistence on mass production and consumption has further accelerated the above-mentioned crisis. As human population increases, its need for food and energy increases, as well as the amount of waste it produces. Feeding the ever-expanding population puts enormous pressure on the earth's ability to regulate its own system. The marginal lands are utilized to hasten agricultural production through the application of chemical fertilizers which pollutes the air, water and land.

Over population in the 3rd world countries has intensified the poverty of man. People flock to the urban centres for environment. The urban centres with limited space is unable to hold the teeming millions which forces them to settle in slums and shanty towns of cities characterized by sub-standard living condition. The towns and cities are highly polluted with industrial and domestic waste. All these lead to human drudgery, deprivation and indignity which is the greatest or of environmental pollution at present.

Population multiplication in the villages has led to large scale deforestation for habitation and agriculture which has resulted in ecological imbalance, soil erosion, desertification, increase of wastelands and devastating floods.

### **Deforestation And Its Impact On Environment**

The utility of forest resource cannot be underestimated. It provides a

natural habitat for millions of animals and micro-organisms, builds up soil rich in organic matter, binds soil through the network of their roots, increases infiltration of water, reduces flood risk, increases precipitation, acts 'natural sink' of carbon di-oxide, provide firewood for millions and timber for industries.

This forest resource, which is the chief component of the biotic community, is mercilessly exploited for the fulfillment of the ever increasing desire of 'modern economic' and 'technological' man, due to which the natural balance of the ecosystem is disturbed inviting severe environmental problems.

Vast tracts of virgin forest areas have been cleared for agricultural purpose and human habitations due to enormous pressure of population on land. The alarming story of deforestation is very much visualized in India and south East Asian countries where population growth is on the verge of explosion. Large expanses of dense forest have been cleared for 'shifting' or 'jhum' cultivation in North Eastern India and parts of south East Asian countries. Mass deforestation takes place due to transformation of forest areas into pastures (as in the case of Mediterranean and temperate regions), overgrazing, forest fires -- whether natural or due to human activities, lumbering for industrial and household purpose and due to several other anthropogenic activities.

The adverse impact of deforestation is highly alarming and a matter of serious global concern. Rampant felling of trees accelerates the rate of soil erosion, increases the load of the river due to heavy siltation thereby increasing the frequency and dimension of floods and reduces soil fertility which hampers agricultural production.

Infact, the most disastrous effect of deforestation is its impact on climate. The amount of precipitation lowers due to reduction in the rate of transpiration by trees and the percentage of green house gas, chiefly di-oxide, increases which induces global warming. Due to destruction of forest the carbon stored in the plants and wood decays, giving off carbon di-oxide, which absorbs more terrestrial radiation accelerating the rate of global warming.

## Agricultural Practice and Associated Degradation of the Environment

Environmentalists are of the opinion that technological improvements in agriculture is largely responsible for large scale deterioration of environmental quality. Mass clearing of virgin forest areas for agriculture, expansion of irrigation facilities, immense use of chemical fertilizers, insecticides and pesticides and increased use of high yielding variety of seeds to boost agricultural production for satisfying the hunger of the teeming millions has ended in severe environmental crisis.

Modern man is bewildered, since he has to fulfil the requirements of the ever increasing hungry millions by acceleration of agricultural production through the adoption of scientific techniques on one hand, while on the other hand he has to be conscious about the irreparable environmental damages caused by such techniques.

Massive deforestation for increasing agriculture land in order to augment food supply accelerates the degree of soil erosion, reduces soil fertility, increases the load of the river-- thereby amplifying the possibility, frequency and dimension of flood.

Irreparable loss of bio-diversity, biomes and extinction of several animal species is consequent upon the practice of monoculture in several parts of the world. The conversion of the steppes of U.S.S.R. Prairies of N. America, Pampus of Argentina, Veld of Africa and Downs of Australia into the granaries of the world, virgin Mediterranean woodlands into vineyards and orchards and replacement of forest cover by apple cultivation in the northern part of India, chiefly Himachal Pradesh, adversely affects the balance of the forest eco-system. Such practices have definitely increased productivity, efficiency and yield, but it have also increased ecological vulnerability and instability. If there is a pure strand of wheat, a pathogen or a herbivore may sweep in and decimate the entire eco-system.

Intensive cultivation increases agricultural productivity rendering large scale environmental degradation. The 'Green Revolution' launched in India to boost agricultural production since 1960 can be cited as an example. The term 'Green Revolution' signifies increased agricultural production

brought about by modern scientific techniques like increased irrigation facilities, use of high yielding variety of seeds and application of chemical fertilizers, insecticides and pesticides. Adoption of such techniques has undoubtedly doubled or trebled crop production on one hand, but on the other it has increased the magnitude of serious environmental problem.

Large-scale application of synthetic, toxic chemical fertilizers has raised agricultural productions, but huge accumulation of unused chemicals in the soil has increased its toxicity making it unfit and sterile for further cultivation. The eluviations of such accumulated chemicals to groundwater level adulterate ground water used for drinking and irrigational purposes.

Some of the toxic chemicals used as fertilizers in agricultural fields reach the food chain of human beings and animals through vegetables and food grains and endanger life. Nitrates, for example, when consumed indirectly through food matter perform complex chemical reaction within the human body, which increases the possibility of cancer.

The transport of toxic chemicals from the agricultural fields to ponds and lakes through rain and surface run off has led to phenomenal growth of certain plants in the water bodies, known as 'Eutrophication', while it has proved fatal for several valuable species of plants, animals and micro-organisms.

Agricultural production has to be boosted up in order to satisfy the hunger of the multiplied millions, but the adverse consequence of scientific techniques on environment should be kept in mind before adopting such measures.

### **Industrialization and Environmental Crisis**

Rapid pace of industrialization since the dawn of industrial revolution has raised the material standard of living of the people at the cost of the balanced natural environment. The adverse effects of rapid industrialization has led to severe environmental pollution which has ruined man's delicate relationship with nature. Reckless plundering of forest cover, excavation of land for mining, collapse of land for drilling of oil, excessive withdrawal of groundwater for industrial purpose has its fatal effects on the environment. Production of industrial wastes, poisonous gases released

from human volcanoes (industrial chimneys), toxic elements, polluted water, aerosols, smoke and ashes are some of the undesired harmful elements released due to industrialization. Such harmful elements pollute the environment imperiling human health and mind.

The hydrological environment presents a deteriorating scenario where in the stagnant water of the lakes and ponds is contaminated due to the release and dumping of industrial effluents and wastes resulting in the death and disease of aquatic ecosystem. Some of the products of chemical industry, like different types of fertilizer, insecticides and pesticides applied to the crops to hasten and enhance agricultural production reaches the food chain and food web of human and animal population indirectly, bringing about their fatal disease and death.

A world wide experiment on the earth's climatic-control system is being conducted by man in his attempt to transform the natural environment into a man-made one. Intensive burning of fossil fuels and rapacious exploitation of forest cover in the name of industrialization has increased the concentration of carbon-di-oxide content of the atmosphere. As this gas traps much of the terrestrial radiation, a rise in the magnitude of carbon-di-oxide level in the atmosphere leads to global warming which in turn causes major shift in weather patterns, with rainfall increasing in some parts, droughts in another and hurricanes becoming more stronger and frequent. Discharge of several other toxic gases, smoke and aerosols into the atmosphere from human volcanoes pollutes the air we breath bringing about severe environmental problem.

Rapid pace of modernization and industrialization has led to greater utilization of fire extinguishers, refrigerators, air-conditioners and spray can dispensers emitting halons and chloro-fluro-carbons (CFC). Jet planes flying through the stratosphere releases nitrogen oxide. These gases released into the atmosphere are harmful in the sense that they deplete the stratospheric ozone layer which plays a vital role in filtering and absorbing the ultra-violet rays of the sun. The creation and destruction of ozone is a natural process, but when the level of ozone depletion exceeds its creation, chiefly due to the aforesaid anthropogenic activities, global warning results due to more entrance of ultra violate radiation which eventually disturbs

the global radiation balance affecting the overall natural ecosystem. The creation of ozone holes in the industrial hubs increases the incidence of skin cancer chiefly among the white skinned masses. Release of sulphur-di-oxide from the industries brings about 'Acid Rain', which is disastrous to plant, animal and human life.

Noise pollution specially in the vicinity of industrial centres is a serious form of environmental disturbance. It affects the brain, auditory mechanism and sometimes cause hyper tension.

### **Urbanization and Associated Pollution**

The level of urbanization is very much related to socio-economic development. Rapid pace of socio-economic development, mainly in the form of industrialization, has led to unplanned and mushroom growth of urban centers. A series of serious environmental and ecological problems consequent upon the rapidity of the twin process of urbanization-industrialization has emerged. Air and water pollution, overcrowding and growth of slums and energy crisis are some of the vital environmental problems arising from urbanization.

Huge accumulation of wealth and ample job opportunities in the urban centers have attracted population from the surrounding rural areas. Consequently, the quality rural population is drained, the rural traditional industries are ruined and the agroindustrial base is crushed.

Overcrowding and congestion of population in the towns and cities due to continuing rural migration and natural growth process has created a situation where the number of people penetrating the labour market exceeds the available job opportunities. Shortage of housing, mushroom growth of slums and *bustees* with substandard and insanitary living condition, large-scale unemployment and poverty are the adverse consequences of overcrowding of population in the urban centers.

The twin processes of urbanization-industrialization has led to havoc increase in the number of vehicles (emitting carbon monoxide, sulphur dioxide and hydrocarbons). buildings, roads and streets, urban waste, sewage, aerosols, smoke and dust. Sewage water, if not treated scientifically, flow through the city and drain into the rivers, bringing about

contamination of fresh water used for drinking and other domestic purpose.

Huge amount of poisonous aerosols emitted from the chimneys of 'human volcanoes' results in the occurrence of 'pollution domes' over the industrial cities. The air quality thus deteriorates, bringing about serious health hazards. The deadly 'urban smog' formed due to the mixing of smoke and sulphur-di-oxide spreads over the industrial city centers imperiling human life.

Reduction in the rate of infiltration of water consequent upon increased construction of 'pucca' structures leads to increased run-off which in turn increases the frequency and dimension of flood. Increased withdrawal of ground water for domestic and industrial purpose in the congested urban centers leads to formation of huge cavities, which ultimately bring about collapse of ground surface. Improper disposal and unscientific treatment of urban solid and industrial waste degrades the environment to a great extent.

## II

So far we have examined the causes and effects of environmental degradation. We have seen in the course of our discussion that any from of developmental process (viz, industrialization, urbanization) directly or indirectly invites environmental crisis as it inclines to disproportionate the ecological balance originated by nature. Should we then say that environmental development is ethically intolerable? The answer may be dubious. If we say, yes, then the question is; should we employ environmental development process, which invited environmental crisis which results in the ultimate destruction of mankind in general? On the contrary, if we say, no, then the question is: What is wrong with environmental development? How the needs and demands of human beings can be carried out or conformed with by forfeiting or ignoring the process of environmental development? What is wrong with the environmental development process if it will run or abide by the policies and laws taken by the government for meeting the needs and demands of the society in general? So there always underlies an apparent dilemma. The dilemma can be formulated in this manner.

If development process will be taken up, environmental crisis will crop up and if development process will not be taken up, then the needs and demands of human beings will not be consummated.

Either development process will be taken up or development process will not be taken up.

So, either environmental crisis will crop up or the needs and demands of human beings will not be consummated.

The question, then is: how the dilemma can be overcome? Arguably we should not or even perhaps cannot cut off ourselves from the participation of globally needed development process as this is supposed to be the only means through which the unbounded needs and demands of scientifically oriented society can be satisfied. There should not be any question of doubt. That is why the rapid development process is being employed or taken up. However, the moral question is: Ought we to run the development process by any means? If development process involves ultimate threat to our own existence as observed above, should we then adopt development process? Ought we to employ development process at the expense of other's basic rights (animate or non-animate)? Ought we to kill or extinct other non-human beings or species for our own mere happiness? This is where the relevance of environmental ethics is embedded in. These are the questions we propose to sort out in this sequel.

We have seen how far environmental degradation is detrimental to human mankind as it ultimately runs towards destruction of human existence. Global warming is a case of point. So keeping its adverse consequences in mind, should we employ environmental development programme, which brings environmental crisis and thereby causes the total destruction of mankind? Here the question of preferability comes into consideration. It is a matter of rational and ethical decision, what we call '*man of wisdom*', to select whether instrumental value is preferable to non-instrumental value, whether intrinsic value is preferable to non-intrinsic value, whether anthropocentrism is preferable to non-anthropocentrism. We the human beings, the only decision making body, should come forward and thereby decide whether human existence in general is preferable to human

happiness. If we rely on non-anthropocentrism which echoes non-instrumental value, then we have to take care of nature by minimizing environmental degradation. If we realise that all living beings have an intrinsic value, then we will be particularly careful about how we treat them, especially as this treatment not only has implications for them, but for our own state of existence in the life and the future.

In this regard, we should follow up the remarks of Dalai Lama who once said, "The Earth, our mother is telling us to behave. All around, signs of nature's limitations abound .... By protecting the natural environment .... We show respect for Earth's human descendants ... as well as for natural right to life of all Earth's living things".<sup>3</sup>

So it is the moral responsibility of human beings in general and modern man in particular not to think of the question: how we can develop but to rationalize himself along the line of thinking: how we ought to develop? If development process is eyed in terms of ought then only in such a way the adverse impact of environmental crisis can be minimized. This is the question of morality in which the relevance of environmental ethics hinges on. But what is an environmental ethics? Environmental ethics is a kind of ethics, Singer echoed, in which the extinction of species by human actions is morally condemned. This might be the basic principle in environmental ethics. We have seen in the course of our discussion that environmental development, viz. modernization, industrialization, etc., tends to bring about environmental crisis by ignoring or denying the basic rights of non-human species. For example, if mining goes on in Kakadu, a national park in Australia, it will certainly involve cutting down trees and destroying other plants as well. Consequently, it will cause death of some animals and impair, if not destroy, wetland ecosystems. In this process the ecological richness of the wetlands can be deteriorated. Consequently, the members of the next kin will miss out the chance of particular recreational or aesthetic enjoyment.

So far we have been trying to find out the ethical relevance or response towards environmental degradation. we have seen in what sense ethical consciousness is useful in minimizing environmental crises. We think that any environmental degradation which is the outcome of environmental development is directly or indirectly related to the extinction of species

which ultimately disproportionate the ecological balance. We have seen in what senses rapid population growth is linked with industrial development, agricultural and scientific upliftment which are very much rooted to the imperilling of species. An environmental ethicist appears to conceive that the extinction of species is bad considered in itself quite apart from any consequences it might have. It is important to be noted here that ethics can be split into a number of theories each of which adopt a different approach to the environment and issues related to it. However, let us pass on to examine how the major ethical theories respond to issues arising from the topic of environmental degradation of crisis.

### **Egoism**

Egoism is an ethical theory which tells us to live for our own interests. Baier says, "Typical egoists ....are self-centered, inconsiderate, unfeeling, unprincipled, ruthless, self-aggrandizers, pursuers of the good things in life whatever the cost to others, people who think only about themselves or, if about others, then merely as means to their own ends,"<sup>5</sup> The above definition gives rise to the true nature of an egoist. This theory, it appears, runs with idea that we will always behave in such a way which is beneficial to us. For an egoist, benefit is always the key motivating our own action. An egoist thus compares variety of moral choices and thereby chooses the right one which he thinks is most likely to produce the benefit for himself. Accordingly, this theory is purely subjective as it can vary from situation to situation, from person to person. Even in the same situation the moral choice of different egoists might be different. If individual choices or preferences are thought to be the sole criterion on which the theory of egoism is based, then it may be the case that the benefit of one egoist may be the drawback of somebody else. An egoist will do what is in his best interest. Hobbes was a proponent of egoism who conceived that the moral choices of people should be determined on their own desire, personal benefit, safety and glory.

The question then is : if egoism holds the view cited above, then what will be its response towards environmental degradation? It is true to say that by seeking mere pleasure, an egoist establishes himself to be very selfish. An egoist being a selfish may accept environmental crisis, say for

example, global warming if he thinks that the adverse effect of global warming is lesser to him alone than the outcome of pleasure. For example, if he conceives that mining in *Kakadu* is more profitable than the reduction of ecological richness of the wetlands, then he may advocate mining in *Kakadu*. He would say, if climate change results from his actions then that is acceptable provided that such climate change does not ultimately have negative consequences for him alone. This makes sense to say that even environmental crisis may be accepted on the line of egoism if it will produce maximum pleasure to an egoist. For example, if an egoist appears to conceive that using aerosols is more likely to increase the risk of skin cancer, he may forego the relatively small benefits of the former for the greater risk of the later.

Pollution is a serious problem, which affects every egoist. Accordingly, every egoist. Realizes that any activity which is polluting the planet would eventually cause him harm. However, there underlies different opinions on the part of different egoists. As far as pollution is concerned, some may adopt a long-term measure than other. The objective of an egoist, who thinks about himself alone, may be different from an egoist who thinks about himself along with his next generation. For example, an egoist with children realizes that it is his best interests to minimize or control pollution because it might have adverse consequences for his children after his death. He may think so as he realises that his children are after all his future. However, a childless egoist may be thinking the other way round. So whatever an egoist thinks is confined within himself or within his family, he is not interested about making in general. An egoist would give little regard to the use of earth's resources as well. He does not bother about the happiness of others as he fails to realise that the utilization of the finite resources of the earth is very much related to its sustenance. As he is thinking about himself, he does not bother about the adverse consequences to be faced by his next kin. He may not be the sufferer of his own activities, but the future faces the adverse consequences of his activity for which he is not concerned.

### Utilitarianism

Unlike egoism, we conceive an altogether different approach in

utilitarianism. We think environmental degradation can be minimized to some extent if we employ the maxim of utilitarianism. In this regard utilitarianism is far better than egoism. Mill, a leading proponent of utilitarianism says, that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the opposite of happiness. Bentham, the other leading proponent of utilitarianism, echoes that the greatest happiness of the greatest number is the foundation of morals and legislation. Bentham's remark is very much significant in rationalizing environmental degradation as unlike an egoist, he conceives that an action is supposed to be right if it benefits many people as opposed to just one person. For him any action is accepted as good if it goes along with the principle of maximization: 'greatest happiness of the greatest numbers.' However, in order to satisfy the principle of maximization, we have to follow rule-utilitarianism instead of act-utilitarianism. Rule-utilitarianism is the only view which goes along with the principle of maximization. An act-utilitarian is very much an egoist as he confines himself within the outcome of action resulting in his own benefit alone.

Let us pass on to examine the responses of utilitarianism towards environmental degradation. Utilitarianism is much more concerned about the problems relating to climate change. According to this theory any action, viz, industrialization or modernization etc, is morally acceptable if it will benefit the majority at the expense of a few. If we take care of the face value of the sentence 'benefit the majority at the expense of a few', we may think that utilitarianism invites environmental development, which involves environmental degradation. Thus the vital question is: In what sense the benefit of the greatest numbers in terms of an action, viz. industrialization, should be taken care of? Should we evaluate the utilitarian maxim 'greatest happiness of the greater numbers' only in the context of present generation? What do we think about the next generation who will be the victims of the adverse consequences of the action of the present generation? Should or should not the utilitarian principle of maximization count the benefit of all animate as well as non-animate species in the context of long term? If an action will produce the benefit of the greatest numbers of the present generation, but is harmful to the greatest numbers of the next kin, then should we morally accept such an action by following

utilitarianism? A utilitarian certainly takes the view that the benefits of actions which potentially cause climate change or disproportionate ecological balance cannot be morally taken care of even though the results of such actions benefit the greatest happiness of the greatest numbers. This is simply for the fact that unlike egoism, a utilitarian might find it necessary to take the longer-term view. Surely he will like to say that any action which constantly indulges potential climate change would be detrimental to the next generation even though the benefit of such an action goes along with the principle of satisfying the greatest happiness of the greatest numbers for the present generation. There underlies no question of doubt in the present context that the burning of fossil fuels has immense instrumental value as it greatly benefits every single human on Earth today. Unquestionably, the use of fossil fuels satisfies the utilitarian principle: greatest happiness of the greatest numbers. However, if such uses were to cause global warming, in fact it is likely to be the case, then the negative impact of today's pleasure would be detrimental for the generations to come. Importantly, such generations will outnumber the present generation of the earth. So if we think of the happiness of the next generation along with the present generation, then the benefit to the use of fossil fuels begs question in terms of satisfying the greatest happiness of the greatest numbers. The utilitarian therefore might reject actions, which indulge potentially global warming.

In protecting pollution, the utilitarian must adopt similar standpoint, as has been taken in the case of global warming. A utilitarian may prefer adopting polluting activities if he is very much in a position to evaluate that the results of such activities benefit many at the expense of few; and not the other way round. This makes sense to say that a utilitarian may accept a certain amount of pollution for the benefits derived from certain activities inviting pollution. So he always rationalises himself in taking any decision, which is familiarised with increasing pollution. He must consider the utility and the benefits of an action not in terms of the present generation; but in terms of the future generation as well. That is to say that he has to adopt his maxim not in terms of individual happiness, not in terms of the happiness of the present generation, not in terms of the animate species in particular, but in terms of all, animate-inanimate existing in the present as well as will

exist in the future. This is the single way through which the utilitarian must think about in fulfilling his maxim: the greatest happiness of the greatest numbers. There is no question of doubt that for longer perspective, the use of nuclear weapon is worse than the benefits it will give rise to as its costs and potential drawbacks will long outlast the benefits now. If the utilitarian were to count all living species in his own way of thinking, then this too will affect his views. It is true to say that the adverse effect alone of pollution does not only touch the minds of humans alone, it equally touches other species as well, even though the only real benefits are usually enjoyed by human beings. At times it appears that the adverse impact of pollution is more detrimental to non-human beings in comparison to human beings. Human beings can take their own decisions; they can protect themselves by their innovative means unlike non-human species. In this regard, non-human beings at times would be the most sufferers. Thus, if it is the human beings who are mostly benefited by his polluting activities and on the other hand, the non-human beings are the sufferers of the polluting activities generated by the conscious human beings. So if we think and thereby adopt the standpoint of rule-utilitarianism, then we have to consider the benefit of all and in this sense human as well as non-human species should be included within the maxim of the greatest happiness of the greatest numbers. As rule-utilitarianism is a kind of utilitarianism in which the maxim is itself a rule, it is always claimed to be universalizable. That is, in fulfilling such a maxim one has to act in such a way so that the result of that action benefits all animate and inanimate existing presently and will also exist in future.

As far as the utilization of the planetary resources are concerned the utilitarian should adopt a rational decision. He has to think of the stock of materials which are much needed for maintaining happy life. Thus the question of equal distribution of the planetary resources comes into point. He has to rationalize himself how to continue the use of the planetary resources through the ages by which the next kin will be benefited. If the principle of maximization is apprehended in terms of the benefit of all, then we have to rationalize its use in our own case. If we do not bother about the exhaustibility of planetary resources and continue its rapacious exploitation there will be acute shortage of such resources within a short

span of time and the future generation will get least benefit from it. Such callous approach will bring more suffering rather than happiness to the future kin. So the utilization of the planetary resource policy should be framed in such a way that the principle of the greatest happiness of the greatest numbers must be fulfilled in the context of the present as well as future generation.

### Altruism

After elucidating the standpoint of egoism and utilitarianism, let us pass on to spell out the response of altruism towards environmental degradations. This approach assumes the view that when making ethical decisions we should take into account the wants and needs of others before our own. We think that this approach is quite phenomenal in minimizing or preventing environmental degradation. It has a very close proximity with utilitarian approach and is very much in contradiction with egoism. It we are always conscious about the pros and cons of others before taking any action, say for example, industrialization, then there always remains a chance of preserving holistic environmental dignity which we call more specifically 'ecological balance'. The beauty of this approach is that if everyone takes into account the wants and needs of others before his own, then this logically guarantees that someone else would always have our best interest in mind. In such a way everybody's own interest is being sustained without forfeiting the benefit of others.

Regarding global warming the altruist standpoint is very clear. He holds that the causes of global warming may be beneficial for others now, but the effects may not be so pleasurable. So an altruist suggests that either we should adopt global warming, fix it or take preventive action. In this way none of these would be harmful for others. Like global warming, pollution is always a great concern to the altruist. As pollution is harmful, an altruist is much conscious about his actions resulting in pollution. He must control his own activities relating to higher pollution. His action even may be more guarded if he thinks of non-human beings, which are the silent victims of pollution. Finally, an altruist wants to ensure that others should not be ill by the natural resources. Being an altruist, nobody should indulge himself in mass deforestation because it ultimately brings about

extinction of species whereby the diversity and balance of natural ecosystem is destroyed. This is all about the holistic approach of altruism, which we think by far to be the best approach of protecting environmental degradation (crisis).

### III

It is apparent from the aforesaid discussion that ethical responsibility or responses of individuals towards nature is the sole solution in minimizing environmental and ecological problems. We are now in a position to answer the question; how we ought to develop? Development process has to continue for the welfare of human beings at large, but not in terms of egoism or utilitarianism in general but in conformity with rule-utilitarianism or altruism. We ought to develop in such a way so that the consequences of such process satisfy the 'greatest happiness of the greatest numbers', not in terms of present generation only, but in terms of future generation as well. Moreover, a development procedure can be adopted only if it fulfils the demand of all --- whether animate or inanimate. This is where the principle of rule-utilitarianism or altruism is justified.

Modern technologically innovative man is quite conscious about the fatal environmental consequences of his actions. However, by virtue of his instinctive nature of enjoying happiness he is reluctant to sacrifice the benefits of his environmentally harmful activities. This is where the relevance of environmental ethics --- an ethics which makes a distinction between the right and the wrong and thereby translates values into options for action --- hinges on. It is man --- the only decision making body --- who should choose the correct option not only in terms of instrumental value but in terms of non-instrumental value as well. Environmental ethics deals with the values and laws of nature and the transgression of these ethical values and principles invites only social disapproval instead of punishment. Not being guided by institutionalised law, the ethical laws and principles are therefore never perfectly realised by human society at large. However, what is important to note here is that no society can deserve stability or orderly progress unless its members adhere to ethical provisions which substantially ensure environmental stability. A vast social space, not governed by institutionalised law, still remains void, and it is the ethical and

moral values, which guide people in this space. Therefore, the prime concern of environmental ethics is to ensure the moral and ethical code of behavior, which plays an important role in regulating cordial man-nature relationship.

Environmental degradation, to a large extent, can therefore be controlled, if society at large abides by the ethical code of conduct. Since human existence is very much associated with nature, he ought to use nature only to that extent which ensures his peaceful survival. Man, being the most intelligent of all living species, perceives and thinks before he acts. This perception and thought of human beings ought to be guided by ethical values and principles and his action in accordance with the above mentioned values is bound to bring about a judicious balance between ecology and environmental development.

The scientific awakening of man since the mid 19th century has dwindled the ethical values that one ensured peaceful co-existence of man with nature. As already discussed, the impact of modernization with more emphasis on individualism, materialism and scientific advancement and with little concern for humanism and spiritualism has brought about a series of environmental problems detrimental to mankind. Certainly, this calls for reversal of the current trend. Should we then recall the principle of 'Sarvodaya' advocated by Gandhiji, which preached about the welfare of all? This dictum of 'Sarvodaya' i.e., 'welfare of all' is very much in conformity with the principle of altruism which takes the same standpoint. Gandhiji conceived that there is enough in the world to fulfil everyone's need but not everyone's greed. He strongly affirmed that there must be a full stop to human needs and wants, because beyond certain stage it becomes totally selfish and meaningless. He further advocated that this sense of discipline could be inculcated in human minds only through self-realization. The relevance, we think, of Gandhian concept in the present context is controversial, but the humanitarian and spiritual values and moral embedded in 'Sarvodaya' has utmost significance in our present day life.

The faulty style of development and modernization undertaken by mankind is gradually making the world ecologically unstable, socially alienated and economically nonviable. The enormous pressure on the earth's finite resources to meet the basic needs of food, shelter and clothing of the

poor on the one hand, and an equally growing demand for meeting the ever-escalating greed of the rich on the other, have adverse effects on the environmental. The first results from rapid growth of population and the second from the so-called modern civilization. Whatever be the cause, the process of development has to continue, but not at the cost of our future generation, nor at the cost of the inanimate species. The developmental process should therefore be guided by ethical values which play an important role in curbing human abuses of nature. Large-scale deforestation, as we have already discussed, invites global warming, hydrological change and other adverse impact on the environment. Should we then say that deforestation is unethical or should we refrain ourselves from this activity as it will minimize environmental crisis? Certainly not. Deforestation has to be carried out owing to enormous population pressure but the magnitude of such activity has to be given a second thought. Progress of the society through the adoption of scientific techniques has to continue but without any antagonism between science and technology on the one hand and environmental on the other. Scientific improvement of the society should not be in terms of egoism, instrumental value or anthropocentrism but in accordance with the ethical principles of altruism, non-instrumentalism and non-anthropocentrism by means of which 'the greatest happiness of the greatest numbers' can be achieved. If human beings have to reside on the earth, forests have to be cleared to a certain extent and the earth's finite resources also have to be utilized. But how? The aforesaid activities should be carried out in such a manner so that the nature's delicate balance is maintained. Environmental crisis, in fact, can be tackled in two ways --- firstly, through the adoption of eco-friendly technologies and secondly, through limitation of human wants and desires which will automatically reduce or minimize the extent of adoption of the environmentally harmful scientific technologies. This approach must be backed by an ethical code of conduct.

As said earlier, there is no inherent conflict between science and technology on the one hand and environmental on the other. What is mostly required is a moral and ethical awakening of scientists and enhancement of scientific outlook of the spiritualists to resolve this conflict. This antagonism is not real as it appears to be. It is, in fact, an outcome of disjunction

between science and humanity or spirituality. Thus, the final answer to our original question: how we ought to develop should be framed in the following manner: we ought to develop in such a manner that the consequences of such developmental process are beneficial to mankind in general. This indirectly needs to be backed by the first formulation of categorical imperative given by Kant, "Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law."<sup>6</sup>

## NOTES

- 1 Park, C.C. : *Ecological and Environmental Management*, Butterworths, London, 1980, p.28
- 2 Dassman, R.F : *Environmental Conservation*, Wiley, New York, 1976
- 3 The Dalai Lama, exiled leader of Tibetan Buddhists.
- 4 Singer, P. (edited) : *A Companion to Ethics*, Blackwell, 1995, P. 285
- 5 Kurt Baier, : *Egoism*, edited by Peter Singer: *A Companion to Ethics*, Blackwell, 1995, p. 197
- 6 Kant : *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*; Translated and analysed by H.J. Paton, Harper & Row Publishers, 1948, p. 30

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# INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

## Vol. XXX

### NUMBER 1 : JANUARY 2003

SYED A. SYEED	: Cross-Cultural Rationality	1
R. C. SINHA	: The Interface of Swadeshi Culture and Technological society	45
H. S. PRASAD	: The Buddhist Foundation of Morality, Universal Culture and Social Ethics	57
J. B. PARANIPE	: Dance of The Signifiers	79
SIBY K. GEORGE	: Nihilism in Heidegger's Being and Time	91
SARBANI BANARJEE	: Theory of Nyāya : Some Observatios	103
ABHA SINGH	: Nagarjuna on The Concept of Morality	111
RAGHUNATH GHOSH	: A Logical Illumination of Syādvada	119
SUMAN MEHTA	: Thinking - A Polymorphous Concept	127
<b>Book Reviews</b>		
I) SHRINIVAS RAO	: <i>Dharmakīrti's Santāna and Santā- nantara</i> by Mangala Chinchore	137
II) N. G. Kulkarni	: <i>Aniccatā/Anityatā</i> by Mangala Chichore	140
III) S. V. Bokil	: <i>Anattā/Anātmātā</i> by Mangala Chichore	146

### NUMBER 2 : APRIL 2003

JOHN-MICHAEL KUCZYNSKI	: Is There Non-Epistemic Vagueness?	153
SREEKALA M. NAIR	: Reformulation of The JTB Account - An Evalution	177
A. KANTHAMANI	: Does Verbalising Across Cultures Embody Quinean Multiculturalism?	199

RISHI KANT PANDEY	: How Performatives Exactly Work	219
K. SRINIVAS	: The Argument from Illusion	237
GAYATRI MITRA	: Alienation and Philosophical Ideas of Rabindranath Tagore	251
R. K. GUPTA	: Gandhi on Conversion	263
BINDU PURI	: Hinduism - A Legacy in Dispute - Savarkar and Gandhi	271
SEBASTIAN J. CARRI	: Ahimsā and Indian Secularism	291

### Book Reviews

I) AMITABH GUPTA	: <i>Human Cognition : A Multidisciplinary Perspective</i>	327
II) S. V. BOKIL	: <i>Illocutionary Acts and Sentence Meaning</i>	347

### NUMBER 3 : JULY 2003

SURESH CHANDRA	: Nature of the Subject that owns states of Consciousness	357
K. CHENCHULAKSHMI	: Emergent Evolution and Ārambhavāda - A Comparison	371
PRABHAT MISRA	: Role of Psychosis (Vṛttī) in Advaita Psychology of Perception	379
JAYDEB JENA	: Is Fari's Derivation of 'If P then Q' from 'P $\supset$ Q' Tenable?	401
D. N. TIWARI	: Ontological Non-being (Abhāva) vs. Philosophical Being [Indian Context]	411
JAGAT PAL	: Sterba on Reconciling Anthropocentric With Non-Anthropocentric ethics	443
DILIPKUMAR MOHANTA	: A Note on Sañjaya's Amarāvikṣepavāda	453

### Book Reviews

I) RANJAN K. PANDA	: <i>Recent Developments in Analytic</i>	459
--------------------	--	-----

*Philosophy*, by R. C. Pradhan

II) K. Bagchi	: <i>Value Perspectives in Indian Philosophy</i> by Bijayananda Kar	470
---------------	---	-----

#### NUMBER 4 : OCTOBER 2003

WILLIAM SWEET	: Cultural Integrity and Liberty Rights	479
S. PANNEERASELVAM	: Gadamer's Critique of Heidegger's Hermeneutics of Facticity	495
ASHA MUKHERJEE	: Civil Society : A Transpositional Understanding	509
G. VEDAPARAYANA	: The Conditioned and the Unconditioned Mind - J. Krishnamurti's Perspective	525
RAGHUNATH GHOSH	: The Āvirbhāva and Tirobhāva Theory in Vallabha Vedānta : Some Philosophical Problems	553
A. D. NAIK	: Ontological Argument	563
AMIT KUMAR SEN	: Inference : Dharmakīrti and Hempel	569
SANTOSH KUMAR PAL	: A Critical Analysis of Sartre's Existential Humanism	575
ARPANA DHAR DAS	: Ethical Responsibility Towards Environmental Degradation	587

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
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